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S T E L L I N G E N 
1. Doordat veel van het landbouwkundig onderzoek wetkt met een ideaaltypische of 
gecomantiseerde visie op de boer, als ondememer of als stylist, is er weinig aandacht 
voor de concrete werk- en arbeidsverhoudingen in de transnationale agro-industrie. 
2. Het functioneren van elk financieel systeem wordt bepaald door het vermögen om te 
meten en te berekenen, 'accounting', en het vermögen om vertrouwen in het systeem 
te waarborgen, 'accountability'. Desondanks verbergen accountants het sociale 
karakter van hun werk achter voortdurend streven naar een foutloze accounting 
techniek. 
3. De eenzijdige interesse van het sociaal-constructivisme in het besluitvormingsproces 
rond technologieontwikkeling, wekt de indruk dat technologie als een plastische 
entiteit gevormd kan worden naar de wensen van gebruikers en consumenten. 
4. De ambachtelijke kant van de sociale wetenschap, namelijk het schrijven, dreigt 
bedolven te raken onder de krachtige punten van het welbekende 
computerprogramma. 
5 . " Het lezen van Sherlock Holmes zou economen wel eens kunnen verleiden tot het 
hanteren van een inductieve benadering. 
6. Het verplichten van digitale publicatie van een proefschrift door de universiteit 
ontneemt de promovendus de mogelijkheid het werk onder te brengen bij een 
uitgever. 
7. Westerse intellectuelen die na de val van de Berlijnse muur lachen om elk project dat 
de wereld wil veranderen, beschouwen hun werkeKjkheid als de laatste en enig 
mogelijke werkelijkheid en aanvaarden niet dat de dingen eensklaps kunnen 
veranderen, onafhankelijk van hun wiL 
(naar Claudio Magris, Groene Amsterdammer?> november 2001) 
8. The lie that all future parents tell themselves: our children will be different 
(vrij naar: Sex in the City) 
Stellingen behorende bij het proefschrift 
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Introduction 1 
1 
Introduction: Organisation and Technology in 
Contract Farming 
INTRODUCTION 
The scene in this picture illustrates 
the analytical focus o f this study on 
contract farming. A Philippine 
farmer, contracted by a global food 
company to grow asparagus for 
export to Japanese markets, 
discusses harvesting procedures with 
one o f the company's technicians 
assigned to this area. Primarily, the 
discussion is about the efficacy o f a 
prescribed farming practice. Also, 
the farmer discusses the financial 
implications o f the newly prescribed 
farming practice; the computation o f additional labour costs plays a significant role in the 
exchange between grower and technician. The grower fears possible unintended consequences 
o f the new practice and, accordingly, he questions the allocation o f risks. 
The technician, on the other hand, wonders how he has to deal with various technological 
uncertainties apparent in the production o f this high-value crop. He is the one who has to 
translate the company's expertise to diverse practices in the fields o f many different growers. In 
this discussion, he emphasises the importance o f proper harvesting procedures; quality levels 
largely depend on right timing and careful handling o f spears. Careless cutting will mean a loss 
for both grower and company. But how effective is company management in directing the 
farming practices in the fields o f the contracted growers? And, what tasks should be performed, 
and in what sequence, in order to secure a stable supply o f high quality produce? And how do 
growers, technicians and company researchers interact in defining production problems and in 
selecting solutions? Consequently, the event links the process o f technology transfer to the 
institutional configurations in contract farming. 
Though on the surface the discussion has a technical character, the scene raises issues related 
to social and institutional aspects o f this contract growing scheme. Contract farmers in this 
village have to come to grips with the external institutional and technical conditions entering 
their everyday life via the contract. For many farmers, signing a contract is their first experience 
with vertical integration into a layered agribusiness system. Looking at the picture raises 
questions such as how does this farmer portray himself in the corporate structure and how does 
he frame his interests after signing a contract? The picture further reflects the entanglement o f 
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contract growers with a corporate institutional structure, which prescribes the use o f technology 
and, to some extent, dictates the financial feasibility o f contract farming. 
In the context o f contracting out production, technicians act as frontline workers o f the 
company and they are the ones who have to convince the grower o f the presumed benefits o f a 
new technology. So, the scene illuminates how strongly company management in contract 
farming relies on technicians for exercising indirect control over farming practices. Moreover, 
during this discussion, the technician and the farmer try to establish the respective 
responsibilities and, likewise, to define the boundaries between firm and farm. Therefore it also 
raises the question how supervision, control and coercion evolve in contract growing, especially 
via the technician. 
The issues raised during the meeting also reflect matters that surface at higher levels in the 
corporate structure; so the boundary condition o f contract farming is beyond the boundary o f 
the farm, where the grower and the technicians interact. Quality standards, for example, are a 
crucial asset in strict and competitive export markets, which is reflected in prescription and 
restrictive measures in growers' fields. Besides, production problems resulting from the harsh 
tropical conditions are partially addressed by research activities and know-how developed at a 
spatial and institutional distance from the asparagus fields. And, most substantial financial 
matters have either been discussed between the bank and company management or are handled 
by the accounting department located in the company compound. Hence, the scene underscores 
the need for a precise institutional analysis o f the incorporation o f farmers into a large and 
complex corporate hierarchy. 
In addition, hot only the technician and the grower participate in the discussion. The 
discussion takes place during a meeting attended by a small group o f growers in the locality. The 
farmer's fellow growers and neighbours observe the exchange o f perspectives. For many o f his 
neighbours the grower has a leading role in the community, and he can act as a spokesperson to 
company representatives. But how does the grower engage his neighbours in a discussion about 
the technological competence o f the company? Furthermore, the implementation o f the new 
pruning practices being discussed is, eventually, an additional task o f the grower's farm workers. 
How does he instruct his workers, and how, in general, does management and recruitment o f 
labour affect performance in the farm? These notions lead up to the question how local social 
relations and local cultures are entangled with new corporate modes o f co-ordination introduced 
by contract growing. 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Agro-industrialisation and global sourcing have fostered prominent and widespread institutional 
and technological changes in the sphere o f agricultural production. These include the rise o f 
contractual exchange in the place o f spot markets, increased attention to prodTicFquality and 
safety, and the change inoonauct o f productive skills, know-how and technical choice (cf. 
Reardon and Barret 2000). The growth and dispersion o f contract farming has been a 
widespread phenomenon in agriculture, also in the Philippines. Contract farrmngjinksjarmers 
both to multinational firms, either retail distributors, shippers and producers o f fresh produce, 
orTnp^iFsup^IyTirm^^ eitherln foreign markets or in domestic markets. In 
view o f that, this study encompasses a wide diversity o f questions, ranging from business 
strategies, customised production and marketing processes, and the transfer o f technologies and 
skills throughout agrifood production. In the Philippines, contract growing is the most 
prominent form o f incorporation o f farmers into international agribusiness complexes. 
he**- ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ I n t r o d u c t i o n 3 
Although associated with globalisadon, integration o f agro-food industries, and innovations 
in (biotechnology and processing, contract farming schemes rarely necessitate a standardisation 
o f social relations in production (Little and Watts 1994). ContractHrrnTng production systems 
do surface in the context o f an increasingly internationalised agriculture and an enhanced 
capacity to regulate nature. Yet the institutional and organisational configurations o f contract 
farming are extremely varied. There are many ways in which companies answer the question 
how to organise production, both technically and socially. Therefore, it is relevant to find an 
appropriate framework for understanding this particular institutional modality o f agricultural 
production. Surprisingly, however, there are few detailed studies that show how contract 
farming schemes are actually managed and operated, how contractual arrangements evolve and 
are disputed, and how producers consolidate both institutional and technological changes in 
their farming practice. 
The study centres on social and material practices related to real organisational and 
technological problems in contract farming. The proposed institutional approach involves an 
examination o f co-ordination o f productive practices, conditions for profit sharing, concurrent 
management styles, division of tasks, handling o f risks and uncertainties in production, and 
efficacy of prescribed technologies and available expertise. These issues expose what happens 
inside the organisation. Therefore, the study helps to explain the picture at the beginning o f this 
chapter by seeking to identify the institutional and technological modalities in which technicians 
and growers work and co-operate. 
The study's overall theme is the relation between technology (transfer) and organisational 
change in the agrarian sector. The research recognises technology as an important dynamic ^ 
element in contractual production, but also emphasises the institutional and cultural modalities f 
as'TbasicTngredient'for una^rstancMg~BieFv7^ Firstly, the / j f / 
study takes up the transfer o f technology al~a~central element mediating the relationship § 
betweOT^ o f \J 
artefacts and~through the gm^ehneTanaTuTe¥prescribed by the contract and technicians is, in 
the case o f contract farming, a major determinant in the relationship between the contract 
grower and the transnational corporation. Furthermore, production costs are closely linked to 
the technological practices in contract farming. The study analyses both the prescription o f 
farming practices and the opportunities for contract growers to modernise and fortify their 
farming practices according to his/her insights (cf. Wood 1994). 
Secondly, through a better understanding o f the precise mode o f incorporation in contract 
farming this research hopes to inform policy makers, managers and farmers engaged in the 
creation o f new linkages between small farmers and agribusiness. Increasingly, independent 
farmers are institutionally captured by, and socially integrated into, new production complexes, 
in which case contracts substitute for open-market relations (Watts 1994). The study centres on 
modes o f control and the hybrid nature o f the organisation, and it has a special interest in 
organisational and technological interventions at the level o f production.1 
Contract farming can emerge from two different situations. Firstly, it can be a successor to 
plantation agriculture. At the core o f the production scheme is a nucleus estate, managed by the 
transnational corporation or by a domestic firm through a management contract. The estate 
assures the continuous flow o f products. A group o f small farmers grows the crop on former 
plantation land, often redistributed in the context o f land reform programmes. Secondly, 
contract farming can emerge as an attempt to introduce new crops, to create marketing facilities, 
antTto co^orxuhate the tairningpjartir.es with the harvesting and processmg_or^rations of an 
5^ 
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agr^-industriaLe^rpo*^^ forrrij}£in5tiniiional and social 
integration o f independent farmers into agribusiness complexes. 
" T o r the purpose o f this study I define contract farming following Little and Watts, who see 
this type o f institutional arrangements as: 
forms of vertical coordination between growers and^uyers-processors that direcdy shape 
proHuctiorr decisions through contractually specifying market obligations (by volume, value, 
qualityTand, at rirrie§7a3vSIceHpnce"3^ andexercise some 
controTatlhe poinFof^jroduction (i.e. a division of management functions between contractor 
and contracreejr^nttTe and Watts f994: 9) " 
Although the actual contracts under which the crops are grown differ gready, according to the 
crop and technology used in its cultivation, certain features are common to most such contracts 
(Clapp 1988). A production contract requires the producer to deliver a particular crop on a 
given date for a price commonly specified in advance. The contract contains detailed 
instructions governing decisions about planting schedules and soil preparation, harvesting 
techniques, and the amount and timing o f fertilisers and pesticides to be applied. The company 
frequently offers advice and assistance from its technicians and extension agents. Hence, 
contracts and supervisors regulate the production o f farmers to a certain extent. On the other 
hand, because agro-industrial corporations tend to concentrate on processing, marketing and 
distribution, growers experience a certain level o f autonomy in this process o f integration. 
The analysis in this study is based on two case studies o f contract growing in one 
municipality in Southern Mindanao, the Philippines (map 1.1). In the recent history of this 
region, the encroachment o f settlers, and the expansion o f agribusiness plantations importantly 
shaped the landscape for agrarian change. Until World War I I , Muslim communities largely 
occupied the region; afterwards, demographic and economic changes led to a new set o f social 
relations. Since the 1990s, mixed populations o f independent farmers have become increasingly 
linked with agribusiness companies. One case study examines the production o f fresh asparagus 
exported to Japan and contracted out by a subdivision o f Dole Philippines. Dole Philippines is 
one o f the biggest multinational corporations active in Philippine agriculture; headquarters o f 
the mother company Dole Food lie in Los Angeles, USA. Its Philippine operations are mainly 
concentrated in Southern Mindanao and involve the production o f pineapples and bananas, and, 
recently, a diverse package o f high value crops largely marketed in Japan. The second case study 
investigates the production o f hybrid maize seed, mainly for the Philippine market, contracted 
out by the Philippine division o f Pioneer Hi-Bred, one o f the world's leading seed firms with its 
headquarters in Des Moines, Iowa, USA. Thus the study offers a great opportunity to arrive at a 
precise and detailed understanding o f the relationships between global companies and 
Philippine farmers. 
Many studies on contract growing focus strongly on sub-Saharan Africa, where declining 
production rates and food security surface as major problems. Problems in the organisation o f 
agricultural production, rather than deficiencies in agricultural production, seem to be a leading 
T S c u s f o r researcrTlh Southeast Asia (Glover~anH _Ghee~199^r"Besides, in the literature on 
contemporary agrarian change inTSbutheast Asia, many studies have tended to concentrate on 
'green revolution' areas in irrigated rice production (White 1993). Moreover, as White (1999) 
argues, historical studies o f agrarian change in Southeast Asia have concentrated strongly on 
colonial systems for the production o f export crops, and their interaction with a peasant 
subsistence sector (see Staler 1986, Brass and Bernstein 1992, Gordon 1999). This study 
attempts to balance this picture by examining the practices o f Philippine contract growers in 
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production schemes for high-value crops, in particular the production o f asparagus for export 
markets and the production o f hybrid maize seed mainly for the domestic market 
Map 1.1: Location of research area in the Philippines 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Uncovering the complex layers o f agency perception, division o f tasks and decision-making 
processes among the two sets o f 'actors' in the scheme is the major task o f this research. Within 
the organisational framework o f contract growing, both company and growers manoeuvre to 
improve their own positions, and individuals within the two groups pursue individual goals and 
strategies, which change over time (cf. Porter and Phillips-Howard 1994: 320). I investigated the 
dynamics o f contract growing through careful ethnographic observation and investigation at the 
interface in which the contract growers and the technicians and company officials negotiate 
certain aspects o f the contract. Furthermore, detailed study o f the adaptation o f the technologies 
and prescribed cropping systems and o f changes and practices in the labour and production 
processes o f the contract growers was an important input to this ethnography. The examination 
o f various events reveals a limited control by the company over members o f the organisation as 
well as over the natural and technological consequences o f intentional actions by these 
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members. Therefore, to understand the practice of contract farming a sociologically informed 
analysis is needed. 
What follows is a brief assessment of theoretical notions in agrarian and rural sociology, 
which serves as grounding for this study. The focus is on the conceptualisation of three aspects 
relevant to contract farming: (1) organisational transformation of the global agro-food system, 
(2) technological changes in agricultural production processes, and (3) economic changes 
induced by processes of incorporation. 
Globalisation of the agro-food system 
In the new political economy of agriculture literature, which has a strong focus on the 
globalisation of agro-food systems, contract growing is examined through the lens of industrial 
restructuring. The analysis in this approach concentrates strongly on the structural separation 
between industry and agriculture, which seems to vanish through new technologies and 
organisational changes. The supposed parallels between the two realms, industry and agriculture, 
are illustrated by referring to flexibility characteristics of industries and to new forms of 
regulation of production in global agriculture. Dietary changes, trade reform, and technical 
changes in the food industry illuminate shifts in the food system (Friedland 1994a). 
Furthermore, agriculture is seen as part of a process of globalisation, which integrates economic 
activities and regions through production and investment. 
This body of literature also relates the dispersion of contractual relations to corporate 
mergers and the changing geography of production, and to new patterns of trade and changes in 
retailing (McMichael 1992). Transnational corporations are seen as the strategic decision-makers 
with a major stake in globalisation (Bonanno et al. 1994). Complex patterns of global sourcing 
are manifested in agriculture, and, consequendy, new agro-food systems emerge in relation to 
the export of high-value and labour-intensive agricultural crops produced in developing 
countries. Friedland (1994b) investigates the process by which firms in the fresh fruit and 
vegetable sector become transnational as the sector globalises. 
An important research agenda is comparative studies of agro-food regimes in the context of 
contemporary processes of rural transformation. This agenda leads to a periodisation of the 
development of international commodity complexes (Heffernan and Constance 1994), ranging 
between vertical integration and global integration, using concepts from industrial restructuring, 
such as flexible specialisation. Raynolds et al. (1993) include an institutional dimension in their 
analysis, and refer to unstable patterns in the intemationalisation of capital situated in specific 
contexts. In this global food system literature, contracting by agribusiness companies is 
discussed as an integral element of the 'new international division of labour in agriculture' 
(Raynolds et al. 1993), which increases flexibility through institutional alterations, or which shifts 
risks to farmers. 
Much attention is given to the coercive cjiamcj£rjQ^ Supposedly, 
the administrative hierarchies of internajion^agri^^ with the 
^ demands'of finance capital and which_ are responsive Jo^jntemational competition, subsume 
activiaes^f~growers^RTckson and Burch 1996). In_such an analysis, contracts are key to^ 
^ ^/company strategies for industrialising farm labour and regulating farmer relationships with their 
* V laScL7 so that the biological uncertatntielToTgrowihg planteT^ffl5e~redliced7lind standardised 
\ valuli^ded p r o ^ Land is becoming an organisational asset, 
wMcnlEe company attempts to control by routinising the way farmers work their land (ibid). A 
continual strategy to centralise the control of production, leads to a similar separation of 
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execution and conception as observed by Braverman (1974) in other industries where others 
control and design work. The main conclusion then is that the company's goal has always been 
domination over the labour process (cf. Noble 1984 ,1985) . 
In the above arguments globalisation is basically understood as a macro-level process, shaped 
by the technological, economic and regulatory features o f transnational production o f food. Life 
is shaped at a global level, leading to uniformity and integration (Bonanno et al. 1994). 2 
However, this analysis is 'under-socialised', as Bager (1997) comments. Therefore, we have to 
examine the empirical manifestations o f globalisation more critically. The straightforward focus 
on a predictable outcome o f managerial interventions and innovation fails to examine how 
technicians, growers and managers construct organisational transformation and technical change 
in a specific set o f social relations in the workplace (cf. MacKenzie 1992). Correspondingly, the 
theoretical foundation in this study is sensitive both to diversity and to historical contingency 
(Fine 1994). In my interpretation, contract farming is a historically and often locally specific 
form o f socio-political linkage between farmers and multinational enterprises, and does not 
represent an inevitable historical transformation o f agriculture. 
As a response to the signalled determinism o f globalisation studies, others in the sociological 
literature criticise the view that arrangements such as contract growing are merely a reflection o f 
forces o f globalisation. These critics contrast this view with studies that emphasise the 
heterogeneity o f farmers' strategies as well as diversity in perceptions, conflicts and cultural 
histories. Thus alerting us to the dangers o f exaggerating the potency and driving force o f 
external institutions and interests (Marsden et al. 1990 ,1992 , Long and Long 1992). This second 
perspective on the organisation o f global agriculture focuses on the nature o f both the levels o f 
integration and distinctiveness particularly expressed in the labour process in contract farming. 
The argument concerns a renewed focus on the local emdeddedness of labour processes. 
Observed diversity also leads other writers on globalisation (Appadurai 1990) to return to the 
local. Globalisation, they argue, does not lead to an increasing uniformity, but, on the contrary, 
results in disintegration and heterogeneity (Featherstone 1990, Featherstone et al. 1995). Local 
situations are transformed by becoming part o f wider global processes, and, correspondingly, 
Appadurai (1990) states that, in the new era o f globalisation differences do not diminish, but 
increase. 
Norman Long (1994,1996) draws on these ideas in his analyses o f rural transformation in the 
context o f globalisation. Although agriculture is global in scope, he argues that, especially in the 
production sphere, we see diversified commodity markets and a flexible global pattern o f work 
and divisions o f labour. Production arrangements and technologies are spreading all over the 
world, and interact or contradict with local modes o f knowledge. Networks o f groups and 
associations react to global conditions by using local and extra-local resources and values. Long 
argues that global changes are not dictated by some supranational hegemonic power or simply 
driven by international capitalist interests. O n the contrary, changing global conditions are 're-
localised' within national, regional or local frameworks o f knowledge and organisation (Long 
1996). 
Accordingly, Long's actor-oriented approach allocates a major role to farmers in constructing 
their own farming world and in internalising external conditions. External institutions and 
interests represent only one set among a large array o f actors who shape the outcomes (Long 
1994). So, patterns o f agricultural development are subject to the combined effects o f 
globalisation and localisation; the focus is the interface where conflicting social worlds intersect 
(Long 1989). The global dimensions o f globalising food production are made meaningful in 
relation to local conditions and strategies. Therefore, each situation represents a specific 
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configuration o f interlocking actors' projects, which is generated by encounters, negotiations 
and accommodation (Long and van der Ploeg 1994). 
Actor-oriented sociology in development (Long and Long 1992) gives strong emphasis to the 
autonomous intentionality o f individual actors, their interpersonal relationships, and the various 
ways o f strategizing. Arce and Marsden (1993) pursue a similar social constructivist argument? in 
discussing the impact o f global quality standards on local production processes, which dovetails 
well with the actor-oriented approach. They try to analyse the consequences o f changing retail 
and farming systems due to new forms o f product specification or grading. In this analysis their 
main focus is on spatial connections and discontinuities in the social construction o f food. A 
key question in the actor-oriented sociology is how food networks and distant social 
relationships affect local social action. In this approach, technological and organisational 
changes in contract growing are essentially seen as a socially constructed development. 
The social contextualisation, which features in this type o f research, identifies variation, but 
the actor-oriented approach risks over-playing agency and intention at the expense o f broader 
organisational or technological features (Leach and Fairhead 2000). The evolution o f contract 
growing schemes is not simply a story o f dominance and resistance; more important questions 
about incorporation involve the modes o f co-operation between people and the ways in which 
people and technology are connected. Besides, the epistemological shift to social construction 
leaves important questions unasked. What voice do specific groups have in determining the 
outcome o f technical or institutional change? How does one account for potentially important 
choices or intangible assets that never surface as matters for debate and choice? Is there a way 
o f evaluating the social and political consequences o f technical and organisational change (cf. 
Winner 1993)? In failing to answer these questions social scientists may offer an account o f the 
politics o f production that conceals social interests and institutional dynamics. They disregard 
the possibility that there may be dynamics or mechanisms significant beyond those revealed by 
studying the immediate needs, interests, and identities o f specific groups and actors. 
Thus, the question is whether social analysis can move beyond signalling actor strategies and 
social agency in localised contexts (Lockie and Kitto 2000). Although actor-oriented approaches 
stress the importance o f local responses to global forces, they are less clear about how people 
cope with the material relationships linking them with others outside. Instead their interest lies 
in "the investigation o f local microcosms o f meaning conceived as autonomous systems" (Wolf 
1982:16). Hence, the actor-oriented school o f rural sociology does not encourage us to account 
in material terms for what happens at the present juncture or to account for how some 
relationships gain ascendancy over others. It emphasises the adaptive modification o f local 
cultures, but fails to analyse the institutional features and outcomes o f new relationships. 
In general, the two approaches in agrarian and rural sociology so far discussed tend to 
concentrate on what goes on outside the 'globalising corporation'. The analytical discussions 
want to understand the external prescription o f farming activities or the diversity in the relations 
that connect global companies and local farmers both socially and spatially. Little has been said 
about how certain strategies are developed and how specific organisational arrangements are 
deployed to enable companies to develop and exploit competitive advantage (Pritchard 2000). 
This may lead to a simple portrayal o f corporate engineering (Pritchard and Fagan 1999). 
For improving our understanding o f contract farming as part and parcel o f corporate 
strategies, Pritchard (2000) proposes to study contingent production arrangements and complex 
integration strategies alongside the management o f intangible assets, such as brands standing for 
quality, or the exploitation o f proprietary know-how. This study does exactly this; the case o f 
asparagus production reveals the difficult task o f establishing quality in growers' fields and the 
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case of maize seed production illuminates the crucial role o f the contracted producers in the 
exploitation o f know-how o f hybridisation in maize. 
This approach corresponds to the central organising theme o f Metcalfe and Boden's work 
(1992), which is that strategy formation emerges at the intersection o f three categories o f 
phenomena: competitive behaviour, organisational design, and technology content and 
capability. Understanding the construction o f the economic is turned from a general issue in 
capitalist society into a specific one, incorporating the uncertainty o f an enterprise such as 
contract growing. Yet, litde research on contract farming involves a thorough understanding o f 
behaviour inside corporate structures and, likewise, much sociological research fails to answer a 
key question: 
• H o w do firms use contract farming as a managerial tool to tune productive activities 
to requirements of marketing and competition? 
This study adheres to the view that we can observe various ways in which farms are^ 
integrated mstimtionally with retailers and processors; hence, there is not one torm~under 
globalisation (Goodman and Watts 1997, Rosset et al. 1999). 3 Nevertheless, an explanation o f 
contract farming has to understand "the social institutional means by which a multiplicity o f 
divisions o f labour that make up the global system are [..] connected so^M^e^&mctkm in a ""}• 
reasonably coherent and effectivernanner?!rlWtlFlTO4Tj7). Obviously, in contract farming 
others largely design the agro-industrial process and, accordingly, growers are asked to carry out 
certain directives. Therefore, contract farming represents an intensified and more regulated 
form o f commodity production; yet, the observed variation in contract growing schemes all 
over the world still has to be explained (Little and Watts 1994, Grossman 1998). Accordingly, 
the focus o f is on the interconnectedness o f production activities and forms of governance for 
co-ordination, and, likewise, on the combination o f capabilities that transcends the boundaries 
o f f i r r n ^ n c f S r m (cf. Coombs andBattaglia 1998, cf. King 1992). 
Therefore, I am less concerned with the origin o f growing schemes or with the motivations 
for offering contracts. It is more interested in the questions about integration and co-ordination. 
In line with the previous observations, Wolf et al. focus on co-ordinating procedures and 
policing instruments inside contract growing schemes. Hence, the study pays special attention to 
the regulations and restrictions ordered by the company (cf. Coombs et al. 1992), and it is 
interested in questions like the ones raised by Wolf et al. (2001): 
• What is the functional role of certain elements of contract farming? 
» What different management strategies do companies use? 
• What are the concrete mechanisms through which control is pursued? 
» What motivates contractors to participate actively in field-level production? 
By farming out the actual production, the company gives up direct control over farm 
management and over land. The role o f contracts is to introducepredictability into^grjbuginess i 
operations, to motivate performance a n d l o enhance quality control and to reallocate financial*^ 
riskl and rewards (Wolt et al. 2001). Although the company partially shifts production risks to 
'growers, its operations rely fully on a sustainable access to land and on commitment and effort 
o f farmers. Growers supervise day-to-day activities in the farm and, consequently, still have the 
right to make production decisions. Patterns o f practices and working relations in a single 
organisation shape the production process to an important degree; either because they allow 
(farmers) 'freedom' to exercise control over labour objects and the means o f production or 
because they directly condition, prescribe and sanction the organisation o f labour and 
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production (van der Ploeg 1990: 278). Thus, contract growing entails a changeable mix o f 
centralisation and decentralisation o f decision-making. Therefore, the book discusses different 
attitudes to incorporation, and shares the awareness o f negotiation with the actor-oriented 
sociology. It also tries to explain the impact o f certain organisational and technological features 
o f contractual arrangements on the sustainability o f the institution. Consequendy, the company 
has to carefully manage its social relations with growers and it has to maintain confidence-
enhancing procedures. 
The approach adopted here posits that the contract and technology entering the lives o f 
contract growers come to form part and parcel o f the resources and constraints underlying their 
labour processes and social strategies. Although the company develops and/or introduces 
certain technologies and farming practices in contract farming, these guidelines and artefacts 
neither lead to a predetermined success, nor govern the actions and labour o f contract growers 
unconditionally. Although the technical conditions o f the production seem to be standardised to 
a large extent (Bernstein 1990), the process o f incorporation does not create a homogeneous 
agncultufeT In thlTsphere o f material production w e c a n o b s e r v e a process of_faegjjsation' 
which produces newjrversities (Richards 1985, 1996, cf. Hannerz 1982). In this sense, this 
research^elqjloreybothTlh^ext^nal determinationof the labour and production process, and the 
'freedom' o f the contract growers to assert contrcJoveFkd2pu^2je_mgans of production and 
use o f the land. In this way, we lay aside the suggestion which tends to stress the external 
determination o f activities in the family farm and which usually leads to an unwarranted linear 
view o f social and organisational change. 
Obviously, an organisation cannot fully control its members. This study aims to unravel the 
complexity and the locus o f control, realising that economic behaviour is embedded in a 
network o f s o r i a l j g J a t i o r ^ a j ^ j b j t ^ as 
contract farming (Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997, Welsh 1997). Correspondingly, this study 
\ suggests that contracts are mostly incomplete and are not able to cover unforeseen deficiencies 
• / and problems in production. Due to the absence o f complete contracts, managerial and 
technological interventions are inevitable in contract growing. These interventions reveal 
concrete mechanisms constituting the social relations o f production in contract farming. This 
leads us to two important managerial questions: 
« H o w do managers connect between productive activities? 
• What intermediaries make social relations in production systems durable? 
Hence, the study tries to explain working relations and co-ordination, realising that the 
^ contents o f relations cannot be solely derived frqm_the dictates o f effirie.nry and profit 
maxirrusatjpn. The empirical focus is on actions o f growers and styles o f management in layered 
institutional and technological systems. A situational analysis will enable us to comprehend the 
social relations, forms o f control, and ideas used and manipulated in everyday interaction (cf. 
Burawoy 1985). In contract growing schemes this implies a precise study o f the input and 
prescription o f technology, the surveillance and monitoring o f productive activities, the 
measurement o f quality, and the sharing and computation o f revenues (Wolf et al. 2001). 
Accordingly, the result o f this study is, I hope, a close-to-the-ground, fine-grained account o f 
working relations and co-operation between different agents in a singleimtitotionaljcamgwork. 
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Technological change and biological constraints 
The above explains the approach to the problem o f organisational change in the context o f 
globalising agricultural production. This section discusses sociological approaches to 
technological change in agriculture, and related to that, to the biological properties found in 
agricultural production. An on-going debate in agrarian sociology has been whether the land-
based production and biological constraints in agriculture can explain the persistence o f family 
farms, understood as an outcome of incomplete industrialisation (Mann and Dickinson 1978). 
In these arguments, agriculture has distinctive qualities, which may, to some extent, explain the j 
type o f involvement o f international enterprises in agriculture (Goodman and Redclift 1991, 
Goodman and Watts 1994). So, in this approach contract farming occurs at the intersection of 
agro-industrialisation and internationalisation. It recognises the significance o f global marketing 
strategies, but it still sees biological challenges for agro-industrialisation and emphasises the 
complex integration o f family farms (Goodman, Sorj and Wilkinson 1987, Goodman and Watts 
1994).t 
The previous arguments contrast sharply with the arguments o f the new political economy o f 
food and agriculture, which argues that agriculture has been effectively industrialised and that 
new technologies, such as biotechnology, resolve any obstacles to further industrialisation. The 
emphasis on a successful industrialisation o f agricultural production, which is the case in much 
o f the new political economy literature, may hamper a thorough understanding o f the dynamics 
in production systems and mainly suggest homogeneity o f technology and farming practices as 
an inevitable outcome o f structural forces. In contrast, Grossman (1998) argues that, in the 
agricultural production process, there is a need for more creative responses and a more flexible 
perspecmrcTt^^ to the 
environmental rootedness o f agriculture, farmers have to cope with the inherent spatial and 
temporal variability o f rainfall, temperatures7pests ancTdiseases, s q i k ^ r o p varieties. Coping 
with such vanafioris~^so "produces Interpersonal differences among farmers in terms of 
production practices and strategies, patterns o f considerable importance in understanding the 
"Utjfflty of companies to control the labour proce^sTn~contract farming (Grossman 1998: 14). 
The -patterns o f enab lenWflmaHc^s t ramt present in agriculture illuminate how concrete 
combinations o f labour and tools shape various forms o f human interaction with nature. 
Moreover, this study presupposes that due to the nature o f agricultural production, i.e. 
regulating and manipulating biological processes, the study o f agrarian technologies is distinct 
from the study o f industrial technologies. 
The research's aim is to improve social theory so that it can include bio-physical processes 
and relate to a serious understanding o f technological problems, realising that biological 
processes and technologies are not entirely plastic. However, I will not pursue an essentialist 
explanation for the range o f production forms existent in the agricultural sector. Key to this 
ethnography o f production technology is to find the relationship between two causal domains, 
namely the organisation o f productive activities and biological and technical processes in crop 
production. Accordingly, the study acknowledges the fact that you need particular theoretical 
approaches to biological and technological problems (Harvey 1999). Consequendy, the nature o f 
technologies and the qualities of the crops produced are explicitly discussed, and, thus the 
various chapters include some details o f technological knowledge apparent in contract growing. 
Understanding how production activities are engineered in contract growing also requires 
linking these variables to an institutional understanding o f co-ordination between distributed 
capabilities (Coombs and Metcalfe 1998, Coombs 1996) and o f working relations in and 
between different task groups (Hutchins 1995, Richards 1986, 2000, cf. McFeat 1972). 
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Examining this linkage reveals how companies and growers navigate towards good performance 
in agricultural production. But, it also shows how production relations are generated out o f 
social processes in which growers and firms negotiate discipline in and control over production 
(Collins 1993). 5 In this sense, contract growing has to be explained as a social and technical 
reality by asking: 
« H o w do organisational measures, such as decentralisation of production, and 
intangible assets, such as quality or technical know-how, interact with the technical 
and natural conditions of production? 
This book accepts that social life is dependent on nature-given material conditions in a 
specific location and argues that technology mediates between human relations and natural or 
biological mechanisms (Benton 1989, 1994). Due to the emphasis on social shaping and social 
agency, suggesting a limitless mastery over nature, social scientists barely acknowledge the 
independent reality o f biological processes and environmental factors in agriculture. My primary 
interest lies in the analysis o f technical capabilities and managerial functions in a specific 
organisational constellation namely contract farming. Evidently, such an analysis has to avoid 
ruling out the autonomy o f non-human causality fjansen 1998), which is common for much o f 
the social science literature. Moreover, the way in which human labour is deployed in agriculture 
is distinct because, as Benton argues, 
it is not deployed to bring about an intended transformation in raw material. It is, rather, 
primarily deployed to sustain or regulate the environmental conditions under which seed or 
stock animals grow and develop [. .] the transformations are brought about by naturally given 
organic mechanisms, not by application o f human labour (Benton 1989: 67). 
This perspective o f an eco-regulatory practice argues that human labour does not bring about 
growth o f the plant or the quality o f its fruit, but secures optimal conditions for an organic 
transformation to occur. 
Hence, the application o f technology in agriculture enables a transcendence o f naturally 
imposed limits or enhances adaptability in the face o f non-manipulable natural conditions 
impervious to intentional action (Benton 1989). Technology is instrumental in regulating nature 
and manipulating commodity characteristics. This explains my empirical interest in crop 
performance in contract growing, in particular with regard to variable yields and quality levels, 
and, accordingly, in stress tolerances and production risks for certain commodities. Analysing 
how these agronomic features o f agricultural are dealt with under certain organisational 
conditions renders analysable the intentionality and responsibility in deployment o f technology 
in crop production. Equally, the agronomic features o f crop production reveal many 
uncertainties in agriculture, partly due to the concrete interaction between man and nature, and, 
likewise, make implausible the statement that the effect o f technology is entirely predictable (cf. 
MacKenzie 1992). 
The above leads us to question the role o f the material attributes o f agriculture, i.e. 
commodities, agro-climatic conditions and technologies in shaping the institutions governing 
agricultural production. In some sociological literature, the specific characteristics o f the crop 
produced are a central feature in explaining the way in which production is organised. Such a 
commodity based approach (Binswanger and Rosenzweig 1986, discussed in Little and Watts 
1994, Paige 1975) associates each contracted commodity with specific conditions o f production 
and labour regimes, which poses both organisational limitations and opportunities typically 
A associated with different social-institutional and management forms. In fact, it sees contract 
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farming arising from the intersection o f technological conditions and crop characteristics. For 
this purpose, a distinction is made between classical export crops, horticultural crops, and staple 
crops. As an illustration o f this point, Little and Watts (1994: 16) argue that most contract 
farming commodities are labour-intensive, requiring the type o f careful management that does 
not lend itself well to mechanisation in a large-scale, centralised production unit. 
In a more elaborated form, the commodity system approach developed in the field o f 
agrarian sociology also utilises crop production and the nature o f the commodity as the critical 
entry point for describing agricultural specialisation. The commodity system approach, 
developed by Friedland (1984), identifies the following foci for research: 
• the techniques o f production and the distinctive problems and conditions for production o f 
the commodity; 
• the way labour is made available to agriculture, how it is recruited, and how it is managed 
and directed; 
• the responsibilities o f the grower in assembling the factors o f production, in deciding about 
farm management, and in utilising and managing labour; 
« the response o f farm workers to the organisation o f the labour process, once employment 
relationships are institutionalised; 
• the application o f knowledge and research, which is often geared to specific commodities, in 
resolving specific problems o f production. 
These straightforward foci help in understanding a number o f important characteristics o f a 
system o f contract growing and bring the point o f analysis beyond the farm gate. But, as Little 
and Watts (1994) argue correcdy, a commodity-based approach has some limitations. Little and 
Watts express the fear that, due to its focus on a system organised around a specific commodity, 
the analysis leads to a technologically deterministic perspective; i.e. the biological and 
technological features o f the commodity determine working relations in and social conditions o f 
production. However, there seems to be no intrinsic reason why a particular commodity should 
be cultivated in a contract growing scheme rather than in a plantation, although perishable 
products, production risks and quality standards are indeed major considerations for 
outsourcing agricultural production. In addition, a commodity-based perspective does not 
include social and economic response in the institutional context o f contract farming. 
In contrast, the material presented in this book suggests that the extemalisation o f 
agricultural production implies a dynamic relationship between the institutional form o f 
production activities and the composite character o f tools, crops and agronomic practices used 
in farming. In order to include the social nature o f production in the analysis, we have to 
address some key questions: 
• In what ways do the organisational and social positions of parties engaged in 
contract growing influence crop performance, and, 
• What type of co-ordination problems surface in the execution of tasks and the 
deployment of technology? 
What follows from the above is this study's focus on performance and technology-in-use 
under specific organisational and social conditions rather than on the design and conception o f 
technology per se. In the case o f contract growing, it seems to be important to understand: 
• What does a certain technology enable a grower to do? 
• What is manipulable in agricultural production and what is not? 
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Technologies in contract farming appear in the form o f artefacts (e.g. seeds, chemicals, and 
fertiliser), the guidelines and rules included in the contract, and in the language and actions o f 
the technicians (cf. Bijker 1995). The study o f the social construction o f technology shows that 
in the context o f laboratories or R&D-departments social choices matter in the course 
technology development takes. Together with social actors, technologies constitute or modify 
hybrid networks o f human and non-human actors. The actor-network theory gallon 1991, 
Latour 1993) explains the shaping o f new networks, which include human actors as well as non-
human 'actants', but does not make a qualitative distinction between natural and social realms. 
In my view, this analysis is difficult to apply in empirical studies concerning the application and 
performance o f technologies in relation to the institutional dynamics o f a production scheme 
(Mooij and Mollinga 1989). 
Hence, I differentiate myself from a mere social constructivist approach, which tends to have 
a problematic, over-socialised conceptualisation o f nature and technology, showing less concern 
with the "hard intractability o f material transformation" (Richards 2000: 19). Thus, the danger 
o f current approaches in social constructivism is that they show little analytical engagement with 
nature or technology; because the organic or biological nature o f agriculture is taken for granted 
(see also Goodman's critique (1999) o f Arce and Marsden's (1993) understanding o f quality). So, 
with regards to technological change, it leaves open the question what we have to know about 
the technological or biological properties present in contract farming and how we have to relate 
specific social practices to non-human conditions (cf. Jansen 1998). Methodologically, therefore, 
we still have to define the social space, and autonomy or subordination o f a contract grower in 
relation to his/her labour process and natural conditions. 
The institutional approach adopted in this study relates the functionality o f technology to 
divisions o f tasks and organisational behaviour in a contract growing scheme and it incorporates 
the capability o f technologies to regulate environmental conditions and to transform commodity 
characteristics. The evolution o f the relationship between growers and company, therefore, is 
embedded in the implementation o f technological choices, the articulation o f technological 
activities and accumulation o f technological capability (Metcalfe and Boden 1992). People select 
the performance characteristics embodied in technology, for example its capacity to regulate 
ecological processes or its capacity to control the performance o f labour. Investigating the social 
consequences o f technological choices also reveals the ways in which actors are engaged in 
defining technical problems and seeking solutions (Winner 1993). 
This study examines the appearances o f technology by looking both at tool using in 
performative behaviour and at forms o f skilled action and learning capacities (cf. Ingold 1993). 
Usually, practitioners work at incremental improvement o f this technology, not questioning the 
basic principles. Operational problems in growers' fields put to test a standardised package o f 
technological recipes and artefacts; concrete practice shows whether these packages are robust 
and able to adapt to changing conditions (cf. Fujimura 1992). Technical decisions become part 
o f a whole, engineering relations 'between people and ordering human action upon nature and 
how people are going to work (MacKenzie and Wajcman 1985, MacKay and Gillespie 1992). 
In growers' fields, design puzzles frequently appear and importantly drive day-to-day 
activities. Nevertheless, growers expect to become integrated in a venture in which the company 
is capable to control the technical dimensions o f farming; often, growing contracts present the 
company as a fully capable institution and the contract as a way to extend the benefits o f 
scientific methods. The practice o f contract growing, however, contests these assumptions. 
Management o f knowledge and technology in contract growing can be characterised as a 'trial 
and error procedure', which is imperfect and firm and commodity specific. Furthermore, 
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agricultural production often involves the use o f composite technologies, which is why we have 
to see, for example, planting material in relation to technologies utilised in regulating nature, 
such as irrigation or pesticides. Hence, success or failure in growers' fields not only depends on 
individual crop management but is interrelated to the design o f cropping systems and the 
selection o f (new) technologies inside the company. 
Thus in an institutional analysis, technological capabilities and distributed tasks become 
closely related to patterns o f interaction within the firm Coombs et al. 1992). In contract 
growing, decision-making regarding technical tools is often institutionally removed from the 
individual farm. Consequently, many authors (e.g. Rickson and Burch 1996, Clapp 1988) assume 
the company dominates the process; perhaps the company assumes this too. But through an 
ethnography o f field practices I will establish that both company and growers have to act 
together. This is a process o f both co-operation and contest in which achieved results are 
significandy different from what the company planners assumed or would have liked them to 
be. Equally, organisational activity engineers the enabling properties o f technologies, which is 
revealed by examining the details o f production problems in contract growing and how 
technologies work to solve these problems. In such an ethnographic approach to production 
management in contract growing we attend to the following questions: 
• H o w do multinational companies and contract growers combine to shape or select 
technological opportunities in a specific institutional context? 
• What goal-directed task groups are formed and re-formed from year to year or from 
incident to incident? 
Differentiation and economic change 
The previous sections relate to this study's interest in organisational matters appearing in 
contract growing schemes, such as co-operative procedures, performative behaviour and 
problem-solving activities. Dominating some bodies o f contemporary social science literature on 
contract farming, however, are debates over the social or class position o f contract farmers, 
basically adopting an 'outsider perspective'. In these inquiries on agrarian change, case studies 
examining the effect o f incorporating farmers into a global food system via a contract scheme, 
primarily focus on rural differentiation, and are essentially concerned with relations o f 
production and exploitation. These studies want to define what type o f farmers contracting 
creates. This eventuates in debates about whether contract farmers are disguised labourers or 
victims o f self-exploitation Papp 1988). Others, such as Korovkin (1992), argue that that 
incorporation into agribusiness systems gives farmers an opportunity to transform themselves 
into peasant capitalists working by contract with agri-corporations. In this argument growers 
maintain a more subordinated and insecure relation with the company, and it remains to be seen 
whether contracting, as such a dependent form o f capitalisation, will sustain in the longer term 
(Korovkin 1992, cf. Gibbon and Neocosmos 1985). Goldsmith's (1985) overview o f contract 
growing schemes shows that contract farming offers only richer farmers an opportunity to 
incorporate modern technologies, to augment their assets, and to increase reliance on wage 
labour. Morvaridi (1995) adds to this discussion the farmer's resource base, especially land or 
water quality and availability and the presumed larger benefits for farmers with large 
landholding. Others focus on the changing work and farm conditions mediated through the 
social relations o f family farming (Carney 1988, Carney and Watts 1991, Collins 1993, cf. 
Whatmore et al. 1987). 
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Little and Watts (1994), however, conclude that a general theory o f the social position o f 
contract farmers seems to be foolhardy and ultimately unproductive. Apparently, contract 
growers can better be perceived as an unstable or diverse category. Drawing a univocal 
conclusion about where differentiation is heading is not the intention o f this book (White 1989). 
Much depends on absorption o f labour, technological properties and institutional arrangements 
in production schemes (Hart et al. 1989). Likewise, contract growing schemes seem to be able to 
assemble a wide range o f landowners, varying from landlords to former tenants, under one 
umbrella. Therefore, this study investigates how these diverse social positions are reflected in 
distinct organisational cultures inside the growing scheme. So, a question for this study is: 
« What is the impact of signing a contract and integration into a corporate 
agribusiness scheme on existing social relations between tenants, landowners and 
farm workers in a community? 
What this study is not able to do is to make an assessment o f the impact o f contract growing 
on the regional economy in terms o f food security, income generation or the development o f 
farmers excluded from the scheme (Litde 1994). Unlike the study o f Mackintosh (1989), which 
looks at the issues o f incorporation o f cash incomes and individualisation and o f experiences 
with wage work in the environment o f contract farming schemes, I will not be able to chart the 
general direction o f agrarian change. N o r do I look into alternate sources o f income. For 
example, Berry (1985) describes the consequences o f the development o f export oriented 
production for the structure o f a regional political economy. Her focus is on changes in the uses 
o f agricultural surplus, as means to upward mobility. Increased incomes generate an ability to 
accumulate and to diversify activities or find alternatives to wage employment. Much depends 
on farmers' differential linkages to the regional economy, rather than on differential access to 
land. The best opportunities for accumulation lay, not in agriculture, but in participating in trade 
or in pursuing a professional career (Berry 1985). Likewise, Kerkvliet (1986) observes in 
Philippine agriculture that socio-economic divisions become more elaborate, through additional 
sources o f income, wage labour, and the introduction o f new technologies. The focus o f this 
study, however, is exclusively on working relations and technology transfer inside the 
institutional boundaries o f contract farming schemes. 
Another point I am unable fully to explore concerns the involvement o f the state in 
promoting contract farming systems and in steering the distribution o f benefits (Goldsmith 
1985, Burch 1994). Benziger (1996) reveals the flexible and creative interplay between 
government and the private sector in the shift to high value-added crops, wherein the state is 
concerned with risk protection and technical services. Largely because o f state efforts, small and 
medium growers are included in the alliance between agribusiness corporations, government 
bodies and growers. All appear to have a common stake in the production o f fruit and vegetable 
exports or o f other high-value crops. Korovkin (1992) discusses the interference o f a state 
owned agency, which supplies funds for irrigation in contract growing schemes. In other 
schemes, the state sustains financial losses (Mackintosh 1989). Furthermore, the state's 
instruments for intervention in contract growing schemes are seldom analysed; usually contract 
growing is presented as a bilateral relation between company and growers. In this study, the 
involvement o f the state is investigated indirectly. The focus is on the policy arena supportive to 
contract growing and on the financial involvement o f a state-owned development bank, crucial 
for the realisation o f one particular growing scheme. 
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RESEARCH METHODS 
Basically, this study relates and reconstructs events in two contract growing schemes. Analysing 
these events helps to disclose organisational and technical mechanisms steering the possible 
outcome o f behaviour and action o f the various parties in contract growing. The study's 
orientation is primarily ethnographic; it is an attempt to contextualise data relating to farm work 
and technology transfer in contract farming to management problems in international 
agriculture and global sourcing via description and analysis o f concrete situations, events and 
interactions (Richards 1996). Analysing the events and descriptions presented in this book 
requires the ability to bridge between literatures o f agrarian sociology, development studies, 
management studies, and agronomy. The previous discussion o f theoretical perspectives helped 
to point out some o f the main theoretical assumptions and influences that have shaped my 
understanding o f the reality in contract growing. The previous discussion elucidates what is 
typical for this study, namely the integration o f organisational concerns and technological 
puzzles. For this purpose, the unit o f analysis is a socio-technological ensemble, rather than 
technical artefacts or social institutions perse (Bijker 1995). 
Listing once again the questions already raised above captures the approach adopted in this 
study:6 
H o w do firms use contract farming as a managerial tool to tune productive activities to 
requirements of marketing and competition? 
• What different management strategies do companies use? 
• What is the functional role o f certain organisational elements o f contract farming? 
» What are the concrete mechanisms through which control is pursued? 
• What motivates contractors to participate actively in field-level production? 
• What intermediaries make social relations in production systems durable? 
• What is the impact o f signing a contract and integration into a corporate agribusiness 
scheme on existing social relations between tenants, landowners and farm workers in a 
community? 
H o w do organisational measures, such as decentralisation of production, and intangible 
assets, such as quality or technical know-how, interact with the technical and natural 
conditions of production? And, how do multinational companies and contract growers 
combine to shape or select technological opportunities in a specific institutional 
context? 
• What goal-directed task groups are formed and re-formed from year to year or from 
incident to incident? 
• How do company managers connect between productive activities? 
• What type o f co-ordination problems surface in the execution o f tasks and the deployment 
o f technology? 
« In what ways do the organisational and social positions o f parties engaged in contract 
growing influence crop performance? 
• What does a certain technology enable a grower to do? 
• What is manipulable in agricultural production and what is not? 
Through an inductive process this study helps to identify and to connect profound 
institutional and technological changes within the boundaries o f two Philippine contract farming 
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schemes. The general approach was to develop an ethnography o f contract farming through 
participant observation, semi-structured interviews, life and farm histories and through 
situational analyses (Bertaux 1981). Key players in the current analysis are people on the ground; 
I tried to discover what informs the behaviour and actions o f company officials, technicians, 
growers and farm workers. 
The approach particularly involved a strong use o f qualitative methods for examining the two 
main concerns o f this study, namely the farming practices and the labour processes o f contract 
growers as well as the institutional dynamics and the politics o f production in contract farming.7 
I spent more than two years in the field interviewing and observing growers, labourers, and 
technicians. Participation in daily life and informal conversations formed the base for 
unstructured interviews with key informants (Bernard 1994). Since contract farming is such an 
innovative process many were eager to share their experiences or to explain to me what they 
were doing. I tried to discover how growers adapted themselves to the prescribed farming 
systems or to administrative inclusion. The observation o f actions and producer strategies 
generated data about the social implications o f contract farming, e.g. the organisation o f the 
workforce by growers, and about the technical side o f contract growing, e.g. weed control, 
quality standards or production risks. I supplemented my own observations with information 
from other sources, such as letters, company memos, court records, contractual papers and 
financial records. I also conducted some descriptive surveys (Oppenheim 1966), identifying the 
types o f growers and forms o f land use, and the origin and use o f labour. 
The emphasis on situational analyses implies detailed descriptions o f particular instructive 
events. It also implies the incorporation o f organisational politics and technological puzzles as a 
normal rather than an exceptional part o f social process in contract farming communities 
(Velsen 1967, Sayer 1992, Mitchell 1983). Each situational analysis provides a close-up view o f 
social interaction and problem solving, in order to elucidate how the social relation works out in 
everyday, problematic situations (Long 1989). Information gathered by participant observation 
and in-depth interviews was used to produce detailed accounts and to record the actions o f 
individuals in a variety o f different circumstances. Obtaining a range o f accounts and 
interpretations o f disputes or other particular events, rather than searching for the single right 
account or interpretation, has been a guiding principle in this research (Velsen 1967). 
The problem o f gaining entry into the scheme and the communities was gready facilitated by 
interested intermediaries; this was especially important because o f the, at times, polarised nature 
o f the relationship between company and growers in the different communities (cf. Breman 
1983). Key informants, both growers and technicians, discussed the politics of, and perceptions 
in, the scheme with gusto, explaining the tactics o f 'the other side' and reconstructing past 
events (cf. Fetterman 1989, Schwartzman 1993). Correspondingly, I had to manoeuvre between 
the different alliances and rival networks in the schemes and the communities, and I also had to 
cope with the danger o f self-appointed brokers directing the investigation. Inside the company, 
people at middle positions, such as production managers or technicians, are sensitive to changes 
from top and bottom. They formed an important group o f informants about decision-making 
processes in the scheme, revealing the companies' adaptation to foreign environments and the 
process o f conflict and accommodation (Nash 1979). 
I took a major interest in what people actually did and how they interacted, either through 
inter-personal communication or through the transfer o f artefacts. Aside from regular work in 
growers' fields, I tried to access the offices o f production managers and company directors as 
much as possible (cf. Useem 1979, Thomas 1993). An important entry was to compare 
performance and action at different levels in the technicd-and-administrative-task-environment 
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(Benvenuti 1991). An ethnography o f contract farming reveals both the formal side o f the 
organisation, in the sense o f having explicit tasks to accomplish and responsibilities to carry out, 
and the informal side, in the sense o f the way members continually negotiate with one another 
in the interpretation and carrying out o f such tasks (Scbwartzman 1993). 
By focusing on the interplay between different levels in the production schemes, I was able 
to examine the puzzles o f company managers facing agrarian communities shaping contrasting 
social futures. Mixing up with and accompanying the technicians on their field trips and 
discussing their careers and their work experience provided insights on their perceptions and 
work-related activities (Grindle 1977, Arce 1993). Consulting the technicians on the technical 
and social requirements o f the cropping systems enabled me to discover how company 
personnel are capable to address complex production problems arising from the tropical climate 
o f the region. Correspondingly, I discussed with technicians how they intervened in the work 
done in the field or in the application o f certain agricultural technologies. And I observed the 
interactions between growers, technicians and superintendents in the field, at the office o f the 
co-operative, or during the many meetings I attended. 
T o understand technical reality in contract farming I had to understand the agricultural 
knowledge prevalent in the company, and the learning processes o f company researchers and 
technicians, as well as the specific, but diverse, farming practices in the field. Hence, I had to 
assume a learning role to grapple with the technicalities o f agricultural production (cf. Agar 
1986). Although I focused much on technology-related issues, unstructured conversations and 
reflections on recent events allowed me to uncover the social dimensions o f technology transfer 
and skill formation. The analysis o f the technical dimensions of specific production problems is 
informed by interviews with company researchers, production managers, and technicians. In 
addition, I read relevant technical literature and used secondary sources, which was further 
supplemented by interviews with both corporate and public scientists and technologists in 
Southeast Asia, USA and Europe. At the local level, I followed how growers gained valuable 
technical knowledge from company research and their conversations with technicians, but I also 
discovered many ways in which growers adapted the prescribed and standardised technological 
systems for their own purposes. Semi-structured surveys were carried out to let people reflect on 
a series o f farm management seminars, in the case o f asparagus growing, and on land use and 
production risks, in the case of hybrid maize seed production. 
The two case studies are different, both in types o f agricultural commodities as well as in 
kinds of management practices, and, consequendy, I examined these aspects differently in each 
case. In the case o f asparagus, detailed case studies o f five producers and a survey among farm 
workers generated the main body o f data at farm level about technology adaptation, 
organisation o f work, and natural and technical conditions o f production. Life histories o f these 
producers were documented, and included the history o f land ownership, business ventures, 
work experience, and political careers. Besides, I attended a large number o f seminars, formal 
meetings, and on-farm discussions in which company personnel instructed growers about good 
agricultural practices. In the case o f maize seed, my focus was on variation in yield and on 
production risks intrinsic to hybrid maize seed production. T o map the technical puzzles 
intrinsic to hybrid maize seed production I interviewed breeders and seed specialists in the 
Philippines and USA. The technical qualities o f seed production related strongly to land use 
issues in the irrigation scheme; I attended a series o f meetings o f the irrigation association, and I 
followed management o f water distribution. 
Discussing performance o f technologies with growers and technicians allowed me to picture 
the technological elements o f this production system. However, performance theory also 
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concerns itself with the stage management o f events (Richards 1996). Therefore, I combined my 
technological interests with observing co-operative procedures and the execution o f tasks at all 
institutional layers o f the production scheme. The promise o f such an ethnography is to 
produce new tools for managing layered organisations, to find new ways o f building 
technological competence, and to challenge prevalent managerial decisions and assumptions.8 
STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK 
How growers and company make contract farming work is the overarching theme in this b o o k 
The establishment o f contract farming in tropical regions can be seen as an institutionally 
innovative arrangement; wherein growers' competence to deal with new financial, organisational 
and technological conditions importandy affects whether a scheme is going to yield improved 
income and productivity or not. Furthermore, the company's remote control over key-activities 
in agricultural production and its capability to deal with technological uncertainties intrinsic to 
agriculture are equally important for achievements in contract growing. Therefore, the study 
explores the institutional and technological disposition o f contract farming schemes. 
The continuous drawing o f boundaries between firm, farm and society challenges 
straightforward managerial perspectives. Obviously, managerial perspectives have their limits, 
and we have to bring in society and technology to comprehend the dynamics o f a production 
scheme. Moreover, due to the difficulty to industrialise agricultural production, leading to 
uncertainty and incoherence in production, the substance o f technology is a major element in 
the analysis. The case study material examines institutional forms, i.e. task groups in contract 
growing schemes, which bear on how technology works. In doing so, I hope to feed a dual 
technical and social perspective into managerial thinking and policy making, which stands close 
to the question o f how to organise things differently. 
The material in this book also reflects on larger issues, although in less depth; in particular 
through analysing the sWfting boundary between the project and society. The permeable 
boundary o f workspace and social life, a recurrent issue in this book, is strongly associated with 
the wider social impact o f these new arrangements. The observation that contract growing often 
is an unstable arrangement raises issues o f cost and risk sharing, increases in productivity and 
wealth, and peace and security. Likewise, the fairness o f the deal is affected by the space 
available to regulate agricultural production in such a way that both company and growers feel 
accountable to the enterprise. Accordingly, this study opens up to scrutiny the level o f 
accountability and sustainability o f new forms o f governance in globalising agriculture. 
So, the study surrounds both the conditions under which new institutional forms can yield 
sustainable growth in agricultural production and the organisational features o f technological 
change in an unstable agrarian society. Thus, the question how contract farming is done also 
relates to the wider question whether it is a politically and socially durable form o f development. 
However, the importance o f these wider questions is, in practical terms, investigated within the 
boundaries o f two production schemes, which boils down to understanding the substance o f the 
organisation and the technology after the negotiated deal is closed. 
The book starts of f by introducing the social history o f farmers and agribusiness companies 
in the regional political economy o f the province o f South Cotabato in chapter 2. Chapter 2 tells 
the story o f agrarian communities in Southern Mindanao, and identifies the changes in the 
region as a result o f settlement programmes and agribusiness expansion. It sketches a picture 
wherein large-scale enclave export agriculture co-exists with small and medium family farming. 
The research was located near General Santos City, an expanding and industrialising urban area, 
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in the province o f South Cotabato, Mindanao. Since the 1960s, the region has attracted 
investments o f international and national agribusiness firms. The Philippine government 
labelled the region as a major target area for agro-industrial growth. Both led to the integration 
o f small-scale farmers in production schemes for export or urban markets (Tiglao 1994). As a 
result, contract growing is now widespread within the region. A brief analysis o f modernisation 
in small-scale maize farming provides the starting point for considering how farmers enter a 
contractual arrangement with an agribusiness company. Discussion o f the various modes o f 
integration in the fresh fruit and vegetable industry and in the livestock and feed industry, 
including seed production, provides the context for the two case studies central to this book. 
Chapter 3 examines both the making and selling o f the contract, the constitution o f 
organisational life, the administration and financial monitoring o f economic activities, and the 
forms o f performance review in contract growing o f asparagus. The central question dealt with 
in this chapter is how does company management assess the financial performance o f 
decentralised units and how does it evaluate and redesign pricing and reward mechanisms 
operational in its venture. This chapter takes up MacKenzie's (1992) suggestion for an ethno-
accountancy o f the financial aspects o f institutional and technical change. This involves 
answering questions how growers and company make a financial reckoning, and what is the 
adequacy o f that financial reckoning in a particular organisational framework? Following Miller's 
(1994) agenda, I combine this ethnography with an analysis o f accounting which points out 
conflicting interests at stake, and mechanisms through which power is exercised. This 
combination reveals how the organisational design and technology o f accounting and financial 
information systems can become a politicised issue during negotiations in the production 
scheme. Correspondingly, the chapter investigates the functioning o f the accounting system, the 
(divergent) notions o f profit sharing, and the range o f definitions o f economic obligations as 
contingent and negotiable variables in a growing scheme. 
The issue o f control is explored in chapter 4. This chapter examines forms o f supervision, 
labour recruitment and collaborative problem-solving activities in the fields o f asparagus 
growers. The premise o f the chapter is that integration o f farms, exemplified by contract 
farming, is importantly directed by the prescription o f farming practices, the transfer of 
technological artefacts, and the control over human activity, rather than through formalised 
authority over land use. Despite the functionality o f contract farming for overall corporate 
strategy, many organisational and technological puzzles are still hidden behind the formal 
contract. Therefore, the analysis o f integration o f independent farm enterprises should not be 
limited to formal and associative factors. The institutional and organisational configurations o f 
contract farming are extremely varied, and it is precisely the composite problem o f control and 
interaction that is investigated here. Consequendy, this chapter develops an organisational and 
managerial argument deriving from the specific combination o f labour and technology in the 
agricultural labour process. 
Chapters 5 collects the insights o f the previous chapters into an analysis o f organisational 
cultures in contract growing, to allow analysis o f the various perceptions on contractual 
arrangements in a single scheme. An unspecified mixture o f coercion and control, o f persuasion 
and conventions, and o f converging self-interests, fabricates the institution o f contract farming. 
The task o f this chapter is to picture the extent to which this institutional complex is able to 
regulate organisational life and to control production processes so that it guarantees the 
company both a stable supply o f high-quality products and a lowering o f production costs. 
Whether the co-operation between company and growers sustains a profitable and stable 
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enterprise essentially depends on the capability to incorporate diverging interests into one 
organisational framework functional to production and marketing. 
Central to chapter 6 is to understand the biological basis o f technological and organisational 
change in agriculture, exemplified by performance constraints that growers o f hybrid maize seed 
are under. The biological and technological features o f hybrid maize seed production are integral 
to how growers perceive co-operation and culture in the organisation and how they picture 
themselves in the changeable process o f integration. I explore an initial assumption that the 
particular social organisation and distribution of tasks in contractual production o f hybrid maize 
seeds constrains the endeavour o f both company employees and growers to combine their 
efforts in ways that produce results. The empirical question for this chapter is how, in contract 
growing, technological problems are managed in such a way that the institutional arrangement 
still functions. And, vice versa, this chapter also questions how technical and natural conditions 
o f production interfere with the working relationship between growers and company. 
In the concluding chapter 7, I relate my institutional analysis o f contract growing to 
development questions and policy issues in the Philippines. My focus is not upon contract 
growing perse but upon the inventiveness and variation present in contractual arrangements that 
may lead to effective and socially productive modes o f incorporation and uses o f technology. I 
hope that opening the black box o f contract growing helps practitioners and policy-makers in 
forming a view o f possible futures within the context o f agro-industrialisation and 
incorporation. 
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Modernisation and Agribusiness Expansion in 
Mindanao 
ACROSS T H F , N A T I O N 
INTRODUCTION 
In 1994, national media covered the visit 
o f President Fidel Ramos and Raymond 
Boughart, Deputy Chief o f Mission o f 
the US embassy, to one o f the 
contracted asparagus farms in 
Mindanao.* This visit lent weight to the 
introduction o f contract growing 
arrangements for agricultural 
development in Mindanao. After the 
dark years o f President Marcos' 
dictatorship (1972-1986) and the 
turbulent years o f President Aquino's 
administration (1986-1992), military man 
Ramos gave a big push to the values o f 
modernisation. Thumbs up, the 
president seems to be saying, for 
economic rationality, for the benefits o f 
scientific method and modern 
technology, and for global 
competitiveness in export agriculture. 
The Ramos administration (1992-1998) insisted to build a monument to economic 
modernisation, and Mindanao became a special case for this purpose. In Mindanao, the 
Philippine government set in motion a process o f economic and technical modernisation, with a 
composite agenda; agrarian reform, agro-industrialisation, global competitiveness, and peace. In 
the 1990s, Mindanao became the target o f a series o f extensive development programmes, 
implemented by the national and local government and supported by foreign aid agencies. Until 
the 1990s, few financial resources went to the island due to government discrimination. After 
President Ramos took office in 1992, he consistently advocated his economic ambitions for 
Mindanao, exemplified by high expectations about increased levels o f productivity and technical 
change, expanded agricultural exports and integration into global markets, and a network o f 
infrastructure projects. In the eyes o f government officials and foreign donor agencies, the 
transformation in Southern Mindanao heralded a new era, after some stagnant and turbulent 
decades. The Ramos administration consistendy hunted for win-win situations, in an effort to 
overcome social and political blockages to economic progress. 
***BW» vsoçBdju »Wi km R*t<™»t*ife»g!H>H «Oos PS 
* Philippine Daily Inquirer, 28/09/94. 
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In this context, Philippine media and policy makers presented contract growers as a new class 
o f modern agriculturists; contract growing in South Cotabato has become a case in itself for 
modernisation. The proposed organisational changes in agricultural production were motivated 
by the idea that it would put an end to stagnation in agricultural production and in export. 
Obviously, such an idea invites further investigation o f the history o f modernisation and 
integration in Mindanao. Hence, the purpose of this chapter is to present a social history o f the 
impact o f world trade and technical modernisation in the regional agricultural export economy 
within which the organisational activity o f contracted production takes place. The focus is on 
events relevant for understanding social, political and economic conditions in the specific 
context o f the municipality Polomolok, in the Koronadal Valley in the province o f South 
Cotabato, where this study o f contract farming is located. 
The description o f pre-existing pattern o f lands and forms o f social organisation in the first 
section serves to prepare the way for analysis o f the more recent processes o f modernisation 
and integration. It establishes that contract growing schemes are embedded in a landscape 
shaped by Muslim landowners, Christian settlers and agribusiness. Section two, on constraints in 
maize agriculture, illuminates the point o f departure for most (future) contract growers. The 
supportive role o f local and national government in the expansion o f agribusiness and the drive 
for corporate-led agro-industrialisation is discussed in section three, which describes the regional 
policy arena within which contract growing arrangements take shape. Finally, I will describe the 
expansion o f contract growing in two distinct commodity systems, the fruit and vegetable 
system and the maize (seed and feed) and livestock system; these two systems dominate 
integration and modernisation in the municipality, and are the central case studies in this book. 
L A N D , FARMERS AND AGRIBUSINESS 
I start o f f this brief social history o f the region with a quotation from the book edited by McCoy 
and de Jesus, explaining the focus on the social history o f a regional political economy: 
The Philippines did not develop as a unitary colonial economy oriented towards a single 
satellite entrepot at Manila. Instead, the archipelago emerged as a series of separate societies 
that entered the world economic system at different times, under different terms o f trade, and 
with different systems of production. (McCoy 1982: 8) 
It appears that linkages to world markets, rather than to the national government and to Manila, 
consistently formed the dominant stimuli for local transformation in Mindanao. The more 
recent expansion o f contract growing arrangements in the province, linking multinational 
agribusiness with local farmers, builds on these earlier processes o f integration and social 
transformation in Southern Mindanao, which will be discussed here. 
The social history under consideration emphasises the importance o f land as a key-asset in 
the process o f economic integration and agricultural modernisation in Southern Mindanao. 
Three consecutive historical processes are o f special relevance for the analysis: the integration o f 
Muslim Mindanao during the American colonial administration in the first half o f the 2 0 * 
century, the large influx o f Christian settlers after the Second World War, and the accelerating 
expansion o f agribusiness since the 1960s. Since the Second World War Mindanao has served as 
an agricultural frontier for solving agrarian unrest in Luzon by absorbing an endless stream o f 
migrants, resulting in a majority o f (Christian) settlers in Southern Mindanao. Simultaneously, 
the exploitation o f the island's resources accelerated after the arrival o f American and Philippine 
corporations; these businesses built up large plantations and ranches or they expanded into 
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logging and mining. The establishment o f a vast pineapple plantation by Dole in 1963, in 
combination with a series o f government programmes in maize production in the 1970s and 
1980s, moulded contemporary development processes in this most southern part o f Mindanao. 
These developments were encouraged by the national government and resulted in a parallel 
system o f enclave plantations and small-scale farming. 
Commerce, agriculture and politics in the late 19h century 
Commerce and agricultural productivity have been closely linked in Mindanao's history. In the 
18 t h and 19 t h century, the Muslim sultanates in Southern Mindanao were engaged in the export 
o f agricultural commodities and other trading activities. An important feature o f the 
development in these provinces is that Spanish colonial rule had failed to penetrate into the 
Muslim south. Accordingly, various sultanates and allied local leaders, dams,* of the 
Maguindanao tribe dominated the valleys and coasts in this part o f Mindanao and they 
continuously took up a leading position in commerce and in agricultural production. 
O f special relevance for this study are the Maguindanao sultanates in the Cotabato delta and 
the Pulangi Valley, north o f the research location (map 2.1). These sultanates maintained a 
symbiotic relationship; the Cotabato sultanate was the trading centre for the Buayan sultanate, 
which controlled agricultural production on the fertile soils in the Pulangi river valley (lleto 
1971). 1 The well-cultivated fields in the Pulangi Valley produced sugar cane, rice, coffee, cacao, 
maize, coconut and fruits. The power o f the leaders and landowners in the valley seems to have 
been based on "the production o f rice with slave labour, the collection o f dues from Muslim 
peasants and the taking o f tribute from upland pagans." (Beckett 1982: 396). 
So, agricultural production was in the hands o f 'petty' sultanates or datus. In Maguindanao, 
the power o f datus mainly depended on wealth and tides were neither very clearly defined nor 
hereditary.2 Datus relied on slaves, war captives, debt bondsmen and free subjects for the 
production o f export crops on large tracts o f land under their control. Commerce was 
stimulating agricultural productivity and the wealth o f local sultans depended importantly on 
agricultural export. The agrarian economy was able to generate surplus for trade, which was the 
foundation o f the wealth and influence o f the local datus. 
Until the late 1 9 * century, the Spanish colonisers did not succeed to control trade, 
production and politics in this part o f the island. However, they gained a foothold in Cotabato 
due to the sultan o f Cotabato's mounting dependence on Spain for the maintenance o f his 
influence over the agricultural areas in the valley. The Spanish colonial administration tried to 
expand its influence over commercial and political affairs and to get access to the fertile plains. 
Until the end o f the 1 9 * century, Cotabato was a door to the world, particularly for trade with 
other sultanates in Sulu and in the Malay world. Through its alliance with the sultan o f 
Cotabato, the Spanish administration was able to block the crucial trading route for the 
sultanates in the Pulangi Valley. The collaboration with the Spanish colonial administration 
exposed the fragility o f Cotabato's control over the fragmented sultanates in the Pulangi Valley, 
where most o f the export product came from. Seemingly, the sultan o f Cotabato acted as a paid 
official o f the colonial administration and this reshaped Maguindanao internal polity. 
* A datu is considered a political and economic leader in the Muslim world in the Philippines. 
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Soon, it appeared that the Spaniards had overestimated the power o f the sultan o f Cotabato, 
as exemplified by the independent route taken by the sultanates in the interior. In their 
opposition to the new vigour in Spanish policy towards the Muslims, the numerous small 
sultanates in the interior, often living in mutual rivalry, united under the leadership o f the 
wealthy and powerful datu Uto. His accumulated wealth, marriages and control over a large 
numbers o f slaves paved the way for his leadership and enabled him to unify the fragmented 
sultanates for a period o f three decades. 
In their collective opposition to Spanish dominance, the sultanates in Pulangi Valley began to 
look for an independent outlet for export o f agricultural products. Sarangani Bay, the natural 
harbour at the southern border o f the valley in which the research area is located, became a 
transit port for export to the Sulu sultanate and to the rest o f the Malay world.3 After the 
Spanish military campaigns, migration from the Pulangi Valley to Sarangani Bay and the 
adjacent Koronadal Valley accelerated. Besides, after the conquest o f Davao in 1848, local 
Muslim leaders transferred their seats to Sarangani Bay. Hence, due to the intensified Spanish 
aggression and due to the related polarisation between the Cotabato sultanate and the sultanates 
in the upper valley in the 1860s, the bay was increasingly used for exporting agricultural 
commodities, importing arms, and smuggling. It had also become the principal market for slaves 
after the closure o f slave sources in Luzon and the Visayas. Thus, the flourishing o f Sarangani 
Bay was made possible by the absence o f Spanish control. The Cotabato sultanate remained 
strongly oriented towards the rest o f the Spanish controlled Philippine islands, with Manila as 
centre. The sultanates in the Pulangi Valley skilfully participated in parallel systems o f trade and 
communication during the 1860s and 1870s. 4 Trade both with Spain and with the Malay world 
continued. War in 1886 disrupted this coexistence. 
A military solution to the 'Mindanao problem' increasingly claimed attention in the Spanish 
administration and the sultanates in the Pulangi Valley became involved in a disruptive war. 
Furthermore, Spanish missionaries slowly gained ground in the tribal communities, which had 
become the main source o f slaves and labourers for datus. Jesuits organised converted former 
slaves, introduced education and created new alliances. In Sarangani Bay and Koronadal Valley 
the B 'kan tribe was the largest population. During the 2 0 * century, the B'laans lost much o f 
their land both to Muslim sultanates, Christian settlers and agribusiness, as a result o f which 
they were pushed into the mountains. The presence o f Catholic missionaries threatened one o f 
the main underpinnings o f the production o f agricultural surplus in Muslim society: the 
employment o f slaves and bonded labour in intensive agricultural production. Together with the 
military threat to the benefits derived from trade many datus and local sultanates reconsidered 
their position and the unified front against Spain lost its strength. 
By the year 1898, military campaigns and the on-going naval blockade had neutralised the 
allied sultanates. In that same year, the United States o f America took over power in the 
Philippines. This was a result o f the Spanish-American war over independence in Cuba. The 
Philippines, as a Spanish colony, was included in this war. The Americans supported the 
Philippine nationalist movement, founded in 1892, and eventually Spain capitulated. Secretive 
negotiations between Spain and the USA resulted in a treaty signed in Paris in which Spain 
surrendered the Philippine archipelago for the largely symbolic sum o f twenty million US 
dollar.5 Remarkably, Mindanao was included in the American jurisdiction by the treaty o f Paris, 
although Spain never had any effective control over most o f the island. 
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American colonial policy: 1898-1935 
The gradual integration o f Mindanao into the Philippine economy and into world markets 
continued with the arrival o f the American colonial administration. During the early phase o f 
American colonialism, the new administration adopted a policy o f non-interference in the 
Muslim areas (CCP 1994) and it concentrated its military campaigns in Luzon and the Visayas, 
which lasted until 1905. At the turn o f the 19 t h century, however, the American government also 
showed its military might in Mindanao. In 1899, American forces arrived in the Pulangi Valley 
and a series o f military campaigns followed. Later the American government adopted a more 
subtle approach centring on integration and pacification o f the Muslim south (Tan 1995). The 
three basic thrusts o f American policy makers were (1) pacification of the non-Christian 
portions in the southern regions o f the colony; (2) the integration o f the Philippine colony into 
the American market; and (3) the rationalisation o f land ownership (Paderanga 1995). These 
three pillars o f American colonialism had a lasting impact on development in the southern 
regions o f Mindanao, as will be shown in the following paragraphs. 
In their pursuit o f pacification, the Americans had to work with a segmented polity in which 
the basic building blocks were the local datudoms (Beckett 1994). Had the Spanish colonial rule 
failed to penetrate into the southern regions o f Mindanao, the American government succeeded 
to enrol local leaders in their drive to exploit the region's vast resources. The Americans 
combined direct rule over the Muslim provinces with a policy o f attraction. They created 
provincial and district institutions, established a public school system, and implemented an 
American-inspired judicial system (CCP 1994). The American government explicidy by-passed 
the sultanates, and incorporated local datus as gatekeepers (Beckett 1982, 1994, Tan and Wadi 
1995). Datus became key players in the so-called Pax Americana that prevailed after 1904. 6 
Through the creation o f new alliances with a localised composite elite the Americans changed 
the political and economic order. According to Beckett (1994), a new type o f data gained 
ground, with an ambiguous position; the new datu mediated policies o f the colonial government 
and, from the other end, the datu mediated the integration and/or resistance by his followers to 
the American presence in political and economic spheres. Already during the last phase o f the 
Spanish administration, many datus in the Sarangani Bay gained wealth through co-operating 
with the Spanish establishment. Also new datus emerged by making themselves useful to the 
colonial authorities. The commercialisation o f agriculture induced the rise o f a new class o f 
small and medium Muslim farmers whose participation in commercial agriculture turned the 
fertile valley o f Pulangi into the rice bowl o f the South (Beckett 1982). Many o f these datus 
found a foothold in the colonial order while their constituency was barely integrated with the 
rest o f the Philippines (Beckett 1982). 
Hence, the position o f local datus was entrenched in the colonial system. Although the local 
datus appear to be autonomous in theory, in practice they relied strongly on others either for 
trade or for the supply o f agricultural products. Also with the arrival o f the American colonial 
administration, these fragmented sultanates importantly constructed social and economic 
development in the beginning o f the 2 0 * century. Relatively few datus emerged as rural 
entrepreneurs and during the American colonial era many assumed political office o f greater 
importance (including the control over local police). This situation continued after 
independence; Maguindanao leaders held political office and were still concentrated in the rural 
areas.7 The datus' political and economic control over ordinary people was their main asset; 
although the colonial administration successfully abolished the practice o f slavery. The 
American authorities relied on these brokers in their endeavour to pacify and integrate the 
Muslim south. Thus, in the beginning o f the 2 0 * century most o f the power in the valleys o f our 
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concern remained with the local datus, who interacted closely with the colonial administration, 
who were engaged in commerce and who largely controlled agricultural production in the 
valleys. However, in the decades following the Second World War and Philippine Independence 
in 1946, the domains o f the Muslim population and its dependent tribes shrank (Azurin 1996), 
something accelerated by the influx o f setders. 
The American authorities combined this political game with a programme for economic 
integration. The production o f primary goods was strongly encouraged, amongst others by 
lowering trade tariffs (Paderanga 1995). Congress seriously discussed the possibility o f turning 
Mindanao into a territory o f the US (Rodil 1994). As a result o f the opening up o f Mindanao, 
American business interests with resources to develop the potential o f the area established 
themselves (Tan 1995). In 1919 and 1929 B.F . Goodrich and Goodyear Tire and Rubber 
Company ventured into rubber plantations. The Philippine Packing Corporation, a subsidiary o f 
the American firm California Packing Corporation later to become Del Monte, commenced 
production in Northern Mindanao in response to pest problems in Hawaii in 1926. After a first 
surveillance demonstrated that rainfall and soil conditions made the land in Northern Mindanao 
very suitable for pineapple production, the company initiated lease contracts with the 
government and with homesteaders who had claimed land. Later, in 1938, the company 
subleased 9,000 hectares from the government owned National Development Corporation. 
Earlier, the corporation had explored the possibility o f organising large-scale plantations in 
Sarangani Bay. Plant diseases hampered this project and the area became a timber zone instead. 
So during American colonialism a limited number o f large plantations were developed in 
specific areas, but plantation development was relatively slow in the pre-war period and 
Mindanao was not transformed into a pure plantation economy. 
Aside from these plantation firms, American planters were attracted by the potential o f 
Mindanao. Beginning in 1913-14, emerging extensive cattle ranches in Bukidnon in Northern 
Mindanao left their mark in terms o f land use. Thousands o f hectares were leased to American 
and Philippine businessmen as pasture land; ranching became a business for absentee landlords 
(Edgerton 1982). Moreover, American planters pioneered in developing agricultural enterprises 
under difficult conditions in Southern Mindanao. They placed faith in hemp and coconut but 
many enterprises failed to take off . 8 Yet, American entrepreneurs did not have a strong presence 
in Mindanao during the early years o f American colonialism. This did not change gready during 
the years preceding the Japanese invasion in World War II (Hartley 1982). 
An important reason for the slow pace o f the expansion o f plantation agriculture was the bias 
against large-scale agriculture in American land legislation. The colonial administration passed 
several new laws regulating both the possession and ownership o f private land and the 
disposition o f public land. The most obvious result o f these laws was to facilitate the opening 
up o f new land in frontier areas, especially in Mindanao (Paderanga 1995). American regulation 
o f land use was patterned after the legal framework designed for the large frontier in the west o f 
the United States o f America. It fixed limits for agricultural land at 16 hectares for individuals 
and 1,024 hectares for corporations (Hayami et al. 1990). 9 The colonial government was afraid 
o f an influx o f large-scale American investment; it wanted to avoid that the country would run 
into a plantation economy, which would reduce the population to being a nation o f plantation 
labourers (Pelzer 1948). 1 0 
Another important facet o f the American land use policy was the introduction o f a 
homestead system during the colonial administration, reflecting the American desire to place 
smallholders on the land and to prevent plantation agriculture (Spencer 1952). 1 1 This system 
allowed Philippine citizens to apply for lots o f 24 hectares, under the condition that they were 
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prepared to establish, cultivate and maintain farms in frontier areas. At the turn o f the century 
there were hardly any Christian Filipinos in Mindanao, except in a narrow strip at the north-west 
coast. The American government, however, encouraged the migration o f Christian farmers and 
farm workers from the densely populated regions in northern Philippines to exploit frontiers in 
Mindanao. The land laws were designed to guarantee ownership o f new land that was supposed 
to stimulate landless families to set out for the frontier and claim their portion Paderanga 
1995). As part o f this general policy, the colonial government tried to form agricultural colonies 
in the heartland o f the Maguindanao datudoms. In Sarangani Bay, one agricultural colony was 
established in Glan in 1913 (map 2.1). Like most other colonies, this colony was a failure from 
an economic point o f view and in 1917 the American government discontinued its policy 
(Pelzer 1948). However, the government continued to stimulate migration o f those who had 
sufficient funds to develop agricultural lands. 
Land ownership through legal instruments became the underlying concept o f land 
distribution, which contradicted the concept of land ownership in the Muslim areas (Tan 1995). 
While the American legislation carefully arranged the ownership o f new land, the administration 
did less to facilitate the formal ownership o f land by those who used the land before the arrival 
o f the colonial authorities. In its attempt to rationalise land ownership, the colonial 
administration wanted land to be registered; a plot had to be surveyed and its ownership had to 
be proven in court. All unclaimed land was considered to be public land, which was opened to 
settlers and business interests. The allocation o f land classified as 'virgin', especially timber 
concessions were concerned, became a government responsibility, which, eventually, proved to 
be more political than bureaucratic, (Beckett 1994). The nature o f land ownership in 
Maguindanao society (based on communal tenure by clan or family) was incompatible with a 
system where land title had been recorded on individual basis (Mastura 1988b). Datus were not 
able to maintain their customary right o f disposing land. Under the American legislation, land 
titles became an indispensable element for participation in the developing market economy, 
especially after the commercialisation o f agriculture gained momentum in the so-called frontier 
areas in Mindanao (Muslim 1994). 
In sum, the American administration's strongest measure was the introduction o f a land 
policy, which sharply outlined the future contours o f agricultural development in Southern 
Mindanao. In the 2 0 * century, Mindanao was the last frontier for colonisation, and after World 
War I I an unremitting flow o f settlers and migrants confronted the original Maguindanao 
inhabitants and other peoples. During the years o f the Commonwealth in the Philippines (1935-
1946), the colonisation o f the frontier areas finally gained speed. The Philippine government 
carried on promoting migration and Mindanao became the land o f promise to many small 
settlers from the Visayas and Luzon. Combined with the entry o f large, centrally managed 
plantations and corporations, facilitated by the National Development Corporation, the 
encroachment o f Christian settlers into Muslim domains led to turbulent political conflict in the 
1970s. 
Settlement in the Mindanao frontier: 1935-1946 
Virtually all agricultural growth in the Southern Mindanao came from increases in the physical 
area o f land under cultivation, mainly induced by government-sponsored settlements in the 
frontier regions (Paderanga 1995). In 1935, the Commonwealth began to implement the 
Colonization Act, which, in fact, meant a continuation o f the American policy to exploit new 
lands in the frontier areas in the south o f the Philippines. The National Land Settlement 
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Administration (N.L.S.A.) was founded and the general Paulino Santos, a confidant o f then 
President Quezon, was appointed to survey the land in Southern Mindanao and to supervise the 
settlement. After a first survey, the Koronadal Valley 1 2 north o f Sarangani Bay was selected for 
the first batch o f settlers, which arrived in the town Buayan at the seashore in 1939. The valley 
was recommended by general Santos, who observed that the region had an equable area, thick 
soils and was free from devastating storms (Ramirez 1993). The clearing o f the open grasslands 
promised to be a cosdy process, and, according to government employees, the climate would 
necessitate irrigation. Nevertheless, the Koronadal Valley was first choice, and in 1939 building 
o f roads and surveying o f public lands commenced, a task assigned to the young general Paulino 
Santos. The settlement programme led by him importandy designed the social infrastructure in 
the area, both in terms o f land distribution and in terms o f politics.* 
According to eady government reports, the valley was thinly populated. However, the 
government did not know the exact numbers o f Maguindanaons (the dominant Muslim tribe in 
this region) and Lumads (the hill tribes in the area) (Peizer 1948). So, the datus wrested a verbal 
assurance that existing land rights were respected but no definite arrangements were made, 
neither did the government determine how much land had to be reserved for inhabitants o f the 
valley (Peizer 1948). Until 1960, demographic changes could still be absorbed by the distribution 
o f public land, albeit Maguindanao peasants had to live through the encroachment o f Christian 
settlers. American land policies meant the jurisdiction over land o f the Muslim leaders had 
eroded. Furthermore, hardly any vacant land was available for newly arrived migrants after 1960, 
which caused tensions between Muslim and Christian peasants. The influx o f migrants into 
Mindanao accelerated in the 1960s (figure 2.1). It is estimated that more people came voluntarily 
than through organised channels; information that flowed back to the former provinces o f the 
settlers induced a long-term voluntary stream o f migrants (Paderanga 1995, Rodil 1994). 
With regards to changing political conditions, we can say that in the years following the war 
collaboration o f and alliances with local Muslim leaders formed the corner stones o f the 
settlement programme in Koronadal Valley. This would change, however, with the arrival o f 
large numbers o f settlers and, at a later stage, o f workers in the area, which entailed an 
increasing number o f Christian newcomers occupying political positions (table 2.1). 
In the early years o f the settlement programmes, Maguindanao politicians were mainly 
concerned with maintaining good relations with Christian votes, ignoring the changing 
conditions in Mindanao (Beckett 1994: 294). The elections in 1971 made clear that this game 
was over, especially in areas where rivalry between Muslim and Christian politicians was intense 
(Rodil 1994). The political power o f Muslim leaders was challenged by incoming Christian 
politicians, a result o f the electoral politics institutionalised by the Americans, which allowed 
competing elites to extend and consolidate their leadership (de Jesus 1982). In 1964, the first 
elected mayor was installed in Polomolok; in 1966 the province o f Cotabato was divided into 
North Cotabato and South Cotabato, which engendered a concentration o f Muslims in North 
Cotabato and a dominance o f Christian settlers in South Cotabato, in which Polomolok was 
located. 1 3 Since then, Christian inhabitants o f the municipality have dominated political office in 
the province as well as in General Santos City. 
These factors turned out to be the main reasons for conflict between Muslim farmers and 
landowners and Christian settlers (Fianza 1994a). 1 4 Despite increasing land pressure and rising 
political tensions, the National Development Corporation (NDC) facilitated the development o f 
a large-scale pineapple plantation in the municipality o f Polomolok in 1963. In addition to the 
See appendix 1 for amore detailed account of the first years of the setdement programme. 
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encroachment o f settlers into the Muslim areas, the expansion o f export plantations generated 
further contradictions in land-use policy in later years (Hayami et al. 1990). 1 5 
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Figure 2.1: Population growth in the province of Cotabato (1903-1990) 
Sources: various censuses on population and housing by different ministries 
Table 2.1: Population shifts in Cotabato (North Cotabato, South Cotabato, Sarangani Sultan Kudarat and 
Maguindanao) in the period 1918-1970: percentages of Muslims, indigenous tribes and Christian migrants. 
Year Muslim Indigenous tribes Christian migrants 
1918 60% 2 5 % 2.5% 
1939 5 5 % 2 5 % 2 0 % 
1948 3 5 % 9 % 5 5 % 
1970 2 8 % 7% 67% 
Source: Rodil 1994: 99, censuses of 1918,1939, 1948,1970 
Further expansion of agribusiness after 1960 
In the 1960s, N D C , a government corporation established in 1937, became a key player in the 
lease o f large tracks o f public land and, hence, in the development o f plantation agriculture in 
Mindanao. 1 6 N D C was allowed to contract lease agreements with foreign and domestic 
investors for the exploitation o f public agricultural and mineral lands over and above the 1,024-
hectare limit stipulated by earlier American land-use legislation, and confirmed by the 1935 
Philippine Constitution (Hayami et al 1990: 43). Although the legal and constitutional 
restrictions on purchase and lease o f large tracks o f land introduced during the American and 
the Commonwealth periods also prevailed after independence in 1946, this did not prevent the 
development o f two large-scale pineapple plantations in Mindanao (Ofreneo 1987). Since the 
1930s, the National Development Corporation (NDC) created the opportunities for 
agribusiness to pursue this mode o f agricultural expansion by assisting in acquisition o f lands. In 
the 1930s, N D C helped Del Monte to start its pineapple plantation in Northern Mindanao. In 
the 1960s, it paved the way for Dole by providing similar lease agreements. 1 7 For several 
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decades their pineapple and banana plantations were tantamount to export agriculture in 
Mindanao. 1 8 
In Northern Mindanao, the large pineapple plantation operated by the Philippine Packing 
Corporation, then a subsidiary o f Californian Packing Corporation, later to become Del Monte, 
was inherited from the American colonial period. Almost 40 years later, the arrival o f another 
American pineapple company, Dole, then a subsidiary o f Casde and Cooke, induced a dramatic 
change in the landscape o f Polomolok. In 1962, Hawaiian officials o f the company negotiated 
with N D C the opening o f a pineapple plantation in the vicinity o f Polomolok. N D C carried out 
the open-door-policy o f the Macapagal government in these days, and it facilitated the 
beginning o f a large-scale pineapple plantation in Polomolok by arranging a sublease contract 
for 9000 hectares o f land (AFRIM 1989a). In 1963, the company finished its wharf in Sarangani 
Bay and constructed a cannery uphill near Polomolok. The first harvest o f pineapple took place 
in 1965 (Zaragoza 1988a). In Southern Mindanao, the Dole Company found suitable volcanic, 
sandy loam soils and cheap labour. 
The investment in the pineapple plantation and the canning facilities is considered to be one 
o f the biggest investments that Casde and Cooke ever made ( IBON 1990). 1 9 It was also the first 
major international move o f the company, which began the transition to a food and land 
business in the 1950s and 1960s (Hoover 1995, I U F 1979) . 2 0 In addition to the lease contract 
with N D C , Dole was able to expand its pineapple operation through farm management 
contracts with neighbouring landowners, and in 1990 this type o f contract covered about 2 5 % 
o f the total area planted. At a later stage, many o f its own employees, owning land, willingly 
entered into a lease agreement for a period o f 12 years (AFRIM 1991b). Over the years, Dole 
found several ways to gain control over land for its expanding pineapple plantation, which 
brought many new migrants to Polomolok. 
Dole's operations have been at the heart o f the municipality's economic dynamics; aside 
from employment the pineapple operations attracted much other business, such as trucking, and 
bring in much o f the tax money available to the local government. The town had become a 
draw for farm workers and tenants seeking employment as field workers or as labourers in the 
cannery; between 1960 and 1970 the population almost doubled (figure 2.2, Zaragoza 1988b). 
Mostly Christian migrants took the jobs in the cannery and in the fields, which, after the earlier 
arrival o f several batches o f settlers in the area, gave a new impulse to demographic change in 
the municipality. In 1995, more than 5 0 % o f the population is classified as urban (data provided 
by Municipal Planning and Development Co-ordinator's Office, 1995). The urban population 
was largely composed o f the families o f regular and temporary employees o f Dole and o f several 
other agribusiness firms located in the municipality; 6 0 % o f the employed labour force were 
agricultural workers (Zaragoza 1988b). 2 1 
Furthermore, its huge operation occupied much o f the arable land and, therefore, 
importantly steered agricultural development 2 2 This resulted in a situation wherein two parallel 
agricultural systems co-existed in the municipality: on the one hand a centrally managed and 
large-scale plantation and processing operation, on the other hand small and medium-scale 
maize farms in a number o f Muslim and settler communities. The history o f agribusiness 
expansion in Mindanao illuminates the dominance o f plantation type production; farmers were 
largely excluded from these export enclaves and operated in independent commodity systems. 
The plantations were inevitably enclaves in nature, because forward and backward linkages with 
the regional economy were limited in the capital deficient areas (APRAAP 1985). The plantation 
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enclaves, and large landholdings, operated parallel to small and medium-scale farms in Southern 
Mindanao.* 
In the remainder o f this chapter I will describe (1) the social and economic situation in small-
scale maize farming, (2) the regional polity around agribusiness expansion, and (3) the more 
recent integration o f former maize farmers into advanced agribusiness systems. 
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Figure 2.2: Population growth in the municipality of Polomolok (1960-1995) 
Sources: MCSC Integrated Census of Population, Municipal Planning and Development Co-ordinator's Office, NSO. 
* See appendix 2 for more details about Dole's history in the Philippines. 
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Map 2.2: Land use in South Cotabato and Sarangani provinces 
Source: Growth plan project for South Cotabato/Sarangani/General Santos City 
Scale 1: 7 0 0 , 0 0 0 
Source: Growth plan project for South Cotabato/Sarangani/General Santos City 
Scale 1:700,000 
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TECHNOLOGY, CREDIT AND PRICES IN MAIZE AGRICULTURE 
In general terms, the landscape in South Cotabato is made up o f a large number o f maize farms 
with a blend o f export crop plantations, livestock ranches and vacant grasslands (map 2.2 and 
table 2.2). The large banana and coconut plantations o f Philippine landowners were 
concentrated eastwards, towards Davao City. A couple o f large ranches, prawn farms and 
banana plantations owned by a few families were located along the coast o f Sarangani Bay. The 
harbour o f General Santos City is mainly shipping canned pineapple, grain (yellow maize) and 
copra, and cattle. 
In the research location, a large-scale pineapple plantation on the volcanic hills dominates the 
landscape (table 2.3). literally on the other side o f the road, mainly small and medium maize 
farms mark out the physical limits o f the villages. This section describes developments in maize 
agriculture and its linkages with livestock and seed industries. It further outlines how maize 
farmers in Polomolok were tempted to shift to alternative crops due to declining prices and 
difficult credit terms. Despite the increasing demand, the maize industry remained a fragile and 
uncertain sector to operate in because o f little technological improvement, constraints over 
credit terms, and fluctuating, unfavourable price levels. These factors will be examined in the 
following paragraphs. 
Table 2.2: Area planted by type of crops in South Cotabato, Sarangani, and General Santos City in 1992 
CROPS Percentage of total planted area 
(690,000 hectares) 
Maize (yellow and white) 6 9 % 
Coconut 1 7 % 
Rice 1 0 % 
Pineapple 2 % 
Cotton < 1 % 
Vegetables < 1 % 
Coffee < Vz % 
Banana < Vz % 
Mango < Vz % 
Source: Department of Agriculture, in: USAID (n.d.) 
Table 2.3: Distribution of agricultural land by crops planted in the municipality of Polomolok in 1995. 
CROPS Percentage of total planted area 
(23,200 hectares) 
Pineapple 64% 
Maize (yellow and white) 18% 
Asparagus 7% 
Other commercial crops 7% 
Other food crops 3 % 
Coconut 1% 
Source: Municipal Department of Agriculture 
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Modernisation and technology 
In the Philippines, maize is a major crop, second only to rice; 2 7 % o f total arable land is planted 
with maize and 2 9 % with rice (UA&P 1997). Maize is a major staple crop, especially for 
consumers in the Visayas, and it is generally cheaper than rice. The significance o f maize as a 
staple crop maize declined in the 1990s; nowadays, 60-70 per cent o f the domestic maize 
production is processed into animal feeds, only 2 2 % o f the nation's maize production is used 
for human consumption (1990 data from Bureau o f Agricultural Statistics). Mindanao 
contributes more than half to the national production. Southern Mindanao is one o f the major 
key-production areas o f yellow maize, used solely for livestock-feed; in 1993 and 1994 the 
region contributed 2 7 % o f the total maize production (CRC 1994, F R L D 1993). Cagayan Valley, 
in Northern Luzon, is the second major production area, contributing around 1 0 % to total 
maize production (UA&P 1997, CRC 1994). 
The demand for feed grains has been rising due to the demand from the poultry and 
livestock industries. However, national production and total maize area declined in the same 
period (UA&P 1997). 2 3 Also in Southern Mindanao, production o f yellow maize had difficulties 
in meeting the demand o f the growing swine and poultry industry, due to conversion o f land 
and unstable production. Recurrent production problems set clear limitations for maize farmers 
in South Cotabato; they were confronted with harsh environmental conditions and a high 
incidence o f pests and diseases, and a slow pace o f technological progress in maize (Lales 1996, 
Iiorito 1996). The lack o f biological and chemical innovations is, however, frequently 
mentioned as a major reason for the failure o f land reform programmes, including that o f the 
Marcos-administration and the accompanying modernisation programmes Quisumbing 1990, 
Cornista et aL 1987). Low average yields o f 1-1.5 ton per hectare remained a common feature o f 
maize production in Southern Mindanao, even though the development o f the feed sector and 
the integration with the livestock industry in Mindanao was accompanied by a rising application 
o f agricultural inputs. Only in the irrigated areas, production figures were slightly better, with an 
average o f 2.5-3 ton per hectare. 2 4 
The government played a prominent role in the diffusion o f modem technologies and the 
modernisation o f farms. In 1981, President Marcos started the program Maisagana in an attempt 
to make the Philippines self-sufficient in maize and to develop export capability. Central 
elements in this policy were the introduction o f a technological package (seeds, pesticides, and 
fertilisers) and the provision o f credit.2 5 President Aquino continued this policy and in 1990 the 
government launched a programme which was expected to supply the domestic feed market. 
Under President Ramos the emphasis on introducing superior maize varieties was maintained; 
also the more recent programmes aimed to supply feed to the livestock industry and, 
simultaneously, to modernise small scale farming. 
The promotion o f feed grains in combination with the usage o f hybrid maize seed has 
consistently been one o f the major programmes in agriculture o f the Philippine government 
(table 2 . 4 ) 2 6 Through the years, government shifted attention to the production o f 'yellow' 
maize, exclusively processed into feeds. Private companies actively participated in the 
development o f new plant material for yellow maize production and competition was intense 
due to the limited market. Mainly foreign companies were active in the seed market: Pioneer 
HiBred (USA), Cargill (USA) and Pacific Seeds (Australia). Pioneer controlled the largest share 
o f the market: an estimated 60-70%. 
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N a m e Programme Aim 
Maisan 77 
Maisagana Maize production 
Programme 
Expanded Yellow Maize Production 
Assistance Programme 
Accelerated Maize Production 
Assistance Programme 
Com Productivity Enhancement 
Programme 
Grain Productivity Enhancement 
Programme (GPEP) 
Medium Term Agricultural 
Development Program 
Gintong Ani for com 
Promote use of mildew resistant, good yielding open 
pollinated varieties. 
Introduce feed grain and technological package including 
hybrid seeds, fertilisers and pesticides; provide credit; 
infrastructure (Institute for Plant Breeding and private 
companies) 
Package of hybrids distributed by private companies, fertiliser 
and pesticides; use of fungicide against the downy mildew 
disease 
Loan assistance (KKK) 
Higher fertiliser usage together with improved hybrids and 
reduce post-harvest losses 
Increase production area and promote better yielding hybrids 
Focus government support on key grain production areas; 
one of the concentration areas was South Cotabato 
National self sufficiency in rice and maize by providing 
credit and facilitating market linkages and the adoption of 
modem maize technologies 
Sources: Baldos, 1993, Laies 1996, Agribusiness Monitor 1993, Llorito 1996 
Traders and credit 
The high costs o f agricultural inputs, in particular o f seed and fertilisers, formed a major 
constraint for maize farmers and made them reliant on external credit. Most farmers depended 
on traders to finance their production. In South Cotabato 6 1 % o f the farmers receive credit 
from traders, 3 3 % are able to finance production from their own resources, and only 6 % receive 
loans from rural banks. 2 7 Production costs are high, especially if farmers are engaged in the 
production o f yellow maize, which usually implies intensive use o f fertiliser and hybrid seed. 
Prices o f both inputs have continually increased (Lales 1996, Manalaysay et al. 1988). At local 
level maize farmers rely solely on local and regional traders for marketing their crop, mainly rice 
and maize. These traders buy more than 9 0 % o f the harvest and handle the transport to feed 
millers elsewhere. Remarkably, the greatest volume o f maize is traded in Manila and Cebu, 
where the major feed mills are located (Mendoza and Rosegrant 1995). The capacity o f feed 
mills in Southern Mindanao is still very limited (Llorito 1994). 
Hence, traders who provide credit, in the form o f material inputs or loans, and who have 
strong linkages with feed millers are key-players in the maize industry. Manalaysay et al. (1988: 
6-9) show that most traders in South Cotabato had multiple enterprises; they combined buying 
o f agricultural commodities with hog raising, milling, and providing production inputs. All 
traders and shippers displayed a high level o f business diversification. The precise scale o f their 
operations differed, depending on whether they operated at village level, at municipal level or at 
Table 2.4: Overview of government programmes affecting maize production in the Philippines (1977-1996) 
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regional level. Also their functions and roles varied, but linking farmers to their trade through 
the provision o f credit was a common feature of these markets, in which few buyers dominate 
trade (cf. Mendoza andRosegrant 1995). 
In these markets, traders try to maintain their market share by taking advantage o f the limited 
financing available in the area. Many o f the farmers interviewed in Polomolok referred to a 
personalised relationship with traders, either in their village or in the municipal market, or even 
with big retailers and shippers in the city (cf. Hendriks 1997). Recendy, however, these 
personalised 'suki' relationships are weakening, which indicates that farmers no longer depend 
solely on traders, because alternative buyers have entered the area. 
In interviews with a number o f key-informants, such as agriculturists and businessmen, 'pole 
vaulting' was regularly referred to; this means that farmers do not sell the complete harvest to 
the financier o f farm production but that they sell to another buyer who offers higher prices. 
People actively searching for maize from farmers and from village traders while adding a slight 
margin to the price offered by other traders also encouraged this. The result was an intense 
competition amongst buyers during certain periods o f the year (Manalaysay et al. 1988). 
Moreover, in recent years, several integrated livestock firms have become a dominant force in 
the livestock and feed industry (PPI 1991). The six leading integrated firms, headquartered in 
Manila, also operated in Polomolok; they were involved in feed milling, poultry and swine 
raising, catde ranching and meat processing ( M O D E 1996). 2 8 These firms began to buy maize 
direcdy from farmers, often after verbal contractual agreements about price and financial terms 
o f the transaction. Simultaneously, the integrators imported considerable volumes o f maize, 
although this was constrained by government regulation. In the short run farmers benefited 
from these additional buying arrangements and market outlets. In the long run, however, 
farmers might lose their access to credit sources. A parallel tendency seems to be that traders are 
faced with high rates o f default, and that they become more selective in providing credit on 
inputs. 
Prices and markets 
Generally speaking, profitability o f maize farming in Mindanao is low, which explains 
fluctuations in area planted with maize. There was litde technological progress and limited 
irrigation capacity and the dryness o f the soils in the southern parts o f the valley discouraged 
many o f the early settlers and hampered the expansion o f agriculture. So technology as much as 
credit remain major constraints in agricultural production in the settlement areas. Aside from 
low productivity and financial constraints, depreciating farm gate prices discouraged maize 
farmers. O n average, prices in Mindanao are even lower than in other parts o f the country 
(figure 2.3). This is usually explained by the oligopolistic nature o f the maize market; traders 
come of f best because they control credit and marketing. 
In the past, the Philippine government tried to establish a grip on the markets for grains, i.e. 
rice and maize, through parastatal institutions like the National Grain Authority and, later, the 
National Food Authority. These institutions were installed to buy grain for a guaranteed price 
but often lacked sufficient funding.2 9 In addition, these state agencies decided about the 
importation o f grains to protect domestic prices, but pressure from feed mills and livestock 
raisers successfully opened up the importation o f cheap maize in large volumes after 1995 (Lales 
1996, Llorito 1996). 3 0 Since 1987, the feed industry frequently imported 'cheap' maize from 
other countries (e.g. Thailand and, since 1995, USA and Argentina) and this affected commodity 
prices during specific periods in the year (PPI 1991). 
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Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, in: Feranil (1995) 
Alternatives to maize farming 
In sum, a large number o f farmers in South Cotabato specialised in the production o f yellow 
maize, which can only be sold on the market for feeds. The 'modernisation' o f their farms 
through higher and controlled levels o f input and credit, and the control o f the (increased) 
output through the organisation o f marketing and processing actually induced integration into 
markets and agro-industrial complexes beyond the influence o f individual farmers (cf. Bernstein, 
1990). Many individual farmers encountered difficulties in their effort to fortify small-scale 
production (Vellema 1994). Maize farmers were facing spiralling costs o f agricultural inputs, 
rising interest rates, declining or unstable prices, and traders who monopolise the market 
(Canlas et al. 1992). Furthermore, regular changes in weather patterns, such as excessive rainfall 
and isolated dry spells, in combination with a high incidence o f pests and diseases turned maize 
farming into a tiresome enterprise (Tanquintic 1995). In the short run, high input prices and low 
maize prices can be met by intensified production, which is difficult to realise at the current 
technical stage, or by reduced consumption. But, in the long run, farmers must find a more 
profitable crop or supplement farming by non-farm jobs. 
This dilemma was frequendy mentioned by interviewed farmers, and many had resorted 
already to alternative businesses and employment in, for example, tuna canning plants in 
General Santos City. Until the 1980s, alternatives to maize were scarcely available in South 
Cotabato. However, towards the end o f the 1980s and at the beginning o f the 1990s, the 
situation in the province changed; new crops were introduced as a result o f changing corporate 
strategies and government policies (Ellman and Greeley 1989, World Bank 1985). Consequently, 
sWfting to alternative crops has become an attractive opportunity for maize farmers in the 
province. The province provided the right venue for bringing together the parallel systems o f 
enclave export agriculture and small and medium family farming. Since the 1990s, the area was a 
focus o f various policies targeted at agribusiness expansion and institutional change. Next, I will 
discuss national and regional agendas for agricultural modernisation, supportive o f agribusiness 
expansion and stimulating to farmers' participation in growing export markets. 
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T H E MAKING OF MINDANAO INCORPORATED 
One o f the most obvious measurements for expanding agribusiness operations is the 
introduction o f contract growing schemes. In the 1960s and 1970s, contract growing 
arrangements were rarely deployed in the export-oriented agricultural sector in South Cotabato, 
except for banana production. The absence o f vacant land and the legal restrictions on land 
ownership, however, necessitated institutional innovations, such as contract farming, especially 
in Mindanao. National government and a regional alliance o f government officials and business 
people importandy changed the contours o f Mindanao's agriculture. Diverse contractual 
arrangements furthered social and technical integration o f independent growers into complex 
production and marketing schemes adopted by an internationally operating agribusiness firm. In 
the last parts o f this section, I will introduce the commodity systems and industries relevant to 
this study. 
State policy, market integration and agrarian reform 
The production o f non-traditional export crops, e.g. fruits and vegetables, and 'import-
substituting' crops, e.g. feed grains, consistendy were the pillars o f agricultural policy in the 
Philippines. During the late 1970s, the Ferdinand Marcos government (1972-1986) unfolded an 
industrialisation programme based on the twin tracks o f agro-industrialisation31 and the 
establishment o f free trade zones. 3 2 In the era o f trade liberalisation and contraction o f 
government spending, President Corazon Aquino's government (1986-1992) opted to follow 
the conditionalities for economic reform prescribed by the country's international lenders, and 
directed the economy towards export-oriented growth. The administration of President Fidel 
Ramos (1992-1998) picked up the same thread; its Medium-Term Philippine Development Plan 
follows the thrust o f integrating the Philippine economy into world markets and outlining the 
directions o f agro-industrial development (PPI 1993). 
With development hopes pinned on exports and foreign investments, setting up of agro-
industrial centres and encouraging export crop production have been major components o f the 
government's agricultural policy (cf. Williams and Karen 1985). The expansion o f export-
oriented agribusiness in Mindanao reached its height towards the end o f the 1970s. Mainly 
foreign companies were prepared to set up export-oriented production; particularly in bananas, 
the Marcos government moderated the concentration o f land. In the 1990s, the continuous 
stream o f migrants and the establishment o f large-scale plantations had exhausted Mindanao's 
land frontier. Furthermore, the investment climate in agriculture, particularly at the primary 
production level, was unfavourable £abanilla 1996b). This induced new ways to construct 
access to land and to develop new production forms, and accordingly, brought up the issue o f 
agrarian reform. 
After a popular uprising, the famous E D S A revolution in 1986 toppled the dictatorial regime 
o f President Marcos. This created space for various agrarian reform advocates to place the 
actual contribution o f large-scale export agriculture to national industrialisation and regional 
growth high on the political agenda.3 3 The views o f these agrarian advocates, most clearly 
formulated in Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano (1990), formed the basis o f several 
development plans for South Cotabato, which were later extended to overall development plans 
for Mindanao. In the ambitious Mindanao 2000 Development Framework Plan (APRAAP 
1995) the need for a new agricultural policy is brought to the fore. This development plan 
presents the following root causes for Mindanao's economic stagnation (ibid.: 10), reflecting the 
history presented earlier in this chapter: 
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• The presence of many plantation enclaves and extractive industries in the island; 
• Mindanao's backwater role o f being a food and raw material supplier to Manila and other urban 
centres in the country; 
• Regional political divisions, reflecting links o f local politicians and business cliques to the centre 
in Marcos time, which further aggravated the fragmented development o f Mindanao; 
• The continuing conflict between Muslims, Christians and other indigenous cultural groups in 
the island. 
The authors o f this framework observe low employment rates and high poverty rates in 
Mindanao, and one o f their main conclusions is that stagnation in small-scale agriculture and 
concentration o f land hinder a solution to these problems. The mtertwined interests o f the 
landed elite in Southern Mindanao and transnational agribusiness corporations and the 
concentration o f land-ownership were at the centre o f the critique, and the new government 
undertook serious efforts to re-organise the dominant organisation o f export-oriented 
agriculture. 
Although the tendency towards export-oriented development o f small and medium farms 
was reflected in government policy since the Marcos era, the real integration o f farm businesses 
and agribusiness corporations in Southern Mindanao did not begin until the late 1980s. Since 
then, government policy took up these challenges through the implementation o f an ambitious 
land reform programme, and by the design o f several development plans focused on further 
integration o f Mindanao's agriculture. Aquino's Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Programme 
(CARP) intended a drastic transfer o f ownership o f public land. The Comprehensive Agrarian 
Reform Law (CARL), signed in 1988, 3 4 covered both public and private lands, regardless o f the 
tenurial arrangements and crops produced. This was in contrast with earlier land reform 
legislation, which solely covered rice and maize farms. 3 5 Implementation o f the new law 
according to the letter would have had serious consequences for traditional landlords and for 
multinational corporations leasing public land. Understandably, the reform encountered fierce 
opposition from the land owning classes and, more carefully, from international agribusiness 
firms. 
Management o f both Dole and Del Monte anxiously waited for the outcome o f the agrarian 
reform; nevertheless, the plantations played a key role in the government's endeavour to gain 
public and political support for its reform programme. The actual design o f CARP conciliated 
the transnational corporation to be the leading edge. CARP's design included two, obviously 
contradictory aims. On the one hand, it aimed to increase the rental fees paid by the 
corporations and redirect rental income to the plantation workers. O n the other hand, it was 
meant to reassure the companies that they could sustain their operations in the country (Putzel 
1992). These corporations could comply with CARP by redistributing ownership o f the land to 
co-operatives formed by their employees. The workers' co-operatives then engaged in a 
leaseback arrangement whereby the employees themselves would earn the rental income from 
the land they now formally owned. Dole and Del Monte agreed to such a leaseback arrangement 
and the settlement was effectuated rather rapidly. In fact, the pineapple plantations were among 
the first areas covered by CARP. 3 6 
Hence, public land in the municipality, formerly leased out by N D C , came under control o f 
the pineapple workers co-operative, which had become the collective owner o f the pineapple 
plantation. Since then, Dole had to negotiate terms and duration o f its lease agreement with the 
agrarian reform beneficiaries' co-operative. Simultaneously, however, the company continued its 
expansion by leasing land from private owners. Hence, the expansion could be pursued more 
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readily. Under the new law, there was no limit to the amount o f land that a foreign or domestic 
agribusiness corporation could lease from local landowners (Putzel 1992). In the context o f the 
new land reform programme implemented in 1988, ownership o f the public land occupied by 
the pineapple plantation was shifted to a workers co-operative. This hardly affected conditions 
in maize agriculture. However, due to the predominance o f small and medium farmers, the call 
for land re-distribution was less radical than in areas with large (corporate) landowners. 3 7 
A regional agenda for agricultural growth 
Since the late 1980s, South Cotabato has been a forerunner in the creation o f institutional 
linkages between (integrated) agribusiness and independent farm businesses. Until late in the 
1970s, the province was essentially a recipient o f settlers from overcrowded agricultural areas 
and urban centres in Luzon and the Visayas; more than half o f the settler population arrived in 
Mindanao in the period 1965-1976 (Gonzales 1996). The migrants pioneered the opening of 
Mindanao's frontiers with minimal assistance from the government. Furthermore, the province 
was the site o f plantation enclaves with a low level o f integration in the local economy. 
The persistent specialisation towards agro-export production started already in the American 
colonial era; the government accorded a major role to international business, which dates from 
the American colonial era (Boyce 1993). International agribusiness firms have been able to 
become key players in Mindanao's development due to the open door policy o f the Philippine 
government 3 8 Initially, two American food corporations, Dole and Del Monte, were in the 
forefront o f Mindanao's incorporation into global commodity markets; the lack o f Philippine 
investors in agriculture made agro-exports reliant on foreign capital.3 9 
Foreign donors, such as World Bank and Asian Development Bank (ADB), were important 
financiers o f agro-industrialisation. In the 1970s, the US government already prioritised large-
scale agribusiness ventures (Williams and Karen 1985). In the early 1990s, USAID was the main 
financier o f a major development programme for the region: USAID contributed US $ 108 
million, Japan US $ 22 million and World Bank US $ 23 million, while the Philippine 
government contributed substantially to the road construction (Tiglao 1994, McAndrew 1993). 
The main features o f this programme were the improvement o f roads, the improvement o f the 
wharf, the construction o f a new airport, the construction o f an agro-processing centre and the 
development o f a growth plan. 4 0 Central notions in the various development efforts in this 
province were infrastructure development, strengthening o f growth clusters, involvement o f the 
private sector, diversification in export-oriented production, and labour-intensive agro-
industrialisation (Iiorito 1995a, 1995b, 1995c). 
Historically the American focus has been on the increase o f agricultural productivity by 
introducing new technologies, abolishing tenancy and exploring new frontiers. USAID was 
reluctant to become involved in the CARP programme because it did not believe such a 
distributive programme could make a positive economic contribution. This position was 
important for agricultural policy in the Philippines, because, due to the constrained financial 
resources o f the Philippine government, the actual implementation and form o f agrarian reform 
decisively depended on foreign assistance. Foreign donors decided how to direct funds in the 
Multilateral Aid Initiative (MAI), in which the US amplified its influence. Putzel (1992) 
convincingly shows that the US government was biased against re-distributive land reform. 4 1 
Furthermore, the American government was concerned about the prospect o f US corporate 
investments; it wanted to preserve the profitability and viability o f some major American 
multinational corporations located in Mindanao. 
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This may be one o f the explanations for the kvmching o f a large US funded development 
programme in South Cotabato, representing an alternative interpretation o f agrarian reform. 
This programme reflected trust in agribusiness corporations as leading agencies in economic 
development. 4 2 The aim seemed to be to maintain productivity in agriculture while sustaining 
normal business operations (de Lange 1997). South Cotabato appeared to be the right breeding 
ground for inducing changes in the agrarian structure. Dole's pineapple plantation was 
exempted from further agrarian reform measures, and the strong presence o f American interests 
served as a platform for farmers' participation in the region's economic growth, and for 
entrepreneurial development (USAID 1999). 
Additionally, successive Secretaries o f Agriculture during the Aquino administration were 
engaged in mobilising support and resources for Southern Mindanao. All these Secretaries of 
Agriculture had long-standing experience, and were professionally involved in agribusiness; 
inside the government they did not favour redistributive land reform and they steered funds to 
infrastructure development and agro-industrialisation.43 At the regional level, the Secretary o f 
Agriculture chaired the Area Development Board, a new institutional mechanism that gathered 
all interested parlies in the province (APRAAP 1995). Thus, American funding and support for 
the ministry o f Agriculture laid the foundation for a regional agenda for agricultural 
modernisation in South Cotabato. 
The above partly explains the specific political climate in the province, and especially in 
General Santos City: historical developments precluded the development o f landlordism so 
common in many parts o f the Philippines and the area lacked substantial government support 
due to cronyism in the Marcos administration. The settler pioneers and the original Muslim 
inhabitants barely benefited from subsidies, economic support and patronage enjoyed by 
businesses in Northern Philippines during the Marcos administration (figure 2.4, Iiorito 1994). 
After the E D S A revolution the local political clique tried to get a hold o f new development 
initiatives and its oudook can be characterised as building the economy rather than a political 
constituency. The two main political families mnning for office in General Santos City were 
both acceptable to the business community, 4 4 and with tight government budgets foreign and 
national investors participated in the formulation and implementation o f development 
programmes for the province (Moran and Jatoyna 1995). The lack o f government support 
induced initiatives to tap the private sector for development programmes. 
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Figure 2.4: Percentage distribution of government expenditures over Philippine regions (1977-1987) 
Source: Lamberte, M. (1993: 62), in: APRAAP (1995:14) 
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Successive growth plans tried to build consensus on investment models in support o f 
infrastructure projects already initiated, with a leading role for the private sector ^IcAndrew 
1993). Local government cleverly introduced the dynamic label 'SocSarGen', referring to the 
provinces South Cotabato and Sarangani and to the urban centre General Santos City, to claim 
its position as a vanguard for new economic ventures. The area was the prime focus o f efforts 
to develop the agricultural potential o f Mindanao Py 1990); it became the centre for new 
projects in agribusiness development, especially after the US government decided to make the 
province its chief target for development assistance.4 5 The brief analysis presented here shows 
that the development framework was essentially a product o f its own history (McAndrew 1993). 
In South Cotabato, corporate business leaders, government officials and technocrats have been 
the primary participants and they joined forces to develop an organisational structure for the 
expansion o f the agribusiness sector. Existing agro-corporations and agribusiness in the 
province provided the primary base for such an expansion. 
As early as 1988, local government officials and businessmen anticipated trends towards 
agro-industrial growth concentrated in key production areas. In the report 'Comprehensive 
Opportunities for a Moving Economy at General Santos City' ( C O M E 1992) a rough sketch 
was given o f the area as an Agro-Industrial Zone (AIZ): 
This ambitious plan evolves around an anchor facility - t h e fish port and cold storage complex-
which will support vital industries, some of which are canning, meat processing, fruit 
processing, vegetable processing, prawn processing and grain processing [ . . J The AIZ project 
will utilize private capital on a purely turn-key basis. It will direcdy benefit the people and 
government, i.e. the government in the form of taxes on top of foreign exchange earning and 
the people by way of improved earnings. Since there will be more jobs, unemployment will be 
sidelined. ( C O M E 1992: 3) 
The launching o f this report illustrates the smooth alliance between local merchants and 
entrepreneurs, agribusiness corporations and government officials. This alliance paved the way 
for attracting large sums o f development assistance, and for stimulating foreign investments 
complementary to the development o f domestic agribusiness (cf. Brewer 1980). 
In the province, a rapid expansion o f the agribusiness sector was projected as the only viable 
approach to fostering economic development (USAID n.d.). The region offered opportunities 
to increase significantly maize productivity by expanding planting o f hybrid varieties and 
improving post-harvest facilities. Next to this, diversification into high-value horticultural crops 
for export markets had to be encouraged. An American consultancy firm was contracted to 
develop a growth plan (Louis Berger 1992) and to manage infrastructure projects. In the 1990s, 
economic activities boomed; investments and the number o f business projects, banks and 
canneries rose dramatically in General Santos City and in South Cotabato (PDI 2 1 / 0 5 / 9 6 ) . 
By the 1990s, South Cotabato had emerged as a 'laboratory for innovative organisational and 
institutional arrangements which enhance private sector involvement' (APRAAP 1995: 6). The 
province acted as a show case for the reorganisation o f agricultural production with, on the one 
hand, the transfer o f ownership o f the pineapple plantation to a workers' co-operative (see 
above) and, on the other hand, the introduction o f several contract growing schemes. The 
integration o f small-scale farming into global markets for agricultural commodities 4 6 and private 
sector growth were at the centre o f development programmes launched in Southern Mindanao 
(USAID 1999). 
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Table 2.5: Overview of existing and abandoned contract farming schemes in crop production in the Philippines 
(1984-1997) 
Company Crop Area (ha) Number of 
growers 
Southern Mindanao 
Dole-TropiFresh Asparagus 1,200 600 
Marsman-Drysdale Asparagus 400 210 
Stanfilco-Dole Cavendish-
bananas 
6-7,000 2500 
Dole Philippines Pineapples 540 156 
TADI Pirjeapples 3,000 1000 
Nestlé 
(also in Luzon) 
Soy beans 8,700. 4000 
Pioneer Hi-Bred / Maize seed 2,500 2000 
Cargill/AADC Maize seed 320 100 
Bioseed/Asia Hybrid/Corn World Maize seed ? ? 
JVA group Cacao - -
Kenram Philippines Inc. (NES) Oil palm NES 1,600 
Growers 2900 
35 
Northern Mindanao 
Del Monte Papaya - -
Del Monte Pineapples - -
Nestlé Coffee 3500 -
Guthrie/NDC (NES) Oil palm - -
Paper Industries Corporation of 
the Philippines (NES) 
Trees N E S -
Growers 16,000/20,000 
5000/3800 
Bukidnon Resource Corp./CDC Tomatoes 2000 (failed) 3000 
Luzon 
California Manufacturing Corp. Cucumber 70 
Ram Food Products Cucumber 45/90 
Kraft General Foods Cucumber 50 
Ram Food Products Young maize 60 40 
Ram Food Products Sweet maize 160 50 
Ram Food Products Bell peppers 25 -
Ram Food Products Tomato (paste) 70 -
Lancaster Philippines Tobacco 5,700 10,000 
Northern Foods Corporation Tomato (paste) 800-1,000 3000 
East-West Seed Company Vegetable seed 105 213 
National Agribusiness Corp. Yellow maize 265 250 
San Miguel Corporation Casava - -
Visayas 
G. Hermanos Inc. (NES) Black pepper 36 20 
Sources: University Asia & Pacific (UA&P 1996, 1997), Dy (1990), Dy (1995 UA&P, pers.comm.), Frohmader 
(1995, USA1D/ASAP, pers.comm.), CRC (1994), Ellman and Greeley (1989) Manila Chronicle (31/03/89) , 
Pionco and Yco (1999). 
Note: This table only gives an indication of contract farming schemes, which operated in the Philippines. 
Possibly, some schemes are not included or some schemes are no longer operational. The figures of area and 
number of growers do not reflect the instability of contract growing schemes; many schemes are aborted, areas are 
reduced, and growers are abandoned depending on corporate and farmers decisions. 
NES= Nucleus Estate Scheme 
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New and established agribusiness firms augmented their operations in the municipality o f 
Polomolok in the last two decades. Catde farms began to buy maize direcdy from farmers, 
based on verbally agreed arrangements. Seed companies contracted farmers with irrigated land 
to produce hybrid maize seed. Mindanao Cotton Corporation tried to sustain its operation on 
farms in the dryer areas. And trading companies like Dole used contractual arrangements to 
expand and diversify its affairs in crop production. 
In Southern Mindanao, contract growing was mainly in the production o f fruits and 
vegetables and o f maize seed (see table 2.5 for an overview). Both kinds o f activity are present 
in the research area. In the following, I will briefly introduce the context o f the two cropping 
systems central to this book. Firsdy, I discuss the integration o f maize farming into the feed and 
livestock industry, in which contractual production o f hybrid maize seed is a distinct element 
Secondly, I go into the expansion and diversification o f export industry for fresh vegetables, in 
which contractual production o f green asparagus for the Japanese market is a leading example. 
Integration in the feed and livestock industry 
Contract farming is not a new phenomenon in the Philippine countryside.4 7 In Mindanao, 
contracts were first introduced by the national government in the early settlement programmes 
in Southern Mindanao. During the settlement period, the government entered into contracts 
with settlers, meant to support the overall aim o f the settlement scheme, as described by Pelzer: 
to create a class of agriculturists who would be more than subsistence farmers working to 
cover their barest needs, as is the case with most rural Filipino families. It was to achieve this 
goal, that the N.L.S.A. allowed each settler a liberal amount of land to enable him to produce, 
in addition to his own food, cash crops such as cotton, rubber, coffee, peanuts, soy beans and 
onions. Recognizing the great need for diversification in agriculture, the administration 
discouraged the cultivation o f the usual Philippine cash crops (abaca, tobacco, sugar and 
coconuts), encouraging instead the introduction o f products in which the country was 
deficient. (Pelzer 1948: 156) 
Aside from organising the general infrastructure in the settlement areas, the government 
provided land, technicians and a market because there was no business yet. In return, an 
applicant settler was asked to sign a contract with the National Land Settlement Administration 
(NLSA), and, accordingly, he was required to plant the crops prescribed in the contract. T o 
receive a land tide for a standard 12 hectares plot the settler was committed to spend his time in 
farming and not to engage in any other trade or occupation (Pelzer 1948, Ramirez, 1993). This 
was part o f the government's effort to bind incoming settlers, to control agricultural production 
and to direct trade o f agricultural commodities, mainly rice and maize. In 1945, cotton was 
introduced as a new crop under similar conditions. The marketing arm o f the N L S A was the 
sole buyer in the settlement schemes, and, initially, traders were not allowed to enter the areas. 
In return, the government provided farmers with agricultural inputs and equipment on credit 
base. But the contractual arrangements did not survive, after the government surrendered its 
control over agricultural commodity markets. 
Initially, centralised marketing enabled the government to steer this development and it 
assured settlers o f better prices than they would probably get from middlemen and traders. The 
government planned that about half o f the land should be devoted to subsistence crops and the 
other half to cash crops for which there was a market in the Philippines (Pelzer 1948: 147). The 
cash crops were supposed to allow settlers to pay part o f their debt to the NLSA, which 
explains why the choice o f cash crops was a great concern for the administrators. This policy 
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laid the foundation for furthering the commercialisation o f agriculture and for the integration in 
national and international markets. Gradually, however, direct government control over 
agricultural development in the southern regions declined, especially after the N.L.S.A. was 
abolished in 1954 due to a reorganisation in government. 4 8 
The invasion o f traders could not be pre-empted; after the first decades o f the settlement 
programmes, social and economic conditions for agricultural production and commerce altered 
due both to intensified activities o f Chinese traders and to enterprising settler farmers venturing 
into trading themselves. Many settlers in the Koronadal Valley were engaged in the production 
o f white maize and coconut. Traders operating in local and regional markets handled most o f 
the agricultural commodities produced in the Cotabato provinces, in particular maize, rice and 
coconut T o bind farmers traders used some form o f contract in combination with loans and 
advances. But the increase in commercial activity engendered pole-vaulting, i.e. getting loans 
from one trader and selling to another trader offering higher prices. This illustrates the 
insecurity attached to contractual arrangements in maize agriculture. 
Still, contractual arrangements did not disappear entirely from maize agriculture. In the 
1980s, large-scale contract growing o f maize was again initiated by the private sector, especially 
feed millers, when shortage in feed supply was at its worst. This scheme, however, failed to take 
o f f when maize production improved in the 1990s. 4 9 In 1993, the department o f Agriculture, 
headed by Mindanaon 'agribusiness-man' Sebastian, again tried to introduce contract growing in 
yellow maize in an effort to regulate demand and supply in a volatile market. However, the 
programme's major hurdle was the unwillingness o f both industrial users and farmers to make 
long-term commitments. 5 0 In volatile markets traders, farmers and input suppliers appear to be 
ill at ease with regulation and formalisation.5 1 
In 1990, cattle farms in Polomolok 5 2 began to offer contracts to maize farmers, including 
credit and guaranteed prices. Until 1990, corporate catde farms depended on pineapple pulp for 
cheap feed. Recendy, cattle raisers increasingly prefer silage, which is fermented and preserved 
animal feed. The feed market changed after a campaign by Pioneer Hi-Bred to launch maize 
varieties suitable for silage, and with a short growing season. Silage could partly replace 
pineapple pulp and it could also provide an alternative to the import o f cheap maize (Lales 
1996). Buying and selling o f chopped maize became a profitable business for local traders and 
truck owners. Financial and contractual arrangements were a common feature in the new 
market for silage. 
In another comer o f the feed and livestock system, seed companies initiated growing 
contracts for hybrid maize seed production, the conditions o f which were entirely different 
from commercial maize production. After the expansion o f the seed market, 5 3 companies were 
anxious to secure access to suitable land. Contract growing offered them the opportunity to run 
a relatively predictable operation. South Cotabato became the 'battleground' o f several, mainly 
foreign, seed companies, both for the production and marketing o f hybrid maize seed. 
The six leading seed companies in the Philippines had been farming out the production o f 
hybrid maize seed to independent farmers since the mid-1980s. Seed companies favoured the 
conditions in Southern Mindanao for the production o f hybrid maize seeds. One reason for the 
attractiveness o f the area was the absence o f typhoons and the regular rainfall over the year so 
that maize seed could be planted throughout the year. However, irrigation was an essential 
requirement for seed production in Southern Mindanao. Furthermore, the area had a good 
infrastructure. The fact that the island o f Mindanao was the biggest market for hybrid maize 
seeds was another consideration for companies; it saves costs to locate production areas nearby 
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markets. Thus, in Mindanao, international and national seed companies were not only 
competing for their market share, but also for suitable, irrigated land to produce seeds. 
Many o f the contracted farmers in maize seed production were small and medium 
landowners. T o them, the company made an offer difficult to refuse. The company would 
advance all inputs including free provision o f parent seeds plus other incentives, provide 
technical assistance, guarantee access to market, and offer fixed purchase prices. The price o f 
the product was agreed in advance, and was, in most cases, slighdy higher than the price offered 
by maize traders. This was, according to farmers, one o f the reasons to sign the contract. More 
decisive, however, was the provision o f a budget for agricultural production, because normally 
these farmers find it difficult to raise capital. The provision o f credit and technical assistance 
proved to be key in linking farmers' land to complex and integrated business operations. 
Growing for export markets 
Since its arrival in 1963, Dole's operations in Polomolok were centred on its large-scale 
pineapple plantation. Pineapple production remained a centrally managed affair. Dole 
supplemented the 9000 hectares leased by N D C with an increasing number o f hectares under 
farm management contract in the vicinity of the pineapple plantations (Magno 1984). The 
expansion o f pineapple production was mainly realised through management contracts with, 
usually, large landowners, or through contract growing arrangements with former tenants. 5 4 
At the end o f the 1980s, the profitability o f Dole's main crops, pineapples and bananas, was 
flat. Its banana and pineapple divisions experimented with several crops, especially vegetables 
and cut flowers. The New Product department o f Dole Philippines ventured into the 
production o f a package o f other high-value crops mainly exported to the Japanese market In 
the beginning, the banana-division was responsible for introducing and marketing these new 
crops. 5 5 Some years later, a new division o f Dole Asia, TropiFresh, was created to market and 
produce new, high-value crops. This division's most important operation was the production 
and marketing o f green asparagus.5 6 
Asparagus appeared to be the most promising crop for production in Southern Mindanao. 
Due to the proximity o f the Japanese market, asparagus could be transported by ship, which 
meant huge savings for the company. Furthermore, the natural conditions o f this volcanic 
region were suitable for asparagus production: rain is evenly spread over the year, typhoons do 
not pass over the region, and the sandy loam soil is loose and has good drainage. The asparagus 
venture was started in the vicinity o f the pineapple plantation and benefited from the existing 
distribution system and the shipping facilities o f the Dole Company. 
The asparagus production scheme in Mindanao was distinct from projects meant to 
complement or partially replace plantation agriculture in pineapple and banana. For this scheme, 
the company relied on contract growing with established farms, because no vacant land was 
available for the asparagus venture. Therefore, the company had to introduce the new and high-
value crop on established farms mainly planted with maize and coconut. The first steps towards 
commercial production o f asparagus in Mindanao were taken at the end o f the 1980s. Starting in 
1989, the company contracted with several groups o f maize and coconut farmers. The company 
offered farmers a 10-year contract. The duration o f the contract reflected the expected life span 
o f the perennial crop. In the beginning o f the 1990s, the company had been able to integrate a 
diverse group o f six to eight hundred small and medium farmers, and some absentee 
landowners, into their agribusiness operations. 
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Introducing the contract farming communities 
As an introduction to the following chapters, I will now briefly sketch the social histories o f the 
communities where the two contract farming schemes for asparagus and hybrid maize seed 
were located. In the beginning o f the asparagus growing scheme, a majority o f the contracts was 
offered to various Muslim communities. In these communities the powerful institution of local 
leadership and kinship networks survived changing conditions and was strong and ever-present 
in the research area (villages 3, 4 and 6, see map 2.3). Leading kinship networks still hold large 
portions o f land and control a following o f workers and tenants; companies would have a 
difficult time to find lasting solutions without their participation. However, not all villages under 
the jurisdiction o f the traditional datus are stable entities. In some villages, the entrance o f 
Christian landowners and the political intrigues between influential families generated a 
potentially discordant and unstable situation (village 6). Additionally, the process o f 
modernisation in Southern Mindanao created small and medium landholders in Muslim 
communities (concentrated in village 4) , with a subordinate position in Muslim society. 
The socio-political situation in the settler communities differed substantially from the Muslim 
communities. The settlement programmes induced by the national government created relatively 
stable and coherent communities. The programmes after the Second World War provided the 
early migrants with secure access to land (ranging from 16 to 24 hectares for settlers in village 
2). The settler families have been able to build up a stable farming business, and they actively 
participated in the dynamic economy o f the province. Over the years, members o f these families 
were able to diversify their business interests or to find employment as trained professionals. 
Absentee landlords whose families gained prominent political positions in General Santos City 
owned other lands, procured during the first decades o f the settlement. In the villages, 
established families operated maize mills or were engaged in maize trading and they played an 
important role in local politics. In village 5 a politician from Luzon had managed a plantation on 
land bought from one o f the old datus. In the 1970s, his plantation was distributed among 
tenants, most o f whom had migrated to Mindanao from this politician's regional constituency. 
In village 1, the location o f hybrid maize seed production, old settler families used to own 
large farms or ranches. 5 7. Since the 1970s, land reform programmes effected a re-distribution o f 
these lands among tenants, after which the new owners planted maize in small farms. Also, 
these former tenants depended much on the whims o f the market for maize and, consequendy, 
eyed either profitable crops, or employment in the city or elsewhere. Increased land scarcity in 
the 1960s and 1970s obstructed further development o f such 'designed' farming communities. 
Polomolok's land frontier was exhausted after establishment o f Dole's pineapple plantation. 
In the research area, many small-scale farmers encountered difficulties in strengthening their 
agricultural production, finding a more profitable crop, or supplementing their income by non-
farm jobs, almost became a necessity. 5 8 The analysis o f maize agriculture shows that farmers 
select from a range o f options, according to the largely capricious course taken by integration 
and modernisation. Farmers weighed their options in a context o f high input prices, low 
commodity prices and credit constraints. Farmers maintained a relation o f growing complexity 
with input suppliers, traders, banks, processors, landowners and government agencies. This 
indicates that the integration o f contract growers is not simply a modernisation process for 
traditional or backward farmers. On the contrary, contract farming occurred in areas with an 
expanding infrastructure and developing markets; in Southern Mindanao commercial agriculture 
was already entrenched, and contract farming seems to epitomise the complex relations 
maintained by farmers (Asano-Tamanoi 1988). 
MAIZE SEED PRODUCTION AREA ASPARAGUS PRODUCTION AREA 
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Dole-TropfPrtsh: 
Asparagus 
processing plant 
Dole Philippines 
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CONCLUSIONS 
The point o f view held by a number o f advocates o f agricultural modernisation in Mindanao 
is that agricultural modernisation was hindered by the dynamics o f agrarian societies entrenched 
in politics, particularly referring to the on-going political conflict in the south. 5 9 Since the 
American colonial era (1898-1946) modernisation is suffused with non-economic values and 
cultural meaning which surrounded both the integration o f Mindanao's Muslim society into the 
national and international economy as well as the settlement o f landless tenants and farm 
workers in Mindanao's frontier (cf. Bemal 1997). The outcome o f such a political image o f 
agrarian societies is a confined understanding o f the Mindanaon farmer, either Christian settler 
or Muslim. 6 0 The effort o f this study is to add a marked elaborate perspective on Philippine 
society, and more specifically, on the integration o f contract growers.6 1 
As opposed to a modernist perspective, which suggests that contract growing is the outcome 
o f a linear process o f modernisation and integration, this study locates contract growing in an 
unstable and historical transformation process embedded in intensified land use, enhanced agro-
industrialisation, and extended intemationalisation o f agricultural production. Both the 
settlement schemes and the more recent contract growing schemes aimed at the creation o f a 
class o f modern agriculturists, but the population o f farmers remains diverse in terms o f 
landholdings, political influence, and social and cultural background. 
The pace and shape o f integration and modernisation in Southern Mindanao generated a 
hierarchy o f landholdings (Fianza 1994b) encountered by corporations venturing into contract 
growing, which is summarised in figure 2.5. Focussing on integration at the level o f agrarian 
production reveals a dynamic society in which land disputes, changing polities, institutional and 
technical changes, and the movement o f international commodity markets shaped the specific 
developments (de Jesus 1982). In the course of this chapter, we have seen that the contours o f 
landownership in Southern Mindanao are the result of: 
1. The gradual integration o f Muslim society into the national economy and into global 
markets, in which the role o f local brokers has been crucial in mediating between rural folk 
and (colonial) administration and business. 
2. Colonial land legislation, the Colonization Act and the settlement programmes, which 
dramatically changed forms o f landownership and land use. 
3. A range o f development efforts mainly conducted by and for Christian settlers and 
entrepreneurs, but which were unclear about the contribution o f Muslims (Muslim 1994). 6 2 
4. Increased land pressure and demographic shifts, which entailed political tensions, especially 
towards the end o f the 1960s when, in most mixed towns, Christians and Muslims competed 
for political off ice . 6 3 
5. the expansion o f agri-based multinational corporations and national agribusiness since the 
1960s. 
Consequendy, contract farming entailed.the integration o f a diverse group o f landowners into 
^ agribuSinesl^JySems. Obviously, the diverse interests o f contracted landowners generated 
s^eHficTmanagement problems for agribusiness corporations. Absentee landlords with diverse 
business interests and settler farmers solely depending on income generated in the farm will 
have a different stake in a contract growing scheme. The confidence in modernisation o f former 
tenants and workers planting the land o f an old ranch previously owned by a leading political 
family will differ from a settler farmer with a secure land title and who participated in 
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succeeding modernisation programmes launched by the government. Agrarian reform 
beneficiaries tilling the land o f the former landlord, based in Luzon, have a different history 
than small farmers or tenants under the jurisdiction o f a political leader and landowner in a 
Muslim community. Also the involvement of traditionally landholding families and small 
cultivators in Muslim villages boils down to the same diversity in interests and histories. 
Concentration of land 
Fragmentation of land 
Agribusiness corporation 
Wealthy Christian landlords or 
family-owned corporations 
Small Muslim landholding elite 
Christian setüer farmers 
Small and medium 
landholding Muslim tillers 
Newly migrated Christian 
settlers 
Muslims tenants and workers 
deprived of land 
Indigenous peoples deprived 
of land 
Strong political 
representation 
Marginal representation 
in political system 
Figure 2.5: Hierarchy of landholdings in Southern Mindanao 
These general processes outline the context in a regional political economy o f integration o f 
independent landholdings, or farms, into the institutional complexity o f agribusiness operations. 
In the 1990s, government policy, the regional alliance o f local officials and business 
representatives, and the auxiliary role o f international donor agencies, created the practice 
ground for institutional innovations in agricultural production in South Cotabato. Contract 
growing assumed the role o f a showcase for the introduction o f new, high-value crops, the 
creation o f marketing facilities, and the co-ordination o f farming practices with the harvesting 
and processing operations o f an agro-industrial corporation. 
This chapter shows that for sourcing a variety o f products, agribusiness companies in 
Southern Mindanao used divergent organisational forms, ranging from plantation agriculture to 
several forms o f contractual arrangements with a diverse group o f landowners. This was the 
result o f the companies' fluctuating access to land, which, as we have seen, depended on 
government policy, managemenf'jrjedg^iS'"'af!d'' '"s'g^ dynamics in a regional economy^ 
Agribusiness companies fried to link^diyjeri^landowni°r.sto..t.hHr nppration<;, prompted by the 
intensified land pressure. Government policy actively promoted linkages between farmers and 
agribusiness in its effort to modernise Mindanao's agriculture. In its vision, the comparative 
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advantages o f South Cotabato could best be exploited in both the integrating maize (seed), feed, 
and livestock/poultry industry and in the diversifying fruit, vegetable and horticultural sector 
(APRAAP 1995). The political realm in South Cotabato laid the foundation for corporate-led 
growth, reflected in contract growing arrangements and in crop diversification. The 
implemented modernisation programme facilitated linkages between small-scale farmers and 
agribusiness, which particularly initiated projects to increase productivity in maize farming and 
to diversify into high-value horticultural crops. Thus, farmers were offered an alternative to 
stagnant and harsh maize farming, although the range o f options was constrained by the 
predominant development frameworks in public and private offices. 
Central to the creation o f new linkages between agribusiness and farmers was the provision 
o f credit. This^3rovlsloTi~or^finitncing ttiakes cohttact j iurcur^^ medium 
farmers cannot refuse, as we have seen ir^tiiis_jdiap^er. Equally, however, for agribusiness 
corporations operating in Mindanao, land remained a key asset in agricultural production and 
tniTcBhrplEieirwere toTced^To^nter into complex joaarielations^with exlsHngTandowners. I 
observedthat~~in""~tneTTnmaI~|>nase of~agribusiness expansion, multinational corporations 
organised large-scale production either through lease agreements with a government agency or 
through contract and alliances with the corporate farms o f well-connected Philippine families 
with established interests in logging and ranching (Muslim 1994). Thus, in the 1970s, big 
business interests were firmly established, in connivance with government officials (Tan 1995, 
Azurin 1996). These alliances strengthened agribusiness control o f large tracts o f land (cf. 
Kowalewski 1989). Yet, with the raid economic expansion o f the 1990s, agribusiness 
corporations were faced with the problems o f how to secure access to land. This imposed the 
task o f addressing and solving new organisational challenges upon these corporations. 
The following chapters discuss the precise organisational and technological features o f 
integration and modernisation. I will make an analysis o f two contemporary contract growing 
schemes in South Cotabato: the production o f asparagus for export markets, and production o f 
hybrid maize seed mainly for the domestic market 
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INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapter examined the history o f agribusiness expansion and agricultural 
modernisation in Mindanao. It sketched a picture wherein large-scale enclave export agriculture 
co-existed with small and medium family farming. The research area has been known as a major L 
maize producing area in Mindanao. Declining commodity prices, partly as a result o f cheap \ 
imports o f maize, and low productivity, were troublesome factors for maize farmers. 
Furthermore, credit was hard to come by in the rural areas o f Mindanao. Therefore, farmers 1 
were forced either to look for a more profitable crop or to supplement farming by non-farm ) 
income. Shifting to alternative crops became an attractive opportunity. 
Under such conditions, contract farming creates opportunities for crop diversification, and, 
in Southern Mindanao, the propagation o f contractual arrangements steadily changed the 
organisation o f buying and selling o f agricultural commodities. In specific locations, maize farms 
were increasingly converted to export-oriented production units, as in the case o f asparagus 
production, the focus o f this chapter, and a number o f other high-value crops.1 Provision o f 
credit, transfer o f modern technologies, and access to new markets, pulled many landowners 
into complex agribusiness schemes. Additionally, m^e^aiseofhx^s^td^^^SS^ farming, 
facilitated corporate access to farmland^ Obviously, land is an indispensable asset for 
agribusiness corporations operating in Southern Mindanao, where almost all suitable land was 
occupied either by plantations or by family-owned maize farms. Hence, farmers as well as 
agribusiness corporations were open to new and innovative organisational arrangements, even 
though the results o f such arrangements were uncertain and unpredictable. 
However, the failure o f capital markets inhibited easy adoption o f new crops, which often 
require investments beyond the capacity o f small and medium farmers (Grosh 1994). This 
underlines th"eTnipomrrcB-T#^overnment- support for financing the introduction o f contract -V 
farming schemesTTn the PhiMppineT^iverrmienTahd relatea^cTevelopmentrr5anks adopted an 
optimistic view on contract farming, which guided actions and programmes for agricultural 
development in Mindanao. This view, clearly described by Little and Watts, confers "advantages 
o f technological and productivity enhancement, income benefits associated with the genesis o f a 
prosperous peasant 'middle class', the prospect o f privatization o f extension services, and the 
growth o f foreign exchange revenues insofar as contracted crops encourage a shift from import 
substitution to export-led growth." (Little and Watts 1994: 7). From this developmental 
perspective the Development Bank o f the Philippines signed up to the asparagus production 
scheme, as proposed by the Dole company. 
In the design o f this scheme the focus o f its advocates was on the generic institution, 
represented as a legal agreement between abstract individuals, rather than on organisation and 
working relations, and on the motives o f the parties involved (Little 1994, Watts 1994). Most o f 
the policy documents dealing with growth plans in South Cotabato do not go beyond 
identifying the institutional arrangements that constrained the advance o f modern technologies 
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and the improvement o f efficiency in land use, such as imperfect information flows and lack o f 
technology (cf. Oasa and Koppel 1987). This study takes on the challenge o f analysing the 
institutional dynamics o f integration and modernisation in the context o f contract growing, 
which implies a less essentialist approach to contract growing agreements, and an emphasis on 
understanding organisational and social mechanisms. 
More concretely, the central question dealt with in this chapter is how does company 
management assess the financial performance o f decentralised units, and how does it evaluate 
and redesign pricing and reward mechanisms operational in its venture. Most likely, 
compensation and reward systems function as visible and salient elements o f contractual 
arrangements. The premise o f the chapter, therefore, is that a precise study o f the accounting 
and reward system will allow us to understand the impact o f a subdivided form o f management 
The accounting system in contract farming contains a set o f practices directed at the way 
growers and the company understand the choices within their collective venture, the way 
activities and processes can be managed, and the way in which the economic activities o f 
growers are administered (Miller 1994). 
In studying contractual relations this chapter builds upon a more general research agenda 
outlined by Miller (1994) about the functioning o f accounting systems, and the contribution o f 
compensation and accountability to various institutional cultures. Firstly, I attempt an 
ethnography o f accounting, by looking at the way these practices constitute organisational life in 
contract farming. Secondly, I then link to a political economy analysis o f accounting, which 
points to conflicting interests and mechanisms through which power is exercised. Thirdly, the 
chapter touches upon the organisational design and technology o f accounting and financial 
information systems, which became a politicised issue during negotiations in the production 
scheme. Thus, I focus on the evolution o f accounting and compensation systems, as well as on 
accountability relationships, with an explicit focus on richness and diversity within the 
organisation, and on participants and procedures, both formal and informal (Dent and Ezzamel 
1995:19) . 
The chapter draws on Rousseau's explanation o f different functions in contractual relations 
(1995: 59, 63, 82). The contract itself cannot be complete, hence, a contract growing scheme 
needs related organisational activities to make the system work. Accordingly, all contractual 
relations involve multiple contract makers, who engage in a mixture o f promises and 
obligations, but who also function in a disconnected way, and distincdy, in organisations. Firsdy, 
Rousseau distinguishes "human contract makers', whose task is to market the contract and to 
promote the organisation and, in our case, who recruit growers. Secondly, 'administrative 
contract makers' design administrative processes and procedures and are responsible for 
organising a (fair) compensation system. Finally, 'hybrid contract makers' set up performance 
review and reshape the contractual relationship through interaction with the parties involved. 
The analysis o f financial transactions and accountability relations in contract growing as 
presented in this chapter is based upon these distinct functions o f contract making. 
MAKING THE CONTRACT 
The promise o f modernisation and integration brought company, bank and growers together. 
This section explores how the company fitted contract growing into a innovative marketing and 
distribution scheme, adopted to even up company results. Since the company opted for 
controlling agricultural production at a distance, it had to find ways to link farmers to managerial 
decisions, and to strategies taken higher in the production chain. It allied with the Development 
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Bank o f the Philippines, which was prepared to supply growers with the necessary loans as long 
as the government and company would guarantee the loans. Equally important, however, was 
support for this particular modernisation scheme by brokers in the communities. The necessity 
to find profitable crops, and to finance agricultural production, and the choice to enrol in a new 
and 'modern' venture, underlies the integration o f farmers into Dole's integrated scheme to sell 
high-value asparagus in the Japanese market. 
Markets and contracts 
At the beginning o f the 1990s Dole's food operations were under high pressure. The former 
owner, Casde & Cooke, expanded into business other than sugar and pineapple and started to 
sell fresh fruits. However, the company ended up heavily in debt and ran into problems with its 
bankers. In 1985, the merger with David H. Murdock's truck-leasing company Flexi-Van Corp., 
and the subsequent restructuring o f long-term debts, relieved the pressure to some extent. Flexi-
Van became majority shareholder o f Casde & Cooke and its owner, Murdock, became the 
major shareholder2. As Chief Executive Officer Murdock took over operations and trimmed of f 
activities maintaining only food operations, Dole Foods, and a real estate arm, Oceanic 
Properties3 (Hoover 1995, Dole and Dole 1990). 
Nevertheless, at the beginning o f the 1990s, the company's results in food did not exactly 
cheer the company's shareholders. Wall Street's confidence in the company further depended 
on the real estate arm, which was considered the hidden gem o f the company, but, in the end, 
this part o f the company proved to be difficult to sell or to make profitable. With a real estate 
pay-off no longer in sight, Murdock had little alternative but to concentrate on the food 
business. Disappointing results in the company's food operations in 1990 even led to a period 
wherein the company's main activity was for sale. In the early 1990s softening prices for its 
major products, bananas 4 and pineapples, battered Dole. As a result, one o f the major produce 
companies in the world had to find an innovative way to counter disappointing results and 
falling operating income (figure 3.1). Company management launched a campaign to slash costs 
and, simultaneously, to boost its international operations by enhancing its distribution systems 
abroad (Hoover 1995). 
Promoting its label in fruit and vegetable markets turned out to be a spearhead for the 
enterprise.5 Underlining its core business and its brand, the company's changed its name to Dole 
Food Company in 1991. 6 Its marketing strategy was geared strongly to consumers and 
supermarkets, rather than to trade per se. Since 1990 the company has invested heavily in 
branding programmes for a variety o f fruits and vegetables.7 Company management believes 
that easily identifiable and branded products will importandy shape consumer demand. The 
news service for the supermarket branch, Predicasts, explains that Dole is making such efforts 
because o f the "rewards branding offers, such as demonstrating quality, bolstering consumer 
confidence and pulling in higher retail margins" (Predicasts 1990). 8 But branding is not merely 
placing a sticker on a product. It also involves a whole complex system o f quality control to 
support the value o f the name behind the product.9 
In the 1990s, the company defined its goals essentially in marketing terms; it wanted to create 
me jndustrVs_finest and most inter^tcd_distrihiitinri system, delivering the highest quality 
product wMijdTetnc^jefficient cost structure (Dole 1997). In Asia, Japan has become the 
company's flagship market increased marketing efforts led to the opening o f a series of 
distribution centres; essentially the result o f efforts to strengthen the company's brand name. 1 0 
The company's terminals in Japan co-ordinated the supply o f fresh products by several divisions 
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in different parts o f the world. In the Philippines, the pineapple and the banana divisions o f 
Dole set up a new division, Dole TropiFresh, to develop and market new crops, mainly 
vegetables and cut flowers. Its primary target was the competitive Japanese vegetable market. 
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Figure 3.1: Dole Food corporation financial performance (1984-1993) 
Source: Hoover's Handbook Database (1995) 
Dow prices for its basic commodities, pineapples and bananas, and high production costs 
compared to Thailand and Indonesia, savaged Dole's operations in the Philippines (Pastor 
1994). The Japanese appetite for fresh vegetables came to the rescue of Dole Philippines. 
Investments and strategies have since 1990 been directed to estabMshing a firm position in 
profitable niche markets. The bet o f Dole's new products division was on asparagus and cut 
flowers, but in the event the spearheaded vegetable with tender tips took off . 1 1 
Japan is by far the largest import market for fresh asparagus in Asia, and is one o f the largest 
importers o f this product in the world. Japanese consumers prefer green spears, and asparagus 
account for 1 3 % o f total imports o f fresh vegetables (figure 3.2). Japan's imports o f fresh 
asparagus have increased substantially from 1988 to 1995, especially as the expansion o f 
supermarkets facilitated the marketing o f perishable produce (table 3.1). Japan imports 
asparagus year-round, and imports are highest during September-April, because Japanese 
production is concentrated during the summer months. 1 2 In the 1990s, the Philippines 
succeeded to become a leading exporter o f asparagus to Japan (figure 3.3); the country overtook 
the United States in 1995. Dole's venture in Mindanao is responsible for more than 9 0 % o f 
Philippine export to Japan. Since 1994 the company has become one o f the two largest suppliers 
o f green asparagus in Japan; the ability to source domestically, after deregulation o f Japanese 
markets, even enhanced the company's position (CRC 1994, RAP 1995, UA&P 1997, Dole 
1997). 1 3 Globally, the Philippines is still a small producer o f green asparagus, compared to the 
United States, Peru and Mexico (RAP 1995) 1 4 , but in the Japanese market the Philippines has 
become a major competitor for the leading producers. 
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Figure 3.2: Japanese imports of fresh vegetables (1995) 
Source: Japan Tariff Association, in: UA&P 1996 
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Figure 3.3: Import of fresh asparagus into Japan from major suppliers (1990-1997) 
Sources: Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, Australia (downloaded 2000, at: 
http://www.nre.vic.gov.au/web/root/domino/cm_da/nrenti.nsf/frameset/NRE+Trade+and+ 
InvestrnentPOpenDocument); Asia Regional Agribusiness Project/Fintract Inc. (1999) through the 
Market Asia website atwww.marketasia.org 
Table 3.1: Japanese fresh asparagus imports (1988-1997) 
Value % total 
1988 56 18 
1989 52 18 
1990 56 17 
1991 61 14 
1992 70 15 
1993 90 15 
1994 112 13 
1995 123 12 
1996 113 14 
1997 99 13 
www.marketasia.org 
FAO Stat Agricultural Data (2000, downloaded at: http://apps.fao.org) 
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The proximity o f the production areas in Mindanao to the Japanese market was one o f the 
major advantages in developing a line for asparagus export. In 1994, the general manager o f the 
new products division formulated his vision as follows: "There's a large demand for fresh fruits 
and vegetables in this part o f the world. We wanted to take advantage o f the infrastructure we 
have in the Philippines". 1 5 The asparagus bundles were transported by vessel, usually together 
with the company's pineapple and banana products, which, obviously, reduced the 
transportation costs substantially. With an increased number o f distribution terminals in several 
Japanese cities, the marketing aspects o f the asparagus venture were set in place in the early 
1990s. 
Figure 3.4: Average price of asparagus imported into Japan from major suppliers (1990-1995) 
Source: Department of Natural Resources and Environment, Victoria, Australia (downloaded 2000, a t 
http://www.nre. vic.gov.au/web/root/domino/cm_da/nrenU.nsf/frameset/NRE+Trade+and+ 
lnvestment?OpenDocument) 
;J More important, however, was the exploitation o f two key elements o f the corporate 
asparagus production scheme in Mindanao: good export prices, mainly resulting from low 
^production costs due to cheap labour (CRC 1994), and high quality. In 1993, average monthly 
V T o k y o wholesale prices ranged from 808 ¥ / k g (7.27 US $/kg) to 1219 Y / k g (10.97 US $/kg). 
Low prices were essential to the company's expansion in Japan; the company's way to establish 
a position in Japan was to sell quality asparagus spears at prices significantly lower than its 
competitors (figure 3.4). 
Promoting its brand name and supplying well-priced quality produce in competitive niche 
markets were key elements o f Dole's strategy to revive profitability in its Asian operations. 1 6 
The assumption seemed to be that most added value is generated at the level o f marketing and 
processing. A more in-depth analysis o f the value chain (Kay 1995) allows us to understand the 
company's operational and financial activities at different levels and locations. Sufficient for the 
analysis in this chapter, however, is the observation that in the 1990s Dole's global operations 
shifted from food manufacture to distribution o f branded food products (Goodman and Watts 
1994). This shift was central to the change in strategy demanded by shareholders and induced by 
debt figures and declining returns. 
The above establishes the corporate environment in which the Philippine asparagus venture 
was launched: cost cutting campaigns combined with gaining a wider market share in 
competitive international markets for high quality, branded fresh produce. At corporate 
headquarters, multinational agribusiness prefers regulated operations and predictable profit 
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margins. In addition, stockholders seem to prefer low-cost operations with minimum 
investments in order to have a guaranteed return on capital. In the case of contract farming such 
a corporate perspective on integrated operations, however, assumes a smooth incorporation of 
contract growers into the overall project of the company. This means, as formulated by 
Friedmann 1993, it must organise stable conditions of production and consumption, to allow 
the company to plan and co-ordinate investments, sourcing of agricultural materials, and 
marketing on a global scale. This brings us to the level of production, which is central to this 
book. 
In developing new product lines in the Philippines the company's premise was tJSatX 
centralised production was cosdy in terms of necessary staff, labour and logistics, and that it 1 
generated problems in terms of adjustments to environmental change. Furthermore, the 
financial situation in the company necessitated strategies, which directed investments to ( C 
marketing and away from direct production. Apparently, the company found no need to invest s 
direcdy in agricultural production, but opted, initially, for 'control at a distance'. The main 
purpose of the asparagus scheme was to link small-scale farms to the operations of a company, 
where the main strategic activity lay in marketing and processing of agricultural commodities. 
Leaving the production to nominally independent producers shows, according to Boyce (1983: j 
213), that control over shipping facilities and marketing channels is the heart of the operations 
of international agribusiness firms. 
Financing the deal 
In contrast to the early stages of agribusiness expansion in Mindanao, Dole's management was^ 
no longer prepared to invest direcdy in agricultural production. Nevertheless, access to suitable ( 
land was an indispensable asset for the company's marketing and diversification scheme. In the / 
province of South Cotabato hardly any vacant land was available for the asparagus venture. Soil 
surveyors, however, found that the sandy-loan soil in the vicinity of Dole's pineapple plantation, 
in combination with reliable rainfall, made the area extremely suitable for asparagus growing. 
Moreover, because of a well-developed road network, produce could easily be transported to 
the processing plant, which was only 25 kilometres away from the wharf accommodating ocean-
going vessels. Hence, management was confronted with the problem of how to gain access to 
land without direct involvement and investment in agricultural production. 
Based on previous experience in the Philippines, and in contract growing schemes globally, 
the company decided to try to introduce the new and high-value crop to established farmers 
mainly planting maize and coconut. Dole's operations in the Philippines show a wide range of 
production and marketing arrangements combined in a single company. World wide, most of 
the company's produce is grown on land belonging to independent growers or on leased land. 
"This could be understood in terms of the desire of a firm to keep its capital commitments as 
low as possible in a highly competitive and high-risk business [...] Leaseholds on land provide a 
way to maintain access to land but at the same time avoid the kind of investments that would 
otherwise be needed" ryillarejo 1992: 4-5). Notwithstanding this functionality for corporate 
strategy, management realised it had to guarantee some form of financing because these small 
and medium farmers would not be able to shoulder investments for such a risky venture. 
Therefore, it joined its marketing scheme to a developmental programme in order to find third-
party financiers for agricultural modernisation of small and medium farms. 
The company found a partner in the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).1 7 The 
bright market prospects and the positive impact on development in a marginal and turbulent 
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region attracted the bank to the scheme outlined by the company. As a development institution 
the bank tapped Official Development Assistance funds as well as government resources to 
stimulate key economic sectors, such as power, transportation and communication, and to 
create an infrastructure for economic growth. Furthermore, the bank was engaged in a 
programme which funded livelihood projects that "generate collective and direct benefits to a 
community; as well as projects for the setting up o f regional centres that foster entrepreneurship 
in agribusiness, small and medium industries and export enterprises" 1 8. I t was under this so-
called Window I I I retail lending programme' that asparagus farming was financed. 
As part o f the bank's social lending programme the project was expected to benefit (i.e. to 
increase incomes) small farmer landowners who otherwise, in their individual capacity, would 
not be able to avail o f any bank credit. In addition, the project had to provide full employment 
to a large number o f farm workers (3-4 per hectare). Furthermore, the scheme allowed farmers 
to learn about new technology applications in crop production. And finally, the project was 
supposed to increase foreign exchange earnings o f the country. D B P was eager to be part o f 
such a developmental scheme. The pioneering venture was the first attempt to produce 
asparagus in commercial quantity for export, and it would allow the bank to show its social 
face. 1 9 The bank's decision was also supported by a tendency to direct agriculture towards 
export o f low-priced fresh vegetables for expanding export markets Pabanilla 1996a, Louis 
Berger International 1992) . 2 0 The province o f South Cotabato, as described in chapter 2, served 
as a future model for regional growth based on agricultural modernisation, which also explains 
the political support for financing the asparagus venture. 
The advantages o f the venture clearly outweighed probable risks, according to the bank's 
feasibility study. The report anticipated few risks for the venture, because droughts were rare in 
the area and the province is usually free o f typhoons. More importandy, the bank had faith in 
the expertise o f the company. The application o f pesticides and fungicides, guided and provided 
by the company, would control the risk o f pests and diseases. Company technicians were to 
assist growers in day-to-day farming operations and company staff gave the associations a 
helping hand in managing the financial aspects. The company's involvement would create the 
right conditions for the project to become a showcase for viable countryside development. 2 1 
Despite bright prospects and wide political support the bank only agreed to finance the 
pioneering venture after the loan was fully secured by a major governmental guarantee (85%) 
and a corporate guarantee (15%). Government support was arranged via the Guarantee Fund 
for Small and Medium Enterprises (GFSME) . G F S M E is a special fund administered on behalf 
o f the livelihood Corporation. This corporation, running under the Office o f the President, 
actively stimulates and guides business development in the Philippines. President Ramos 
portrayed Livecor's role as enabling "groups o f small entrepreneurs and community-based 
enterprises to find profitable markets and become stable business organizations." 2 2 Through 
G F S M E , Livecor provided guarantees o f loans access through accredited banks by small and 
medium enterprises engaged in production, processing, manufacturing and services. 
Contract growing and export-diversification fitted neady into the government's overall 
programme for agricultural modernisation. The development o f farmers and small and medium 
agricultural enterprises had been identified as crucial elements in the country's efforts to achieve 
economic recovery and growth. The department o f Agriculture tapped G F S M E to operate and 
develop credit delivery for this purpose, for which one hundred million pesos o f the 
Comprehensive Agricultural Loan Fund (CALF) had been earmarked. The programme would 
be primarily for guarantee support, which was the case in the asparagus growing scheme; 
G F S M E guaranteed D B P upon default o f the borrowing associations payment in cash o f 8 5 % 
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o f the outstanding loan balance, including unpaid interest and other bank charges. 2 3 The 
company guaranteed the remaining 1 5 % o f the loan, but was, in all documents, mainly 
presented as the buyer o f marketable asparagus. So, the Philippine government was deeply 
involved in the financial underpinning of this particular production scheme; through the 
guarantee to DBP ' s loan, the asparagus scheme became part o f an endeavour to strengthen 
government-private sector partnership in the development o f small and medium enterprises. 
In processing the loan application, the bank's personnel responded quite optimistically to the 
proposed venture; the bank engaged, itself, in financing asparagus farm development and 
seasonal operating costs. The bank worked from the point o f view that the shift from traditional 
maize farming to export production would generate employment for farmers and increase their 
income significandy. The bank's estimate was that a farmer's yearly income would increase from 
P 26,000 out o f traditional maize farming to an average o f P 120,000 starting from the 5 t h year, 
when the crop is fully matured. 2 4 Growers can only generate enough cash to service their loans 
and credit lines after the 4 * year. The first four years o f the project were regarded as 
developmental stages, because asparagus has a long gestation and maturity period. Sales on the 
2 n d year up to the 4* year were expected to service only the interest portions o f the loans. 
Consequently, the bank decided a grace period o f 4 years. The bank's feasibility study projected 
sound financial prospects from the 5 * to the 8 t h year o f the operation. The loan would extend 
for eight years, so in these years, amortisation had to take place. After the 8* year, the farm 
businesses were expected to be self-financing, although between the 8 * to the 1 0 * year 
production would decline, which might lead to replanting, or a shift to other crops. 
Bank personnel projected an optimistic and linear prospect for economic growth in 
asparagus farming. Remarkably, the bank embarked on the venture with minimal information. 
In various documents it estimated a growth in both volume and quality in asparagus growing 
(figure 3.5). However, evidence used for the assumed upward trend in production volume and 
quality was rather feeble: production data from Taiwan, two years o f field trials by the 
company's banana division,2 5 and a university investigation o f one grower. Based on these 
reports, the bank projected substantial growth o f sales and profits after four years (figure 3.6), 
which would, obviously, imply rising incomes for contracted growers. Finally, the bank 
envisaged an increasing buying price assuming an increasing demand for asparagus locally, and 
in Japan, where the company intended to export the produce (table 3.2). Several documents 
used in financing the agreement, state a floor price subjected to upward adjustments in relation 
to increases in the export market, and in accordance with the peso-dollar exchange rate. 
Conditional for the bank's engagement was the organisation o f associations, which would be 
the actual borrowers. The associations were organised through the encouragement o f the 
company. Management o f the associations had to be done by respected leaders o f the 
communities. Associations collected the individual land tides from its members, so that the 
farmers were not able to encumber their lands again. D B P accumulated the land tides for 
safekeeping. However, the loan with D B P was without real estate or chattels as collateral; the 
G F S M E and company guarantees, and the growing agreement with the company, served as the 
basis for the provision o f loan and credit lines. 
The fact that the contracted crop served as collateral proved to be a crucial factor in 
convincing farmers to subsume their lands to a scheme with unpredictable outcomes and 
unknown risks. 2 6 In the following paragraphs I will illustrate how DBP's loan offer was part and 
parcel o f a continuing process to convince farmers to participate, and to sustain commitment. 
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Figure 3.S: Estimated production volume in asparagus growing 
Source: Various documents under the auspices of the local branch office of the Development Bank of the 
Philippines: Credit application forms (1991), Loan Transaction Executive Summary (1990), Loan 
Transaction Executive Summary (1991). 
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Figure 3.6: Projected sales and profits in asparagus farming on a per hectare basis 
Source: Various documents under the auspices of the local branch office of the Development Bank of the 
Philippines: Credit application forms (1991), Loan Transaction Executive Summary (1990), Loan 
Transaction Executive Summary (1991). 
Table 3.2: The projected annual price increase of export-quality asparagus 
Estimated price for 
Year export-quality asparagus 
(P/ks) 
1 37 
2 41 
3 45 
4 50 
5 55 
6 61 
7 67 
Source: DBP credit application document (1991) 
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Brokering integration 
Starting in 1989, the company contracted with several groups o f maize and coconut farmers 
(table 3.3). The company offered farmers a 10-year contract The duration o f the contract 
reflected the expected life span o f the perennial crop. In the beginning, company officials had to 
make a huge effort to convince local leaders and farmers o f the potential benefits o f a 
contractual arrangement. Later, increasing incomes o f neighbouring farmers were enough 
evidence for many suspicious farmers to specialise. As a result o f these efforts, the company was 
able to link family enterprises o f widely variant assets, small and medium farmers, and some 
absentee landowners, with a central processing, export and purchasing unit. 
Table 3.3: Actual expansion and reduction of the planted area in the asparagus program (1989-1997) 
Batch Year Size of expansion Total production area 
(ha) (ha) 
1 1989 195 195 
2 1991 52 247 
3 1991 200 447 
4 1993 140 587 
5 1994 183 770 
6 1994 550 1320 
(?) 1997 (abandonment) -189 1131 
S^urcëTDoîe^ïropÏFTësh™ 
The company's touting for growers was based on the assurance o f relatively cheap and easily 
available credit through D B P , without collateral. But there was more to convincing farmers to 
take the gamble and to incorporate their most valuable property, i.e. land, within a corporate 
scheme. A combination o f financial inducements, and promises o f forging a new partnership 
between company and farmers, seemed powerful reasons for farmers to participate in a scheme 
o f 'profit sharing' (cf. Bougen 1994). Clapp (1988) suggests that the farmer's rationale is a 
compromise between modernity and necessity. In this sense, contract farming can be 
understood as a farmer's first experience with integration, which indicates a choice to be part o f 
modernisation, to be modern. O n the other hand, farmers operate in an environment lacking 
institutional credit, o f unfavourable prices and worsening terms o f trade in commodity markets, 
and absent alternative profitable crops, which gives farmers every reason to grab the 
opportunities implied by signing a contract. 
Obviously, farmers in Mindanao had no influence on strategic decisions to introduce 
contract farming in the province as part o f a strategy for capital accumulation. Still, when 
preparing a fertile soil for the expansion o f asparagus growing, the company found it necessary 
to act extremely carefully in approaching the communities. Its approach relied strongly on 
brokers in various communities. The two elements mentioned before, modernity and necessity, 
continuously played a role in convincing farmers to sign up for the project, although the specific 
social contexts in which these brokers acted varied. 
Important for our analysis is the observation that political leaders in both Muslim 
communities and settlement villages act as brokers between government and agribusiness in 
various modernisation programmes. Mosdy, these brokers rely upon kinship networks (McCoy 
1994). 2 7 Partly due to the engagement o f local brokers, the asparagus growing scheme succeeded 
to gather a diverse population o f farmers under one umbrella. In processes o f integration much 
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Example 1 : Brokers in Muslim communities 
Community Relations officers of the company realised that the company would never be able to 
encroach on Muslim territory without the consent of leading and politically influential families. Some 
members of these families were asked to promote the asparagus scheme. One of them was the 
granddaughter of a former sultan; she energetically participated in campaigns meant to convince 
Muslim landowners. She also was the first woman in this village to receive a college degree, in 
commerce, underlining her ability to promote a modernisation scheme. Company officials 
frequented her house and brought along ice cream to attract her into the programme. 
At the beginning, the company was not very strict in selecting farms for asparagus production, 
she revealed in an interview: "We received extra attention because we were propaganda. After the 
propaganda many farmers wanted to join, and only then the company became very strict in 
selecting. But with us, they never did a soil test, they even brought our pay rolls and cash 
advances to the farm." Her involvement, and that of other influential community members, seemed 
to be more important to promote the potentials of contract growing. In this particular case, the land 
proved to be much too wet to grow asparagus successfully. She complained the company 
neglected her and, quite suddenly, management abandoned her farm after disappointing results. 
Aside from linking influential community members as brokers to the scheme, the company's 
offer to bail out existing debts was decisive in its expansion programme. 2 9 Staff of DBP revealed 
that in these villages 15-20% of the contracted farmers were borrowers from the bank with long 
overdue accounts. Other farmers were indebted to other banks or to traders. One of the pioneering 
growers owned a maize shelter in the village and, therefore, was an influential person in maize 
farming, but he also was deeply indebted to DBP. Later, this person ended in conflict with the 
company about illegally selling inputs and over accounting for debt payments. 
depends on a broker's intelligence, organising capacity and ability to command his following. 
Gutierrez and Danguilan-Vitug (1997) suggest that in Muslim communities a transition from 
local bosses to managers o f development altered the position o f the datus. In contrast with 
existing Muslim communities, the settlers' kinship networks were truncated due to migration 
(Beckett 1994). Notably in the settlement villages, the power o f the families engaged in maize 
milling and trading was eroded after the introduction o f contract growing arrangements to the 
settler farms; the new economic opportunities created new brokers. All brokers I interviewed 
were aware o f the creation o f new social relations, and they continuously deliberated where to 
draw the line between community interests and corporate interests. 2 8 Most strongly in Muslim 
communities, brokers defended the interests o f their constituency, defined by kinship networks 
and political supporters. 
This human relations side o f contract fanning is clearly illustrated by the examples o f the first 
three associations incorporated into the scheme, and o f the largest expansion programme, 
described in the boxes below. These examples indicate that the expansion o f contract growing 
induced a composite mode o f contract making as constructed by liuman contract makers' or 
marketers o f the project (Rousseau 1995). In the starting phase, company personnel focused on 
persons o f special importance, to introduce the scheme among a diverse group o f farmers who 
looked up to them expectantly. In their conversations, they emphasised the exceptional nature 
o f the opportunity offered to farmers, and cleverly linked this to the prevalent situation o f poor 
credit facilities and unfavourable terms o f trade in maize farming. In addition, the company 
pampered growers by providing non-operational advances for health and educational purposes. 
Financial assistance, in combination with the flavour o f modernity, won over many farmers. In 
the process o f winning over hesitant farmers, the human contract makers suggested to growers 
the idea o f partnership. In the following section I will explore how a second element in the 
contractual relationship, namely that o f an administrative hierarchy, shaped the relationship in a 
different way. 
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Example 2 : Brokers in a settler community 
For the majority of the settlers who arrived during and after World War II maize farming was one of 
their most important sources of income. In maize farming, most farmers received credit from a 
personal trader or suki. Maize farming in these communities was not intensive due to high costs of 
hybrid seed and the required basal application of fertiliser during planting. Traders did not demand 
changes in production technology as long as they received their share of the harvest. A small 
number of families in the village owned sufficient resources to provide credit and to run milling and 
trading businesses. Their business operations also helped them to local political office. From 1970 
to 1994, two families controlled the seat of barangay captain. They were hesitant to join the 
asparagus growing scheme, understandably, because they would lose business as well as political 
influence if many farmers were to convert their lands to asparagus farms. 3 0 One of the prominent 
families was the last family to join the asparagus growing scheme in this community (during the big 
expansion phase in 1994). This former barangay captain complained that asparagus growers no 
longer socialised with him and that he was excluded from conversations: "We were forced to join, 
otherwise we would be isolated. In their minds is asparagus only." 
The company's combined offer of credit, bail out and modernisation reshuffled social positions 
in this settler community. The company allied itself with families who had little or no interests in 
maize trading and credit provision. A large extended family played a leading role in convincing 
farmers to join the asparagus venture. The brothers and sisters in this family owned small parcels 
of the divided property of their parents. The elderly brothers believed the asparagus business to be 
an opportunity for increasing their incomes and enhancing their farming business. But, they also 
saw a partnership with Dole as a way to bring progress to the community. This family helped 
company employees to organise seminars, explaining the purpose and outcome of a partnership 
between company and growers. They also contacted farmers whose lands were approved by the 
company soil surveyor for possible asparagus growing. By calling meetings, and talking to farmers, 
members of this family became well-known figures in the community. In 1994, after the asparagus 
venture really took off, one of them was elected as barangay captain. As a result, the involvement 
of this family in initiating asparagus growing altered local political conditions. No longer was 
political office in the hands of families who controlled maize processing and trading. The family 
members were well aware that both their newly generated wealth and their newly created political 
cloud depended on the venture introduced by the company. 
One of the other supportive families was an old and established settler family with a long 
history in the settlement programme and in city politics. This family maintained a wide range of 
business interests, and it viewed asparagus farming as one of its many ventures. The company's 
banana division had employed family members and the family had also planted bananas. Not 
surprisingly, it was influential in the decision making process of its neighbouring farmers. In the 
end, however, it became disappointed by its business deal with the company, especially after most 
of its lots were nominated for abandonment. It turned its attention to other business ventures. A 
member said: "In the beginning we were convinced, we thought 'this is modem'. Contract farming 
in a general sense is good, but we were confronted with the high costs of materials used in 
production. What we 'earn' is heavy debt. This is not a business; business you do for profit." Family 
members were either abandoned by, or withdrew themselves from the asparagus venture. 
Example 3: Agrarian reform beneficiaries 
The last association in the first batch of asparagus growers was organised in a village where most 
landowners were agrarian reform beneficiaries (38% of the initial growers occupying 29% of the 
total area). The area used to be a plantation owned by a member of a political family in the 
northern island of Luzon. An appointed farm manager organised and controlled the agricultural 
enterprise. During the land reform programme under President Marcos in 1972, the plantation was 
distributed among tenants and farm workers; the farm manager continued to play a leading role in 
the community. When the asparagus venture started, a majority of these landholdings was 
encumbered with mortgages, partly to secure credit for their maize farming operations, and some 
farmers were indebted to the DBP itself. Furthermore, the agrarian reform beneficiaries still had to 
pay amortisation for their land titles to the Landbank. To them the company made an inviting offer 
that had to convince the former tenants: bail out their fragile farm businesses and, simultaneously, 
incorporate them into a production and credit scheme. This village was usually mentioned in 
documents linking the asparagus scheme to developmental goals of the government and DBP. 
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Example 4 : Expansion and competition for land 
More than four years after the first batch the company decided on its largest expansion 
programme: 550 hectares were added to the production area (table 3.3). Many farmers who had 
been hesitant now decided to join the venture, and many established growers decided to add other 
lands to the scheme. Apparently, yields and incomes had been convincing; many growers told me 
they were convinced by observing their neighbours buying motor cycles or renovating their houses. 
This worked to the advantage of the company, which was unpleasantly surprised by the 
asparagus venture of a competing company; this competitor has eyes on production areas in the 
same villages. The competitor offered farmers much higher sums for a bail out than Dole: 
P 50,000/ha and P 15,000/ha respectively. To deal with this menace, company management 
decided to increase the bail out amount and to expand the production area. It was the price the 
company had to pay to sustain its dominance over the area, to avoid possible cases of pole-
vaulting, and to nourish its relations with growers. All expansion phases were financed by DBP, 
under similar conditions as the first batch. Only the grace period was reduced to three instead of 
four years. 
Competition for land and influence forced the company into an expansion scheme, which 
otherwise might have been planned in a later stage or at a different speed. Quite a number of 
growers enrolled their lands in the scheme of Dole TropiFresh. Simultaneously, however, other 
farmers and established growers engaged with the competing company for other lots. This 
situation offered growers the opportunity to compare their situation with the situation in another 
corporate environment. Growers observed differences in qualification, pricing and technical 
applications. Another striking difference was the organisation of a co-operative, which, in contrast 
with the existing associations, was legally allowed to raise funds, to deliver labour services in the 
processing plant, and to sell agricultural inputs. 
ORGANISING COMPENSATION AND COMPUTATION 
After signing a contract, growers are incorporated within the institutional boundaries o f a 
complex system o f accounting and information flow. Accounting transforms the physical flows, 
such as harvest produce or agricultural inputs, into financial flows, such as cash proceeds, debt 
reserves and excess calculations (cf. Miller 1994). The purpose o f an accounting system is to 
make organised activities visible, and to allow company management to detect, count, record, 
report and analyse what happens in different layers o f the operation (jVIunro 1996). Thus the 
organisation o f an accounting system is to invent a particular way o f understanding and 
administering events and processes in contract growing. The task o f this section is to present a 
detailed empirical understanding o f the way accounting is performed in contract growing. It 
starts with a brief description o f the formal structure resulting from agreements about financing. 
Then it moves on to consider the organisational aspects o f the two basic financial transactions 
in contract growing: sharing o f profits and computation o f production costs. This analysis 
points to fluid ambiguities in the formal reward system and difficulties to secure transparency in 
a complex reward system. 
Formal incorporation through credit provision 
The financial deal closed in this growing scheme was that growers' associations, organised by 
company personnel borrowed money from the Development Bank o f the Philippines (DBP) to 
finance the initial phase o f farm development (term loan), i.e. land conversion, nursery and 
planting, and to finance seasonal operation at costs dine loan). Interest on loans with D B P was 
13%, exclusive of a 2 % annual guarantee fee. A government-supported guarantee and a 
company guarantee securdd credit lines and term loans for 8 5 % and 1 5 % respectively.32 In 
addition, the company financed subsistence allowances during non-harvest periods and lent 
Performance and compensation 69 
non-operational advances for medical and educational purposes. Figure 3.7 shows the four types 
o f contractual agreements, which constituted the formal basis o f this project: 
• The financing agreement between growers association, company, bank and guarantee fund 
which combines guarantee and loan agreements and which specifies the respective 
commitments and obligations; 
• The loan agreements between growers' association and bank; 
• The guarantee agreements between bank and guarantee fund and between bank and 
company. 
• The contract growing agreement between an individual grower and company, an integral 
part o f the above agreements.* 
As a result o f these financial understandings, contract growing can no longer be considered 
as merely an arrangement between a producer and a buyer. On the contrary, it brought with it 
an extensive and layered institutional framework, which shaped the organisational relations 
between the different parties. In the paragraphs below I discuss the obligations and duties 
following from these formal agreements. 
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Figure 3.7: Contractual arrangements in the asparagus growing scheme 
Appendix 3 describes the details of the contractual agreements between an individual grower and the company in asparagus farming. 
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The associations agreed to liaise and co-ordinate closely with the company for the 
implementation o f farm plan, distribution o f inputs, delivery o f asparagus, accounting and 
auditing o f company advances, sales proceeds and deductions thereof for debt payments. 3 3 
Furthermore, associations had to assure that its members would: 3 4 
• provide land for the project; 
• plant and religiously develop and maintain only the asparagus variety supplied by the 
company on the piece o f land designated; 
• provide farm labour requirements; 
• co-operate in the implementation o f farming technology introduced by the company; 
• comply with the terms and conditions in relevant agreements. 
According to the loan agreement, the association, the actual borrower, was supposed to 
maintain adequate financial records in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles 
and permit the bank to examine such records and discuss the asparagus growing business with 
the board members o f the association. 3 5 The associations were supposed to co-operate with the 
bank for the evaluation, processing and timely amortisation o f the loans that were obtained by 
the association on behalf o f its members. Loan releases were credited to the Association's 
account with D B P , from which the associations were to reimburse the company's advances 
made in favour o f the grower. 3 6 Promissory notes signed by the association president evidenced 
the loan, payable to the bank. Growers submitted individual land tides covering the project sites 
to D B P for safekeeping, but these were not considered as collateral. Furthermore, the 
agreements stipulated that no additional loans would be extended to borrower, and no 
additional lien was to be created on the mortgaged properties. 
Term loans were exclusively used to finance asparagus farm development. The term loan was 
to mature in the 8 t h yean for the first group o f associations, the bank approved 4 years o f grace 
period and amortisation in 8 semi-annual instalments to start in the 5 * year. 3 7 The line loan was 
to mature 360 days from date o f ability. This line loan is subject to renewal and roll-over in 
accordance with the needs o f the pro ject . 3 8 This credit accommodation is made available to 
finance the seasonal needs for farm inputs, pest and disease control and field maintenance 
expenses, and the lines are reviewable after one year. 3 9 
Although the actual loan from D B P was meant for the associations, the practical 
arrangement, in fact, was that credit flows passed by the company. Technically, the company 
held the accounts o f the growers' associations. The company delivered production inputs, 
provided weekly labour advances based on a forecasting prepared by technicians, and issued 
weekly cash proceeds during harvest periods. Contractually, the company had committed itself 
to design a computerised accounting system with the purpose o f creating transparency in the so-
called lausiness deal'. As a result, its financial department handled all accounting matters 
between company, growers and bank (figure 3.8). 
The financial department supervised and managed the following financial flows: 
1. the administrative retention o f harvest proceeds used for debt payments (amortisation and 
interest charges), reimbursement o f operational advances, and repayment o f subsistence 
allowances and non-operational advances. 
2. the issuance o f cash payments for harvest deliveries (weekly cash proceeds), labour payroll 
advances, yearly excess computations, subsistence allowances and non-operational advances; 
3. the calculation o f costs for the delivery and supply o f agricultural inputs; the company was 
refunded for these operational advances through draw downs o f association loans with the 
D B P . 
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As one might imagine, looking at figure 3.8, monitoring and calculating all the transactions 
for more than 600 growers was an enormous job in itself. Not surprisingly, the accounting 
system frequendy failed to fulfil the aim o f transparency in the first six year o f the growing 
scheme, especially when we consider the existence o f many covert forms o f transactions, which 
will be discussed below. Furthermore, accounting and financial transactions acted as 
independent streams in the organisation, remarkably disconnected from performance and 
productivity in growers' fields. Nevertheless, the organisational features o f contract growing 
entailed that relationships and interactions were increasingly dealt with in monetary terms. In 
the following we will see how both company management and growers reacted to accounting 
and recording practices in relation to (1) sharing o f income and profits, and (2) computing o f 
production costs. 
Profit sharing: modes of payment 
Before the entrance o f the contractual arrangement, the calculation o f income and expenses o f 
maize and coconut farming was embedded in credit relationship with traders. 4 0 At the end o f 
the cropping season farmers sold their harvest to a trader, who, usually, also had provided them 
inputs and credit. The outcome o f such a transaction was an amount in cash, based on a 
division agreed upon in advance. While the physical division o f a crop into shares is a fairly 
simple matter, the calculation o f production costs and sales profits is not. The accounting 
system, implemented in contract growing to determine these costs and profits, was designed and 
controlled by the corporate authorities (cf. Bernal 1997). For many interviewed growers, 
proceeds were some external mystery managed by others for whom they did the work. This 
underlines the important role o f accounting in shaping the organisational dimensions o f such a 
'profit sharing' scheme. Here I will focus on the modes o f payment operational in asparagus 
growing: to illustrate the formal reward system and, concurrendy, to indicate ambiguities, and to 
disclose forms o f fiddling. 
After delivery o f the harvested asparagus spears, growers were not paid the agreed price. The 
company's financial department retained 9 0 % o f the gross value o f the harvest. The retained 
amount, or the difference between the supposed buying price and the actual amount paid to the 
grower per kilo, is used for the payment o f bank debt and bank services, interest charges and 
guarantee fees, subsistence allowances, and operational and non-operational advances. For many 
growers, this system o f retention was both difficult to understand and hard to trust. 
One morning I attended a 'financial seminar' in one o f the farms where all neighbouring 
growers were gathered. An employee o f the financial department did his utmost best to explain 
to growers that the accounting system was reliable. He used an enlarged example o f a statement 
o f account to illustrate what information the company provided. This amounted to repeating 
the labels attached to the various columns, and emphasising that retention was unavoidable 
under the financial system adopted by the production scheme, under which the actual practice 
o f computation was hidden. The financial officer explicated that 2 0 % o f the retained amount 
was used for payment o f advances, 1 0 % for guarantee fees, and 7 0 % was deposited as Reserve 
for Bank Debt, but revealed nothing about the work done in the financial department. Growers 
complained that his explanation did not justify the cash amounts they received for their effort. 
Furthermore, many said: " W e first have to go to school before we can understand this system. 
Why can't you design a system which resembles the credit system we had in maize farming." 
After a short while, growers walked away from the meeting and began to discuss technical 
matters with the technicians present. 
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In interviews with other growers the use o f retention amounts came to the fore. As stipulated 
in the financial agreement, growers only start paying their loans in the 5 t h year. During the grace 
period o f four years, growers only paid interest charges to the bank. Nonetheless, a monthly 
amount was retained as Reserve for Bank Debts. Wealthy growers complained about this delay 
in amortisation. They would have preferred to start paying their debts during the years the 
asparagus plants were producing well. But the company did not allow such an early amortisation 
and continued to retain parts o f the harvest proceeds. 4 1 At meeting with company officials, 
growers openly questioned in whose bank accounts these retention amounts were deposited, 
and who was earning interest. Growers were not able to trace this money, and, consequendy, 
suspected the company o f using it for other projects. The sting o f the accounting system was 
that the company administered cash flows as well as retention. 
These examples show that the accounting system was a concern for growers, but as long as 
their income was satisfactory they accepted the terms o f profit sharing and credit provision. But 
the moment results out o f asparagus farming declined the complex financial system became a 
disturbance in the relationship between growers and the company. Fundamental to the 
organisational role o f the accounting system was that so much money "disappeared in the 
books", as one grower called it. Hence, i f the financial information is not able to explain to 
growers the use o f harvest proceeds, this easily gives rise to suspicion and distrust. Eventually, 
growers' judgement was based not on statements o f accounts but on the cash they received as a 
reward for their efforts. 
Cash circulated in different forms in the growing scheme. Growers received cash proceeds as 
partial payment for their harvest, but they also received cash in the form o f advances for labour 
payments, o f subsistence allowance during rest periods, and o f non-operational advances for 
medical and educational purposes, as a service by the company. Labour advances were budgeted 
by the technician; the exact amount was to some extent dependent on bargaining processes in 
the individual relationship between grower and technician, and not solely based on technical 
criteria. The amount o f subsistence allowances was fixed by company management, and was 
deducted from the grower's proceeds at the end o f the year. While touting for growers, the non-
operational advances had been an important tool for the company, which, during operations, 
continued to play a social role in shaping working-relations. The regular cash payments attracted 
so-called Thursday growers'; these growers were accused by other growers and company 
technicians o f being mainly after the money they could withdraw from the bank on Thursday 
mornings, and who spent the advances on other things without considering its real purpose. 
Obviously this affected the financial viability o f their individual farm operations and these 
growers ended up heavily indebted to the company. However, more interesting for this study is 
the form o f cash payment as a form o f reward for effort. Later, I will discuss the organisational 
complexity o f cash proceeds, prices and classification, which decisively shaped the mode o f 
profit sharing in the asparagus growing scheme. 
During harvest periods, growers received cash proceeds on a weekly basis. These cash 
proceeds were based on a guaranteed part o f the agreed price per kilo, differentiated for quality 
standards (table 3.4). This system functioned well until the company discovered that for a 
substantial number o f growers the retained amount no longer covered the outstanding debts 
and financial obligations. On several occasions, the general manager alerted growers to this 
problem: "The company is paying more cash proceeds than you are earning". Company 
management decided to implement a new system for calculating cash proceeds, in which reward 
was related to performance. Poor performing growers, mainly judged in terms o f volume, 
received fewer cash proceeds, in an effort to secure sufficient retention. The company explained 
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that it took over the retention, amount from growers who produced insufficiendy and, 
accordingly, would not be able to meet debt payment schedules. Management explained its 
decision in a number o f letters addressed to growers: 
Due to high production costs the chances of gaining are low; that is why only minimal cash 
proceeds will be received. 
(Letter from general manager to growers, dated 3 1 / 0 7 / 1 9 9 6 ) . 
We wish to emphasize again that we are taking this step o f reducing cash proceeds to: (1) 
encourage less productive and heavily indebted growers to improve their performance so as to 
reduce and eventually eliminate their outstanding debts; and (2) inspire the productive growers 
to excel more and attain new production records. 
(Letter from general manager to growers, dated 0 1 / 0 8 / 1 9 9 5 ) . 
Table 3.4: Old and new system for cash proceeds in asparagus growing: differentiated for quality standards, and in 
new system also dependent on grower performance 
Old system, Excess grower Non- excess grower 
no differentiation _ > Quota (9.5_T/year) _ < Quota (9.5 T / y e a r ) 
Dole grade ' lTp'/kg 9 P/kg" " 6 P/kg 
Mountain grade 9 P/kg 7 P/kg 4 P/kg 
Other grades 8 P/kg 6 P/kg 3 P/kg 
Source: Company letters to growers 
In the discussions following this revision o f the system o f cash payment, growers direcdy 
linked the changes in calculating cash proceeds to negotiations about prices for asparagus. 
However, changes in product prices or quality standards require a powerful and collective effort, 
which was hard to organise in a context o f culturally distinct communities and socially 
differentiated growers. Furthermore, local management, although confronted by demands o f 
growers' representatives, was not in the position to take far-reaching decisions on price policy, 
ultimately, it had to be accountable to regional and international headquarters, applying very 
strict guidelines on profit margins. 
Management was not likely to give in to demands because it believed that earnings from 
asparagus were very good for those growers who were average to very good growers. In 
addition, it stated that cash paid to growers is very good, even for those growers who do not 
perform very well. 4 2 Consequendy, the company was not prepared to show mercy to those 
growers performing badly in terms o f both volume and quality. In negotiations, company 
management consistendy coupled possible price increases to improved performance, especially 
enhanced quality. 
In 1995, the association president succeeded to open negotiations with the company about 
the agreed prices for asparagus.4 3 Several o f the proposals and counter-proposals are presented 
in table 3.5. It shows that the company was prepared to pay higher prices for premium 
asparagus, Dole Grade and Mountain Grade, but coupled this with substantially lower prices for 
grades difficult to sell in the Japanese market, in particular class A. Company management 
complained that the marketability o f lower grades was not very good; they explained reduced 
earnings in term o f the losses they incurred buying class A products. In relation to these price 
negotiations, the company also implemented a more restrictive qualification than in the start-up 
phase o f the production scheme. In response to market demands, the company upgraded its 
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quality specifications several times, but, as -will be discussed in more detail in chapter 4 , it was 
difficult to improve quality in growers' fields. Nevertheless, growers' incomes and rewards were 
made direcdy dependent on the quality o f their harvest, and many o f them wondered whether 
price increases for premium asparagus would generate any benefits for producers. Moreover, 
the practice o f classification became highly disputed in this growing scheme and increased the 
tension in the relationship between growers and company. 
Table 3.5: Buying prices offers for 1995-1996 and prices in original asparagus growing agreement 
Grades Prices 1992- Current 1995 Company Growers Company Growers 
contract prices 1« offer counter # 1 counter # 1 counter # 2 
(P/gross (P/net kilo) (P/net (P/net (P/net (P/net 
kilo) kilo) kilo) kilo) kilo) 
Dole 32.00 50.00 52.50 57.50 55.00 55.00 
Mountain 25.00 40.00 42.50 47.50 45.00 45.00 
8-inch 33.00 37.00 40.00 43.00 43.00 
7-inch 33.00 35.50 37.50 33.00 33.00 
Class A 20.00 33.00 27.50 35.00 25.00 33.00 
Class C (sold) 33.00 25.00 33.00 22.00 33.00 
Class D (sold) 33.00 22.50 30.00 20.00 33.00 
Source: Company letter to association presidents, dd. 01 /08 /95 ; Memorandum of agreement. 
Note: In the original contract growing agreement the company specified three grades; the number of grades 
increased through the years. 
Note: In 1993, Tokyo terminal prices varied between 197 P/kilo and 297 P/kilo. In 1999, prices varied between 
387 P/kilo and 508 P/kilo (www.ams.usda.gov/mnreports/TK_FV020.txt) 
In the trust relationship between company and grower, it was precisely the classification 
system operational in the packing plant where the shoe pinched. Growers increasingly distrusted 
the harvest records they received: the recorded grade distribution contrasted with their own 
observations in the field and they observed differences between the first tally and the final 
payroll. Commonly, growers believed that the sample system used by the company allowed 
embezzlement. Furthermore, growers suspected the company mixed low grade asparagus with 
premium asparagus, while they received a low price. The principle o f fiddling with quality 
standard and grades is widely observed in the contract farming literature: the company pays 
growers less for lower grade produce but sells the same produce as premium quality in the 
market. I was not able to trace or observe systematic fiddling, but I registered many stories 
concerning both company and growers. These stories appeared repeatedly in negotiations and 
exchanges and, consequendy, affected the working relationships in contract growing. 
The general manager was well aware o f the fact that any system o f classification was based on 
oust. In an exchange with protesting growers from Muslim communities, and in particular with 
one o f their prominent spokespersons, he tried to demonstrate the trustworthiness o f the 
company's system. The discussion centred on the question whether classification should be 
done in the field or in the packing plant: 
We are not going to make a system that is designed to cheat the growers, but any system is 
open for abuse. 1 have seen many systems in other countries, and I can see a difference 
between classification in the field or in the packing plant. In the field is impractical, bad on 
quality and expensive, but it is good for growers' confidence. Classification in the packing plant 
is practical, easy to manage, less expensive and good on quality, but has a negative effect on 
confidence, so trust is no longer there. 
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At later stages, the discussion evolved towards technicalities o f the sampling system. Company 
employees took a 1 0 % sample of 2.5 kilogram for every tray, at six places different places. 
Growers suspected that packers were instructed to drop premium quality asparagus in order to 
lower the harvest proceeds o f growers. The company criticised the practice o f growers o f pre-
classifying asparagus in the tray, and trying to place high quality spears on top, which destroys 
the randomness o f the sample system. 
A more serious allegation was the existence o f a syndicate in the packing plant. 4 4 It was 
rumoured that people in the packing plant were accepting bribes to influence the samples from 
individual growers. In addition, drivers collecting the harvest were accused o f tampering with 
the trays o f growers and placing premium quality spears in trays o f other growers. Or, in a 
different version, growers placed 'their own people' in the packing plant to interfere with the 
classification. Others also observed that after a conflict with company officials, the classification 
results o f the growers concerned deteriorated. Obviously, the alleged existence o f these types o f 
organised activities undermined confidence in the practice o f classification. 
The above shows that, despite the existence o f a formal reward system, various covert ways 
to alter or manipulate the distribution o f reward (imagined or real) shaped the relationship 
between company and growers. The discussion about lack o f transparency and clarity in the 
administrative and accounting system, and about the erosion o f trust in the classification system, 
reveals the complexity of an organisation in which partners are supposed to share profits from a 
common venture. In the following, I pursue this argument by examining technology transfer as 
a vital financially salient flow within the organisation. 
Technology transfer: computation of costs 
The formal arrangement for financing production activities was crystal-clear in the financial 
agreements: the bank opened a credit line o f P 100,000 per hectare, which had to be renewed 
annually. As a service, the company delivered material inputs at cost price and advanced labour 
expenses, which were later refunded through the association loan with D B P . But what would 
happen in the case o f increased production costs? The gradual increase in production costs 
(table 3.6) did not come as a surprise; both bank and company were aware o f the estimated 
annual increase o f 1 4 % resulting from the early company trials.4 5 Not surprisingly, a majority o f 
growers exceeded the line loan through the years, and, as a result, many o f them incurred high 
debts. In this situation, the company began to subsidise the operations o f indebted growers, 
who were able neither to repay all advances nor to meet debt obligations. The company's 
primary interest in the early years o f the asparagus scheme was to arrange a stable supply and to 
establish a strong position in the Japanese market However, in 1995, the company's financial 
figures convinced management that the production costs, as well as the numerous advances, 
were really getting out o f hand, and something had to be done (figure 3.9, table 3.6). 
Table 3.6: Increase of average growing costs in asparagus (1992-1996) 
1992 199 ! 1994 19951 19% Average annual increase 
Total growing coste 99 102 114 142 161 
('000 pesos/hectare) 
Annual increase 1% 12% 2 5 % 14% 
Source: Company letter to growers, dated 05/08/1996 
12.5% 
Performance and compensation 77 
a> 15000 c 
I 
O 10000 • 
5000 • 
•Harvestlng/fem cutback 
Pest and disease control 
Weed control 
Fertilisation/Soil amendment 
Field maintenance/cultivation 
Others (irrigation, drainage, 
tools, etc.) 
1992 1993 1994 
Year 
1995 1996 
Figure 3.9: Company computation of average asparagus growing costs per hectare (1992-1996) 
Source: Compiled of figures mentioned in company letter to growers, dated 05/08/1996 
The former agricultural manager mentioned in an interview that, in a corporate setting, costs 
pressures are always there. Therefore, the main task o f his agricultural department was to secure 
an increase in productivity that supports rising operational expenses. This was a risky path to 
take, especially because in the beginning the company still had to leam how to produce 
asparagus under these specific circumstances. He said: 
Nobody knew whether producing asparagus would be a lucrative business. The technology was 
copied from Taiwan and still had to prove itself. The farmers were hesitant to join, but the 
financial assistance convinced them. We succeeded to raise productivity, and thus the company 
could have lowered the purchase prices. Growers have to pay for business, we can give 
enthusiasm. 
His argument, however, did not hold, because despite rising productivity, the harvest 
proceeds hardly balanced the continuous increases in production costs: increasingly, growers 
were unable to pay for business. Undeniably, in quite a number o f cases, not all production 
costs were covered by the line loan. Consequendy, growers had additional expenses, and the 
promise o f high incomes turned out to be fallacy. Growing debts confronted company and 
growers also with the question whether the asparagus farm would indeed be self-financing after 
8 years, and, if not, how working capital had to be arranged after the DBP's loans matured. I 
interviewed a businessman engaged in asparagus growing who stated that: " i f the company had 
told me that more than half o f the growers were indebted, I would not have joined the project". 
Such businessmen considered turning their attention to other ventures because the rewards in 
asparagus growing were unsatisfactory. Thus the company was confronted with a group o f 
demotivated growers who were unwilling to take responsibility for their debts because these 
were guaranteed by G F S M E and the company, and who lacked faith that they would receive a 
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* In chapter 4,1 will discuss in detail the consequences of cuts in labour budgets at the level of production. 
reasonable reward for effort, and who mistrusted the company's computations. So company 
management was forced to act upon the financial conditions for production. 
Basically, company management analysed that costs were too high, and, consequendy, had to 
be reduced. 4 6 Rather than showing a bright economic future for contract growing and asparagus 
farming, financial figures began to play a decisive role in controlling costs. Labour costs were 
highly visible in the financial figures available to company management; mainly due to the fact 
that growers received weekly cash advances for paying their workers. 4 7 The company signalled a 
concern with growers who still withdrew labour advances even when this budget was not 
needed in the farm. In addition, growers were very easy in requesting non-operational expenses, 
even i f their accounts showed negative balances. Furthermore company technicians made 
forecasts o f operational expenses not based on actual operations and needs. Much more difficult 
was making an assessment o f the large number o f routine sales and purchases o f agricultural 
inputs; the control o f working capital was a problematic feature o f the accounting system in 
operation in this growing scheme. 
In a multi-level company structure, superiors rely on sub-ordinates for information used for 
assessment o f practices and for managerial decisions. In the asparagus scheme, technicians had 
many opportunities to conceal, distort or dress up the information channelled through the 
system. The distance between the office-based corporate management and financial controllers 
and the field-based technical staff was big. Communication between the two parties was partly 
facilitated by appointments o f company staff and field officers (cf. Porter and Phillips-Howard 
1994). Therefore technicians were an important source o f information about performance o f 
individual growers, and, moreover, technicians largely fixed operational budgets for growers 
they interacted with on a daily basis. The company had little sense o f how much it was 
ploughing back into growing operations. An improved financial monitoring system showed that 
the company was, in fact, subsidising a significant number of growers by continuing to supply 
agricultural inputs. 
A related phenomenon was selling o f inputs to outsiders. It was commonly known that in the 
asparagus production scheme individual growers had found a way to increase their benefits. 
This activity was partially organised in networks o f growers and input suppliers. It was not a 
secret to company officials and technicians that chemicals and fertilisers intended for use in 
asparagus farms were sold in several markets in the province. At a later stage, the company's 
response was to contract out fertilisation in order to secure proper timing and right application 
and to avoid selling.48 At the same time, fertilisation on a contractual basis was expected to be 
cheaper. The diversion o f inputs might, according to Clapp (1988), be interpreted as a form o f 
growers' resistance, but one which does not bring general injustices to the fore (something also 
observed by Watts 1992, Jaffee 1994, and Jackson and Cheater 1989). My argument would be 
that selling o f inputs illustrates the existence o f a total reward system (Mars 1982), which entails 
more transactions than merely formalised mechanisms for distribution o f benefits and costs. 4 9 
Hence, organisational and social elements transformed procedures in the formal accounting 
system. 
T o some extent, growers disagreed with the financial assessment made by management. They 
questioned why, at first, the company allowed overrunning the budget Growers did not easily 
accept the enforcement o f budget cuts; they believed sudden changes in labour budgets and 
application o f inputs might hurt asparagus production." Furthermore, growers distrusted the 
company's financial figures. The company decided upon technology and inputs to be used; in 
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addition it had a monopoly o f sales. Literature on contract growing suggests that in such a 
situation opportunities for abuse are numerous in the pricing o f inputs and the costing o f sales 
(Mackintosh 1989). 
Growers frequentiy mentioned the pricing o f urea, an intensively used fertiliser in asparagus 
farming, as evidence for the company's deception. Growers' experience in maize farming 
allowed them to compare company prices for urea with the prices charged by traders in the city. 
The company sold urea at a higher price than in the market; growers mentioned figures o f 
"more than 400 pesos per bag compared to 3 0 0 + in the market". The company, however, 
claimed the urea it supplied was o f better quality and, hence, had a higher price. The same 
argument was brought forward in relation to the chemicals selected by the company: "why can 
we not use another and cheaper fungicide, or buy it at another dealer". Growers could not 
understand why the prices o f agricultural inputs had to be high, especially because the company 
bought direcdy from the manufacturer and in large volumes. The 6 % charge for handling and 
delivery could easily be compensated by the discount resulting from large volumes. The 
impression that the company overcharged, even though it was contractually obliged to deliver 
inputs at cost-price, was confirmed when, with the arrival o f the new agricultural manager, and 
as a result o f growers' complaints, input prices went down, especially for urea. Was price-setting 
simply a managerial decision? And what explains the difference in prices for high-use inputs? 
This lack o f clarity affected the level o f trust between company and growers. Growers were 
convinced that people inside the company were earning commissions in the process o f 
purchasing inputs. They referred to close contacts with input dealers who were retired 
employees o f the company's banana division as proof o f entangled interests. The importance o f 
such a social network, in which commissions were common, was confirmed in interviews with 
traders and input suppliers in the province. Although concrete evidence is lacking (table 3.7), the 
general idea that individuals in the company abused their position weakened the relationship o f 
trust in the growing scheme. 
Table 3.7: Company prices in pesos for most commonly used pesticides, fungicides and fertilisers in in asparagus 
farming (1994,1995,1996), compared to prices in two major input supply stores (1996) 
1994 1995 1996 1996-store 1 1996 store 2 
Fungicide #1 138 P/kg 140 P/kg 143 P/kg Not available Not available 
Fungicide # 2 252 P/kg 247 P/kg 273 P/kg 440 P/kilo Not available 
Fungicide #3 
or #4 
373 P/kg 258 P/kg 250 P/litre Not available Not available 
Pesticide 
#1 
Not used 696 P/litre Not used 750 P/litrc 710 P/litre 
Pesticide 
#2 
854 P/litre 854 P/litre 869 P/kilo 935 P/kilo 900 P/kilo 
Foliar fertiliser 1500 P/litrc 1590 P/litre 1520 P/litrc 2167 P/litre Not available 
Potash 220 P/bag 260 P/bag 288 P/bag 290 P/bag Not available 
Urea 310 P/bag 384 P/bag 414 P/bag 370 P/bag 355 P/bag 
interviews 
Note: most pesticides and fungicides recommended in asparagus production were not readily available in 
commercial stores. 
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Aside from disputes over prices for agricultural inputs, the actual computation o f production 
costs was doubtful as well. Report has it that growers were paying too much due to 'double 
entries'. For a long time, the company relied on manual, not computerised, records, which 
resulted in missing transactions and errors, especially in the expansion phase between 1994 and 
1996. It is my impression that at management level the company was open to correct errors; 
indeed, what would be the reason for a large company to put its reputation at risk in a venture 
promoted as a showcase for future development in Philippine agriculture. Yet, accountants 
hired by growers reported that no individual records existed. In addition, growers stated that 
they did not use the whole amount o f the term loan; maize farms needed little preparation for 
farm development So, they wondered what happened to the remaining sum. Together with the 
lack o f clarity in the practice o f retention, as discussed above, growers began to believe the 
company had found a way to get their own working capital very cheaply. 
In general, the accounting system and price schedules created a confusing situation in which 
individuals had to find ways to increase their rewards. The former Agricultural Manager o f the 
company, whose wife was the responsible officer for the purchase o f agricultural inputs, 
confirmed the chaos in accounting, and he believed that this was the thorny issue which 
undermined growers' confidence in the whole operation. He emphasised the possibility for 
correcting errors, but, at the same time, acknowledged that working relations hindered an open 
dialogue. In his opinion, this led to a deadlock in which growers accused the company o f 
inefficiencies, mismanagement and corruption. In doing so, he stated, growers tended to mystify 
their own problems. 
The analysis presented here only affords a glance behind the scenes, but it confirms the 
presence o f informal and formal reward mechanisms in a network o f work-based relations. In 
particular the lack o f transparency in accounting and the opportunities available to get round the 
formal structure and to cheat either party show that the organisation o f reward and 
compensation contrasted sharply with this trust. Rewards were not only allocated through 
formalised transactions, and depended much on individual bargdning power. Apparendy, 
negotiations in contract farming include a wider spectrum o f activities than formalised collective 
institutions typical o f manufacturing (Mars 1982). The examples o f cheating in harvest 
classification and selling o f inputs speak to the counterproductive impact on the firm's original 
concept o f asparagus business, and even impact direcdy on the firm's balance sheet However, 
these fiddling activities were extremely productive for the individual.50 The increased difficulty 
in working together in a coherent and fruitful way came fully out into the open after the 
company initiated an extensive review process, in order to improve financial performance o f the 
scheme. So the general issue raised here is how the observed manipulation o f accounting 
procedures by both parties interacts with other organisational mechanisms. 
MEASURING PERFORMANCE 
In the beginning o f the asparagus production scheme, the company had to do its utmost to 
convince farmers to incorporate their land into the proposed venture. For this purpose, 
company employees entered into relations o f trust and confidence with leading persons in the 
targeted communities. During these initial years, financial monitoring o f performance and costs 
was done rather loosely. The company kept its distance and concentrated much on the 
marketing aspects o f the operation. In the field, company personnel interacted closely with local 
leaders and with leaders o f the associations. The basic trust was a win-win situation as a result o f 
the co-operation between business partners. 
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When company management realised it was in fact subsidising a substantial number o f 
growers -a conclusion based on revealing figures about rising production costs and declining 
returns- it introduced a strict and individualised form o f accountability. Management's emphasis 
on cost reduction and performance, coupled with organisational changes that instituted formal 
control and enhanced accounting control, led the reshaping o f the institutional framework o f 
the growing scheme Bougen 1994). In the following paragraphs I examine this precarious 
combination o f uncertain accounting tools and changing organisational relations in the fields o f 
(1) measurement o f production costs, (2) performance and productivity, and (3) risk and debt 
management 
Monitoring costs and results 
In the early years, optimism about the whole enterprise allowed for financial accounting, which 
summarised the economic condition o f the scheme, such as rising incomes and increasing sales. 
However, when operating efficiency wa,s labelled problematic, cost accounting was introduced 
in order to aid internal management decision making (cf. McGaw 1985). An important reason 
for this shift in management policy was the increasing number o f growers heavily indebted to 
the company. By advancing labour costs and delivering inputs, the company thought it had firm 
control o f the flow o f money to the production process. Nevertheless, in many cases the 
production costs exceeded the amount o f the bank's loan. While the company continued to 
provide inputs and cash advances for labour, the proceeds, for a large number o f growers, were 
no longer sufficient to support production costs. Consequendy, people inside the company 
began to feel the need to increase their control over what was happening in growers' fields, 
especially because it was felt that the company was subsidising the production o f an increasing 
number o f growers. This created a situation in which transactions between company and 
growers was re-focused in narrow monetary terms, which in turn undermined the social 
relationship between company and growers. 5 1 
Monitoring the financial viability o f every individual grower proved to be a difficult task, and 
one that was done with little accuracy in the early years. At the beginning o f the scheme farmers 
were still very suspicious about the potential profits from asparagus production. Later growers 
also showed a lack o f confidence in the financial success o f the scheme. Therefore, the company 
had to make a huge social and political effort to get growers to commit to the scheme. T o win 
over farmers, company personnel were willing to turn a blind eye to their financial status; the 
primary objective was get access to land in order to pursue the company's marketing strategy. 
However, when the scheme evolved, the behaviour o f a number o f growers foreshadowed the 
future problems in their financial situation. Some growers sold the inputs, which were provided 
by the company, on local markets; others demanded very high labour budgets and spent only 
parts o f it on actual payments for labour; it was also common practice for growers to negotiate 
higher labour budgets with their technicians. 
The company's technical personnel were assigned to oversee results o f money spent in 
production. Company technicians made a weekly budget for labour needs; the growers received 
cash advances for labour at the bank. Technicians discussed with growers what work had to be 
done the coming week and what inputs would be needed. One o f their important tasks, aside 
from technical supervision, was to fill in all the necessary forms and to fulfil other bureaucratic 
requirements. This was supposed to facilitate the monitoring and aciministration o f production 
costs by the financial department However, interviews with employees o f the financial 
department revealed that they had little idea about what was happening in individual fields, or 
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_ 'y,5 what inputs and labour were really needed to guarantee good quality and productivity, 
r - Technicians were the ones most knowledgeable about problems and events in asparagus fields. 
Confined communication with the financial department, mosdy limited to forms and requests, 
hampered a close monitoring o f the performance o f individual growers. 
The factual basis for managerial decisions found litde approval by many growers. Growers 
questioned whether the accounting system operational in the company was capable o f 
..." calculating rewards and computing costs. Their experiences showed that administrative 
^fi' procedures and processes in this production scheme could partly be considered as a tool for 
[\v ' measurement, but, more importandy, these procedures had to be understood as a social and 
.; . ? organisational practice. In this context, management had to convince growers that their 
decisions were reasonable and sensible, even in a situation where accounting performance was 
•-. unsatisfactory (Kirk and Mouritsen 1996: 246). 
The previous sections revealed that calculative processes are imperfect mirrors o f economic 
reality; accounting mainly creates and defines profits and losses to which various parties react 
(Miller 1994). For example, prescribed farming practices easily led to frictions between company 
and growers, especially around the question 'who bears the cost?' (Grosh 1994). At the 
beginning o f the asparagus scheme, the balance between production costs and results was 
assumed rather than measured. The issue came out in the open during the time that company 
\ management simultaneously introduced budget cuts and prescribed new, labour-intensive, 
farming practices. Immediately growers asked whether the effects o f these farming practices 
.would reflect in their returns, especially because the company left little choice in farming 
, J
 r \ ' .practices. Furthermore, the company prescribed new targets for both quality and volume, 
^ * Resigned to improve growers' financial performance. In addition, a process o f off-setting was 
^ \} introduced, which linked all lots o f one growers in the accounting process. As a result, a well-
•performing lot o f one grower was paying for an established poor-performing lo t Previously, the 
? ^financial performance o f individual lots counted as the unit for computation. Despite the 
N i ^ " imperfection o f accounting figures, company management used the available accounting figures 
* <\j ^ K ^ 0 r e s n a P e w o f k relations in contract growing. 
* ^ ' The accounting information used in management processes was not interpreted and 
\ j * understood in a 'shared context o f extensive mutual knowledge'. This disparity became a source 
o f anxiety for company management. How reliable was the technician's information about 
growers' performance in his assigned area? How necessary were operational budgets set up by 
technicians? Did accounting information provide a true picture o f productive activities? Did it 
give the company sufficient ground to influence events in the field? These concerns came 
especially out in the open when the figures for production costs appeared to be above earlier 
\ \ ^ targets, and quality and production figures proved to be disappointing. Then management had 
X S 1 t o m a k e sure that it was given 'genuine accounts o f unavoidable contingencies', and not 'merely 
excuses which seek to mask incompetent management practice' (Roberts and Scapens 1985). 
Increasingly the company sent messages to growers based on records and documents 
constructed by the financial department; the contents discussed changes in compensation 
systems, and in cost computation and budgeting. In this process, accounting is, in Miller's view, 
"an attempt to intervene, to act upon individuals, entities and processes to transform them and 
to achieve specific ends. [A] ccounting is no longer to be regarded as a neutral device that merely 
documents and reports 'the fact' o f economic activity" (Miller 1994 :1) . What we can actually see 
managers doing is not only making profits but also giving accounts which constitute action 
(Munro 1996: 6). Management needed financial records as arguments for proposed 
interventions. This suggest that company management and its financial departments are inclined 
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to create a false sense o f order and, consequendy, review and monitoring becomes subject to 
political positioning. 
After the commencement o f the review process, the company consistendy refused to link 
changes in the management o f the production process to the functioning o f the financial and 
administrative system. This decision confirmed the discrepancy in the problem-analysis o f 
growers and o f management; growers reviewed the growing scheme as an institutional entity, 
while management commenced a review process o f individual farms. As discussed by Roberts 
and Scapens (1985: 451-453), the salient feature o f accountability across distance is the relative 
absence o f frequent face-to-face interaction between actors at different levels in the scheme. 
Although empirically interlinked, the financial and the agricultural departments in the company 
were made responsible for distinct fields o f intervention. 
Under such conditions, two critical questions with regard to the organisation o f transactions 
and accountability arise (Eccles 1995: 13): (1) who is the point person and what style o f 
management and intervention will be used by that person and (2) which function or group will 
co-ordinate efforts in a divisional corporate structure. A key figure in the review process was the 
newly appointed agricultural manager, who adopted a straightforward style in his interactions 
with growers, in contrast to the pampering style adopted at the beginning o f the scheme. 
However, his authority was restricted to interventions in the field o f production, due to the 
prevalent division o f labour in the company between the agricultural department and the 
financial department There was little co-ordination between these two departments, and the 
accounting system was a bounded unit, largely separated from events in growers' fields. Besides, 
the actual question o f failure, and risk management, was dealt with in an even wider institutional 
context, involving the bank and the government This distanced matters about debts from the 
concrete review process, although both were mtertwined from a grower's perspective. Next, 
these conditions will be further discussed. First, I will examine the managerial style adopted by a 
newly appointed manager in reviewing growers based on productivity and profitability figures, * \ £ 
and, second, I will discuss the institutions managing the institutional and juridical side o f debts 
incurred by growers. 
The manager ranking growers 
Â 
<f%. 
\ 
B O 
Accounting and financial management entered into accountability relationships between * 1 
company and growers through coded representation and measurements o f performance, and 
through stories about the nature o f the enterprise ^Vlunro 1996). Increasingly, farmers were 
evaluated on the basis o f their yield, the quality o f their product, their cooperativeness and their 
loyalty to the venture. The procedure to rank growers was a mixture o f reasons, attributed to ^ 
various problems signalled in contract growing. During a seminar the general manager explained 
that the selection processes combined objective and subjective criteria (table 3.8). The general 
manager considered financial figures as only one measure among a broader set o f measures, e.g. 
partnership or loyalty, but when conflict arose, financial considerations won out (Eccles 1995). 
The new agricultural manager, who was brought into the organisation to take energetic -i; 
measures against problems o f low productivity and high debt rates, steadily introduced the use 
o f production figures in negotiations with growers. His argument was that """^ C 
Although much o f the discussion about these problems deals with the financial situation, the 
basic cause of the problems and the basic solution lie in the productivity of the fields and the 
quality o f the asparagus that is produced. 
(Company memo: see box 3.1) 
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He considered his task to increase productivity, in order to solve the problematic debt figures o f 
a large number o f growers. 
Table 3.8: Representation of the selection process used by company management in asparagus growing. 
Objective criteria Subjective criteria 
• Account status 
• Productivity (volume and 
quality) 
• Length of contract 
" Estimated annual 
production 
• Improvement 
• Mentality 
» Presence in the field 
• No Thursday growers 
» Willingness to succeed Source: field observation 
One obstacle put in his way was changing the growers' financial dependence on the 
company. This was especially a burning issue in the case o f established growers whose credit 
line with the bank had fully matured. Their loans were not renewed, and, consequendy, the 
company was obliged to subsidise these growers. The manager also insisted in changing the 
mentality o f growers who were continuously angling for increased budgets. These 
considerations were embedded in a major operation to reduce production costs by means o f 
budget cuts. T o be successful, much depended on the accuracy and use o f accounting figures; 
both about productivity and profitability o f individual farms, as well as about computed 
production costs. 
Crucial to the company's approach, was a process o f ranking and selecting growers based on 
the balance o f production figures and production costs (table 3.9, box 3.1). The agricultural 
department needed the categorisation o f growers to explain their decisions about termination 
and continuation o f contracts to higher management, accompanied by an approach to reducing 
production costs. According to the agricultural manager, the company had to decide what was 
more economical: "continue with existing land or find new areas". Accounting figures became a 
strategic instrument in decision-making about the economics o f asparagus farming. 
These 'objective' figures further assisted the agricultural manager in his conversations with 
problematic growers, wherein he presented them with the option o f either improving their 
production and change their commitment to the scheme or accepting the possibility o f 
abandonment. He formulated his approach to growers as follows: 
In my decisions about abandonment, I only looked at 'what you produce not at who you are'. 
The problem in some villages is that growers are not real farmers, they use their status. I have 
been tough on growers, but I thought we had a deal and I kept my part o f the deal. I want to 
bring back the interest in production, and move away from all the attention devoted to cash 
and non-operational advances. 
The manager's approach was based on 'reliable measurement and records' in combination with 
a 'business-deal' interpretation o f the contractual relationship. In this way, he tried to make his 
problem-solving activities transparent and manageable. 
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Table 3.9: Representation of the selection process based on production figures used by the company's agricultural 
department in asparagus growing 
Ranking of Selection criteria 
growers 
1 • Production volume above average; works and manages farm 
independently 
2 • Good harvest, but technical assistance is required. 
3 • Poor harvest but technical assistance can lead to improvement 
4 • Marginal performance; requires much time and effort; farm 
management in hands of administrator appointed by company 
and association; risk of abandonment. 
5 • Removal from the scheme; company suggests alternate crop in I 
order to secure debt payments. | 
Source: Interview agricultural manager 
Box 3 .1 : Company principles and process for dealing with low producing/high debt asparagus lots 
In two separate memos the company formulated its principles for dealing with problematic farms: 
Memo 1 (March 1996): Principles 
1) The company, the bank, and the guarantee funds are in partnership with the growers in solving 
the problems of the lots that have been identified as low producing and high debt. 
2) The growers on the designated lots will not be allowed to walk away from their debts. All 
growers must take good faith effort in doing everything possible to pay all obligations to bank and 
the company. 
3) All contractual obligations among all parties: growers, associations, company, bank and 
guarantee funds must be adhered to unless an exception is made with the consent of all parties. 
4) Although much of the discussion about these problems deal with the financial situation, the 
basic cause of the problems and the basic solution lies in the productivity of the fields and the 
quality of the asparagus that is produced. 
Memo 2 (March 1996): Process 
1) The company identified the lots and growers. 
2) The company prepared the documentation for each lot and grower. 
3) The company briefed the presidents of the concerned associations. 
4) The company briefed the officers of the concerned associations and all of the concerned 
growers. 
5) The company briefed officials from the bank and the guarantee fund analysing the situation to 
come up with the best solution to the problem. 
6) The company evaluated alternate crops. 
7) The company presents options to the association presidents recommending those that are 
appropriate for each concerned grower. 
8) The company brief all concerned grower on the recommended options and solicits the approval 
of the growers and associations. 
9) Documentation is completed for each concerned grower amending agreements and contracts as 
necessary. 
10) Implementation of agreed options begins. 
However, interviews and observations at different levels in the company revealed that the use 
o f accounting and production figures was accompanied by subjective judgements, which 
complicated the change in management style. Furthermore, growers whom the company 
defined as successful and loyal gained certain concessions and incentives from the company and 
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were favourably treated. One of the responsible officials in the financial department stated in a 
.conversation with growers: 
/ 
I observed that growers have no knowledge about business. 
A high-ranking official in the agricultural department claimed that: 
Established growers have their own ideas and concepts, which are difficult to change. 
Furthermore, farmers began to hire farm workers and, as a result, became too big for their 
boots. 
i The director of agriculture mentioned that some farmers were accepted as growers for political 
\ reasons; in the beginning the company relied on people open to the venture. This was one of 
the factors leading, in his view, to a ruined 'corporate atmosphere': the lack of transparency in 
accounting gave growers the feeling of being cheated; the availability of cash brought about a 
transition away from farming; co-operation between partners was bad; pathetic growers failed to 
manage their farms. The social and organisational frictions in asparagus growing embroidered 
on the marginal and deceptive appearance of agriculture in Philippine society. He said: 
Why do people not farm anymore? Government does not stimulate people to farm, there is no 
respect for this work. Farmers are cheated, which is very sad. People with money and land opt 
for large-scale agriculture. Yet there is no money in agriculture, no technology. 
He emphasised the need to locate problems in the social and cultural system of contract 
growing, and wondered: 
Why are Filipino farmers more or less destroying this opportunity for business? 
These observations indicate that also inside the company, officials related productivity problems 
to complex cultural and organisational configurations. Hence, a simple ranking of growers based 
on production figures ignored the related discussion about the (evolving) nature of the 
enterprise; about the spirit of a contractual relationship. 
(^""Nevertheless, both company managers and bank officials restricted their considerations of 
^-"evaluation of growers to measurable production matters, while intangible factors remained 
/ implicit in the decision-making process.52 The latter, however, decisively influenced the selection 
\process. The former agricultural manager's reference to the 'mind-set' of established growers 
Illustrates this: 
In the beginning o f the scheme, production was low. Growers were used to maize farming and 
they attended their farms only once in a while. It was necessary to change farming practices, 
but this was a difficult process. I concentrated on new growers, who were eager to learn and to 
improve their farming methods. Older growers did not attend their farms well, and they were 
always looking for an alibi for low production figures. The company has pampered the 
established growers; they received non-operational advances. I tried to introduce the idea of a 
business venture: if farming practices are followed the business will be O K . 
Also a bank official blamed growers for mismanagement: 
The reason for failure is that growers did not conform. The company gave full support to 
growers, but growers were not accepting their advice. We only looked at feasibility and 
whether, technically speaking, farms can produce asparagus and soils were tested. 
These statements contradict the assurances both company and bank gave about productivity 
and profitability during the making of the production scheme, which were also the foundation 
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for the managerial approach taken in the review process. This was firmly based in the belief that 
volume and quality can be improved to the extent that asparagus farming is profitable. 
However, it did not take into account the swings in the nature o f contractual relationship, which 
had confused interactions between the parties, and which interfered with the endeavour to 
improve productivity in the farms. 
Thus, ranking farmers into groups has shaken the working relations and commitments in 
contract growing. This became most obvious after almost 100 growers received notes stating 
that the company will terminate their contracts due to 'low productivity' and 'large account 
balance(s)'. However, no records accompanied these letters and the selection o f growers was 
challenged on numerous occasions. In general, it still remained to be seen what the deciding 
factor was in an individual case. O n the one hand, the figures used to select objectively were 
problematic. Many growers did not believe the figures used by the company and argued that 
they were able to pay their debts. O n the other hand, subjective criteria tended to blame a 
grower's mentality and to evade the issue o f the company's responsibility. The ambiguity o f the 
selection process launched a continuous debate about both the use o f problematic figures as 
well as about the nature o f the commitments made by company and growers. 
i l » j g ^ o r j g j o - A e - c o m p a n y ' s allegations, growers pointed their finger o f blame at the 
company's technical inadequacies, clearly formulated by one of the abandoned growers in the 
following terms: 
In production we had to rely on the company because they had the technical know-how, but 
this did not avoid low production. It was the company who introduced new practices, but in 
the case of failure the grower shoulders the risk. 
In addition, in areas where many were abandoned, growers mentioned that low productivity w a s \ 
related to unsuitable soils and that the company had made mistakes in the soil survey. 
Furthermore, growers mentioned factors such as fluctuating technical advice, and lack o f 
punctuality in the delivery o f inputs, as causes for reduced harvests. In short, all types o f 
arguments were used in the discussion about the responsibility for disappointing results in 
asparagus growing. This was particularly important because it was the growers' understanding o f 
the contract that before termination the company still had to prove that a grower either did not 
follow instructions or disobeyed prescriptions, thus indicating the reasons for failure. Besides, 
growers believed the increased quota for production volume and raised quality standards were 
unreasonable. Apparendy, the assumptions about the financial viability o f the scheme had been 
wrong, and growers were expected to carry the consequences o f these Tjroken promises'. 
The above shows that the review process initiated by the company represents a new 
management style and implies new working relationships in contract growing. Contract growers, 
however, challenged the review process because the real causes o f failure were not properly 
investigated. The adopted management style seriously affected the position o f growers, who 
considered themselves to be partners in a business venture. The institutional context further 
confused working relationships. The company individualised accounting and decided about 
future involvement o f individual growers. The financial agreement, however, seems to suggest 
that risk and failure was a collective responsibility o f company, bank, guarantee fund and 
associations. In the following pages, I examine the response o f these remote institutional actors 
to problems in the scheme's viability. 
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The institutions managing debts 
Aside from any misunderstanding about shared responsibilities and earlier commitments, 
growers were puzzled about the role o f guarantees and financial agreements in the case o f 
failure. What became clear during the review process was the existence o f two interwoven and 
mutually dependent forms o f accounting in the scheme (Roberts 1996): socialising forms o f 
accounting, i.e. the relation between bank and associations, and individualising form o f 
accounting, i.e. the relation between grower and company. Institutionally, however, these forms 
o f accounting stood apart. The company had full authority over measuring the performance o f 
individual growers and decided about the settlement o f high debt figures. The bank and the 
guarantee funds maintained quite a distance from these daily organisational matters, and, in fact, 
only came into action when a call for guarantee was brewing in the scheme. Growers, however, 
positioned these agencies in one single system with the company. They blamed the company for 
allowing growers to accumulate high debts and expected bank and guarantee fund to help them 
out. 
The analysis in his chapter shows a situation also observed in other contract growing 
schemes. Firms frequendy offer favourable terms to growers in the early stages o f an operation 
in order to attract suppliers, but are unable to sustain those terms in the longer run. I f an 
arrangement that is initially favourable to growers deteriorates, farmers appear to be locked in' 
by debt and specialisation. They find it difficult to extricate themselves (Glover 1987) . 5 3 It is 
possible that a grower may voluntarily enter a contracting relationship, but subsequendy be 
unable to terminate when the expected benefits do not materialise (Glover 1984). As in the case 
o f asparagus growing, farmers end up in debt management; in this situation the company is 
permitted to deduct any debts owed by growers (off-setting) from any money due to growers 
(cf. Bernal 1997). This was the situation after several years o f asparagus growing. 
After several cases o f abandonment and administrative take-over by the company, the 
question o f risk, and who bears it, became politicised. The asparagus venture was high-risk, 
trying to bring export horticulture, with its stringent marketing and quality demands, into a 
complex ecological and divers social environment. Profitability depended heavily on quality, 
price and timing o f sales, and hence on control o f production and effective marketing. The 
question remains, however, what is the ability o f firms to shift risks? Often, companies provide 
loans to growers under favourable terms, and perhaps companies are inclined to forgive debts 
or to be generous in order to sustain operations. 5 4 Otherwise the main threat available to 
companies is discontinuation (Grosh 1994), especially because it is hardly ever the case that 
provisions in the contract are legally enforceable in practice. The review process expelled a 
number o f growers from the scheme and the question remained who was responsible for the 
debts they left. This question resulted in a stressful game between the partners in the scheme, 
trying to shuffle responsibility around the group. 
T o understand this game it is relevant to recall two conditions o f the loan agreement: the 
loan was obtained without collateral and the loan was covered by guarantees from G F S M E and 
company. Interviewed farmers repeatedly claimed that they joined the project because it was 
^stipulated that every account was covered by a guarantee, and, in case o f failure, their land 
would not be in danger. Their confidence was severely disrupted after the bank's effort to have 
growers sign an Individual Promissory Note (IPN). The bank claimed it merely wished to 
identify the accounts o f individual growers, in addition to the associations' accounts it had at its 
disposal. Growers, however, read in the promissory note a way to control their land tides and to 
evade the responsibilities o f the guarantors. Bank personnel forced growers to sign during the 
collection o f advances; otherwise, the bank was not prepared to release the funds necessary for 
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operation. Some growers signed without realising the precise contents o f the promissory note. 
This act o f coercion fuelled new controversy in the scheme. 
In this controversy the initial optimism about the scheme steadily faded away. As in a 
budding romantic marriage, nobody had thought about the possibility o f a divorce. And the 
contract did not contain a clear procedure for breaking up the relationship. So the parties 
involved invented procedures. The bank wanted to obtain individual records to be able to call 
for a guarantee. Formally, the association was mentioned as borrower in all financial agreements. 
But the associations did not default, individual growers did. Hence, a change in contracts was 
necessary before the bank could use the guarantee provision o f G F S M E . The company wanted 
to make the association responsible for debts o f its individual members, even though the 
association had never been in charge o f financial management O n several occasions, company 
personnel suggested to turn associations into co-operatives. This contrasted with the starting 
phase o f the scheme, when the company was strongly opposed to co-operatives; it had 
campaigned against a federation o f co-operatives andj tried to convince growers to work 
individually. Growers suspected that the current wish to set up co-operatives was prompted by 
the legal provision to make co-operatives responsible for the bad debts, which is not the case 
for associations. During association meetings growers were divided about the precise nature o f 
all the procedures. It was difficult to answer questions about signing the promissory note, given 
the treat to halt advances, and doubts about how to share responsibility for the association's 
loan and to preserve the association's reputation. In the midst o f all the procedural manoeuvres, 
the actual meaning o f guarantee, and thus o f risk-sharing, became less and less clear. 
Another tricky problem for growers was how these procedures would affect the status o f 
their land tides. After signing a contract, farmers entrusted individual land tides to the company, 
and later to the bank, for safekeeping. They suspected, however, that the promissory note was a 
lever to turn the land tides into a kind o f collateral or a lien. It was unclear what would happen 
in the event o f default, referred to in the 'standard' promissory note or hidden in sections of the 
law (box 3.2). Obviously, the bank and G F S M E intended to keep the land tide in their 
possession until growers fulfilled all their obligations. This position transformed contract 
growing from a promising joined affair into serious business. Farmers had trusted their land to 
the venture, but were now in danger o f losing control over their property. 
These concerns related to debt management were not resolved during my fieldwork. Yet, the 
events show clearly that the contract growing scheme lacked proper procedures to settle these 
matters. The formal arrangements were finalised in a period o f high optimism about future 
developments, and they did not anticipate disappointing performance or flaws in the accounting 
system. Probably, by far the largest financial losses to the investors were sustained by the 
Philippine state, i.e. G F S M E and D B P . These state agencies responded reluctandy. 
The trouble in accounting procedures only became an issue after associations were unable to 
pay of f debt. Only then did a bank manager hint at troublesome accounting procedures. In an 
interview, he did in fact drop a hint in the direction o f major mistakes, or fraud, but the bank 
was still waiting for an internal auditing report He said that the bank knew stories that D B P 
money was used for purposes outside the asparagus venture, but the bank was not able to 
substantiate these stories. All the bank could do was to negotiate transparency, hence their 
initiative to claim all individual records. Bank and guarantee fund also considered restructuring 
o f the loan, to allow growers to pay their debts through alternative sources o f income, such as 
trucking. This was essentially a political decision. The government wanted to avoid trouble in 
the affected Muslim communities, especially after government and the secession movement 
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Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) signed a peace agreement in 1996, marking a new 
engagement to build peace and development in Mindanao (CIDS 1997). 
Largely because o f the state's involvement, small farmers were included in export-oriented 
production schemes as minor partners (cf. Korovkin 1992, Goldsmith 1985). So the question 
/ about appropriate state measures announces itself in the case o f organisational failure, examined 
as undermining "the ability o f a contract scheme to function where it would otherwise be the 
preferred form o f organization" (Grosh 1994: 255). Surprisingly, however, both semi-
government institutions involved, D B P and G F S M E , played no part in setting the terms o f the 
contract-growing scheme. Contract growing was left completely to the private sector. Initially, 
S the bank did not interfere in the contractual relationship between company and grower; the 
jbank merely assessed the existence o f a profitable market for the product. The bank's 
commitment was primarily financial in nature. However, when growers had difficulties in 
fulfilling their obligations to the bank, the financial institutions were direcdy implicated. 
Resulting events show that the contract did not cover what should happen in the case o f failure 
and the bank's interventions basically served its own financial interests.5 5 
Box 3.2: Articles in guarantee agreement, promissory note and law with respect to default. 
1. Guarantee Agreement (CALF-GFSME Guarantee Facility, 1990): 
It is matter of default in case the borrower fails to pay three consecutive monthly amortisations or 
one quarterly amortisation. In case of default DBP may either restructure the loan, after having 
received written consent of GFSME, or it may exercise its option to call on the guarantee by 
submitting to GFSME a letter identifying the defaulted promissory notes, letters of demand to the 
borrower together with the latest statement of account, copies of the loan agreement, the corporate 
resolution to the borrower, and the duly accomplished Deed of Assignment assigning to GFSME its 
rights and title to and interests in the loan account. The call for guarantee must be exercised within 
120 days from the date of default of the borrower. After the lapse of said period such option shall 
automatically expire and terminate. 
2. Promissory note: 
Upon the happening of any of the following events (hereinafter referred to as 'events of default'), 
the whole sum remaining unpaid under this NOTE shall thereupon become immediately due and 
payable without demand and notice: 
a) failure to pay any installment or interest on the date thereof; 
b) attachment of any property, death, dissolution, receivership, insolvency, suspension of 
payments, reorganization of similar proceedings, or suspension of usual business; 
c) any of the cases mentioned in Article 1198 of the Civil Code and Sections 76 and 77 of the 
General Banking Act; [see belov^ 
d) default in payment of any other present or future loan or other obligation for borrowed money or 
any obligation guaranteed by any of them; 
e) any act or event which, in the bank's opinion, results in the impairment of the financial 
responsibility of any of them. 
3. Civil Code, article 1198: 
The debtor shall lose every right to make use of the period: 
(1) When after the obligation has been contracted, he becomes insolvent, unless he gives a 
guaranty or security for the debt; 
(2) When he does not furnish to the creditor the guarantees or securities which he has promised; 
(3) When by his own acts he has impaired said guaranties or securities after their establishment, 
and when through a fortuitous event they disappear, unless he immediately gives new ones 
equally satisfactory; 
(4) When the debtor violates any undertaking, in consideration of which the creditor agreed to the 
period; 
(5) When the debtor attempts to abscond. 
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4. General Banking Act, section 76 and 77: 
Sec. 76. Before granting a loan, banks must exercise proper caution to ascertain that the debtor is 
capable of fulfilling his commitments to the bank. Towards this end, banks may demand of their 
credit applicants a statement of their property and of their income and expenditures. Should such 
statement prove to be false or incorrect in any material detail, the bank may terminate any loan 
granted on the basis of said statement and shall have the right to demand immediate payment of 
the obligation. 
Sec. 77. The purpose of all loans shall be stated in the contract between the bank and borrower. If 
the bank finds that the funds have been employed, without its approval, for purposes other than 
those agreed upon with the bank, the bank shall have the right to terminate the loan and demand 
immediate repayment of the obligation. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The empirical focus o f this chapter has been upon financial transactions in contract growing, 
and on the functioning o f the accounting system operational in the particular scheme described. 
In an abstract sense, the accounting system design embodies rules and regulations and a set of 
accounting techniques. In use, however, it represents a system o f accountability relations; social 
relations between people who are physically remote from one another (Roberts and Scapens 
1985: 447-449). Management relies to a large extent on accounting information to connect 
between organisational activities, e.g. distribution in the market and production in growers' 
fields. Furthermore, management has to convince growers that its decisions are reasonable and 
sensible, even if accounting performance is unsatisfactory (cf. Kirk and Mouritsen 1996). 
Subsequendy, the empirical question in the examination o f organisational activity under contract 
growing arrangements is how does accounting fit in the totality o f organisational activities? 
The first section described how the company succeeded to incorporate independent farmers 
into its diversification programme and to generate financial support from a semi-government 
bank. In the start-up phase o f the enterprise, the company had to convince potential growers 
both o f its capacity to fulfil commitments concerning market shares and satisfactory 
performance and o f its willingness to behave consistendy with its commitments and promises. 
Growers considered competitive alternatives and interpreted the choice presented by the 
company, which was especially difficult in the beginning because there was little evidence that 
the venture would be successful. Later, the increased incomes o f established growers provided 
sufficient proof for other farmers to sign up. 
The role o f brokers should not be underestimated in explaining the expansion o f agribusiness 
to the areas o f established maize farming. The effectiveness o f an engagement with agribusiness 
affects the position o f leading political families in the villages. As a consequence, brokers take 
responsibility for behaviour in a newly created institutional environment and for the economic 
results o f lining up with an agribusiness company (cf. Douglas 1987). This perspective on 
integration indicates the political role o f brokers in promoting a project o f modernisation. These 
observations place the introduction o f contract farming in a context wherein politics and 
modernisation are intertwined, which broadens out the narrow and formal perspective on 
contractual arrangements in agriculture. 
Parallel to selling the organisation, company and bank turned their attention to organising the 
financial system in contract growing. It appeared that signing a contract was not simply an act 
between two partners engaged in a promising venture, but implied integration into a 
divisionalised institutional structure. The formal accounting system was supposed to arrange the 
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distribution of costs and benefits. However, compensation and rewards were not solely 
dependent on these formal arrangements. The existence of informal and covert forms of 
compensation in a 'total reward system' (Mars 1982) led to a situation in which distribution of 
advantages of contracting was neither predictable nor secure. Implicidy, the contract makers 
adapted the 'let's make a deal' view on contracting, which treats contract growing as a bargaining 
process in which all parties have their own interests and try to obtain the most for the least 
(Rousseau 1995: 3). Section two discussed how this bargaining for compensation was embedded 
in social networks and work-based relations at different levels in the organisation. 
Section three analysed the impact of some critical events on the nature of working relations 
in contract growing, such as fiddling in the processing plant and in application of fertiliser, 
declining productivity in farmers' fields, and conflicts over risk and poor performance. These 
occurrences prompted far-reaching interventions by a newly appointed manager and changed 
management styles in the organisation. Accounting figures and other measurement devices 
became tools in managerial decision-making and in reorganising the scheme. In this sense, 
accounting has been shown to be a way to intervene in and to give meaning to economic 
activity; it actually constitutes the 'economic' domain. 
Accounting information allows managers to act upon distant units, but, likewise, distance and 
divergent interests raise problems of trust and accountability within an organisation (Roberts 
1996). disagreements and tensions in the 'economic domain' are most explicidy expressed in 
the financial relationship between growers and companyJ(Porter and Phillips-Howard 1995), 
and the management's interventions instigated collisions and polarisation in the scheme. The 
changes implemented in this contract growing scheme show that budgetary processes and 
financial controls are basically social and political in nature, aimed at redirecting and reshaping 
organisation. 
The analysis of compensation and reward systems in contractual relationships offered above 
suggests that it is precisely the complex interplay between ways of calculating and ways of 
managing social and organisational life (Miller 1994) that importandy shaped the organisational 
changes implemented in this particular contract farming scheme. Unfortunately, the role of 
accounting in organisational control is little understood (Dent and Ezzamel 1995: 39). 
Consequendy, Roberts (1996), in his discussion with accounting researchers, proposed to move 
from accounting to accountability; to shift from a preoccupation with technique, and its 
refinement, to social and organisational practices and their consequences. 
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Control over Labour and Performance in Agro 
industrialisation 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent literature, contract farming is often associated with the industrialisation o f agriculture 
(Goodman and Watts 1997). Indeed, the horticultural sector has been seen as a vanguard of 
social, institutional and technological shifts in agriculture (Litde and Watts 1994). In the 
Philippines 'high-value crops' have increasingly displaced classic export commodities like sugar 
and coconut, often accompanied by innovative management structures and production 
methods, as apparent in the production o f asparagus for the Japanese market. The asparagus 
production scheme was part o f Dole Food's expansion and diversification programme. The 
previous chapter told how this international food firm contracted out the production o f 
agricdtoKdcommodities. while concentrating most o f its acflviïïësln volatile and risky markets 
for fresh fruits and vegetables. In 33s context, contract farming suits the efforts o f agribusiness 
to industrialise agricdtural'pîredûction and to regulate farmer relationships with their land and 
This certainly is a steering pattern o f organisational and technological change in parts o f 
Philippine agriculture. The previous chapter, however, also emphasises the fluid and changeable 
nature o f contract farming as an organisational framework. I f successfully implemented, 
contract farming allows companies to direct the labour-intensive cultivation activity, and to sell 
staodMelised^Ki|^^ in contract growing, the firm's 
reliance on vantiuTtorms o f indirect control over primary production is likely to be a major 
cause o f fluctuation in organisational configuration. Despite the functionality o f contract 
farming to the overall corporate strategy, many organisational and technological puzzles are still 
hidden behind the formal contract. 
Theprernise o f this chapier i j^hatjntegration o f farms, exemplified by contract farming, is 
impottariHy^dk^tfiir^ 
artefacts, and control over human activity, rather than by formalised authority over land use (cf. 
Benvenuti 1991). Therefore, the analysis o f integration o f independent farm enterprises should 
not be limited to formal and associative factors. The institutional and organisational 
configurations o f contract farming are extremely varied, and the composite problem o f control 
and interaction is investigated here. Consequendy, this chapter is an argument about 
organisational and managerial aspects deriving from the specific combination o f labour and 
technology in the agricultural labour process. 
These intertwined foci, labour and technology will come to focus in the analysis o f rising 
production costs and dwindling productivity and quality levels on farmers' fields. I will examine 
a series o f events at the level o f primary production which seriously affected the key conditions 
for competitiveness in international markets for fresh vegetables: (1) to produce with low costs, 
especially low labour costs, and (2) to achieve the right mix o f quality and productivity. 
Examining the composite character o f agro-industrialisation seems to be especially relevant for 
understanding labour-intensive production o f high-quality crops, especially because 
:ers. -
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organisational contingencies and biological uncertainties at the level of primary production 
entail inevitable challenges for contracting agencies. Obviously, this requires study o f both 
agronomic and social aspects o f production. 
I select three areas to examine three evolving problems in the production processes related to 
labour management and technical supervision: (1) the reorganisation o f production due to rising 
cost pressures, especially in labour use; (2) the impact o f management and supervision o f the 
actual work effort on quality; (3) the efficacy o f the specific combination o f tools and labour 
power in relation to the uncertain nature o f agricultural production. The examination o f the 
company's responses to these production problems illustrates how its management intervened 
in the production process in growers' fields and how it re-designed working relations and 
control mechanisms. This analysis points to the social and political character o f attempts to 
secure satisfactory performance in contract farming, and rejects the idea that contracting is 
merely a matter o f rationalised organisation and co-ordination. 
The labour intensive nature o f asparagus production, mainly field activities associated with 
weeding and harvesting, adds a distinct managerial problem to the contract growing 
arrangement Sustained productivity and quality, keys to the economic success o f the venture, 
are highly dependent on the growers' capacity for intensive crop and labour management 
practices. This chapter seeks the explanation for a high diversity o f performance in different 
cultivation and labour management practices observed in growers' fields (cf. Castella et al. 
1995). Growing scarcity and higher costs o f (temporary) hired labour seriously constrained the 
performance o f a varied group o f growers, ranging from small family-based operations to big 
land owners, mainly using wage labour (Castella et al. 1994). The company's interventions, 
following problems with performance and supervision o f hired labour, interfered with the 
technological efficacy o f prescribed farming practices. More importantly, these interventions 
contrasted with the original conception o f labour relations in contract farming and, 
consequendy, put pressure on the relationship between growers and company. 
L A B O U R RELATIONS IN CONTRACT FARMING 
The designers o f the asparagus scheme, the company and the bank, shared one basic 
assumption with many writers on contract farming; the basic production unit was a family farm. 
It was expected that the farmer's family would do most o f the work. As one company official 
expressed it: 
In the beginning we used a small grower concept, because many farmers here are agrarian 
reform beneficiaries. Only if you are wealthy you will have 15-20 hectares left after land 
reform. We wanted to bring these farmers together, to farm in business. It was supposed to be 
a 'ma-pa' operation. The parents were expected to use their family labour on the farm. All they 
needed was to have a land tide, to be clear of debts, and to provide the labour. The company 
would give technical assistance, provide inputs, and arrange transportation. 
All labour payments, advanced by the company, were supposed to go to the farmer's family, 
as well as the weekly cash advances for harvest deliveries, and the excess payment at the end o f 
the year, from which production and labour costs were deducted. It was expected that growers 
would be able to finance asparagus production themselves after approximately 8 years. This was 
based on the assumption that the family provided most o f the labour, and that no additional 
labour costs were incurred. In order to give the project a 'developmental' label, both company 
and bank had promoted the contract farming scheme as a 'family affair'. The initial design 
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would give the farming household control over two types o f reward for their effort: the money 
paid for the delivered products, and the money paid for the labour performed in the field. 
Reality, however, confronted the company with a different set o f labour relations. In general, 
high-value horticultural crops are labour intensive commodities and require careful crop 
management Asparagus production is highly labour intensive because there is little 
mechanisation o f cultivation practices Castella et al. 1994); spear harvest and weeding are 
fundamentally manual operations. The majority o f farm work is done by hired labour, and the 
asparagus scheme attracts many workers from outside the province. The labourers are 
permanent farm workers from inside and outside the province, or marginal farmers from other 
regions who are either running away from violent conflicts, owners o f depleted farms, or former 
farmers who have decided that permanent employment is better than earning irregular incomes 
from farming. These workers stay permanently, for over two years, or temporarily with growers, 
depending on the management practices o f growers and on the employment opportunities 
elsewhere (table 4.1). The contracted farmers mainly supervise and manage fieldwork, and, 
sometimes, classify spears in the field. 
Table 4.1: Use, origin and mobility of wage labour in asparagus farms (as a percentage of the total) 
Use of wage 
labour 
Origin of farm workers Permanent employment 
( > 2 years) 
Y e s N o Marginal 
farmers 
Farm workers 
in province 
F a r m workers 
outside 
province 
Y e s N o 
97 3 20 23 57 42 58 
Source: Survey of t lirty-one farms in t iree villages. 
Note: Only one grower relied entirely on family labour. His children performed all tasks, including 
harvesting. On other farms children were not employed or only participated in weeding. 
The widespread use o f wage labour faced the company with the problem o f how labour was 
managed by growers. The grower hired, managed, and paid the labourers on the farm. However, 
management and recruitment o f labour was not dealt with in the contract. The conditions in the 
contract were limited to decisions about land use, the right to prescribe farming practices, and 
the specification o f quality and related price rates. As the production scheme evolved, the 
company began to realise that this was a major problem for realising the right mix o f 
productivity and quality to balance the relatively high production costs. A combination o f poor 
financial monitoring, decreasing production and quality levels, and production costs exceeding 
loans, endangered the company's profitability. As a result, a series o f interventions began. These 
interventions targeted both the reduction o f production costs and the improvement o f yield and 
quality. The company decided to change its control over what happened in the fields, and thus 
to reshape the contours o f the contract farming scheme. 
At first sight, it appears that contract farmers surrendered a measure o f control over the 
production processes on the farm to the contracting agency. However, contract growers did 
retain considerable control over the labour process, and over the performance o f their workers. 
Although growers depended on the company for the reproduction o f their farm business, 
mainly through the provision o f credit and technology and through the marketing o f their 
products, their management practices did not necessarily coincide with the needs o f the 
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company. Naturally, contract growers continually adapted their management o f the labour 
process to the needs o f the family (farm) business, and not the asparagus crop alone. 
However, in order to realise a higher income a grower largely relied on the quality and 
productivity realised by hired labourers. Low wages in asparagus hampered the recruitment o f 
the skilled workers required to meet quality standards. Since the beginning o f the 1990s, the 
province, and especially the city close to the scheme, experienced an increase in economic 
activity and investments. Hence poorly paid farm workers were able to acquire better paying 
jobs in the city. In addition, the motivation o f workers also depended on social factors like 
Christmas presents, or shares in the year-end excess, in return for good performance. The actual 
management o f workers mainly rested upon the individual growers. 
The company only remotely controlled the workers' effort; it was the grower's responsibility 
to supervise, monitor and reward the efforts o f the labourers in the field. Harvesting asparagus 
spears required skilful workers; o f special importance was to select spears o f the right height and 
to cut at the right place. The asparagus spears had to be handled very carefully otherwise the 
spears could be rejected at the processing plant. In order to achieve a profitable mix o f 
productivity and quality growers must supervise fieldwork closely. 
This discussion on labour relations in contract farming discloses the organisational 
stratification o f contract farming. It particularly shows that in this production system, the 
relationships between the parties involved were mediated in separate spheres o f control, which 
shaped the interaction between company and grower and between grower and workers. The 
stratification had an impact on the type o f supervision practised at different levels, which, in 
return, engendered financial pressure and specific production problems. In the following, three 
o f these problems are explored: the relation between rising labour costs and weeding practices; 
the relation between declining quality levels and supervision o f farm workers; and the relation 
between lowering productivity and eroding growers' confidence in the company's technological 
capabilities. These three problems required different types o f interventions. Then, I will discuss 
how the organisational stratification led up to coexisting and sometimes contradictory 
interventions in the production system. 
W E E D I N G OUT RISING LABOUR COSTS 
When in 1996, company management realised that on a number o f farms yield and quality no 
longer balanced production costs, it implemented a general change in financial policy (see 
chapter 3). After six years and a steady expansion o f asparagus production, the views inside the 
company on the financial viability o f the scheme altered, and the actual control over the 
production costs o f growers' farms became a major concern for the managers. The combination 
o f poor financial monitoring, production costs exceeding loans, and decreasing production and 
quality levels, endangered the company's profitability. 
The managerial response was to attain stronger organisational control over people's 
behaviour, and, consequendy, to call for stricter financial monitoring. The newly appointed 
production manager consistently sought the causes o f decreasing profitability in a lack o f 
control over labour budgets: 
The production costs rose especially due to increase in the use of labour. Growers started to 
demand more and more; average yearly labour budgets rose from 25,000 to 30,000 up to 
40,000 pesos. This could happen because our staff were never in the field; they were not able 
to judge whether the budgets allocated by technicians were really necessary. Technicians gave 
growers the budgets they asked for. Many of the growers did not pay their workers on time or 
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the right amount. Growers put the money in their own pockets. That is why we want to go 
back to the family farm: it must be members o f the family who work on the farm, then they 
will be paid for their efforts on the farm. We took over management o f some farms; the main 
problems appeared to be labour management. Our technicians paid on time and supervised 
performance o f labourers, and our experience showed that yields doubled within two months. 
We try to reduce costs in weeding by turning to chemical weeding in between the rows, but 
between the plants we have to continue doing it by hand because otherwise the plants will die. 
Labour costs indeed formed a substantial part o f total production costs, ranging from 56 to 75 
percent (table 4.2). Three main tasks were performed in the field: harvesting (daily for 6 months 
a year), field maintenance and weeding (continuous, less intensive during the rest period), and 
spraying (weekly). On average, a grower employed three workers per hectare; asparagus is a very 
labour intensive crop. Company management decided that use and compensation o f labour was 
a key issue in its effort to strengthen the financial viability o f the scheme. In the following we 
will see how this decision interfered with existing labour relations in asparagus growing. 
Table 4.2: Share of material costs and labour costs in asparagus farming (pesos per hectare per period of 4 weeks) 
Year 
(as 
Material costs 
percentage of total) 
Labour costs 
(as percentage of total) 
Farm 1 (1 ha) 91-92 36 64 
92-93 33 67 
93-94 41 59 
Farm 2 (1 ha) 91-92 44 56 
92-93 32 68 
93-94 34 66 
94-95 35 65 
95-96 29 71 
Farm 3 (2 ha) 93-94 31 69 
94-95 25 75 
95-96 30 70 
Farm 4 (1.8 ha) 95-96 39 61 
Source: Calculated from financial figures provided by individual growers 
T o tackle the problem o f rising labour costs, the company, as a start, reduced the number o f 
man-days budgeted for weeding, and removed field maintenance from the budget entirely (table 
4.3). In the new financial system, labour budgets would only be provided under the condition o f 
'work done'; technicians had to monitor actual work done on farms. Growers expressed their 
concerns about the reduction in labour budgets; they expected not to be able to keep their fields 
clean o f weeds, especially during rainy days when weeds grow faster and growers have to hire 
additional labour to control the weeds. In spite o f the complaints, the shift in financial policy 
was enforced rather stricdy. Thereafter, new problems arose, especially because the reduction in 
labour budget appeared to be interwoven with the recruitment o f labour for weed control and 
field maintenance. 
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Table 4.3: A comparison of labour budgets before and after changes in financial policy in asparagus farming 
(per year, per hectare) 
T a s k Current situation New Situation Difference 
Man days Amount Number of Amount Amount in percent 
(xlOOO pesos) man days (xlOOO pesos) (xlOOO pesos) of total cut 
Cutback 80 4,8 80 4,8 0 0 
Selection - - 18 1,1 +1,1 -
Field maintenance 288 17,3 - - -17,3 54 
Drainage 68 4,1 68 4,1 0 0 
Weed control 520 31,2 390 23,4 -7,8 24 
Cultivation (2,5) (1,6) (2,0) (1,3) (-0,3) 1 
Ploughing 6,0 0,6 - - -0,6 2 
Disease control 163 11,4 138 9,7 -1,7 5 
Insect control 17 1,2 12 0,8 -0,4 1 
Irrigation 30 1,8 - - -1,8 6 
Fertilisation 13 0,8 12 0,7 -0,1 0.5 
Soil amendments 20 1,2 18 1,1 -0,1 0.5 
Harvesting 508 30,5 476 28,6 -1,9 6 
T O T A L 1713 106,5 1212 75,6 -30,9 100 
Source: Compiled from data in a company letter distributed to growers 
Note: Figures in brackets are expenses charged to the company. 
Labour recruitment 
Recruitment o f workers became a major problem for the growers after expansion (of 550 
hectares) in 1994. This expansion was strongly motivated by the arrival o f a competing 
company. The competitor also ventured into the production and marketing o f asparagus and 
surveyed the area for suitable farms to plant asparagus. Dole was afraid to lose control over the 
area and decided to offer new contracts. This resulted in a substantial increase in the area 
planted with asparagus: from 770 hectares to 1320 hectares. Generally speaking, this expansion 
demanded an additional number o f 1650 workers. As a consequence, an increasing number o f 
growers faced difficulties in finding workers. 
The problem became more severe when, two years after the expansion, the company decided 
to significantly reduce budgets for labour. The decreased budget for weeding meant 25 percent 
fewer man-days per hectare per year. Field maintenance was completely removed from the 
budget, and budgets for other tasks were reduced too. Growers strongly complained about 
these sudden changes in budgets: 
The company changed the wages for our maintainers abruptiy. But we have to continue paying 
our workers, we have to treat them as family, otherwise they will look for other employment. 
We have difficulties in keeping workers at our farm, they return to their hometowns, or move 
to the cities, to look for work. 
I observed that the experienced workers became more selective and many o f them decided to 
transfer to other farms, for example the ones paying better and on time. In addition, wages in 
asparagus remained at a very low level and farm workers started to look for employment 
opportunities elsewhere. The company provided growers with a labour budget, but one which 
only permitted very low wages: the fixed rate was 60 pesos per day (approximately US $ 1.50) 
while the minimum wage in non-plantation agriculture was supposed to be 102.50 pesos 
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(Department o f Labour and Employment 1998). Few growers decided to pay their workers the 
minimum rate because they expected to get higher results by doing so. Most o f the growers, 
however, held to the budgeted 60 pesos. 
Problems occurred particularly in weeding, because o f the scarcity o f labour. This situation 
forced growers to introduce new labour arrangements. Around half o f the surveyed growers 
began to use some kind o f a piece-rate-system for weeding, which, in some villages, resulted in a 
fierce competition between growers for labour (table 4.4). Unlike previously, weeding was 
considered as an additional job, paid per row, and was no longer included in the daily wages. For 
weeding, some growers relied almost entirely on so-called 'strikers': workers who complemented 
their daily wages by taking up additional, temporary jobs. Other growers only hired temporary 
workers if their permanent labour could no longer cope up with weeds. Sometimes children 
were hired to do the weeding. The amount paid to the weeders depended on the height o f the 
weeds, so high labour costs could result from a grower's decision to delay weeding, e.g. to 
reduce his spending o f cash advances. 
In general, growers had difficulties in finding enough workers for weeding and relied strongly 
on flexible workers. For these reasons, growers had a hard time to maintain their fields and to 
keep their farms free from weeds. The piece rate system meant an additional financial burden 
for growers, and the budget cuts laid down by the company caused even more problems. 
Growers could either decide to live within the financial constraints and adjust their labour 
management practices (box 4.1), or, as many did, combine this with an effort to reduce labour 
costs by changing weeding practices, particularly ploughing to clean the fields. The latter had an 
unintended impact on yield and quality, to be illustrated by the case study in the next section. 
Table 4.4: Labour arrangements in asparagus farming 
Use of wage 
labour 
Use of piece rate system in 
weeding 
Use of child labour 
Yes No Structural Incidental None Only in weeding None All tasks 
97% 3 % 2 9 % 2 6 % 4 5 % 2 6 % 7 1 % 3% 
Source: Survey of thirty-one farms in three villages. 
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Box 4 .1 : Examples of labour arrangements in weeding 
These examples show that manual weed control brought with it high labour costs. Rising labour 
costs could not be prevented by a simple financial measure, namely reducing budgets. Among 
others, high costs were a result of competition for labour. Piece rate systems were one way to 
handle the shortage of labour; especially in weeding, complex and growers introduced diverse 
reward mechanisms. 
Example 1 : Small farmers competing for labour 
In this village, a group of small farmers was offered contract during the expansion of 550 hectares, 
which entailed a sudden and large increase in the demand for labour in the whole scheme. The 
average farm size in this village was 1.5 hectares, which requires around 4-5 labourers per hectare 
for harvesting, weeding and field maintenance. One of the families had introduced a piece rate 
system for weeding; workers were paid between 10 and 30 pesos per row on top of their daily 
wages for harvesting. Different growers used different rates for weeding. It proved to be difficult to 
find permanent workers and many workers no longer agreed to the daily wages offered by growers 
(60 pesos). One grower gave privileges to his labourers, like bringing fish from the market or 
paying for medical assistance, and he also shared his excess after every year of harvest. The 
fierce competition for labourers and the differences in reward systems resulted from the 
introduction of the piece rate system. As a consequence, labour costs rose in this village. 
Many growers worked mainly with hired temporary labourers; they had to reckon with an 
unreliable and unstable workforce. Workers resigned and returned to their homes, others were 
fired because they did not perform well. After the budget cuts, workers themselves worked on their 
farms, which allowed to them to pay farm workers a higher wage within the boundaries of the 
budget. 
Example 2: Managing a large farm 
Joyce managed one of the biggest asparagus farms (24 hectares); it looked more like an estate. 
Her family was among the political leaders of this Muslim village. Her son and husband also grew 
asparagus. Her 24 hectares needed a lot of labour. During harvest season she employed more 
than 70 people. Besides, she was actively engaged in management of the farms of her son and 
her husband, who had other occupations and who played a prominent role in local politics. 
Joyce considered weeding a separate task, done by a separate work force. She hired a special 
foreman, a relative of hers, to supervise field maintenance and weeding. Especially after the 
company implemented budget cuts for field maintenance, she had to adjust her labour system. Her 
farm was divided into separate blocks, and she employed workers from one block with little work, 
because of the rest period, to do the weeding in another block. She also concentrated weeding in 
one restricted area to be able to finish the work on time and within the available budget. 
In weeding, she preferred to use a piece rate system (P10/row or higher, depending on the 
height of the weeds). As a member of a leading family in this Muslim village, and as one of the 
biggest landowners, she felt obligated to employ as many people as possible. The piece rate 
system allowed workers to earn a wage during rest period, or to add to their daily wages by 
working more hours. Especially in weeding, she managed a flexible workforce. Also children were 
allowed to earn additional incomes for landless families. 
Joyce shared the opinion that her fields did not have to be absolutely free from weeds. Smaller 
weeds even increased the quality of her asparagus spears because they break the soil and protect 
spears from sun. She even observed that no weeds meant poor quality. Assigning tasks to 
weeders was influenced by this technical consideration. 
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Unintended consequences for productivity 
Tatay was one o f the dignitaries o f the setder village; he belonged to the first batch o f growers. 
He was one o f the old setders and owned a big asparagus area (6 hectares). Additionally, he ran 
a catde and pig farm. Tatay also owned a truck. He rented out several tractors. Before, he 
owned about 25 hectares o f contiguous agricultural land, but after the implementation o f the 
land reform programme, this land was divided among his children; they owned about 3 hectares. 
His children, most of whom had jobs as professionals, visited 'their' farms once a week and had 
appointed foremen on their individual farms, but Tatay insisted to stay in control o f daily 
management o f the family area o f 25 hectares. This was a source o f conflict in the family, but it 
also complicated the work o f company technicians. Formally, the children had signed contracts 
with the company, but they were not the ones controlling farm work, so they had to deal with 
Tatay. 
The area managed by Tatay did not yield well. The technicians continuously complained 
about the state o f his field, especially about the high weeds. I also observed that the roots o f the 
crowns were exposed, yellow plants stood in the lower parts o f his rolling area, and most o f the 
time weeds were standing high. According to the technicians, high weeds were common in the 
fields o f growers who did not spend their entire budget for weeding. They were afraid to apply 
fertilisers because this would strengthen the weeds, and damage the asparagus plants. The 
technicians were eager to change the management o f the farm, but the old man refused to hand 
over his authority. On the contrary, Tatay blamed the company for the state o f his farm. He 
complained that the labour budget provided by the company was insufficient to meet his labour 
requirements. Furthermore, he demurred at the earlier prescribed practice o f hilling up, which 
would have led to high hills and, to exposed hills as a result o f erosion. He accused the company 
o f being incapable o f making asparagus farming a success; their technology was not right, he 
said. 
Tatay's most important daily problem was to find enough workers. He recruited workers 
from an area near his catde farm, but they proved to be an unreliable workforce. Many o f his 
workers were adolescents, whose parents did not have the money to send them to school. Often 
workers did not show up. Only one old woman, which had worked for this family for a long 
time, was always present. I observed many times that supervisors had to use all their social skills 
to convince people to stay or to come back the following day. Tatay was not considered a good 
employer; he only reluctandy paid wages on time and sometimes (I noticed) workers sabotaged 
harvesting or tried to finish their tasks as quickly as possible. Hence, workers easily transferred 
to other growers, who offered better conditions. 
Due to his reputation as a bad employer, Tatay was faced with an unstable workforce. One 
o f the supervisors complained that the temporary workers did not perform well; they did not 
clean the hills, worked much too quickly, and damaged the plants. She said the piece rate system 
for weed control, which Tatay preferred to use, enforced these type o f problems in the fields. 
But Tatay considered this to be a good way to limit his expenses for labour. He did not want to 
spend all his cash in asparagus farming; he also had other businesses to attend to. 
His problem was to recruit workers, and his wish was to reduce expenses. These were why he 
used labour saving tools in weed control. From the start Tatay had used a plough to do the 
weeding between the asparagus hills, which required less labour and was cheaper. His mechanic 
had invented a small cultivator, which could ride between the rows and was used for weeding. 
By ploughing, soil is transferred from the inter-row to the top o f the hills. The result o f this 
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practice was that the crown had less volume o f soil available to hold water and nutrients. A 
related problem was that Tatay often delayed weed control, also to reduce his expenses. Weeds 
stood high in his fields and they developed an extended root system. By removing these weeds 
topsoil was removed, along with the extended root system o f the weeds, which, again, reduced 
the soil available for the plant. Thus, due to ploughing and delayed weeding, most o f his 
asparagus fields showed very high hills. 
High hills led to a series o f problems (figure 4.1). Firsdy, the high beds eroded quickly after 
heavy rains passed the area; high beds imply a mobile soil. Secondly, the asparagus crowns 
began to float in the high beds, which exposed the roots. Thirdly, the crowns had more 
difficulty to take up nutrients, because they had little contact with the topsoil. Fourthly, the 
reduced volume o f soil available for the crown became easily heated; high soil temperatures 
resulted in thin spears. 
Figure 4.1: The problem of exposed crowns in asparagus farming 
Due to high hills and exposed crowns, the quality o f spears was reduced and the growth o f 
the plant was limited. Indeed, the spears harvested in Tatay's fields were short or thin, had open 
tips, or were malformed. Tatay's harvests were o f low quality, and, consequendy, his proceeds 
from asparagus production decreased substantially. Still, Tatay continued to practice ploughing 
and to use a cultivator on his farm. His main consideration for doing this was the difficulty to 
recruit and to manage labour. The company technicians observed this situation for a long time; 
they gave advice, but Tatay was reluctant to change his management practices. Tatay, on the 
other hand, did not feel responsible for the failure o f his farm; it was the company who had 
misinformed him and who did not help him to solve the problems o f his farm. 
So the way weed control was practised by Tatay had unintended consequences for 
productivity and quality. Therefore his debt to the company rose critically. These unintended 
consequences o f labour-saving practices challenged the company to come up with a better way 
to keep fields clean from weeds. The challenge was redoubled when the company realised that 
its trimming down o f labour budgets led to counterproductive practices in the fields o f growers. 
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Hence, the company considered the introduction o f a labour-saving and cost-efficient 
technology, which would, simultaneously, enhance their control over farm management. 
This indicates that the company arrived at the conclusion to take a more interventionist 
approach. For the sake o f profitability, the company reduced labour budgets. However, after 
changing the financial conditions o f production, the farm management issue confronted the 
company. In cutting labour budgets the company failed to address growers' difficulties in 
recruiting and managing labour, which had unexpected consequences, especially in weeding. 
Besides, limited budgets and shortage o f cash had already encouraged the use o f 
counterproductive weeding practices by growers, which then had an adverse effect on 
productivity. Hence, in order not to upset the balance between production costs and 
productivity the company came forward with cost-efficient technologies, which were supposed 
to save on labour costs in weeding and simultaneously enhance the company's control over 
farm management. 
New technologies: chemical weed control 
Until a late stage the company did not use herbicides in asparagus production, because the 
Japanese market has strict regulations concerning chemical residues. Any herbicide residues on 
asparagus carrying the company's brand name would certainly undermine its carefully 
established position in the market Nonetheless, the problems with labour use made the 
company settle for spraying the inner-rows with a herbicide widely used in the production o f 
bananas. This technical intervention was approved after an internal investigation showed that 
chemical weed control would substantially lower production costs (table 4.5). The financial 
comparison acted as an engineering principle rather than as a complete and computed outcome 
o f precise accounting (cf. McGaw 1985). 
The adoption o f chemical weeding as a solution to labour problems in weeding removed a 
basic task from the grower's supervision. Spraying o f herbicides was introduced gradually and 
did not yet cover the whole 'plantation'; weeding between the plants continued to be done 
manually. Sprayers o f herbicides were hired by the company and paid according to minimum 
wage standards. Specially assigned technicians supervised their work. In this scenario growers' 
responsibilities were narrowed to harvesting, some weeding, and field maintenance. Chemical 
weed control would confine the responsibilities o f growers to some basic activities in the 
asparagus fields. In addition, the company began to command fertilisation and application o f 
fungicides and pesticides more direcdy. The externalisation o f tasks would gave company 
management effective control over an increasing number o f activities in the production process. 
Seemingly, this was the (implicit) main consideration for the company. A locally manufactured 
hand plough, invented by one o f the growers, proved to be very effective, but mechanical 
weeding would leave more control in the hands o f growers (box 4.2). 
As a preliminary conclusion, we can say that in its approach to restraining rising production 
costs, the company reduced the number o f tasks co-ordinated by growers and combined this 
with the introduction o f labour-saving technology. The externalisation o f tasks represents an 
effort to radically reshape production relations in asparagus farming: transforming the grower 
from a farm manager into a worker or foreman on his own farm. The introduction o f chemical 
weed control implied a standardisation o f the production process in order to cope with 
increasing cost pressures. Managers opt for this direction and persistendy tend towards 
homogenisation o f farm management, as a reflection o f a belief in a company's managerial and 
technological capacities. 
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Table 4.5: Monthly costs for weeding (pesos per hectare) in asparagus farming estimated by the company 
Costs Manual weeding Mechanical /manual 
weeding 
Chemical weeding 
(hills not included) 
Labour 1800 
(30 man day) 
1080 
(18 man day) 
234 
(2 man day/minimum 
wage) 
Material None 120 
(2 man day/hand plough) 
380 
(herbicide) 
Total 1800 1200 614 
Savings (compared to 
manual weeding) 
- 600 1186 
Source: Company handout to technicians 
Box 4.2: Technological alternatives: Bobby's Kubota Pinoy 
The company opted for chemical weeding in order to be able to deal with labour management 
problems in weeding. Spraying herbicide would decrease the need for manual labour, and, this 
practice would be supervised and controlled by company technicians, and performed by labourers 
hired by the company directly. Chemical weeding, however, was not the only option present in the 
asparagus scheme. Bobby, an asparagus grower, had invented a small plough, made out of local 
materials, which saved on labour and proved to be very effective in weed control. Company 
technicians and managers showed enthusiasm for this invention. Still, chemical weeding got 
priority in the end. As a grower Bobby discusses technical and agricultural matters with his 
technician, but he did not strictly follow the farming practices and guidelines given by company 
technicians. One of his inventions was a small hand plough, what he called Kubota Pinoy, referring 
to a Philippine version of the successful Japanese motorised plough widely used in rice farming. 
His operator worked very fast with this plough and he paid him an incentive of 20 pesos (US $ 0,75 
in 1996) above his daily wage of 60 pesos (US $ 2.20 in 1996). Bobby's asparagus field was clean 
and the soil was pulverised very well. I observed few weeds and hardly any erosion. He let his 
ferns grow high because this limited the growth of weeds. As a result of these practices Bobby 
spent less on weeding than most other growers did. He also spent less on drainage because his 
hand plough prepared the soil well. The construction of the hand plough could be done easily by a 
local blacksmith. Most growers in this village were familiar with the invention of Bobby, but none of 
them decided to use it themselves. And despite their enthusiasm over the result on Bobby's farm, 
company management also decided otherwise. 
However, asparagus farming was difficult to standardise, and growers were best able to tackle 
specific field problems. Besides, growers only reluctantiy complied with the intended changes in 
control. Unintentionally, the change in organisation, implemented to reduce production costs, 
affected performance in the field. This threatened to thwart the company's main aim, namely 
the restoration o f a stable supply o f high-quality asparagus. 
It was not the company's explicit objective to transform social relations in the production 
system. It decided to do so after production costs got out o f hand. But production costs were 
only one o f their concerns. Low quality and productivity levels also affected the profitability o f 
the scheme. T o enhance performance in the field the company strongly relied on the effort o f 
growers. This might explain why the company also tried to improve the growers' management 
capabilities, which appears to stand in contradiction to efforts at standardisation in weeding. 
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QUALITY AND LABOUR MANAGEMENT 
The competitiveness o f the high-value horticultural sector largely rests on low costs o f 
production, particularly labour costs, but it also depends on the extent to which quality can be 
established as a way o f creating dominance in niche markets (Goodman and Watts 1997). Since 
the 1980s, the Japanese market expanded importandy, and food companies entered into a fierce 
competition for the profitable niches for fresh produce. The Japanese market is very strict in its 
quality requirements, as is widely observed in business journals ^.siafruit 1996). T o retain its 
profit margins and its position in the market Dole had to meet strict quality standards. Hence, 
quality was a key aspect o f the company's relationship to the market. 
So the company's marketing strategy was closely linked to the production strategies o f the 
contracted units; the establishment o f quality was realised at the lowest level o f the 
subcontracting linkage. The aim was to minimise involvement in risky production processes as 
much as possible. Managers believed that the company's strength was found in marketing and 
transport, and the corporate strategy was designed accordingly. Major efforts were made to 
establish a strong position in the Japanese vegetable market. In this competitive market the 
company strongly promoted its label, as a guarantee o f quality, not the commodity perse. 
In the early years o f the production scheme, quality was not considered a problem, but after 
six years, quality levels on a large number o f farms deteriorated. The optimism that dominated 
the beginning o f the scheme proved to be premature. Diminishing quality levels threatened the 
company's position in the Japanese market, and management reconsidered its level o f control 
over agricultural production. Logically, the company wanted to restore the right mix o f quality 
and yield, which had made the production scheme a profitable venture before. Management 
especially felt the need to interfere, after they had observed that low quality levels generated 
high rates o f indebtedness to the company. Apparendy, the formal side of the contractual 
arrangement was no longer considered the right tool to guarantee stable yields and high quality. 
For this reason, the company had to intervene in existing labour relations, and to change the 
degree and form o f control over farm work. 
Through examining the establishment o f quality, this section tries to reveal the changing 
nature o f labour relations in contract farming. It explores how one condition for a successful 
marketing strategy, namely the supply o f high quality products, was translated into specific 
farming practices and labour regimes in the fields o f contract growers. T o understand the 
establishment o f quality in production we have to understand the relations between the 
technical and human aspects o f work. 
Establishing quality 
Six years after the start o f the contract farming scheme, company managers realised that 
contracting out the production o f risky crops did not automatically guarantee a stable supply o f 
high quality spears. The general manager's main effort had been to conquer the niche markets in 
Japan. After all, production was the responsibility o f growers. However, after the expansion o f 
550 hectares, and after five years o f intensive production, problems with quality and 
productivity in the field figured as an issue for the company's management. 
In 1996 the company received complaints from its Japanese customers about tiprot; the tip 
o f the spear is affected and the asparagus smells badly. Tiprot could harm the company's 
position in Japan, and an instantaneous intervention was required. The company decided that 
tiprot was related to early morning harvesting, because then asparagus was still soft, due to the 
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lack o f photosynthesis, and spears were usually wet with morning dew. Not all growers found 
the evidence presented by the company convincing: 
They cannot prove that tiprot is the problem, and meanwhile the company limits harvest 
periods. The company does not make a difference among growers. Some growers harvest very 
early. Maybe they are the ones causing all the trouble. 
Another hypothesis formulated by growers was that blight caused the bad smell, which would 
mean that not all growers controlled for blight well. The company selected one technical 
explanation for the tiprot problem, which was not consistent with the varied observations made 
by growers. Hence growers criticised the company for implementing a uniform policy. 
Despite these differences o f opinion, the management imposed a change in harvesting 
practice on the growers; only one harvest per day was allowed, instead o f the practice o f a 
morning as well as an afternoon harvest The company insisted to pursue its short-term strategy 
for meeting the demand in the Japanese market, in terms o f volume and o f quality. It did not 
want to get engaged in a complicated technical discussion on quality problems. Apparently, 
business was too risky to do so. Therefore solutions for quality problems had to be found 
immediately. After a while, the company's marketing people in Japan informed the production 
manager that abolishing the morning harvest indeed solved the problem o f tiprot. The manager 
brought pictures o f the company's asparagus, and o f a competitor's produce, to show growers 
that Dole's solution had been the correct one. 
However, growers were still not convinced by the change in harvesting procedure; they 
feared that it might affect their performance. In a letter to the general manager, the association 
presidents wrote: 
Although our volume was not so much affected, but our Class A, Class C and rejects 
tremendously increased. We also have to cut 7" & 8" if we think this will be a reject the 
following 2 4 hours and this of course affects the volume. In short, if we have to go back to our 
usual harvest, twice daily, we will not only increase our volume but this will result in better 
grade distribution. Hence, our revenue will increase and assure our capability to pay our 
financial obligations both to the bank and the company (letter dated July 5, 1996) 
One o f the growers' major concerns was that with the abolition o f the morning harvest the 
chances o f an open tip became bigger; the openness o f a tip is an important criterion for grading 
o f the produce (table 4.6). Ending the morning harvest complicated the work o f the grower and 
the harvesters; asparagus spears grow at a high rate and what is still a small spear in the morning 
can already be a low quality spear at the end o f the afternoon. As a result, the harvesters had to 
select more carefully after the abolition o f the morning harvest, and to control the size o f the 
spear became more difficult In general it is recognised that asparagus is particularly difficult to 
produce in the humid tropics because the high temperatures tend to result in tips opening at a 
short height, and the spear diameter often suffers due to a shortage o f carbohydrates (Nichols 
1999). Additionally, the planted variety was sensitive to high temperatures, which generally 
meant an early opening o f the tip and, consequendy, lower quality (box 4.3). 
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Box 4.3: Variety selection and quality under tropical conditions 
The appropriate choice of a suitable asparagus variety fflsparagus officinalis L.) is a key element 
in a profitable crop production enterprise. In the case of a perennial crop like asparagus, the long 
term nature of the crop stresses the importance of careful cultivar selection (Nichols 1986). The 
contracted growers have to handle the specific characteristics of the selected variety for the term of 
the contract, which is a least 10 years. Research in Taiwan shows the complex relations between 
yield, quality, timing of harvest and temperatures, which is particularly relevant for production in the 
tropics (Hung and Huang 1987). 
For green asparagus production, varieties developed in California, the United States, are 
considered to be most suitable (Nichols 1999). Very few cultivar trials have been carried out in the 
tropics; most breeding is done for temperate environments with a long winter dormancy. So the 
company had to select from a small spectrum. In 1986 the company tested 32 varieties, mainly 
acquired from US-based breeders to which the California-based company had good access. Two 
lines were selected for use in the commercial enterprise, and UC 157 proved to be the best 
available variety in the 1989. This line was one of the first hybrid asparagus varieties available and 
was first launched in 1975 (Linden 1978). In California, the variety was praised for tight heads, also 
with rising temperatures towards the summer, long spears and high yields (Bolton 1990). It could 
be expected that UC 157 would perform relatively well in hot climates. In an interview, the 
Californian breeder involved in the development of UC 157 thought that the variety was well suited 
for the Japanese market because it produced small spears, but that UC 157 has problems with 
early openness of tips, related to sensitivity to high temperatures. 
According to company research, the agronomic performance of UC 157 is satisfactory, 
although the company is continuously in the process of evaluating new varieties pueto et al. 
1999). Testing of new varieties is only relevant to new production areas. Newly tested varieties 
showed higher yields after the second season and most of the newly developed varieties have a 
higher percentage of premium grade, indicated by a tight tip, than the planted UC 157 (ibid.). The 
development of an well-adapted variety, however, cannot be considered a solution to the 
immediate production problems in asparagus farming. The observed drop in production and quality 
was directly related to performance of the selected variety; the number of spears is still good but 
the size of the spears will be less. The latter has an immediate impact on the quality of the spears. 
Conditions in Mindanao are reasonably good, but high temperatures and monsoon-like rainfall 
cause stress to the plant. 
In addition, the company had introduced the mother fern production, adapted to tropical 
conditions. This system of induced rest periods allows for an extended harvesting season, which 
concurrently causes additional stress in tropical conditions. Normally, the life span of an asparagus 
crown is 8-10 years in temperate climates and with a shorter harvest season. Growers and 
company disputed the expected life span of a crown in mother fern production in tropical 
conditions. Growers believed that their yields and quality went down because the crowns were 
exhausted after 7 years of intensive production. On the contrary, the company was still confident 
that the crown could produce well, and asserted that control over natural conditions and labour 
management were key to good performance. 
The Community Relations Officer acknowledged a potential conflict o f interest between the 
company's business strategy and the growers' incomes: 
This year is a difficult year because the Japanese are scared by the cases of food poisoning and 
they fear to consume fresh food. Fortunately our customer no longer complains about tiprot 
problems and we deliver quality again. Obviously, our decision resulted in a hail of complaints 
because it meant less harvest and a different quality, which means less money in the pocket of 
the grower. But the decision to eliminate the morning harvest has led to good results. 
Although the tiprot problem seemed to be solved, the condition o f the tip remained a major 
concern for both company and growers; quality o f the tip was in fact crucial for the company's 
marketing strategy in Japan. In 1995 the Philippines became the second largest supplier o f fresh 
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asparagus to Japan. The booming Japanese market for fresh vegetables was the raison d'être for 
this particular contract growing scheme. Dole's strategy was to promote its label as a guarantee 
for quality. The general manager explained this to the growers: 
The Japanese want to eat more vegetables, they want quality, they want volume and a reliable 
supply, and they are willing to pay a fair price. The Japanese are eager to do business with the 
Philippines. Our tiprot problem is solved and our main competitor is losing market They are 
failing because of poor quality. So what we have to do now is to remain a reliable supplier and 
to deliver high quality. 
This, however, proved to be problematic. According to company figures presented to the 
growers, the number o f exportable boxes decreased from a total o f almost 1 million in 1993 to a 
total o f 840,000 in 1996. The company related the decrease mainly to a high percentage o f Class 
A asparagus, spears o f the right length but with opened tip (table 4.6), harvested by the growers. 
The general manager expressed this concern during one o f the farm management seminars: 
We have a problem; our ability to supply is going down for the last 3 years. We have to think 
about class A, why has the percentage increased to 37-38%. We have to reduce the percentage 
of class A to less than 2 5 % . We have seen it is possible. 
In 1996 we paid P33/kilo for class A, but in total P33 million worth of class A has not been 
shipped to our customer, it goes to the cows o f the livestock industry. This is bad business. 
And we have high costs, so this means we are losing. 
We need a change in farm management, and we need a change in trust between growers and 
the company. We have to reduce production costs, to increase efficiency of labour and to 
reduce material costs. 
The director o f agriculture mentioned the same concern, but he showed less confidence in the 
growers' ability to improve farm management practices: 
We must go for a higher grade product. In the end this will also mean a higher income for the 
grower. They have to come to realise that quality is especially important when exporting to 
Japan. When Dole came with this new crop, growers recognised its potential profitability. But 
this commitment lasted only for one or two years, then they made their profits and they either 
turned over farm management to others or they entered into new business ventures. We have 
to reorient their thinking. 
In the company's conversations and negotiations with growers, its personnel consistendy 
placed the blame for lower quality on the grower's labour management The Community 
Relations Officer complained that the malpractice o f a substantial number o f growers put a lot 
o f pressure on the company. 
The company is still buying low-quality asparagus, which we can no longer sell in the market. 
Growers lack a business mentality. Moreover, they are not able to manage their workers well. 
They simply say to their workers to harvest and do not bother about it anymore. As a result, 
labourers harvest spears which are too small and this generates problems with quality. Growers 
do not supervise the work, hence it lacks care and management in the farm, which is a 
requirement for a good production. 
According to the company, many growers did not pay enough attention to their asparagus 
farms, and during the seminar several managers tried to restore the growers' interest in 
asparagus farming. A related problem brought forward by management was that growers 
preferred to spend less on labour; growers did not reward workers for their effort Later, at 
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regular meetings, company employees tried to convince growers o f the importance o f labour 
management and o f the fact that asparagus still remained the base for their newly gained wealth. 
They thought that the solution to low quality and productivity and to high costs was a simple 
one; be present at your farm and supervise farm operations closely, otherwise asparagus farming 
is a losing business. 
Table 4.6: Quality specifications in asparagus farming 
Grade Price in 1995 T i p Girth He ight Appearance 
(pesos /kg) (mm) (inches) 
Dole 50 < 2 0 % open 8 9 " No bruises 
Mountain 40 < 5 0 % open 8 9 " Slight bruises 
8 " 33 < 5 0 % open 8 8" Slight bruises 
7" 33 < 5 0 % open 8 7" Slight bruises 
Class A 33 75% open 8 8-9" Moderate 
(quality problem) Can be hooked to 120° 
Class C 33 75% open < 5 8-9" Moderate 
(no market) Can be hooked to 120° 
Reasons to reject spears 
Broken tip; broken spear; malformed; short; white spear; fully opened tip; 
worm damage; fingernail damage; thin spear; tip-rot; bruises. 
Source: Company documentation 
In contrast, growers questioned the company's capability to solve the problem o f low quality: 
During a meeting growers expressed their doubts: 
The company says there is too much class A, but does its research help to rninimise this? No, 
they have no answers to our problem. 
The growers were told that quality levels had to improve but, according to many o f them, the 
company was doing little to help. It was not sure whether the company was able to deal with 
this technological uncertainty, as one o f the growers complained: 
They called us to a meeting at the clubhouse, and there they urged us to improve quality and to 
reduce class A. But they gave no solutions, we are waiting for recommendations from their 
research. The company's researcher has no answer to this problem. We are victims o f their 
research. It is never clear why we have to use what; we adopt their advice and next week it is 
different again. 
The relationship between growers and company left little space for an open dialogue on how 
to pursue the quality issue. The earlier cuts in labour budgets already triggered a transformation 
o f the interaction between company and growers. The imposition o f control caused bad blood 
in the production system. During a number o f confrontations between growers and company, I 
observed a growing distrust, especially over classification. Growers argued that diminishing 
quality was mainly a post-harvest problem. They said, it was the company's responsibility that 
the transportation to the packing plant was delayed, or that the processing time at the packing 
plant was too long. One o f the leading spokespersons did not accept the general manager's 
lamentation about losses: 
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I told him "you receive the asparagus in good condition, we do not need your drama. If you 
have a losing business let's stop!" I do not believe the stories about losses, how is it possible 
that the company's foremen drive around in new cars, and that the company's net income is 
millions o f US dollars. [On another occasion the reply to the general manager was: In the field we still 
have high grades, but if we look at the harvesting slip suddenly our grades are low. We have 
our doubts about the classification in the packing plant] 
In reply, the general manager impressed growers with the importance o f trust 
Any system of classification is based on trust, the company depends on you, and we are not 
going to make a system to cheat the growers. But any system is open to abuse. 
Despite this call for trust, the issue o f quality continually stood between growers and 
company. O n the one hand, growers distrusted the classification methods and lost confidence in 
the technological capability o f the company. Furthermore, the interaction o f the asparagus plant 
with its natural environment made performance even more uncertain, as a grower explained: 
I have problems with the tips; they open too quickly. In the first years tips were still closed at 
14 inches, now they already open when the spear is just 5-6 inches. This can have all kinds o f 
reasons, the timing o f harvest, a high pH, or exposed crowns. When I harvest only in the 
afternoon I have less Dole grade [the highest quality standard^. 
On the other hand, the company persistendy laid the problem o f quality at the grower's door. 
By doing this, the company confronted growers with a complex managerial problem attached to 
the issue o f quality. Growers not only had to monitor and care for their crop, they also had to 
manage and to supervise workers, and they had to monitor costs and debts. Remarkably, the 
company did not leave the solution to these managerial problems in the hands o f the growers. 
O n the contrary, its management tried to exert more control over what happened in the field, 
and, consequendy, it changed the original character o f the contractual relationship. In its 
intervention practice, the company narrowed down the problem o f quality to labour 
management by growers, and the company tried to come up with tailor-made solutions to this 
selected problem. 
Labour and quality 
Obviously, the financial situation o f growers reflected the quality o f asparagus produced in their 
fields; high grades have a high price. So, the quality problem partly explained the deteriorating 
financial position o f a significant number o f growers. Other related problems were decreasing 
productivity and rising production costs. Besides the inappropriate use o f inputs, labour 
management was the company's most important explanation for poor performance o f a grower. 
The mode o f labour use and management in asparagus farming increasingly became a concern 
for the company. One o f the superintendents tried to make growers aware o f the delicacy o f 
harvesting: 
Harvest is money. But the practice is often problematic. You lose by your system. It all 
depends on your workers; they are decisive for colour and length. Every piece of white or 
violet will be turned down in Japan. Therefore you need a long spear because every piece 
underneath or just out o f the ground is still white. You must have a lot of communication with 
your workers. You must have close supervision. 
My research confirms that labour management strongly influenced both productivity and 
quality levels. However, there was big difference between growers. One o f the case studies in 
Control over labour and performance 111 
this research was a poor-performing grower who planted around 20 hectares. He was also 
engaged in other businesses and spent only 2-3 hours per day in his farm. He left most o f the 
management to a couple o f foremen. Most o f his labourers were not knowledgeable about 
quality standards and there was little done to improve their skills. Moreover, many o f his 
harvesters were still young, while other growers refused to hire children for harvesting because 
"children work too fast and they are careless." This grower did not treat his workers well and 
often delayed payments. I observed that sometimes harvesters were deliberately cutting short 
spears. 
Regularly absent growers left labour management to caretakers. Mostly, these caretakers were 
paid a slightly higher daily wage than regular workers. This, however, did not assure growers o f 
good performance (box 4.4, page 114). By appointing a caretaker or foreman, growers added an 
additional layer to the system o f supervision, which moved supervision and control further away 
from the company. This remote control o f a crucial aspect o f production gradually became a 
thorn in the company's flesh. 
After the company had warned poor performing growers several times, technicians were 
allowed to intervene direcdy in labour management. Suddenly, technicians were assigning tasks, 
supervising work, and controlling payments. In some cases, growers were deprived o f their 
management tasks and an appointed administrator, together with the technician, took over. The 
production manager was surprised about the results o f such a 'semi-take over'; he observed that 
quality and productivity levels rose after labourers were paid on time and were instructed well. 
Although, this might be true for a specific group o f farmers, what about others? 
By way o f contrast, the majority o f growers were deeply engaged in the management o f their 
farms. My survey showed that 19 percent o f the surveyed growers employed a foreman, 81 
percents were regularly present in the field and were fully responsible for farm management. 
The following dialogue illustrates how labour management was discussed between growers and 
a technician: 
Grower 1:1 numbered all my T-bars, which allows me to keep a close watch on how a certain 
area was harvested. I can call the harvester in charge to account. 
Grower 2: What if nothing changes, if it is always the same. 
Technician: Never mind you have continuously to instruct your harvesters. 
Grower 2: But my harvesters always cut spears too short, or they cut them above the ground. 
Grower 1: There is nothing for it but to remind your harvesters again and again about the 
harvesting procedure. 
Technician: It also depends on the people, if their minds are on something else during work. 
This dialogue indicates that supervision o f farm workers was a major concern for growers. 
However, there was no single way to do this. The example in box 4.5 (page 114) describes the 
complex management task a grower was faced with. Growers explicitly discussed the need for 
transferring skills to their harvesters, but they also felt the need for close supervision. They 
realised that much o f their income depended on the effort o f harvesters and on the maintenance 
o f their fields by workers. Nevertheless, only a few decided to compensate workers for their 
effort. As discussed earlier, growers introduced piece rate systems in weeding, which allowed 
workers to increase their daily wages; normally, weeding and harvesting were included in the 
wages budgeted by the company. Only one o f the growers in the sample had decided to pay 
minimum wages to his experienced workers, which almost doubled their wages compared to 
regular wage in asparagus. This grower achieved good results: 
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Higher payment will give higher quality, because the workers are satisfied. Labourers talk 
amongst themselves, and 10 pesos means a big difference. 1 also discuss new farm practices 
with my workers. I consider them as equal, I pay them well, and we learn together. But it takes 
time before workers perform truly optimally and they can be paid maximum rates. 
Obviously, labour management o f growers, and the skills of harvesters affected the level o f 
quality in a farm. As one might imagine, when looking again at table 4.6, harvesting the right 
spear at the right time is a difficult and skilful task. 
Firsdy, the precision needed in harvesting requires skilful workers who know when and how 
to cut spears, and who can decide when to cut a spear. Spears have to be at least 10 or 11 inches 
high. I f a harvester decides to leave the spear until the next day it may have grown taller and still 
have a closed tip. Or, on the contrary, it may have grown taller but opened its tip and, 
consequendy, be classified as class A. Research shows that the rate at which young spears grow 
in height is very dependent upon temperature. Increasing temperature increases growth rate, and 
simultaneously, frequency o f harvest (Nichols 1986). Controlling the size and quality o f the 
spear was further complicated by the company's intervention in harvesting schedules in order to 
avoid tiprot. Before this intervention, workers could leave the shorter spear until the afternoon 
harvest With one harvest a day one had to harvest all spears with a closed tip. Spears could 
have a beautiful closed tip, but their length made them a low class asparagus. The company 
compensated this by increasing the prices for spears o f 7 and 8 inches. Still, a grower could end 
with plenty o f low class spears due to a small mistake in timing the harvest. 
Secondly, the work o f harvesters was even more delicate because o f one specific technicality 
o f the asparagus plant. In asparagus production one has to cut the spear exactly at ground level. 
I f cutting is not done properly, the remaining portion o f the spear will develop into a fern. I f a 
harvester decided to cut a 14 inches spear at 9 inches, but he did not remove the remaining part, 
this would have unintended consequences for productivity. While the fern is developing, the 
plant is not able to produce spears for a period o f at least three weeks. Hence, missed or 
wrongly cut spears had a serious impact on the productivity o f a farm (table 4.7). Trirnming in 
the field could easily lead to the problem described above. Trimming was encouraged after 
company and growers agreed to shift from gross buying to net buying; i.e. only the net weight o f 
spears cut at the right length o f 9 inches was considered as sold produce. Hence, growers were 
tempted to instruct their workers to cut spears at exactly 9 inches. Avoiding this problem meant 
a double burden for the harvester, as was clarified by the company's instructions: 
There should be no more trimming at your classification site. Trimming of asparagus can be 
done in the field during the harvest by cutting it at 10 inches maximum spear length. The 
harvester then would cut the remaining portion of the spear left to ground level on the plant. 
[Letter to growers, August 1995] 
The accuracy needed in harvesting and some o f the biological characteristics o f asparagus 
production required a very precise and skilful worker, but were equally demanding o f careful 
management by the grower. Certainly, a group o f growers lacked the time or interest to 
supervise their harvesters closely, which, in many cases, led to poor performance. In my view, 
however, many growers were concerned with the intensify o f supervision, and they were aware 
o f the contribution made by skilful harvesters. But managing labour was only one o f their many 
tasks. In this new commodity system contract growers were having "[..] to perform more 
complex managerial functions than before as well as more complex technological functions" 
(Fulton and Clark 1996 :220) . 
Control over labour and performance 113 
Table 4.7: The impact of harvest misses on yield in asparagus farming 
Grower Area 
(ha) 
Number o f missed 
spears per 10 metres 
Losses in kilograms 
per hectare per week 
1 0,92 3 25 
2 1,23 2 17 
3 1,00 5 41 
4 2,93 3 25 
5 1,28 2 17 
6 1,30 3 25 
Source: Company research 
The company narrowed the problem o f quality down to poor labour management by 
growers. Growers, however, also linked the quality issue to financial matters and to 
technological and biological constraints (box 4.6), but the company waived the growers' remarks 
aside and refused to include these in the discussion. The examples in this chapter, however, 
show the complex and ambiguous relation between labour management and the establishment 
o f quality. The examples also show that low quality levels cannot solely be blamed on 
mismanagement o f farm work. Aside from organisational and managerial aspects, quality 
involved several technical and biological aspects. Furthermore, problems were created by an 
earlier intervention o f the company itself, namely abolishing the morning harvest. 
Looking at the agronomic details o f harvesting asparagus raises the questions whether such 
complex and unsettled agricultural practices can be managed according to uniform and 
standardised guidelines. Likewise, the company had contracted some six to eight hundred 
growers, all o f whom had their own ways o f managing their farms, possibly in combination with 
other businesses. Consequently, the diversity o f supervision, and ways o f rewarding farm 
workers, was large. All growers, i.e. farm managers, made individual decisions about how to 
work with their workers, and about how much time to spend on supervising farm work. Hence, 
the mode o f labour management was still open-ended. The diversity in form and intensity o f 
labour management contrasted sharply with the company's wish to have a uniform and 
predictable operation. Management wanted to enlarge its control in the second organisational 
layer in contract farming: the supervision o f farm workers. In its interactions with growers, it 
attempted to routinise supervision and management by growers. This must be seen as an 
attempt further to industrialise the production o f asparagus. This required, however, a 
modification o f the institutional arrangement between growers and the company, especially 
because this intervention focused on the level over which growers used to have full authority, 
namely the daily management o f farm work. 
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Box 4.4: Farm management by a foreman 
Tung was foreman on the farms of the brothers Muslem. He migrated to the asparagus area in 
1991. Tung is an uncle of the Muslem brothers and he was assigned to manage and maintain their 
new asparagus farm. One of the brothers passed by once in a while and paid wages to the 
workers. The schedule for payments was irregular, and the workers were never sure when they 
would receive their wages. Some time ago workers negotiated for higher wages but the brothers 
refused to pay. So, these workers left and new workers, from the same tribe, were found in the 
north. Tung and his wife and children were the only permanent workers. He also complains about a 
low income. He has sidelines, on other asparagus or corn farms, to supplement his meagre 
earnings. The lack of workers and Tung's time constraints often delayed weeding. His neighbour 
observed that weeds were growing bigger since they started to apply manure and organic fertiliser. 
High weeds are easier to remove, but this takes away a lot of topsoil. Regularly Tung had to use 
the plough to control the weeds, which resulted in exposed crowns (figure 4.1). Harvesting was 
done as quickly as possible, as one of the many tasks in the farm. High weeds and exposed 
crowns resulted in disappointing quality and productivity. 
Box 4.5: Supervision in asparagus farming 
Billy started asparagus farming with only 1 hectare, and later added 3.5 hectares. He used a so-
called area system. This means that one worker is responsible for a specified number of rows. This 
worker has to harvest and maintain this part of the field, including weeding. The area system made 
supervising easier for Billy. Especially when he and his wife, Ayda, started to grow asparagus for 
another company on the land she inherited. Now he had to attend to several fields. Every morning 
he checked on his established asparagus farm and assigned tasks to his workers. If weeds were 
high in a certain part of his field he called the worker responsible. If the worker missed a lot of 
spears he told him to improve his performance. His farm was organised like a little factory, 
morning, lunch and afternoon breaks were clearly defined and his workers acted accordingly. 
Labourers worked with time schedules and they were aware of the time needed to finish a job. Billy 
was aware of the fact that he had to treat his workers well, if he expected them to perform well. 
Therefore, he always paid on time, provided housing, and shared some of the bonus he received 
at the end of the year. He also implemented a piece rate system for weeding, in order to allow his 
workers to supplement their earnings to the level of a minimum wage. 
Box 4.6: Delicate harvesting procedures: quality, yield and cash proceeds 
Carlo's family had always been suspicious about the asparagus scheme. They only signed a 
contract after most of their neighbours had produced asparagus for five years. The family planted 
17 hectares with asparagus out of a total of 33 hectares of family property. Individual family 
members traded closely with one another. Financial transactions and earnings of family members 
passed through a corporation, which divided the incomes from farming, employment (many of 
Carlo's brothers and sisters were professionals), as well as other business ventures. Carlo was a 
fulltime asparagus grower. In the last two decades, Dole hired him as a mechanic in the cannery 
and the industrial engineering department. One of his tasks was to monitor the efficiency of 
working practices. 
In his first year as an asparagus grower, he closely monitored his field and the neighbouring 
fields of his two brothers. He discovered differences in quality and harvesting procedures. During 
this period, harvesting was only allowed in the afternoon and net buying was already introduced, 
i.e. all spears were cut off to exactly 9 inches. "The company advised us to harvest every spear 
larger than 10 inches. In the first week we harvested between 10 and 13 inches, and in the second 
week our average was 12 inches. After analysing my data, I decided to harvest around 11 inches, 
which gave the best balance between yield and quality. Higher spears often had lower quality, and 
all spears would be cut off to 9 inches anyway, so your yield does not increase. I marked 10.5 
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inches and 11.5 inches on the harvest knives. My brothers had higher yields, but my quality was 
better, and in the end, I earned a higher income." 
Scheduling one harvest per day had complicated the harvesting procedures. Growers were 
forced to harvest shorter spears, otherwise quality, principally related to openness of tips, would 
decrease substantially. Although the company increased the prices for high-quality but short 
spears, i.e. 7 inches and 8 inches, shorter spears meant less weight, and consequently, less 
income. Carlo believed he had found a system that could still produce a reasonable yield and, 
simultaneously, maximise quality. Therefore, he was one of the few growers who collected the 
harvesting slips which the company provided weekly since 1996. 
Remarkably, the company's accounting system did not reward Carlo's production system. In 
order to differentiate between good and bad growers, the company's financial department 
introduced a new reward system. The height of weekly cash proceeds, already differentiated for 
quality standards, was made dependent on grower's performance. Performance was measured by 
yield (>9500 ton/hectare/year), quality (high percentage of Dole grade) and last year's excess. 
Carlo's farm management was guided by the idea to maximise quality, which had an impact on his 
yield. But the company's policy forced him to include low quality spears of his brother in his harvest 
in order meet his quota (9500 tons). 
This interplay between farming practices and accounting system discouraged Carlo to invest his 
own money in farm improvement measures, since he was unsure whether he would benefit from it. 
"I feel cheated by the company", Carlo said. T h e company had assured me that the shift from two 
to one harvests a day would hardly change the results of my farm, especially not with regard to the 
percentage of Dole grade". But Carlo's research proved otherwise; it was more difficult to harvest 
high quality spears. Furthermore, he felt compelled to produce high yields in order not to lose good 
cash proceeds, but this conflicted with his pursuit of high quality. 
TECHNOLOGICAL CAPABILITIES AND GROWERS' CONFIDENCE 
"Every year the practices of the company change, they are no master o f asparagus." 
(Grower commenting on the company's technological capability) 
The company's research and experiments were expected to guarantee productivity and quality, 
as long as growers would follow advice given to them by company technicians. The contract 
signed by growers clearly referred to the company's capability to turn asparagus farming into a 
success: "the company has the planting seed material and the trained and technical personnel 
and know-how for the project, world-wide marketing facilities, the necessary scientific 
knowledge and practical experience" (Memorandum o f Agreement). But growers' trust in the 
company weakened in the context o f expanding managerial control in the areas o f labour 
management and farming. The hierarchical relations brought about by earlier interventions, 
which were basically financially motivated, had changed the culture o f the scheme. This 
outcome o f earlier interventions certainly affected growers' trust in the company's capacity to 
regulate risk and to cope with uncertainties intrinsic to the production o f horticultural crops. 
This raises the question how the company's response to rising production costs influenced 
problem-solving activities in the areas o f quality and productivity. 
Company management realised that its push for more authority over farm management had 
to be accompanied by successful interventions in production, which created a complicated 
situation for the newly appointed production manager. His main task was to reduce losses in the 
scheme, for which his primary focus was the reduction o f production costs. Only in extreme 
cases he decided to abandon growers and to terminate contracts because he wanted to avoid 
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that "the incompetence o f 10-15% o f the growers would ruin the whole scheme". 
Simultaneously, he had to come up with convincing interventions to restore productivity and 
quality in established farms. 
However, the abandonment o f 200 hectares, decreasing yields, and lowering quality, had 
undermined growers' faith in the company's capabilities. Many o f them observed a field o f 
tension in the scheme; the company wanted to pass on costs and still be in full control o f 
farming. Growers wondered whether the company's mainspring was simply to produce high-
quality asparagus as cheaply as possible, or whether the company was willing to invest in finding 
solutions to new production problems in asparagus (see chapter 3 for more detail). O n top o f 
that, growers blamed the company for failure (box 4.7). 
Box 4.7: Growers loosing confidence in the company's technological competence 
The following citations illustrate the sphere of mistrust in the asparagus scheme: 
"Technology is Dole. Whatever they want, we do. Dole is responsible for the technology, but also 
for its failure." 
"We follow the scientific technology, so what can go wrong?" 
"You always blame farmers, but the farming practices do not come out of the blue. You gave us the 
advice about soil maintenance, but hilling up led to exposed crowns. We are angry always to be 
blamed." 
"The problem lies in the technical advice given by the company. Their decisions always fluctuated. 
The constantly changing implementation discouraged me" 
"We are not educated on how to maintain the asparagus plant. The company is continuously 
studying, they are still in an experimental stage. They only give solutions if the problem has already 
manifested itself, then they react. They take a sample, discuss the problem, and send their results 
to California. This takes a long time, and in the mean time the problem is still there. And all the 
charges and risks are for the grower, but we have no knowledge about the status of the plant." 
"Who is to blame for low quality? If the prescribed technology is wrong, growers shoulder the costs. 
But it is the company's responsibility to introduce correct technologies and applications." 
"Our technicians only pass by once a week, how can they closely monitor farm operations. We rely 
on them, they are supposed to be the experts, so what if they are absent?" 
"I was an employee of the company for a long time, and I feel loyal to it. Unfortunately I have to say 
that the company was not able to guarantee quality and productivity, although they promised to do 
so. Now all risks are with the farmer, and the company only takes a look at the area when 
production is already going down." 
"The company blames the growers, that is not fair. They have the technical know-how, they 
schedule everything in the farm. Often, the company delivered inputs too late, while in asparagus it 
is a matter of days. I know how to manage a farm. We are professionals and we can work with the 
right recommendations and when the inputs arrive on time." 
The director o f agriculture was still convinced by the farming system, and believed that the 
company's technology was good and practical. His model to increase production was guided by 
paying attention to agronomic details, controlling natural conditions in the field, and breeding 
new lines, which corresponded with the company's production strategy in fresh vegetables in 
their home base California. Key to the company's research program was testing for new 
varieties at different altitudes and different temperatures (box 4.3), although it was unlikely that 
established growers would benefit from this because they had to cope with the planted 
asparagus variety. Still in his view, there was no reason to doubt the technological system and 
he contested the critique concerning fluctuations in technology: 
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It is never the same in a farm; every year you will have different tonnage and quality. Y o u can 
be up and down, especially, if the conditions are not optimal like in this area where we have 
high temperatures and heavy rainfall. But you can work your way around nature. Y o u have to 
control diseases and you need a good management of the field, otherwise you will have 
additional stress for the plant. 
So this director insisted that nothing was wrong with the technology, and that the natural 
conditions gave rise to fluctuations in performance. What is more, the director o f agriculture 
considered the incorrect practices o f growers as the root cause o f poor performance, and, like 
his colleagues, he perceived standardisation o f farming practices as a conceivable way to ensure 
more control over farm management and to improve performance. However, the question 
remained how the company could dispel the growers' fears and how the prescribed farming 
practices could convincingly deal with specific production problems signalled in asparagus 
production in the tropics.* 
In an effort to restore trust in its capability, the company admitted that something had to be 
done to enhance production. Organisation-wise, management separated the asparagus scheme 
from other operations and appointed a production manager in charge o f all matters concerning 
asparagus production and processing. Shortly after his arrival this manager tried to find a way to 
remove the discussion about technological capacity and risk from the political arena. He 
acknowledged the lack o f uniformity and the, often, conflicting advice in the past; he promised 
that the company would come forward with consistent recommendations and standardised 
prescriptions: 
I want clarity. We have to take a decision about what is the correct technology. Now growers 
complain about lacking standardisation. The technicians have to sit together to synchronise the 
system, then they will become accountable foremen. If you don't accept our recommendations, 
it is up to you. These are meant to serve the grower, to maximise production. 
We want to sustain the 'green gold'. Therefore, we have to correct wrong practices, and we 
don't want to argue about the practices anymore. Let's go and leam together, and look at the 
progress we make. 
The production manager was aware o f the politics o f the situation and was in support o f a firm 
and decisive change in farming practices. Together with the general manager and the leading 
researcher, he pushed forward a new farming practice, which was supposed to perform as a 
trust-securing mechanism. 
Dispelling uncertainty 
During one o f the earlier mentioned farm management seminars, a group o f established 
growers, belonging to the first batch, challenged the company. Their association used to be 
highly productive, but, recendy, yields and quality were going down. They accepted the fact that 
low productivity and quality endangered the productivity o f the scheme, and they showed a 
willingness to do something about it. Most o f them agreed that a number o f growers did not 
look after their farms well. However, the solution brought forward by the company, changing 
labour management, did not explain problems in their own farms, they said: 
Our group is consistent. W e want to achieve our previous production levels again. Then we 
keep a future in asparagus. Most o f what you tell us about farm management we know already. 
Appendix 4 describes in more detail the constraints and problems of asparagus production in the tropics. 
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The root causes of our problem are exposed crown and reduced population. The solution to 
this is rehabilitation o f our farms, but this cannot be done without the company's assistance. 
The growers insisted on an effort by the company to bring an end to the decline in productivity 
and quality levels. After all, the company had indicated that it was knowledgeable about 
asparagus farming and the growers largely relied on assistance and guidelines provided by the 
company. 
The general manager agreed that sometimes the system did not work, that uniform practices 
were needed, and that conflicting advice must be relegated to the past. Technicians in the field 
also acknowledged that the prescribed practices frequendy changed: 
Our technology is not fixed. It changes every year, with the weather. We are still researching. 
However, after the arrival o f the new production manager it became more stable and yield and 
quality increased again. 
Also the Community Affairs Officer agreed that the company has no omniscience, and many 
questions remained unanswered. But, the company did not concur with the view that the 
technical measures taken by the company were based on trial and error experiments. Logically, 
because this would entail a discussion about who is responsible for possible failure. The 
company referred to the changes as farm improvements and assured growers about the 
potential benefits. O n several occasions company personnel tried to convince growers that they 
were still in control o f the operation. 
During the farm management seminar the general manager tried to revive the overall trust in 
the company's R & D by presenting a new innovation, the modified cutback system. In a 
technical sense, this new system was supposed to deal with the problem o f carbohydrate loss. In 
an organisational sense, this new system can be considered as a reply to the accusation that the 
company had not been able to maintain productivity and population in asparagus fields. In a 
tense situation between growers and company the general manager introduced the company's 
leading researcher, responsible for this innovation, as follows: 
This man made, perhaps, the most revolutionary innovation in the whole business: modified 
cutback. It will stop your population losses. Arguing with each other will not help. 
By presenting the new farming practice as a technological breakthrough, the general manager 
hoped to rebuild trust in the whole operation. Concurrendy, he maintained the hierarchical 
format o f the scheme; the research department decides about a solution, which has to be passed 
on to the growers. In addition, growers had litde influence on the selection o f the problem 
taken up by the research department The precise nature o f declining productivity and quality 
relates to complex and often unpredictable biological processes depending on the interaction o f 
the genetic qualities o f the planted cultivar with the environmental factors in the humid tropics 
(appendix 4). During the seminar, however, the researcher confirmed that this innovation could 
save the programme, which would have been stopped otherwise, due to problems in 
implementation, but he also wanted to convince growers by explaining the scientific ingredients 
o f this modification to farming practices. His explanation is described in the following 
paragraphs (based on several observations and interviews): 
The modified cutback is invented to cope with the losses in population in the fields, which 
were related to an important feature of this particular production scheme, the so-called mother 
fern production. In high temperate asparagus production the boundaries of the harvest season 
are set by nature. The spears start to grow when temperatures allow. When temperatures are 
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too high or the weather is too wet or too dry, the production o f new spears will end and ferns 
will grow. The ferns will grow for a while and then die naturally. 
In the mother fern production, invented for tropical conditions, you let the ferns grow from 
the start, which permits a longer, almost continuous, harvest season in the scheme as a whole. 
Photosynthesis continues in the ferns and this allows spears to grow daily. In southern 
Mindanao, rainfall is regular and the climate is almost the same the whole year round. 
Therefore, the company was able to get a guaranteed supply of asparagus throughout the year. 
On individual farms, a rest period was required to let the plants recover, maintain the soil, and 
allow some necessary cultural practices; hence, the cutback o f mother ferns. 
Before the rest period and before the start of a new harvest season, the ferns are pruned 
down to ground level. This caused a big shock for the plant and led to a substantial loss of 
energy. Apart from the energy loss, the open stems at ground levels easily induced rot. The 
crown had to recover all by itself, without photosynthesis in the fern, and, approximately, 3-
11% o f the population died. In modified cutback, the three most developed fronds are cut 
knee-high and mosdy left intact (Fintrac 1999). This evaded the shock method because 
nutrients and energy are allowed to return to the crown and pass on to the spears more 
effectively. Supposedly, modified cutback reduces mortality and increases yields (figure 4.2). 
Another advantage o f the modified cutback is that it enables selection of poor parts o f the 
plant and creates an even distribution o f plants over the field (figure 4.3). This generates more 
space for the strong part o f the asparagus plant, and it might even increase and consolidate the 
population. With the total cutback, a dead plant leaves a big hole in the population. Replanting 
is impossible because the old plants will overshadow the seedling. With modified cutback the 
original hill vanishes and the ferns are evenly spread over the ridge, and, by chance, the 
population can increase. 
2 Modified cutback: yield increases 
slowly and stabilises at harvest time 
Traditional cutback: yield increases 
quickly but impairs after a while. 
Time 
Figure 4.2: The estimated impact on yield of modified cutback in asparagus farming 
Source: Explanation provided by company researcher 
Figure 4 J : Company representation of impact modified cutback on distribution of plants in an asparagus farm 
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The focus o f this chapter has been to examine how technological interventions are 
embedded in a continuous processes o f institutional change, so this research will neither validate 
the explanation given by the company's researcher nor assess the impact o f the modified 
farming practice. Although the scan o f technical literature presented in appendix 4 raises the 
question whether a single change in production techniques can improve a farming system 
containing various complex and sometimes interrelated production problems. Obviously, 
growers observed the multiple factors influencing performance in their fields and questioned the 
company's authority in directing such a composite farming system. Research by Castella and 
others (1994 and 1995) indicates that differences in cultivation practices and performance o f 
individual farms underlines the unsuitability o f any normative, standard 'package' advice and the 
importance o f a well-targeted technical message. In the previous paragraphs I described how 
growers expressed their concerns about the usefulness o f the company's technology. At the 
centre o f the dispute tackled in this chapter was the question who was to blame for declining 
quality and productivity. 
With modified cutback, company management wanted to assure growers o f their technical 
competence. After the decision to pursue the innovation, technicians and superintendents 
started to demonstrate the procedure in the field. I observed several o f these occasions and will 
describe one o f them: 
The superintendent presented the new technique as a logical and natural outcome o f scientific 
research, based on experiments. He did not allow growers to tamper with the decision and he 
begged all the questions raised by growers. In the field, he limited himself to demonstrating 
several technicalities o f the procedure, for example, how to select ferns and how to c u t He 
asked technicians to follow his example, but they felt humiliated and embarrassed. 
In the mean time growers complained about the labour intensity of the procedure. They 
asked how much extra budget would be provided. When the answer did not satisfy them, they 
just walked around and obviously lost their interest in the actual innovation There were lots of 
tête-à-tête conversations between technicians and growers. The discussion circled around the 
labour requirements and many of their remarks floated in the air. 
Other growers indicated that the new scheme was still too much up in the air. In one of the 
neighbouring villages the experiment with modified cutback did not seem to be successful, 
according to them. After 26 weeks they had not seen any spears and there was no harvest 
They wanted a guarantee that crowns would not die, since growers were the ones carrying all 
the risk. Why should they not follow their own practice? 
This example shows that the modified cutback was presented as a magic potion, but the new 
technique fell on stony ground with many growers. The above notes clearly record the 
procedure for problem solving in this corporate structure: the research department of the 
company solved the problem o f decreasing population size. The hierarchical implementation did 
not allow growers to judge the innovation on its merits. In a way, growers came to the 
conclusion that modified cutback was expensive and that the result was uncertain. The fact that 
the research on modified cutback was still in an experimental stage bore out their opinion. 
Obviously, modified cutback did not take away the mounting distrust. 
The procedures utilised to implement technological and managerial interventions reflected 
the corporate hierarchy. Growers were not represented in the activities started by the company 
to deal with declining productivity and quality levels. The imposition o f technological 
innovations and unilateral budget cuts, made growers wonder about the actual substance o f 
their partnership with the company. This typified the institutional culture in which researchers, 
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managers and growers were looking for solutions to specific production problems in the 
asparagus scheme. As a result, managerial and technological interventions by the company 
became highly politicised. Notwithstanding the potential results o f modified cutback, the 
innovation was not able to restore growers' confidence in the scheme, and its implementation 
was characterised by distorted communication. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has discussed the capacity o f a division o f the Dole Company to direct farming 
practices and labour management in contract farming in the Philippines. The contract farming • 
scheme suited the company's new global corporate strategy o f greater diversification. The/ 
scheme originated when the international food corporation began to focus much o f iœ 
resources on distributing and marketing its products on a world-wide basis. Asparagus was 
discovered to be a highly profitable niche in the Japanese market. The company's attention 
shifted away from farming and it became engaged in global sourcing. Still, this marketing 
strategy required a method to guarantee a sufficient and stable supply o f quality spears. Contract 
farming o f asparagus fitted into a global marketing scheme and seemed to be a convenient way 
to secure a steady supply o f high-quality commodities. Yet also this form o f 'the 
internationalisation o f agriculture largely depends both on low price levels and intensification 
based on quality and quantity o f farm work. 
This rationale was contested by rising labour costs and by declining quality levels in asparagus 
growing. In the beginning, the company believed that financial control, prescriptive farming 
practices, and agronomic research would be sufficient to secure a stable supply o f standardised 
asparagus and, at the same time, to maintain the profitability o f the contract farming scheme. 
Correcdy, Rickson andBurch (1996: 177) argue that research in management and organisations 
demonstrates that "organizations cannot fully control their members over space and time, and 
the biological uncertainties o f growing crops and animals preclude a straight-forward application 
o f industrial Fordist models to farming." Along the way, management discovered that 
contracting out production did not entirely evade diversity in labour practices and biological 
uncertainties. It became concerned with the fact that the formal arrangement could direct field 
activities and financial flows only to a limited extent, and changed its control over labour and 
technology in production. 
The company's interventions clearly reflected the company's past experience in plantation 
agriculture characterised by the thrust to minimise labour costs and utilise cost-efficient 
technologies, and by the urge for far-reaching control over production. An increasing number 
o f tasks became directly supervised by company personnel, which restricted the grower's 
involvement to only a few aspects o f primary production and restrained diversity in farming. 
This move towards centralisation and industrialisation o f agricultural production was, however, 
in contrast to the endeavour to restore quality levels. Here, the company realised that they 
needed a motivated grower who would take good care o f sensitive plants, make difficult 
agricultural decisions, and carefully supervise field maintainers and harvesters. Therefore, the 
company opted to improve growers' management capabilities and not to intervene direcdy in 
production practices. Notwithstanding these seemingly contradictory management decisions, the 
company tried to eliminate diversity in growers' actions and to strengthen its grip on labour 
management and farming practices in the field. 
The close examination o f weeding practices and harvesting procedures reveals that this 
particular contract farming scheme was not designed originally to command farming and labour 
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practices, but that changing conditions in production generated important managerial problems 
for the company. These problems can be divided in three thematic fields. Firsdy, the precise 
nature o f the relationship between growers and company is continuously negotiated and largely 
depends on interactions between diverse farm businesses and the corporate institutional 
environment. Secondly, due to the labour-intensity o f asparagus fanning, actual performance 
depended much on employment and supervision o f wage labourers in famung^ operations, 
which makes production very management intensive (cf. Oltman 1994). Thirdly, in agricultural 
production, management o f labour, performance o f the crop, and interaction with the natural 
environment, create dissimilar problems, for which both growers and company had to reach 
deep into their technological capacities. 
Firsdy, the examples o f weed control and o f harvesting procedures reveal the co-existence o f 
I two modes o f governance over the production process. Initially the company had designed the 
j scheme following its desire to externalise costs and risks as much as possible, but, eventually, 
J was faced with difficulties to maintain its position as a mere buyer o f asparagus. Production 
1 problems impelled the company to engage itself again in production. It sought the reintegration 
j o f weed control in the corporate sphere and deprived growers o f their authority over some tasks 
| in the field. This reinforced vertical and hierarchical relations. Simultaneously, however, 
j asparagus farming is innovative and requires supervision and skilful labour for certain tasks. In 
realising satisfactory quality levels, the company heavily relied on close co-operation and co-
ordination with growers. This encouraged horizontal and collaborative relations. Both 
tendencies were equally present in the contract growing scheme. The issue o f authority over 
production was not resolved and the fluid nature o f governance caused tensions in asparagus 
farming. 
Secondly, both subcontracting and direct employment coexisted in a single production 
system. For corporate management farm work remained functional to its overall strategy. By 
contracting out the production the company avoided labour management, but, in return, relied 
on a combination o f direct and indirect measures to reach satisfactory productivity and quality 
levels and to control production costs. The company gave cash and material advances for 
growers to assume production. The company's supervision was initially based on prescriptions 
o f farming practices and the assistance supplied by its technicians. However, when labour costs 
got out o f hand, partly as a result o f recruitment problems encountered by growers, the 
company decided to get direcdy involved in labour management o f contracted farms. In 
addition, quality levels appeared to be highly dependent on the performance o f harvesters in the 
field. This performance relied mainly on actions o f the grower and was, formally, beyond 
control o f the company. So, in the course o f the contract growing scheme, company 
management balanced between achieving a closer supervision o f sensitive work tasks and 
leaving the responsibility for labour management with growers. 
Thirdly, the company resorted to assuming more authority for farming operations. However, 
the company's attempt to industrialise and routinise farming contradicted with the wide range o f 
crop management techniques used by individual farmers. Consequendy, organisational and 
technological interventions no longer sat well with many growers. In reaction to the company's 
extended influence over their management practices, growers were in doubt as to whether the 
company would truly be able to restore quality and productivity levels, and they openly 
questioned the company's technological capabilities. 
In its attempt to implement more uniform and scrupulous management practices the 
company ran into the stratification and organisational contradictions o f the production system. 
This complicated the engineering o f social and technical control over asparagus production. On 
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the one hand, the company considered growers as kinds o f foremen in an hierarchical, industrial 
operation. O n the other hand, growers were trained to become better managers; that is, to be 
independent farmers who skilfully organised and co-ordinated the production processes. The 
position o f farm workers was part and parcel o f this ambiguity. Technological developments in 
asparagus farming have not overcome the need for large quantities o f skilful, intensive labour. 
In particular, quality requirements have implications for the ways that wage labour is deployed in 
contract growing. Equally, the cost o f labour was an important consideration for both company 
and growers, which suggests the preferred use o f flexible and cheap labour. The following 
chapter shows that these considerations do not comprise the whole story. The technological and 
organisational evolution o f contract farming is an element within local histories shaped by such 
factors as the organisational strategies o f growers, changing corporate goals and management 
activities, and labour arrangements embedded in culturally different societies (Collins 1993). 
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INTRODUCTION 
In general terms, contracting out asparagus production leads to further social and technical 
integration o f independent farmers into extensive production and marketing schemes adopted 
by internationally operating agribusiness. So, contract growing institutionally captures local 
farmers; however, incorporation o f contract growers does not necessarily mean that the 
contracting company seeks direct control over the production process or labour on the (family) 
farm. While it is easy to see how a rigid form o f regulation and contract derives from corporate 
strategies and organisational powers, the content and impact o f these regulations cannot be 
derived solely from the dictates o f efficiency and profit maximisation. The mixture o f actors 
included in contract growing schemes makes it difficult to decide which partners are in effective 
control o f the scheme and how major decisions are made (Glover 1984). This is especially so 
because the company has to rely on remote control. The indirect nature o f control makes both 
the mutual understanding o f the actual arrangement and the reliability and accountability o f each 
partner crucial for the evolution o f a production scheme (Clapp 1988). 
My analysis centres on variant grower-company interactions in integration, and on growers' 
responses to the imposition o f institutional frameworks. The design o f this study does not allow 
for a systematic explanation o f the behaviour o f growers, either individually or collectively, 
reflecting sociological categories such as land distribution or political power. The more complex 
history o f responses o f working and farming families to modes o f integration, and o f the ways 
these shape outcomes o f agro-industrialisation, has yet to be written (Collins 1993). However, 
the ethnographic material presented in the previous chapters points to the capacity o f 
contractual arrangements to incorporate diverse social relations into the firm's operations and 
strategies. Accordingly, this book develops an institutional understanding o f the empirical 
evidence presented in previous chapters. A socially informed analysis o f both working relations 
and o f accountability and compensation mechanisms helps to explain and indicate modes o f 
negotiation and managerial styles in contract growing. 
This chapter argues that organising contract growing involves managing the social attributes 
o f changeable working relations. Integration shapes the organisational cultures in which 
company and growers interact, either through a process o f brokerage and attraction by 
reciprocity, or through a process o f venturing into a new enterprise and cultivating a business 
mentality, or through a process o f institutional capture by administrative controls and 
performance review. The resulting organisational variety allows growers and company to pick a 
form o f interaction that suits their current interests. As a consequence, contract growing entails 
a lot o f strategizing, as well as numerous collisions between divergent perceptions on the actual 
content o f the social relationship. An unspecified mixture o f coercion and control, o f persuasion 
and conventions, and o f converging self-interests fabricates the institution o f contract farming. 
The task o f this chapter is to picture the extent to which this institutional complex is able to 
regulate organisational life. The problem tackled in this chapter is the restricted capability o f a 
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company to manage such a culturally hybrid organisation at times o f failure. Correspondingly, it 
raises the question what happens i f institutional perceptions are incommensurable (cf. Richards 
formcorning). The hypothesis investigated here is that the co-operation between company and 
growers can sustain a profitable and stable enterprise, but it essentially depends on a capability 
to incorporate divergent interests and variant cultural notions o f solidarity into one 
organisational framework functional to production and marketing. 
I take on board two perspectives. Firsdy, I will highlight institutional and cultural aspects o f 
the integration process experienced by contract growers. I describe the process o f incorporation 
as one o f including different social relations and notions o f solidarity into a single growing 
scheme. The first part o f this chapter examines how interactions between growers and 
management sustain an unstable and hybrid form o f organisation showing an inherent 
precariousness. I use neo-Durkheimian cultural theory as a heuristic device for mapping the 
diverse organisational formations wherein management and growers interact, and for describing 
the evolving managerial, administrative and working relations in contract growing. This exercise 
results in a characterisation o f organisational cultures specifying the hybrid nature o f contract 
growing schemes. This outcome underscores the prominent role o f divergent opinions and 
perceptions on mutuality in a contractual relationship and, correspondingly, the existence o f an 
array o f management practices in the production scheme. The conclusion is that integration o f 
independent farmers results in organisational variety, which shapes accountability and working 
relations in contract growing. Describing these contrasting dimensions helps to understand 
tensions and conflicting perspectives. 
Secondly, I focus on the company's managerial decisions in solving financial and production 
problems. Securing productivity and quality, arranging financial transactions, solving production 
problems and avoiding the risk o f crop failures are basic requirements for a strategy grounded in 
contractual arrangement for agricultural production. Company management has to guarantee 
both a stable supply o f high-quality products and a lowering o f production costs; key 
requirements for participation in the competitive and volatile market for horticultural products. 
Therefore, a challenge for companies is to regulate production by controlling farm work in 
remote localities. In asparagus production, the company prescribed input-intensive farming 
practices, based on research activities and enforced by technicians present in the field. This, 
however, has proven not to be a guarantee for high productivity and quality. O n a substantial 
number o f farms the combination o f rising production costs and decreasing levels o f productivity 
and quality resulted in a dramatic loss o f profitability. The way the company deals with failure 
indicates the prevalence o f a limited set o f management tools. The tendency to opt for either 
hierarchical organisations, or for individualised or entrepreneurial partnerships, seems to 
undermine one o f basic strengths o f contract growing, namely its capacity to incorporate a 
much wider range o f working relationships embedded in culturally diverse societies. Strengths 
and weaknesses o f the organisation are most explicitly shown during moments o f collapse and 
failure in production; occasions which are central to the discussion in the final part o f the 
chapter. 
T H E INSTITUTIONAL CULTURE OF INTEGRATION AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
The asparagus growing scheme is embedded in the regional political economy o f South 
Cotabato (chapter 2 delineates the social history o f the province). In the first half o f the 2 0 * 
century land and trade was largely governed by a number o f local Muslim leaders. Commercial 
relations and control over land labour were important sources o f their wealth and power. In 
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most Muslim communities, control o f labour power was more important than land, and the 
building o f a following required more than simply the provision of land (Scott 1972: 16). Since 
World War I I large-scale migration changed the contours o f the agrarian societies in Southern 
Mindanao. The original settlers received land titles from the Philippines government and 
participated in an orchestrated development project. The stream o f migrants persisted and 
eventually Christian settlers formed a majority in the province. In addition, the establishment o f 
a vast pineapple plantation attracted large numbers o f workers and exhausted the land frontier 
in this area. Therefore, Dole's newly established contract growing scheme had to incorporate a 
variety o f existing landholdings, which implied the incorporation o f both Muslim communities 
and settlers villages. T o secure a stable production organisation, the company had to convince a 
diverse population o f landowners to take part in a new venture, and at the same time, to avoid 
institutional resistance by communities. Local brokers and the company frontline workers are 
key actors in this process o f integration by global corporations and local farming communities 
(see chapter 3 for further detail). 
Analysing the social character o f communities affected by the contract growing scheme leads 
on to the question o f how an organisation works when collecting such a variety o f growers, with 
correspondingly divergent moralities and political cultures. In theory, all contract growers, large 
or small, Muslim farmer or Christian settler, are subject to the same level o f integration, as well 
as the same loss o f control. However, companies have to adopt strategies to include variant 
local social formations, and combine these with various forms o f corporate control. This also 
appears to be their key problem in managing and organising contract growing. As it turns out, 
the prevalent assumption -presenting contract growing scheme as one uniform organisation 
with one dominant culture- seems to be invalid. It then becomes crucial to comprehend the way 
in which social order is constituted in a particular institutional configuration. 
For this purpose, I use neo-Durkheimian cultural theory as a tool to analyse the ethnographic 
material presented in the earlier chapters.1 Neo-Durkheimian cultural theory, or grid-group 
theory, offers a fairly straightforward framework to categorise organisational behaviour in 
contract growing schemes. Essentially, grid-group theory distinguishes four social formations or 
institutional orders as the social and cultural context o f individual behaviour. These formations 
are constructed by measuring different types o f individual and collective responses to 
incorporation (social involvement or group) and imposition (regulation or grid) (Thompson et 
al. 1990). The group and grid dimensions can be either strong or weak; for example a 
hierarchical formation has high grid and high group dimensions. The specific combination o f 
grid and group dimensions shapes social solidarity and authority, as well as institutional thinking 
and cognition. Grid-group theory substantiates various modes o f social order, and presents 
limits and organisational constraints within which the individual can move. It also reflects the 
experience o f belonging to a social organisation, and o f social differentiation within and 
between organisations (Rayner 1992). Furthermore, as clarified by Hood (2000:24) , it brings out 
some o f the varying and contradictory attitudes about who to blame, how to assess risks or how 
to put matters right. 
The work o f Hood (1996, 2000) and Mars (1982), both grounded in cultural theory, helps to 
map divergent problem definitions and conflicting perspectives, as well as varieties of actions 
and negotiations in layered and bureaucratic organisations. They discuss behavioural responses 
to integration and imposition, and relate these responses to the cohesion o f groups acting in an 
institutional context. The literature on contract growing suggests that forms o f resistance and 
negotiation seem to be individual, fragmented and unorganised (Little and Watts 1994, 
MacKintosh 1989). The contract remains a source o f tactical resistance for the growers, as is 
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indicated by diversion o f inputs or abuse o f labour advances (Watts 1994). The danger o f this 
argument is that it treats farmer responses all in terms o f individual actions. In contrast, we want 
to explore whether growers' strategies also reflect other forms o f solidarity or reveal subde 
cultural renegotiations o f the agreement. This objective is rooted in the observation that growers 
have different appraisals o f how to act, and, consequendy, how to see the relation with, and 
their dependence on, the company. 2 
The following section attempts to see the strategizing o f company and growers against their 
organisational background and their institutionally imposed roles. An essentialist view on the 
social position o f contract growers does not help understand the realities o f this scheme. The 
following describes a variety o f ways in which groups come and hold together; such as 
accounting for actions, loyalty to an organisation, social responsibility, and trust in the 
competence o f others. The four cultural biases present in this contract growing scheme, 
examined from a neo-Durkheimian perspective, are summarised in table 5.1. This table flags the 
existence o f various perspectives on incorporation into a bounded social group, and it suggests 
various responses to the imposition o f rules and conventions. The four cultural biases, situated 
in social relations and organisational backgrounds, seem to capture the different institutional 
perspectives, or modes o f social engagement: 
• Fatalist culture Contrived randomness and reciprocity 
• Hierarchical culture Administrative control and transparency 
« Individualistic culture Entrepreneurial partnership and performance 
• Enclavist/egalitarian culture Brokerage, delegated negotiation and obstruction 
It is important to realise that these perspectives do not necessarily coincide with specific and 
bounded actors groups. Growers can readily shift from one perspective to another. Moreover, 
company management can employ different management styles, responding to these 
organisational styles in concert. Hence, the exercise is not to categorise growers, but it is meant 
to pinpoint conflicting views and to make these perceptions part o f the social relations and 
institutional cultures growers and company employees are involved in. Moreover, the notion o f 
institutional thinking also helps identifying the range options for solving problems or addressing 
social tensions in an organisation. In this approach, the internal level o f organisation is 
presented as a product o f circumstance; in contract growing local social history is combined 
with the corporate environment This is reflected in the mutual persuasion to earn a living in a 
particular type o f organisation (Douglas et al. 1998). Herein the attraction o f modernisation and 
the convergence o f economic interests collide. 
In the following, I will summarise the actions o f both growers and company management in 
cultural theory terms. I will start o f f with growers who strongly depend on personal ties with 
company personnel and who, consequendy, reproduce traditional patronage relationships in 
their interaction with the company. Subsequendy, I will relate the hierarchical bureaucratic 
character o f financial and administrative transactions to the actions o f a number o f 'organised' 
growers demanding transparency o f accounting procedures. However, the result o f contract 
growing is also that farmers become more entrepreneurial and individualistic. Therefore, 
growers, for example, seek a business mentality in negotiations with the company, especially 
since the implementation o f a review process underscores the business-oriented idea o f 
compensation for effort Finally, I will describe the actions o f delegated negotiators in Muslim 
communities, whose power is located within a bounded local community, but whose authority is 
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challenged by the consequences o f the contract. These brokers are assigned to respond, on 
behalf o f their constituency, to challenges and unfavourable terms set by the company. 
Later, I will discuss the managerial instruments available to the company for incorporating 
diverse social relations, and for dealing with divergence in organisational perspectives. In the 
second part, I will show how instability in the organisation generates specific organisational 
problems and contradictory management strategies, especially because it is difficult to maintain 
diversity in working relations, in times o f failure and collapse. Choices for specific institutional 
modalities appear most prominendy when conflict arises. 
Table 5.1: Dimensions of and responses to incorporation and imposition in contract growing 
(A summary of neo-Durkheimian cultural theory) 
R 
Fatalist culture 
Contrived randomness and reciprocity 
* Acceptance of uncertain procedures and 
unpredictable rewards; 
• Stratified individuals alive at margins of 
organisational patterns; 
* Individual bargaining outside formal reward 
system and exploit personalised 
relationships in situation of limited choice; 
* Permanently failing organisations and 
perception that economic survival is not 
linked to performance; 
• Minimum anticipation and lack of disposition 
to take responsibility: ad-hoc responses to 
events. 
Individualistic culture 
Entrepreneurial partnership and performance 
by competitive individuals 
• Freedom to enter and to exit transactions; 
" Relationship is subject to negotiation and 
dependent on the ability of individuals to 
shape their work as they choose; 
• Boundaries are provisional and failure stems 
from lack of co-operation; 
• Unchecked private gain at the expense of 
what is supposed to be a collective 
enterprise; 
• Pursuit of personal rewards; dependent on 
effort 
Hierarchical culture 
Administrative control and transparency 
' Elaborate organisational apparatus of 
controllers and overseers at all levels of the 
organisation; greater managerial grip; 
* Division of labour and differentiated roles; 
confidence in organisational competence; 
* Excessive trust in technical expertise and 
tight bureaucratic procedures; 
" Binding prescription and inability to learn; 
error inducing organisation; 
• Fairness consists of equality before the law; 
conceal evidence of failure. 
Enclavist or egalitarian culture 
Brokerage, delegated negotiation and 
obstruction 
Failing negotiation and unwillingness to 
accept higher authority to break deadlocks; 
lack of ability to resolve disputes and feuds; 
Sending a delegate as negotiator, strong 
relations between group members; 
Shared opposition to outside world keeps 
group bounded together; 
Respond collectively to opportunities 
provided by company; 
Clash of cultures; dose territories and put 
blame on the system. 
GROUP 
Source: Fieldwork observations and drawing on Hood (1996, 2000), Mars (1982), Douglas 
(1987). 
Note: The vertical grid-axis represents the degree to which life and behaviour of individuals is 
circumscribed by conventions and rules or by externally imposed prescriptions; it reflects the 
extent to which space for individual negotiations is reduced. The horizontal group-axis 
represents the degree to which indMdual choice is constrained by group choice; it reflects 
the extent to which an individual's life is circumscribed by the notion of solidarity of the group 
he or she belongs to. 
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Fatalist culture: contrived randomness and reciprocity 
When initiating the scheme, the company had to persuade growers by showing that its offer was 
promissory, that it was bound to future action. Under such conditions, provision o f credit and 
strategic uses o f advances and other payments to secure loyalty through personal obligation 
were among strategies open to the company willing to contract (Clapp 1988). At first sight it 
looks as if growers and company are affiliates in a production chain, in which one party sells its 
produce to the marketing agent. However, the marketing or production contracts per se did not 
play a decisive role in the relationship between growers and company. Most growers told me 
that they spend no more than 2 minutes in the office o f the company's 'customers relations 
officer' both reading and signing the contract, which comes down merely to placing a signature 
on a piece o f paper supposedly distributed to growers at a later stage. The contractual agreement 
between grower and company was only one element in the institutional structure designed to 
arrange financing and compensation. The analysis o f the company's diversification and 
expansion strategy reveals that Dole mainly saw itself as a merchant, using little fixed capital and 
treating investments as operational expenses rather then as capital improvements requiring long-
term planning for replacement (cf. McGaw 1985). 3 The idea o f formalised partnership between 
two business entities has little value in analysing contract growing because the institutional 
context involves numerous agents and various social contracts constitute the financial 
undercurrent in this scheme. 
At the outset o f the scheme, brokers had played a key-role in the communities for several 
years. Brokers strongly contributed to discussion among growers about feasibility and risk o f 
negotiations, about levels o f income acceptable to farmers and about the levels o f profitability 
the business aspired to. Usually, they acted as mouthpiece for a group o f growers, and many 
gained experience in local politics or as professionals in companies, or in the army. These 
powerful growers, who had acted as brokers, were also able to access company officials in their 
offices and negotiate the outcome o f accounting.4 Some rich growers used their personal 
relations to obtain contracts for hauling asparagus. The company also rewarded their political 
effort, for example, by compensation for experiments in their farms. 
In addition to seeking support o f local allies, technicians illicitly distributed rewards among 
dependent growers, such as increased labour budgets or specific attention to production 
problems in certain farms.5 In the corporate hierarchy, technicians, as frontline workers, were 
essential to maintain the relationship o f trust with growers. Technicians evaluated a grower's 
ability to repay non-operational advances for educational or health purposes. In this system, 
growers without personal ties to technicians, and to a lesser extent to company officials, had a 
weak bargaining position; others expected to benefit from inviting technicians, superintendents 
or staff as godparent to the baptisms or weddings o f their children. 
Growers claimed to have shown a lot o f confidence in the company by trusting their land to 
the venture; company employees actively nourished the idea o f a personal partnership to sustain 
this level o f confidence. 6 During so-called friendship seminars, growers and company personnel 
were brought together to discuss problems with the idea to avoid polarisation and to maintain 
good working relations. During a more technically oriented seminar the facilitator stated: 
Asparagus is already a big industry, serving a growing market. But that is not a guarantee; it 
needs to be maintained and it requires commitment. 
The drawing in figure 5.1, which was presented during a one-week farm management seminar, 
shows how the company perceived the relationship between growers and itself as a mutual 
dependency o f two independent and equal business partners participating in a successful 
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enterprise. However, this picture is not univocal. Sometimes growers approved this 
presentation, with its emphasis on a business deal, and indeed acted as business partners 
negotiating for better terms and higher prices. More often, however, growers, technicians and 
managers acted and negotiated within their pre-scheme solidarity, to some extent ignoring the 
institutional conditions o f the contractual arrangement. 
TOWARDS 
SUCCESS 
Gasoline, provided by 
the bank 
Technicians who 
help by pushing 
the car 
Company Growers 
Figure: S.l Representation of partnership in asparagus farming presented at growers' seminar 
Obviously, farm management and dedication were treated as interrelated aspects, which are 
dependent on the quality o f personal relations between growers and company employees. The 
new vertical links may bind growers to office-holders or technicians, while raising expectations 
in regard to services and security (cf. Scott 1972). In Philippine culture, this raises the question 
whether a contract is, in fact, a transaction o f reciprocal obligation. In addition to the company's 
efforts in contracting farmers, particularly when offering credit facilities and personal favours, 
this attitude suggest a willingness to replace a traditional patronage relationship with new 
personalised relationships.7 This coincides with a widely observed characteristic o f interactions 
in Philippine culture, namely a personal orientation to the world Pertierra 1997). Hence, in 
many conversations, farmers suggested that signing a contract implied the existence o f new 
forms o f reciprocity and redistribution, in order to fulfil the company's social obligations (cf. 
Hollnsteiner 1973). 
The company's social obligation towards growers was most explicit in its relationship with 
persons in strategic positions, who acted as intermediaries for the growers and company, fixing 
social problems. These persons were often able to turn brokerage into an economic-cum-
political activity (cf. McCoy 1994). More ambivalent was the company's attitude towards cultural 
expressions o f reciprocity in the case o f individual growers. Individual growers settled for small 
concessions, such as non-operational advances, but they had to deal with numerous gatekeepers 
inside the company's structure. T o achieve some security through interdependence, growers 
cultivated a personal network o f alliances for strategic purposes (Pertierra 1997). 8 
When the production scheme evolved, growers were increasingly confronted with impersonal 
institutions and objective financial norms enforced by remotely known functionaries. 
Increasingly, management rewarded efficiency, and placed less value on personal ties. The 
analysis in this book shows that trust eroded due both to mistakes, and to fiddling in financial 
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transactions, both on the side o f growers and by company personnel. Company regulation and 
control constrained growers' behaviour and growers' resisted by breaking the rules. A system 
solely based in personalised relations is open to flaws and disputes in financial matters. 
Eventually, reciprocal relations proved to be inadequate to govern the new modes o f interaction 
beyond the boundaries o f the village (cf. Pertierra 1995). It became obvious that the actual 
functioning o f a contract growing scheme largely depended on its organisational features, and its 
linkages to other parts o f the corporate structure, as we shall see in the following. 
Hierarchical culture: administrative control and transparency of financial measures 
The original thrust in contract growing schemes is the creation o f a win-win situation. However, 
the discussion in chapter 3 shows that a narrow understanding o f the administrative and 
accounting system is inadequate to cope with the organisational discrepancies in sharing profits 
and in computing production costs. The arguments developed in this chapter shed a different 
light on the *business deal' concluded in contract farming. Key to the organisation o f financial 
transactions was that debt and credit has become central to the relationship between company 
and grower. Although bank and growers' associations were the actual partners in the loan 
agreement, the company's authority to handle all administrative matters moved organisation 
away from a simple business deal. 
The profitability o f a contract growing arrangement is closely related to the flow o f capital to 
and from other parts o f the commodity chain, or divisions within the company. Growers were 
hardly informed about market conditions, profit margins, or investments o f asparagus profits 
within new ventures in the company. Although this information is essential to understand 
sttategizing inside a company, the current study is limited to financial and information flows at 
the level o f production. However, also at this level, decision-making relevant to growers, i.e. 
about both production costs and price schedules, was institutionally distant from their daily 
practice, but was central to on-going negotiations in the scheme. 
Due to the company's decision not to invest direcdy in agricultural production, several other 
parties and contractual agreements co-shaped the institutional logic o f this growing scheme. Far 
away from the actual farm, bank, company and government agreed to become engaged in a 
export-oriented project. A crucial element in this engagement was the provision o f loans for 
farm development, and the opening o f a credit line for the operational expenses o f growers' 
associations. The presidents o f these associations signed the basic agreement for the operation 
-the financing agreement between association, bank, company and guarantee fund. The specific 
terms o f the various contracts were hardly discussed with associations or growers; the several 
government institutions involved primarily supported the idea o f modernisation, but lacked a 
clear vision about either specific terms and obligations, or formalised bargaining mechanisms 
embedded in this institutional framework. A bank manager told me: " F o r us, asparagus is a 
different case than maize farming because it is fully guaranteed. We had nothing to be afraid o f 
and we evaluated the scheme on an association basis." Hence, the financial performance o f 
individual growers was o f marginal relevance in determining the institutionalised form o f 
finance for agricultural production. 
In reality the business deal boiled down to a process o f complex integration into a corporate 
organisation. O f overriding importance for the organisational and social dynamic in this scheme 
was the fact that the company was assigned as collecting agent for the bank. Consequendy, its 
role as bank-agent turned the company's financial department into a key-player in the financial 
affairs between growers, associations, bank and company. Its responsibility was to deduct from 
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the asparagus sales proceeds the amortisation, bank charges and production costs, and to remit 
the amount collected to the bank. In addition, it fixed cash proceeds and declared excess 
payments, which constituted the actual reward for growers' effort. This resulted in a multi-
levelled contract growing scheme wherein decision-making was fragmented, and strongly 
dependent on trust 
The separation o f spheres o f action -in particular those o f financial transactions and 
productive actions- seriously affected the original ways through which trust and loyalty was 
maintained. Increasingly, individual accounts took over the role o f personalised bargaining and 
social interaction; ad^ninistrative hierarchy displaced the potential for reciprocity. Management 
was supposed to keep an oversight, in combination with tight surveillance o f the different units. 
We have seen, however, that transactions in contract growing easily lead to anomalies, especially 
when bureaucratic control is strong. Fiddling is built into the bureaucratic structure. A grower, 
who was an accounting graduate, pointed to a flaw in the financial organisation: 
I do not think the company wants to cheat as matter o f policy because in business you give a 
fair share to your partner. The problem is that the financial system did not make asparagus 
growing a business; they created an employer-employee relation. 9 
For growers it was not easy to decide how to act in these circumstances. Far-reaching 
integration into a corporate hierarchy suggests that collective bargaining is a convenient way to 
change terms and outcomes o f the arrangement But growers tended to perceive themselves as 
entrepreneurs and not as employees. Moreover, in this particular growing scheme no formal 
bargaining mechanisms had been established. Representative farmers' organisations, i.e. the 
associations, were largely driven by the requirements o f the finance agreements with the bank, 
and the associations had litde autonomy in decision-making (Clapp 1994). Moreover, I observed 
several organisational and political processes obstructing collective bargaining. Several efforts 
had been made to organise a federation, which would be in the position to bargain with the 
company on behalf o f the growers' associations. However, this initiative received litde support, 
both from the side o f the company, and from the side o f individual growers. Company 
management even tried to limit the role o f existing associations or co-operatives by 
decentralising technical discussion to groups at field level, under the supervision o f technicians. 
This process eroded the authority o f association in the fields o f finance and production. 
Moreover, interactions between growers and company technicians were usually individualised, 
which undermined collective action. In asparagus growing, there was no co-operative body 
acting as an intermediary organisation, mediating the power relationship between buyer and 
grower and defusing conflict (Litde 1994, Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997). 
However, one group o f growers, from different villages and associations, made the effort to 
challenge the way financial transactions in the scheme were organised. They strove to turn the 
association into a major business unit, controlling interactions with both bank and company. 
These growers entertained suspicions o f the company's role as collecting agent for the bank. 
These growers supported a group o f abandoned growers, who by way o f going to court, tried to 
gain a clear insight into their individual records. The complaint was about defects in the 
accounting system, such as the deposit o f retention amounts, double or wrong deductions, and 
the lack o f transparency. In court, the company responded that these mistakes could easily be 
adjusted, and asked why growers had opted for a lengthy procedure. In the field, however, 
company employees brought the message that the company considered halting the provision o f 
production inputs and the advance o f labour payrolls. This threat, and the lack o f confidence in 
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the Philippine judicial system, instigated intense discussion among growers, about the wisdom 
o f the court case, and the resulting polarisation to which it led. 
Basically, however, the issue raised was who could claim authority over accounting -the 
association or the company? One o f the main spokespersons in the case mentioned above 
complained that major decisions were discussed during a closed meeting between (selected) 
associations presidents and company management; there was no proper procedure installed. 
Furthermore, as Glover (1984) argues, the economic success o f contract growers depends, to a 
large extent, on their organisational capabilities.10 The associations in this scheme did not 
provide a venue for negotiations with the company. On the contrary, both association 
presidents and individual growers usually preferred to negotiate their individual interests in the 
setting o f a total reward system. 
Thus, the accounting system failed to create transparency in the numerous transactions 
between company, bank and grower. Growers complained that the arrangement itself, but also 
its implementation, lacked transparency. Additionally, growers had little knowledge o f 
accounting procedures inside the company, which led to mistrust and suspicion. Although the 
company might not be bent on cheating growers as a matter o f policy, errors and malversations 
in the accounting system eroded growers' confidence in the whole operations. Opportunistic 
behaviour by employees created an atmosphere that growers were being cheated by the 
company, which did not contribute to a sustained relationship o f trust (Jaffee 1994). Accounting 
graduates among the growers claimed that "accounting-wise the company is not transparent". 
Understandably, this observation made growers reflect on the reward system they were part of: 
\ Small farmers need to know not only that they gain financially from the contract enterprise, 
I "but also that they are not being cheated out of further profits by company manoeuvring 
I (Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997: 227) . 
O n the other hand, growers usually seem to prefer to receive cash rather than a cheque or a 
booking in their account, and to be paid frequendy, e.g. bi-weekly or on delivery (cf. Goldsmith 
1985). In addition, the non-operational advances, and the importance o f personalised relations 
in the total reward system, complicated the social content o f the grower-company relationship. 
My argument in this chapter is that the institutional framework, which combines financial 
arrangements between various parties and accounting practices, had a fax-reaching effect on the 
final results, and consequendy, on the commitment o f growers. The analysis o f the organisation 
o f accounting and the distribution o f cash flow shows a continuous process o f institutionalised 
transactions and o f individualised bargaining, which hampers progress in farm business 
development, the original objective o f the bank and the major reason for the government's 
involvement in financing the venture. The bank had expected to see self-financing farm 
business, based on optimistic forecasts o f prices and production figures. However, the 
interactions, as described, between flaws in accounting, low prices and rising production costs, 
made the outcome less predictable, the farm businesses continued to rely on external provision 
o f credit . 1 1 Moreover, by spending cash advances for purposes outside the asparagus scheme 
people were 'eating' from capital without realising it. As a result, the financial performance o f 
individual growers created trouble for the bank, because associations had difficulties in paying 
their debts. 
Additionally, the company decided to abandon growers because it was not prepared to 
subsidise poor-perforrning growers. These critical problems came out in the open when 
company management initiated a review process o f productivity and profitability in individual 
farms. This managerial decision obviously reshaped the working relationship between growers 
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and company; growers were subjected to a review o f their performance. The company did not 
grasp the complex nature o f productivity problems, and, simply, believed its own mission that 
'good farm methods' would make money. However, accounting became a tool in reviewing and 
re-organising the contract farming system. 
The contradictory situation in contract growing is that a contract readily locates growers 
outside the institutional and bureaucratic hierarchy o f the company, while company 
management still has to find a way to construct control. The need for innovative and flexible 
corner cutting operators on the one hand, particularly technicians and brokers, and the need to 
maintain rules, on the other, represents dual dilemmas for organisations based on technological 
intensification and integration o f distinct parties. Although growers view themselves as business 
partners, there is, nevertheless, a strong group dimension to the scheme. Looking at the total 
institution reveals an organisation with both interdependent and stratified roles. 
The mixture o f agents involved in design and implementation o f compensation mechanisms, 
and o f the financial system confused the conception o f working relationships in contract 
farming. Interdependencies at the level o f production, and o f accounting, confronted growers 
and management with the rigid character o f the formal organisation. But as long as income and 
the furnishing o f credit are satisfactory for growers they will likely agree to manoeuvre within 
the terms and institutional boundaries o f the contracting scheme. However, in the following we 
will see how unexpected social dimensions invaded the formal and hierarchical accounting 
system. Seemingly, the way in which the accounting system organised the distribution o f costs 
and benefits became an element in a disintegrative organisational process (Bougen 1994). 
Individualistic culture: entrepreneurial partnership and performance 
Rising labour costs, and declining productivity and lower quality levels, triggered interventions 
in which financial figures and accounting procedures proved to be decisive. The way this 
intervention and organisational change was managed can be described following Wildavsky and 
Hammond's (1965) analysis o f budgetary processes in the US Department of Agriculture: they 
show that usually managerial practice is fragmented and sequential and does not reform an 
organisation from the bottom up. Most o f the action was oriented towards the justification o f a 
small number o f incremental changes in isolated expenses, such as labour or fertilisation. 
Company management did not review a wide range o f alternative expenditures, nor did it 
investigate thoroughly the consequences o f proposed budgetary and expenditure changes. 
Interventions were presented merely in terms o f changes o f existing budgets and earlier 
commitments. A major target for the calculations was making growers aware o f the 
organisation's goals and standards pougen 1994). The cultivation programme, on the other 
hand, was not reviewed from the ground up. 
In the beginning o f the scheme, trust between growers and company resulted from applying 
a particularist principle. However, strict financial control and performance reviews presuppose 
an application o f universal principles (fonssen 1996: 109). A striking outcome o f this shift in 
managerial style was that the social role o f community leaders and brokers in the production 
scheme altered. Emphasising this shift, the new manager told growers that he no longer looked 
at who they were; only performance and costs mattered in managerial decisions. Privileges and 
benefits were gradually cut-off. Obviously, this left no space for showing gratitude or 
consideration for growers who had played a stimulating role in the early phases o f the venture. 
Thus the company resorted to management styles which contrasted to the previous experiences 
o f growers. 
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Tensions, arising from discordant work relationships, affected the implementation o f 
technical solutions to declining quality and productivity levels. The discrepancy between the 
financial figures and organisational changes, and the growers' perception o f disappointing 
performance and work methods, fuelled controversy in the scheme. Originally, growers 
expected to become integrated in a system in which the company was fully capable to control 
the technical and financial dimensions o f farming. Their technical and financial dependence was 
an important motive for growers to obey prescribed farming practices, as long as they would be 
able to govern daily management o f their farm businesses. The implementation o f financial 
restrictions and cost-efficient technologies, however, took away a substantial part o f growers' 
authority, and turned the original institutional arrangement upside down. 
Growers disliked the change in the relation between physical effort and reward and they 
discredited the company's status as the technical expert in a risky enterprise. Furthermore, 
growers expressed great discontent with the practice o f accounting. Clashes over the validity o f 
financial figures, misapplied accounting and embezzlement forced the company to organise its 
relationship with growers very carefully. For that reason, the company balanced between 
imposing hierarchical relations on institutionally captured growers and establishing a well-
matched relation with independent business farmers (who might be regarded as individualists). 
One outcome o f the company's actions was that growers subverted the company's authority 
and openly questioned its technological capability. The prevalent patterns o f interaction within 
the corporate context o f contract farming conflicted with the trial and error procedures used to 
design new farming practices. In relation to the complexity o f finding a solution to specific 
production problems, technological interventions became politicised and disputable. This 
explains the company's effort to introduce a practice o f pruning as a mechanism to reinsure 
growers' confidence in its technological capability (see chapter 4). The disputed authority over 
production turned the collective pursuance o f an enhanced capacity to manipulate nature into a 
politicised issue. Disappointing performance drove the company to its decision to strengthen its 
control over the production process. Its power to do so was mainly based in growers' 
dependence on the company for technical assistance and for financial support. But, in return, 
growers' acceptance o f the company's authority depended on the extent to which the company 
was capable effectively to improve performance in production. 
In general, the review process induced increased individual bargaining and, sometimes, rivalry 
between growers. Many growers increasingly acted as individual business farmers, and problems 
with the company were rarely solved collectively.1 2 Also company management gave the 
impression to stick to business in its association with growers. The idea o f a business-like 
partnership appeared on several occasions. In the feasibility study, in the various Memoranda o f 
Agreement or Production Contracts, and in the Financial Agreements, a common notion o f the 
contractual relationship is present -all participants involved in production, processing, and 
marketing o f the asparagus are defined as separate and independent entrepreneurs.1 3 Company 
and bank adopted a representation o f the contract which transformed socially unequal partners 
into 'political and social equals'. 
For these business farmers, a disappointing result o f the review process, however, was the 
absence o f an opportunity to negotiate a better business deal: buying prices increased marginally 
and production costs rose continuously. This was difficult to balance by an enhanced effort by 
individual growers. Some growers were willing to exit the scheme. Simultaneously, company 
management reinforced the importance o f performance measures in terms o f which individuals 
are evaluated; participation in the scheme became conditional and removal from the 
organisation was a possibility. Additionally, the company's financial department presented facts 
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and figures as objective measurements, generating an apparently inescapable and indisputable 
image o f the results o f organised activity. 
In this sense, the reorganisation process came close to what Rickson and Burch argue: 
One o f the most significant factors defining farm work under contract as 'organizational' is the 
fact that farmers are systematically and routinely evaluated on their performance. In other 
words, companies tend to treat farmers as if they were employees o f the organisation (Rickson 
and Burch 1996: 187) 
This tendency establishes contract growing as an organisational activity rather than a mercantile 
relationship. 
As a result o f the lack o f transparency concerning accounting procedures and financial 
records, the operation bogged down. Moreover, growers complained about the lack o f respect 
shown by company personnel and the obstructive role o f various gatekeepers inside the 
company. This left growers with the feeling that nobody in the company was prepared to risk 
his/her neck for a real solution to declining profitability and productivity. Likewise, the lack o f 
authority over the financial department reinforced the production manager's inability to counter 
distrust in the scheme. Justification to improve economic performance, e.g. rehabilitation or 
investments, may have had litde influence against a powerful budget-cutting drive. 1 4 So, financial 
measures resulted in a declining confidence in efficiency and integrity o f the company. As a 
result, entrepreneurial growers were inclined to leave the scheme. However, financial bonds 
kept them attached to the scheme. This situation led to fierce resistance to the outcome o f 
signing a contract. In effect, the company found itself unable to bridge between hierarchical and 
individualist solidarity. 
Enclavist or egalitarian culture: brokerage, delegated negotiation and obstruction 
"Gituok mi sa compania (The company is holding our necks)" 
Leading Muslim grower describing his relationship with the company 
T o some extent, the process o f individualisation took place at a different pace in the Muslim 
communities. A peculiar and stable feature o f the Muslim communities involved in the scheme 
was the leading role o f political leaders, or datus, as spokespersons for their constituency. Most 
leaders I interviewed combined a vision on modernisation and entrepreneurship with a positive 
attitude towards business investments in their communities, even by foreign corporations (cf. 
Wertheim 1978). As explained in chapter 2, the company relied on these leaders to gain access 
to the villages and to cut deals with individual landowners. Their collaboration created the 
foundation for the development o f commercially oriented growers o f export crops. In the 
organisational set-up o f the production scheme, the company was not able to disregard these 
brokers. Although individual growers were contracted, these local leaders took care o f most 
communication and negotiation. Muslim leaders explicidy nurtured ideas o f justice and social 
equality; their sense o f propriety was that people in their constituency, both growers and 
workers, were entitled to livelihood and dignity (cf. Kerkvliet 1986, Hollnsteiner 1973). As a 
consequence, the brokers had to defend both their individual interests as well as collective 
interests in cases o f failure or conflict. For the company, this contradictory form o f 
representation turned out to be a burdensome aspect o f the social character o f the growing 
scheme. 
During the time o f the review process, leading figures in two o f the Muslim communities 
took extreme measures in their negotiations with the company. They translated their disapproval 
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o f the formal rewarding system into obstruction, and isolated themselves from the scheme. 
Company trucks were no longer allowed to pass by their fields and technicians felt threatened. 
These growers assumed an isolationist or fatalist position (according to the grid-group scheme), 
illustrated by a technician's description o f the situation: 
A small number of growers do not bother about the future anymore. Many of them have no 
hope left they will ever be able to pay their debts. They spend their budgets on other things or 
delay payments to workers, which, o f course, had a strong impact on production. These are the 
ones making trouble. The majority of the growers, however, realise that asparagus is their life; 
that improvements have been realised due to asparagus production. 
Characteristic o f the troublesome villages was that not one single family was o f overriding 
importance. Several factions constituted the community, and in case o f conflict, entire kinship 
networks became involved, but not necessarily the whole community. Nevertheless, obstruction 
o f operational affairs and the isolationist stance taken by a number o f kinship networks affected 
all growers located in the area. Dealing with such a complicated social matter was beyond the 
capacity o f company technicians and officials. After several attempts to mediate, company 
management decided to leave it to the community to solve these problems; technicians were no 
longer allowed to enter the area and most operations were cancelled. Obviously, this had an 
unintended impact on the performance o f other growers in the communities. However, leading 
families pulled along these growers in their search for autonomy. 
In other villages, the diverse group o f growers and workers belonged to the constituency o f 
one single family. This family was assigned to negotiate on behalf o f the group. Therefore, this 
family decisively set the terms in negotiations with the company. Equally, they worried about 
the future o f workers and small growers, a majority o f their constituency and voters, in cases o f 
abandonment. 1 5 In these communities, almost all communication between company and 
growers passed through the brokers or spokespersons. Such a self-governing group was able to 
take a firm stand in negotiations with the company. However, it was difficult to make a breach 
in the company; their organisational capabilities did not fit the corporate hierarchical structure. 
Hence, especially in the Muslim villages, the way to compromise was a community affair. 
Much depended on the position taken by local leaders; as local politicians they were obliged to 
negotiate social justice and redistribution o f benefits on behalf o f their constituency. 1 6 Brokers, 
or delegated negotiators, continuously played a decisive role in responding to changing 
opportunities presented by management These brokers act as delegated negotiators, bargaining 
on behalf o f the group with the world outside the community. This role always involves 
compromising (cf. Richards forthcoming). However, in cases o f conflict, brokers may, for 
individual or collective reasons, decide to shift to an isolated position and obstruct further 
incorporation into the corporate structure. 
Thus, in the case o f communities where the company strongly relied on the brokerage o f a 
social compromise, the available managerial tools were insufficient As described above, in the 
case o f delegated negotiation, dissident cultures are hard to deal with, and there are few grounds 
for reconciliation. Due to this failure in social engineering, the company left the handling o f 
conflicts to the community leaders. In extreme cases, it withdrew technicians from the area and 
postponed operations; continuation o f contract growing was made a responsibility o f the 
community. Due to a combination o f continuous battling and a strict performance review, the 
company switched to abandoning individual farms. The company was no longer willing to 
negotiate with the collective and by-passed the delegated negotiator. In the new type o f co-
ordination installed by the company, dissidents proved hard to deal with. The extended social 
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Table 5.2: Forms of regulation and control in contract farming (adapted from Hood 2000) 
Mutuality 
•Emphasise partnership and sustain familiarity 
•Reward local brokers for commitment 
•Reciprocal processes of interaction as solution 
to management problems 
•Unpredictable patterns of decision-making and 
supervision 
Hierarchy 
•Strengthen monitoring and performance review 
•Conscious oversight and inspection embedded 
in ladder of authority 
•Formal power to pronounce on disputes or 
complaints 
•Command action and prescribe farming 
practices 
Competition 
• Make growers responsive to reward 
•Improve technical performance of individual 
farms 
•Outsourcing of all activities 
•Decentralisation of growers' association 
•Reduce involvement in productive activities 
Brokerage 
•Broker social compromise and negotiate with 
collective 
•Rely on group to check behaviour o f individuals 
•Abandon area and elude negotiator 
consequences o f signing a contract, especially the expectations o f reciprocity and the resistance 
in cohesive Muslim communities, confronted the company with managerial problems for which 
it lacked the organisational tools. 
MANAGEMENT OF ORGANISATIONAL VARIETY 
This study's inquiry centres on organisational variety and evolving definitions o f management 
functions, as features o f a system o f vertical co-ordination. The evolution o f management 
practices and working relations in this particular scheme shows that the concept o f contract 
farming cannot be limited to a formal understanding o f the relationship between company and 
grower -a firm requesting a group o f farmers to produce high value crops, which the first party 
then sells. O n the contrary, it suggests that contract farming can best be understood as an 
evolving institutional arrangement, which engineers both the political and organisational 
features o f integration and the management o f farm work and technology on dissimilar 
landholdings. It argues that variations in ideas about how to organise production-related 
activities is a recurrent and constant issue in contract growing. Therefore, the aim o f this study 
is to explore the underlying patterns o f control and regulation, and, to discuss the company's 
managerial capacity to respond to failure (cf. Hood 2000). 
I observed four modes o f control and regulation, acting as interdependent social practices 
receiving variable emphasis during the evolution o f the scheme (see table 5.2 for a synopsis o f 
different managerial perspectives present in the company). The views o f managers inside the 
company also reflect an existing diversity in management styles, and, accordingly, in views on 
the precise nature o f the contractual relationship (table 5 .3) . 1 7 
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Table 5.3: Conception of managerial tasks expressed by company officials in the asparagus scheme 
Manager Conception 
A Emphasises marketing aspect of the enterprise and sees growers as business partners or clients in a 
corporate programme of global sourcing 
B Stresses superiority of company's research and technical expertise and blames growers for failure in 
production and for not grasping the opportunities offered 
C Presents scheme as a unique opportunity for agro-industrial development and tries to create a 
business mentality among (successful) growers 
D Realises the importance of binding local brokers to the scheme and equally tries to bend decision-
making in the associations to the company's will 
E Realises the fragile balance between costs and productivity and introduces strict financial 
monitoring and performance review of individual growers 
F Monitors the purchase of inputs and the financial transactions with the bank, but fails to create 
transparency and to design an accounting system suited to the needs of production 
In these organisational formats, growers and company were held together differendy. Firsdy, 
building personalised relationships constructed the idea o f partnership in a new enterprise. 
Secondly, the administrative and financial inclusion o f growers gave logic to an extensive 
corporate administrative hierarchy. Thirdly, the process o f review o f performance rooted in 
attempts to raise productivity levels gave rise to subtle forms o f competition and a move 
towards individualised bargaining. And, finally, the brokerage o f a social compromise led, in 
more extreme cases, to abandonment and obstruction. These organisational forms function 
separately and concurrently in a single framework. 
This messy mixture o f management styles can be seen as an unintended outcome o f how 
contractual relations are embedded in local societies, rather than as intentional nurturing o f 
different institutional cultures. So, contract growing can be a robust organisational form because 
it is able to incorporate cultural and organisational diversity into its constitution. This situation 
was, however, not the way in which the scheme was supposed to work. Therefore, this section 
addresses the question whether, as the scheme evolves and new problems arise, the observed 
mixture o f cultures and managerial instruments can be sustained. After closure o f the 
contractual deal, the effective use o f technological expertise, financial profitability, integrity o f 
management processes and transparency in the allocation o f rewards, become key factors 
redefining the nature o f the relationship between growers and company. The type o f approach 
adopted by the company to solve newly arising problems, such as rising production costs or 
declining productivity levels, is largely dependent on existing thought-styles about co-operation 
and regulation inside the company (cf. Douglas 1987, 1996). The adopted managerial approach 
may clash with the various cultural notions o f social solidarity existent in the communities 
incorporated into the scheme. 
The evidence presented in the previous section shows that companies hunt around among 
management styles. Disappointment over the capacity o f one approach to deliver satisfactory 
results, leads to increasing support for one o f the other options. Moreover, in problematic 
situations management tends to opt for extreme measures, such as imposing hierarchy or pure 
business deals, which rule out the cultivated mixture o f cultural notions and social frameworks 
apparent in the beginning (Hood 1996: 221). In cases o f failure, managers turn to a confined set 
o f instruments, while the range o f existing social practices in contract growing entails a much 
wider set o f organisational relations. 
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Thus, in the practice o f agro-industrialisation, choices for management are limited. These 
restricted options can be related to Dent and Ezzamel's (1995) distinction between two typical 
approaches to financial and organisational control, namely classical hierarchical and neo-classical 
individualist (table 5.4). Eventually, these two directions o f organisational change defined the 
managerial options present in this contract growing scheme. On the one hand, we saw a 'neo-
classical individualist' approach to accounting and financial management. A main feature o f this 
approach is the motivational impact o f budgets. On the other hand we observed a shift towards 
a 'classical hierarchical' approach to financial management. In this process, the company's 
behaviour reveals a strong cultural bias towards hierarchical supervision and management 
accounting based on cost reduction, in combination with cost-efficient technologies. This 
contrasts with a bias towards freedom to contract in combination with reward for effort or a 
bias towards personalised relationships of 7mutuality. Hence, the managerial discourse was 
confined to the continuum between individualism and hierarchy. Yet, the previous section 
shows that contract growing is more than a simple binary institutional configuration between 
market individualism or imposed hierarchy. Pursuing only these narrowly defined options may 
result in error-inducing organisations lacking incentives to learn, due to their confined capacity 
to respond to financial pressures and production problems, or to social resistance and 
communication difficulties (cf. Perrow 1984). 
Table 5.4: Typical approaches to organisational and financial control in contract growing 
Classical hierarchical Neo-classical individualist 
• Financial management based on cost accounting 
« One integrated plan of action for the 
organisation as a whole with centralised co-
ordination 
• Series of specific co-ordinated tasks for each 
segment in the organisation. 
• Vertical control through the line of authority 
• Far-reaching interdependence and resource 
transfers 
• Financial management based on motivational 
impact of budgets 
• Participation in schemes and management -by 
objectives- encouraging identification with 
corporate goals 
• Effective performance is obtained when tasks 
are made intrinsically stimulating and rewarding 
• Control is a behavioural and social problem, not 
a problem of formal structure 
• Formal and informal bargaining procedures 
Source: adapted from Dent and Ezzamel (1995) 
SHAPING MANAGERIAL CONTROL 
The following expose o f managerial responses to moments o f crisis suggests that, originally, the 
company's management styles were guided by the idea to construct a community o f business 
farmers. However, later interventions triggered further technical integration between 
organisational goals, performance and measurements, which meant a deepened integration with 
managerial control methods, and, consequentiy, an encounter with organisational power 
relationships. After unforeseen increases in labour costs and unexpected decreases in quality and 
productivity levels, management decided to intervene direcdy in the labour management 
practices o f growers and to change technological practices in an endeavour to sustain the 
profitability o f the production scheme. Along the way, the company felt the need to reshape its 
involvement in the actual farming operations; it felt an urgent need to improve production 
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What is arranged by the contract in asparagus farming? 
L a n d • The land must be used for asparagus farming for the duration of the contract (10 years). 
• The grower cannot sell, dispose, transfer, assign or lease the land without prior consent of 
the company. 
• No inter-cropping is allowed. 
Farming « The contract allows the company to prescribe farming practices, and to employ 
Practices technicians who monitor the status of the crop. 
• The contract allows the company to turn over the work on the farm to an administrator 
if the success of the crop is endangered because the grower fails to follow the 
prescribed farming practices. 
0 The company provides the seeds, furnishes technical assistance and recommends such 
cultural practices necessary to obtain maximum yields and high-quality asparagus. 
Quality • The contract specifies the conditions of the asparagus and allows the company to reject 
and asparagus, which do not meet these specifications. 
prices • The contract specifies the price rates, in accordance with the quality specifications. 
Source: Memorandum Agreement between company and grower* 
* See appendix 3 for a detailed description of the contractual arrangement between company and grower in asparagus farming. 
practices, accompanied by organisational change. Evidently, these interventions reshaped the 
social relations between company and grower. 1 8 
Indirect control embedded in the organisational arrangements in contract growing 
complicates managerial interventions in the case o f failure. Following Dent and Ezzamel (1995), 
I interpret control as the problem o f ensuring consistency in organisational activities. Equally, 
however, control is also an intervention in the activity being subjected to surveillance, not a 
simple after-the-fact activity, and this observation, obviously, generates reaction and conflict 
(Kirk and Mouritsen 1996). It is, therefore, important to understand what happened after the 
company decided to interfere with the existing organisational configuration. This decision was 
made after a close monitoring o f production and financial figures showed a weakening in the 
initial prognoses o f the viability o f the scheme. The company's intervention was strongly guided 
by its intention to reduce production costs. The events presented in the previous chapters 
illustrate how the company's control shifted away from hands-off management to a more 
interventionist hands-on style o f management The company, for example, either left the 
responsibility for farm management to farmers or, on the contrary, took away tasks from the 
growers, turning the landowner into a kind o f self-employed foreman. 
At the start o f the asparagus project, the company firmly believed it had sufficient control 
over production, and also a firm grip on financial aspects o f production. Its research department 
had designed a farming system for asparagus farming in the tropics, and its technicians were 
assigned to monitor farming practices in growers' fields. In addition, the company advanced 
inputs and labour payments to the grower, which were deducted at the end o f the year. The 
contracting company paid the growers a pre-arranged price per kilogram, which depended on 
the quality o f the product The contract gave the company bounded authority over farming 
practices in the field (table 5.5). The contract for asparagus production left control over day-to-
day activities to growers. Growers were, however, contractually obliged to follow instructions 
given by the company and they had to use inputs provided by the company. 
Table 5.5: Selected conditions from the written contract in asparagus farming 
Fixing control and cultivating accountability 143 
When the production scheme developed, the company was confronted with several problems 
that required managerial response and strengthening o f control mechanisms. The shaping o f 
control that evolved depended on the technical and managerial problems selected by 
management One manager explained his understanding o f the company's response as follows: 
Essential is control. We need to control to avoid stress o f plants. Control refers to nature; the 
crop must be in a good condition. An additional aspect of control refers to growers 
themselves. They show great inconsistency, which can easily cause stress in addition to the 
natural constraints. In fact, the company only has convincing power. We are a 
recommendation agency, we have no control. I would like to change the system. I want to go 
to a system in which we decide when and where to do something. I would like to control 
fertilisation, pests, diseases, cutback and the preparation for harvest. This leaves weeding, 
harvesting, cultivation and maintenance to the grower. 
After unforeseen increases in production costs and decline in quality, management changed 
its course and tried to augment its managerial authority to improve quality and co-ordinate 
production tasks. Though its actions revealed an ambiguity about how to approach the growers. 
In one approach towards the problems in asparagus, the company was persistendy building a 
consensus around how to manage farms efficiendy, in partnership with growers. Together with 
growers, the company tried to construct a workplace for growing asparagus. Growers were told 
to be a good employer; it was suggested they were " to lead by example, to encourage workers 
and give incentives, to make hard decision but to be soft on people, to be tender and loving as a 
person, and to pay salaries on time". The production manager emphasised that growers had to 
translate knowledge and to transfer technology to their labourers. Technicians would be present 
in the field, but merely to assist and to demonstrate new practices. He said: 
It would be a mistake to rely entirely on the technicians. Supervision and farm management is 
the task o f the grower. If we observe that in a field too many short spears are harvested I ask 
the grower 'do you watch your harvesters?' This is the business we are talking about. It is 
nothing personal. We have to fully understand each other. We do not want to put someone 
down; we look for a more effective way to transfer knowledge and technology 
So the company wanted to turn growers into better managers o f agricultural production. 
During one o f the earlier mentioned farm management seminars, the Assistant Regional 
Director o f the Department o f Labour and Employment (DoLE) led the discussion. This 
underlined the view that the issue was essentially considered to be a matter o f organising farm 
work. As business farmers, growers had to become employers accountable to hired workers. In 
a later interview this director stressed the fact that in contract farming the grower is the actual 
employer. In his opinion the company is supposed solely to assist in farming. But he also 
admitted that this division o f labour was clearer in theory than in reality: 
You are an employer if you hire, control, and supervise workers. The department thinks that in 
a growing system the owner is the employer, even when the technician assists in supervision. 
But, the exact form o f supervision is crucial, does the technician also assign tasks to workers 
and does he make payments? In asparagus farming the company gives growers a labour 
budget. This is a confusing term. 1 suggested to the company that they should term it 
appropriately; using the term 'advances' suggests that the company still is in control to a large 
extent. Then the question is who controls the money. The company thought that if it gave all 
the loans to growers, it would not be able to control farm work and there would be no 
produce. So the loans to growers conditioned their performance. 
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This quotation shows that the contracting system itself led to organisational problems. The 
company's control over financial flows and the daily interaction o f technicians with growers 
suggest substantial corporate control over agricultural production. Still, the growers were seen as 
employers o f farm workers and as actual farm managers. Growers basically viewed themselves 
as individual entrepreneurs who made a deal with a company. Hence, many growers strongly 
disagreed with the implementation o f uniform policies, which did not take account o f the 
differences between individual performances. Another tension in this scheme was that growers 
tend to believe they had a very individualised relationship with the company, reflected in 
personal commitment and subsumption o f land. The company, on the other hand, was inclined 
to fall back on a continual strategy to centralise control o f production and to value land 
primarily for its instrumental value (cf. Rickson and Burch 1996). Consequendy, the company 
wanted to standardise both management and farming practices in the scheme. 
In the event, the management strategy balanced continuously between improving the 
management capacities o f independent growers and turning growers into foremen in a 
corporate hierarchy. O n the one hand, growers were trained to become better managers (that is, 
to be independent farmers who organise and co-ordinate the production process). This was part 
o f an effort to re-establish the family as the basic production unit, in which it was the grower's 
responsibility to manage labour and productivity. In this sense, contract farming is confined to 
linking independent small holders to a larger agribusiness, and the company kept aloof from 
supervision o f farm workers. 
O n the other hand, the company considered growers as foremen in some kind o f industrial 
operation. This meant that growers were assigned a rather fixed position in the corporate 
hierarchy. The company tried to ehrninate diversity in their actions and to strengthen its grip on 
labour management and farming practices in the field. In order to solve production problems, 
company management tried to expand its authority and, in doing so, to redirect labour 
management by growers. Therefore, the company was not able to get around the issue o f 
authority over the organisation in production. 
The company's ambiguity towards growers is, to some extent, also reflected in the 
institutional stratification in the scheme. Growers and technicians are working at a lower level in 
the organisation, and their daily lives were inextricably tied to the production process. Both 
growers and technicians viewed accounting information or technological expertise in terms o f 
its significance for their effort in production. Due to their daily presence in the field, company 
technicians maintained good personal relationships with most o f the growers. Growers' distrust 
in company behaviour was especially expressed in the financial relationship; which was neither 
part o f the responsibilities o f technicians nor o f the agricultural department as a whole. 
Technical and production matters were increasingly decentralised by company management, but 
handling o f accounts and other financial matters was concentrated in the offices at a great 
distance from growers' fields, both physically and institutionally. 
In contrast to the work o f the agricultural department, managers and financial staff had no 
direct involvement in agricultural production. For them, accounting information was an end to 
monitor the company's profitability and the financial figures were crucial in defending the 
outcome and the future o f the operations in front o f top-management, representatives from 
headquarters, and in the end, company shareholders. Understandably, a typically instrumental 
interest in production dominated these spheres o f the corporate structure (Roberts and Scapens 
1985). However, in its effort to instil awareness o f control, and to make growers conform to 
certain institutional values, the company did not anticipate that a process o f review and 
reorganisation would cause people to strategize and seek to evade discipline. 
Fixing control and cultivating accountability 145 
The above indicates that, over time, the company adopted various organisational tools to 
shape its relationship with growers. Growers, o f course, did not readily accept the organisational 
visions accompanying interventions in the scheme. Hence, this study exposes divergences in 
conflicting perspectives on organisational activity. The company's emphasis on technical and 
rational behaviour denies the social origin o f co-ordination and productive activities in a division 
of labour (cf. Douglas 1987). Imposing one form o f organisational activity forges a new identity 
and new modes o f social engagement. But not all disagreements can be handled through 
bargaining over differences by free contractors, or though forcing growers into a framework o f 
hierarchical control. Various contingencies and ruptures impacted upon the common ground 
prepared at the start o f the scheme. The company's response to failure and collapse was 
incompatible with growers' response to the changing organisation. 
In the case o f institutional or technological failure, management could no longer 
accommodate divergent working relations, seemingly an important prerequisite for building 
trust and creating stable expectations in contract growing. This study indicates that the 
individual grower's acceptance o f and/or resistance to new working relations largely depended 
on the company's capacity to accommodate culturally embedded relationships to new forms o f 
management. Growers no longer recognised the roles given to them in the process o f 
reorganisation, which then fed mistrust and rejection. The analysis o f increasing social 
disagreements and divergence in organisational values clarifies an important source o f instability 
in contractual arrangements. 
We have seen that the introduction o f restricted institutional conditions in a contract growing 
scheme easily brings about erosion o f trust and accountability. The new practice o f review and 
performance assessment, for example, contrasted sharply with the promise o f modernisation 
made to farmers in the beginning. Over time, and as a result o f several interventions, 
organisational life in the scheme moved away from partnership in a business venture and 
gradually tended towards intensified bureaucratisation accompanied by enforced lines o f 
authority. In the case o f failure o f the enterprise, the hybrid nature o f contract growing seems to 
disappear. As a result, growers seriously doubted the company's accountability and 
commitment. T o them, accountability was to be understood in terms o f being a competent 
participant in dialogue, and in demonstrating the ability to uphold contracts and to contribute to 
problem solving (Jonssen 1996:115-116) . 
CONCLUSIONS 
The previous institutional analysis o f social relations in contract growing, using a scheme 
from neo-Durkheimian cultural theory as heuristic, goes beyond the obvious dichotomy 
between hierarchy and individualism (Thompson et al. 1990). Hence, I refute the duality 
presenting growers either as independent business partners or as subordinated employees o f a 
corporation. In contrast, my analysis emphasises the need to comprehend the evolving and 
multi-level institutional environment contract growers manoeuvre in. The detailed examination 
o f accounting and rewarding procedures and o f farming practices in contract growing reveals a 
modey palette o f forms o f control and modes o f interaction, balancing between establishing 
personalised reciprocal relationships and obstructive negotiations by coherent communities, or 
between nurturing a business mentality and imposing restrictive measures. Farmers and 
company employees were able to shift from one style to the other, which resulted in 
contradictory and parallel organisational cultures. Seemingly, farmers consistendy perceived the 
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scheme as a new system o f political and social relations, not purely as an entrepreneurial or 
corporate scheme o f profit sharing and supply obligations. 
Obviously, at various moments the parties in contract farming had different perceptions o f 
the social content o f their relationship. These divergent and evolving understandings are related 
to conceptions o f integration and interdependence, which continuously returned in discussions 
and conflicts between growers and company about how to regulate and organise production. In 
my analysis, working relations in contract growing are based on a mixture o f (1) mutual 
understanding and notions o f solidarity, (2) instrumental treatment o f the other party, and (3) 
strategic behaviour and coercive relations (cf. Pertierra 1995). 1 9 The result, therefore, is a hybrid 
organisation wherein authority in and governance over the organisation is constandy subject to 
negotiation and interaction. I^pwever, this study o f management practices in contract farming 
indicates that the reorganisation o f production processes, as actually practiced by this 
management, often entailed essentially technical responses to cost pressures and productivity 
decline, trather than any attempt to deal with the motivation and skills o f growers and farm 
workers.yt was too much focused on a schematic response and too little on understanding the 
social processes triggered by contracting. 
The company's narrow focus on technical criteria silenced growers' stories about the 
connection between compensation levels, work procedures, and risk sharing (cf. Bougen 1994: 
139). Rather than to find accountable management procedures, the shift in organisational 
practices induced by financial pressure and technological contingencies led to (1) short-term 
crisis management, and (2) rogueing o f deviants (Mars 1982). The interlock between varying 
attitudes, modes o f information and audit, and technical choices largely determined the viability 
o f the organisational formation. Furthermore, we saw that the company had neither a single 
management style nor a single concept o f growership. Its management combined different 
forms o f control and was, equally, confronted with the problem o f co-ordination, in an 
institutional setting, between multiple divisions o f management functions and authority. 
Hood (1996) interprets this hybridity as a reaction to the limitations o f typical forms o f 
control, based either in hierarchical relationships or in individualistic relationships. This is 
central to any institutional analysis grounded in cultural theory, as Hood (2000:11) writes: 
Cultural theorists are not the first to have noticed that in matters of organization and 
management, we tend to formulate ideas about reform through a process of reaction against 
what we see as an unsatisfactory status quo, rather than beginning the process o f institutional 
design from a genuinely 'zero base'. But that observation is central to their ideas about what 
sustains organizational variety. 
Therefore, this chapter raises the question whether this variety can be sustained in the case o f 
financial and production failures. Or, whether managerial interventions are primarily guided by 
the company's inclination either to regain hierarchical control over production, or to out-source 
all activities to individual business partners. 
The more reliance is placed on one organisational recipe, the more likely it is that such a 
decision will give rise to resistance from those who have alternative preferences about how to 
organise contract growing (Hood 2000). Therefore, managerial choices confine the company's 
ability to deal with growing distrust and to resolve conflicts. Apparendy, sustainability o f the 
organisation strongly relies on the efficacy o f available forms o f governance in handling 
unexpected events. It brings into question whether management is capable to address new 
organisational challenges and to solve unexpected events in the sphere o f production. 
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This probable instability in working relations implies an increased number o f communication 
and co-ordination failures, a major threat to the entire enterprise. The analysis presented here 
underscores the importance o f understanding the organisational grounds o f distorted 
communication (cf. Roberts 1996), especially in the related areas o f computing costs and 
rewards and o f solving production problems. It raises the question what useful tools are 
available for making visible and manipulating important aspects o f complex interaction between 
the business environment and the sphere o f production in contractual production. A related 
question is how does the organisational nature o f contract growing affect commitment and 
performance o f growers in situations where the system is under pressure or in situations o f 
discomfort. Sustaining trust requires an ability to manage a variety o f contingencies and implies 
risk taking. This warrants a focus on internal organisational dynamics and communication 
processes, and their impact on organisational and technological problem solving, which is the 
central theme o f the following chapter. 
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Technological Uncertainty and Organisational 
Coherence 
INTRODUCTION 
This chapter, which represents a shift o f empirical focus from asparagus farming to the 
production o f hybrid maize seed under contract, centres on the factual uncertainty in nature-
bound production schemes. Whether contract farming is going to work is related to whether 
technology is going to work. I f a company believes that contracting is going to simplify 
problems in the technical managerial domain, it will be deceived. This chapter investigates the 
extent to which the performance o f technology determines the outcome o f contract farming. 
For this purpose, I present an anthropology o f production management in the contractual 
production o f hybrid maize seeds. Technology in hybrid maize seed production is tricky to 
handle, but the company is also challenged by an uncontrollable and changeable social context. 
Therefore, this chapter adopts the view that for solving technical problems a company also 
needs sociology. I investigate how, in the socio-technical ensemble o f contract farming, growers 
and company construct solutions to composite technical problems. The key question is how 
contingencies in production have a direct impact on the coherence o f the organisational 
framework. The combined analysis o f social and technical domains may provide answers to the 
question how the type o f institutional arrangements, explored in the previous chapters, creates 
the conditions for successful use o f technology and good performance in agricultural 
production. 
My main concern is with the social and technical requirements for the performance o f 
technological artefacts in a peripheral part o f the whole organisation. In section one, I start with 
describing the social context responding to technical inputs and new forms o f co-operation 
transferred in the context o f contractual seed production. In section two, I will tune in on a 
specific production problem, which interfered with the working relationship between growers 
and company. Management o f the technical infrastructure, i.e. an irrigation system, is the focus 
o f section three. Understanding the precise nature o f the technological problems and the 
biological recalcitrance o f the commodity, i.e. hybrid maize seed, is central to section two. This 
section also adds a secondxkmjenfc-ta-the-performance analysis, namely that a combination o f 
production teclnnologies has to function consistentiy in an institutional context wherein 
decentraliseH technical units^e^rrn_specialised tasks. Therefore, aspects o f seerTproduction 
beyond the chyc^control of the company, such as crop management in individual farms and 
water management in the irrigation system, receive_special attention. Production company 
managers and'Trau^aam." "water tenders " o f & e . irrigation association, and seed growers, 
collectively contribute to overall performance in maize seed production. However, 
disagreements ab0ut-eaTOe^t3fTaiIure,"and about required interventions, are central features o f 
the behaviour o f growers and company employees. The question then is whether this constrains 
an organisation's ability to cope with technological uncertainty or to adjust to environmental 
change. 
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The related problem o f organisational coherence and divergent interests comes to the fore in 
section three, where I discuss the functioning o f the irrigation scheme. This section relates the 
politics o f water distribution to the farmer's risk assessment of, and commitment to, the seed 
production scheme. Farmers' respond to uncertainty in seed production by exploring available 
alternatives to contract growing, which affects the irrigation association's capability to distribute 
water in accordance with crop requirements in seed production. A well co-ordinated 
management o f the irrigation system is a prerequisite for good yields in seed production under 
tropical conditions. Yet technical incoherence in seed production may break the social cohesion 
needed for co-operative water distribution. 
So, organisational coherence in the seed production system remains rather unpredictable, 
which is exemplified by the growers' decline o f the offer o f a long-term contract. They seem to 
be fearful o f not being able to leave a tricky venture with technological uncertainties. We have 
to comprehend the company's endeavour to accommodate these changeable commitments. 
Production management has to engineer production risk, i.e. to provide successful technological 
solutions, but it also has to manage fears, i.e. to maintain good social relations with seed growers 
and to compensate risks satisfactorily. 
T H E INTRODUCTION OF HYBRID MAIZE SEED PRODUCTION IN MINDANAO 
The production scheme o f hybrid maize seed, the empirical focus o f this chapter, is located in 
the same municipality as the asparagus production scheme examined in the previous chapters. 
However, the area has a unique social history, as will become clear later in this section. The 
island o f Mindanao is the 'battlefield' for, mainly foreign, seed companies, both for kunching 
their hybrid seed in the competitive seed market as well as for the actual production o f hybrid 
maize seed. Pioneer Hi-Bred Agricultural Technologies, the contracting agency, is a strong 
player in the Philippine market for maize seed. In the 1980s, the American mother company 
introduced its hybrid maize seed operations to the Philippines and Southeast Asia, anticipating 
an increasing demand for modern varieties. This expansion strategy took place in the context o f 
an increasing need for feed grains in the fast-developing livestock industry, related to changing 
consumption patterns and intensifying urbanisation (cf. Goggin 1989). The company's clients 
are Philippine commercial maize farmers able to purchase the rektively expensive proprietary 
hybrids. Its actual product, hybrid maize varieties, is produced in the fields o f contract growers. 
The contracting agency is a wholly-owned subsidiary o f the world's krgest maize seed 
company, Pioneer Hi-Bred International, founded in 1926 and headquartered in Des Moines, 
Iowa, USA. 1 In the United States, the combination o f commercial interests o f seed 
manufacturers and substantial government support in aid o f improved hybrid seed eventuated 
in the dominance o f an extensive system o f maize seed production and marketing.2 These 
developments resulted in an extensive technological system containing biological artefacts, 
organisations, science and knowledge, and legislative artefacts (cf. Hughes 1987). Breeders, bio-
technologists, kwyers and corporate managers are the main designers o f this overall 
technological system that exploits the theoretical and practical knowledge o f hybridisation. 
Much o f the expertise in this system materialises in the artefacts themselves, i.e. the parent 
seeds, inbred lines and hybrids developed by company breeders. Hence, technological and 
scientific developments in the seed industry resulted in a specialised organisation o f seed 
development and seed production (Morris 1998b, Morris et al. 1998). Transferring such a well-
developed and multi-layered system to a new environment brings about parallels and 
dissimilarities in the performance o f a seed production scheme. 
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Seed conditioning 
Marketing 1S2 
distribution 
15% 
General overhead 
15% 
Seed production 
30% 
Gross margin 15% 
Figure 6.1: Typical breakdown of the price of hybrid maize seed 
Source: Pioneer 1991 annual report (1992) 
The marketing and manufacturing o f improved maize varieties is a multi-faceted process 
mvolving several steps: product development, testing, seed production, and marketing (Ansaldo 
and Riley 1997). In general, activities in a seed company consist o f (1) varietal development for 
maize and (2) production and distribution o f hybrid maize seed. Much literature focuses on 
R & D and technology development in the hybrid seed industry. This is understandable, because 
in the hybrid seed industry strategic decisions are strongly focused on developing new hybrid 
varieties, or on genetically modified seed, directed by competition and concern for market share. 
So, seed companies control the development and marketing o f this high-value commodity, but 
the actual production o f seed takes place in farmers' fields, at the tail end o f the seed industry. 
Seed production contracts are the general rule in the 'business o f breeding' powswell et al. 
1996, Singh et al. 1995, Rice 1992). The significance o f seed production is further muminated by 
the fact that costs for the actual manufacturing of hybrid seeds comprise 3 0 % o f the price for 
the final commodity (figure 6.1). Hence, this study o f contractual seed production tackles one o f 
the major questions facing all seed companies, namely how to organise the production o f hybrid 
maize seed in changeable social and natural environments. 
Generally, three types o f seed are produced in the hybrid maize seed industry (figure 6.2, 
Agrawal et al. 1998). First, breeders procure inbred lines or breeder seed, which is the source o f 
genotypes and traits basic to the breeding programme. These lines should be uniform, and a 
combination o f lines represents the genetic constitution o f the final hybrid. Second, foundation 
seed has to be produced. Breeder seed is rarely available in sufficient quantities to serve as input 
into commercial seed production. Large quantities o f high-quality, genetically pure parent seed 
stock are required for commercial seed production. The production o f these inbred lines is 
expensive due to extremely low seed yields. Third, the foundation seed is used for the final 
production o f hybrid maize seed, which is the actual focus o f this study. 
Breeder seed Foundation seed Commercial seed 
Company breeders 
Figure 6.2: Types of seed used in the production of hybrid maize 
Company parent 
seed group 
Seed growers 
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Table 6.1: Division of tasks in contractual production of hybrid maize seed 
Seed company Seed grower Irrigation Association 
Provide parent seeds 
Determine planting schedule 
Prescribe use of inputs 
Finance purchase of inputs 
Give technical advice 
Monitor crop 
Irrigate crop 
Apply chemicals and fertilisers 
Manage labour 
Distribute water 
Maintain cropping pattern 
* For a synopsis of the growership agreement see appendix 5. 
The departure point for this chapter is the contracted seed farm, where an elementary 
condition for commercial success is produced, namely the supply o f high quality seed o f varietal 
purity at reasonable costs (Faungfupong 1984). Most o f Pioneer's hybrid seed for the Philippine 
market is produced in Southern Mindanao. The irrigation system investigated in this chapter is 
one o f the company's major production areas, covering around 300 hectares. In this area, the 
company offers around 150 farmers a one-season growing contract (approximately 3 months); 
growing contracts are open to renewal by both parties. The company is also active in other 
irrigation systems in Southern Mindanao, and in Luzon; in some cases it has a permanent 
involvement, in others the company maintains more flexible operations.3 
The contracts in seed production schemes clearly stipulate the obligations o f both parties.* In 
addition, the company tries to regulate production through prescriptions, written procedures, 
quality control, and the presence o f technicians.4 The company supplies farmers with parent 
seeds at its own cost. As a rule o f thumb, parent seed amount to 4 0 % o f total costs in seed 
production. The other inputs are advanced in material form and are deducted from the farmer's 
proceeds upon harvest. Pioneer prescribes the cultural practice in detail. Its technicians closely 
interact with growers, and they are allowed to interfere i f the farmer's operation endanger the 
yield and/or purity o f the seeds. Labour is either provided by the farmer's family or hired by the 
farmer; in the production o f maize seeds, activity which requires almost permanent attention, 
technological development has not overcome the need for large quantities o f relatively intensive 
and careful labour. The ownership o f the product remains in the hands o f the company, and 
selling to other parties is strictly prohibited. Afterwards, both parties have the freedom to decide 
to continue the contractual arrangement or not. 5 
One o f the company's major concerns is that various tasks, distributed across a social 
network (table 6.1), are executed in combination and in a certain sequence. In the sphere o f 
production, the firm provides parent seeds, prescribes the application o f inputs and imposes a 
strict cropping calendar specifying the timing o f tasks to be performed in the field. Company 
technicians interact closely with seed growers for solving commodity-related production 
problems, but growers keep full responsibility for crop management. In addition, a community-
based Irrigation Association is responsible for an efficient and reliable water distribution, which 
is particularly crucial during certain phases in the growth o f the plants. Hence, a seed production 
scheme assembles various parties, all important for the overall performance o f the scheme. 
Therefore, in order to understand the functioning o f a seed production scheme, it is essential to 
comprehend the social context wherein it is introduced, which is the purpose o f the following 
paragraphs. 
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Land use history in the village 
" Y E S T E R D A Y , we dreamt water to flow over our dusty land, this day we have i t . . . let's 
make use o f it, our wished for you, IA members and officers with the citizenry." 
(Message on the inauguration o f the irrigation system in 1986) 
Since the late 1980s, the village where the research took place, close to the seed conditioning 
plant, has become the main production area for the company. A majority o f farmers with access 
to irrigated land have, on a regular base, been involved in seed production. Seed production was 
attractive to them because it solved a major, generally recognised, problem, namely how to 
finance agricultural production (see also chapter 2). In their effort to obtain credit farmers 
entered into different relations with traders, input suppliers, agribusiness, or neighbours. Given 
difficulties over financing, Pioneer made an offer difficult to refuse. The company would 
advance all inputs, including free provision o f parent seeds, make technical assistance easily 
available, give incentives for detasseling and productivity, guarantee access to the market, and 
offer fixed purchase prices for farmers who never had assurance o f either (cf. Lopez-Pereira and 
Garcia 1997). The price o f the product is agreed upon before signing, and is, in most cases, 
slighdy higher than or equal to the price for maize grain offered by traders. Secure prices were, 
according to farmers, one o f the reasons to sign the contract. More decisive, however, was the 
provision o f a budget for agricultural production. Consequendy, seed growers depended heavily 
on external credit, technologies and expertise, all provided by the company. And, as a result o f 
the introduction o f seed production contracts, social relations o f production in the village 
changed. 
In the years before World War II , the area was a huge ranch owned by a Japanese immigrant. 
Little crop production took place in this dry and hot area. 'Cowboys' ran the ranch, and one o f 
the leading figures was D o n Carlos, who later became the actual manager o f the ranch. After the 
Japanese owner left the place, he transferred a large part o f the ranch to D o n Carlos. Since 1945, 
D o n Carlos and his family have been big landowners in the village and in the surrounding area. 
In the years after World War I I , most o f the land was divided among his relatives. His son was a 
long-standing mayor in neighbouring General Santos City, and over the years, the family became 
one o f the prominent and politically powerful settler families in the province. Until now, most 
such influential and powerful families in the village are linked to D o n Carlos' family by marriage. 
These families control substantial tracks o f land in the surroundings o f the research area. 
Don Carlos also invited many o f his relatives, living in the island BohoL to come to the ranch 
and to settle in the area. However, farming in the area proved to be grim. Often, farmers 
experienced a dry period o f nine months and crop failure was common. Plenty o f the original 
settlers returned to the island they came from, and new families arrived. Rich families, like D o n 
Carlos's, shifted their attention to other ranches, to new business ventures and to political affairs 
in the city. However, farming conditions changed dramatically with the construction o f an 
irrigation system in the 1980s. 
In the 1950s and 1960s farmers in the village had tried to bring irrigation to the area, but lack 
o f funds and political will obstructed their initiatives. In 1970, farmers sought assistance for a 
gravity irrigation system from the government through the Presidential Assistance to 
Community Development programme. Farmers organised themselves in an association and the 
government began to construct a concrete dam in the river. Unfortunately, the construction was 
not completed due to funding constraints, and this frustrated the association. Nevertheless, the 
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' The barangay is the smallest administrative unit in the Philippines. 
farmers did not give up and there was a series o f follow-ups to National Irrigation Authority 
(NIA) in the 1970s. 
Again in 1981, the barangay council* handed in a petition to NIA. The council asked for the 
construction o f a community-based irrigation scheme. This time, the barangay captain, who was 
in office from 1970 until 1991, succeeded to defend this proposal at local and regional levels, 
and to win over both the politicians and the engineers o f the irrigation authority. Moreover, a 
member o f one o f the old settler families became secretary to the mayor in the municipality and 
he was able to gain further support for the idea o f an irrigation system. After a major effort by 
the barangay council, or more specifically by the influential and land-owning families in the 
village, the idea o f the irrigation system was politically approved by NIA. But, despite political 
support, funding still remained an obstacle to the construction o f the irrigation scheme. 
Eventually in 1983, the government allocated funds to the community irrigation scheme and 
construction started. The World Bank agreed partially to fund the construction, but the 
counterpart, the Philippine government, was long in coming. For a while construction stopped 
again because the project ran out o f money. Only in 1985, the money finally arrived and the 
construction continued. Members o f the newly formed Irrigation Association (IA) contributed 
labour to the construction. The secretary to the mayor managed to attract the assistance o f 
Dole's Community Affairs department as well as a development-oriented foundation associated 
with Dole. The seed division o f the domestic beer brewery, San Miguel Corporation, located on 
the boundary o f the village, also contributed to the project These institutes helped in the 
construction o f the system and provided some o f the heavy equipment. And finally, the 
irrigation system was inaugurated in 1986. 
One unresolved problem was the limited water source available for the system. Another 
irrigation association, involved in banana plantations, already used the same river. After several 
negotiations, the barangay council entered into an agreement with this association and NIA; the 
agreement stipulated that the newly constructed scheme would only be allowed to use water in 
the wet season and during certain agreed times. The banana plantations (covering approximately 
1600 hectares) demanded access to sufficient irrigation water at night-times and in the dry 
season. As a result o f this bargain, the association was only allowed to take water in the wet 
season: from June to November. The projected service area was 300 hectares, but in practice 
only 150 to 200 hectares could actually be served. The potential water shortage continued to 
haunt the users and the management o f the irrigation system. 
In designing the scheme N I A had made the assumption that most farmers would plant rice 
in the wet season and maize in the dry season (table 6.2). In its feasibility study N I A wrote that 
the existing 260 hectares o f maize land was convertible to 300 hectares o f rice land. But in her 
report on the inauguration, NIA's Community Organiser already observed that: 
There are some IA members who have started preparing paddies but most o f the members 
planted cotton loaned from the Philippine Cotton Corporation. However, they are expected to 
plant rice after harvest, so with those who planted maize. 
When deciding about land use farmers took into account many factors, such as credit, water 
supply, commodity prices, etc.. Hence, it was unlikely that NIA's original design would be 
followed to the letter. Alternate land uses became common in the irrigation scheme, which 
made it difficult for the IA to maintain the designed regime for water management. 
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Table 6.2: Existing and projected land use in irrigation scheme (1981) 
Wet season Dry season 
Existing 
Rice 
Maize 260 ha 260 ha 
Projected 
Rice 300 ha 90 
Maize - 210 
 ha 
 ha 
Source: NIA provincial office report, 1981 
Besides water shortages, financial problems pursued the irrigation association. The IA had 
signed a turnover contract with NIA, which basically stated that the IA was obliged to amortise 
a debt o f four million pesos over a period o f 50 years. This created a difficult problem for the 
IA. The service area was limited because o f its restricted water rights. However, the annual 
amortisation was high, 120,000 pesos, and the collection o f fees, during one crop per year, 
generated hardly enough money to meet the financial needs. The amortisation put substantial 
pressure on the Irrigation Association to maintain high production levels in the system and to 
assure fee collection from its members. This situation generated a discussion on profitable crops 
and on the introduction o f two or three annual croppings, since this would ensure a steady flow 
o f fees to the association. Contractual production o f maize seeds seemed to offer some form o f 
financial security for the irrigation association. Therefore, shortly after the inauguration o f the 
irrigation scheme in 1986, an international seed company became a new and influential actor in 
the community. 
The entrance of seed companies 
In the Philippines, local development and production o f hybrid seeds took a big step forward 
during the late 1980s, and even more so after 1992. 6 Mainly foreign companies are active in the 
Philippine seed market: for example Pioneer HiBred (USA), Cargill (USA) and Pacific Seeds 
(Australia). The American seed companies began to operate world-wide from 1960 onwards and 
Southeast Asia was a potential expansion market (Ansaldo and Riley 1997). In the Philippines, 
Pioneer controls the largest share o f the market: an estimated 60-70%. The diffusion o f hybrid 
maize seed accelerated through improved yield performances o f locally developed varieties. The 
use o f hybrid maize seeds was further popularised by advertisements and demonstration farms 
and, most importandy, by government programmes designed to promote the use o f hybrid 
varieties (chapter 2). In addition, the steady expansion o f the livestock sector, especially poultry 
and hogs, contributed to an increased demand for animal feed and, consequendy, for improved 
maize varieties. After a dip in 1991, due to drought in Mindanao and the eruption o f Mount 
Pinatubo in Luzon, the volume o f hybrid seeds sold, grew steadily (figure 6.3). As a result o f 
these developments the Philippine market for hybrid maize seeds continued to expand. 7 
Alliances with national corporations acted as a springboard for the expansion o f Pioneer's 
operations in the Philippines. Pioneer's presence in the Philippines began in the 1970s, through 
its partner Philippines Hybrid Seed. 8 Initially Pioneer imported seeds from Southeast Asia and 
the US because demand was limited. In the mid-eighties, when the demand for hybrid maize 
increased, the company started to produce seeds locally in several locations.9 Pioneer contracted 
Ayala Agricultural Development Corporation (AADC) as a local agent for production and 
distribution o f hybrid maize seeds under the brand name o f Pioneer. A A D C was responsible for 
156 Making contract farming work? 
contacts with contract growers and with dealers. Until 1989, AADC contracted out the 
production o f Pioneer seed in several locations in South Cotabato. 
In 1989, after Pioneer's contract with the Ayala Company was terminated, Pioneer took its 
chance with the national beer giant San Miguel Corporation (SMC), a conglomerate also 
engaged in various aspects o f the agro-food-industry.1 0 SMC had developed a very successful 
hybrid variety for farmers in the northern island o f Luzon. SMC produced its seed in a nucleus 
estate on the border o f the research area. The company also built a modern seed processing 
plant in the same vicinity. The joint venture o f Pioneer HiBred and SMC strengthened the 
position o f both companies in the competitive seed market. In 1991 Pioneer bought out SMC 
and it became an independent producer and distributor o f hybrid maize seeds in the Philippines, 
under the name o f Pioneer HiBred Agricultural Technologies (PHAT). 
Also in 1991, SMC's lease contract on the nucleus ended and seed production under these 
conditions was discontinued. Afterwards, Pioneer decided to contract out all its seed production 
to individual farmers; it targeted the irrigated fields o f the farmers in the village close to the seed 
conditioning plant as its main production area. After the finalisation o f the irrigation scheme in 
1986, the area became attractive to seed companies. From 1989, Pioneer contracted medium 
and small farmers for seed production in the village. Farms were selected carefully by Pioneer's 
technicians. Irrigated fields were a requirement because yields in seed production easily suffer 
from drought stress. Moreover, to avoid unwanted crossbreeding the selected farms had to be 
isolated in time or space from other maize farms. Obviously, the introduction o f contractual 
seed production had an impact on decision-making and social relations in the village, as we will 
see next 
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Social conditions of contract growing 
In the 1990s, contract growing o f maize seed on irrigated land was widely supported in the 
village, and different types o f farmers joined the seed production scheme. It seemed to offer a 
good opportunity to take advantage o f the irrigation system, and the integration into Pioneer's 
technological system turned farming into a profitable undertaking. Maize seed production 
became an important, stable source o f income for large and small fanners in the village. Small 
farmers supplemented their incomes with farm work or with contractual work in canning and 
food processing industries. Larger farmers participated in business ventures and local politics. 
Initially, old settler families held back from fully supporting Pioneer's presence. A couple o f 
these families used to be engaged in a combination o f shelling and milling o f maize with buying 
and selling o f commercial maize. The first sheller opened at the beginning o f the 1970s, and 
later others followed. In addition, the owners regularly financed the maize production o f other 
farmers or tenants, and many owned tractors and trucks. The mill owners also acted as brokers 
between maize farmers and traders in the city. Their involvement in business had generated a 
large social network, and consequendy, these families were major political players in the village. 
In the 1990s, a striking feature in the village was the presence o f five idle maize mills. Shortly 
after Pioneer's entrance in 1989, only one maize mill continued its operations. The other owners 
decided not to continue with the business o f milling and to 'buy and sell'. They closed down the 
mills after the majority o f the farmers in the village had decided to shift to contract growing o f 
seed. Understandably, the owners o f the maize mills did not like losing business and assets. 
Nevertheless, many o f the larger landowners joined the scheme, even though their businesses 
were strongly affected by the entrance o f Pioneer into the village. In general, Pioneer's 
operations received political support from both local leadership and the Irrigation Association. 
However, uncertainties in production affected the commitment o f growers to the scheme. 
One afternoon, I observed two young employees o f the company delivering letters to most 
houses in the village. These letters contained the accounts o f farmers with the company. The 
following day, the two employees were still busy delivering letters to growers. Asking growers I 
learned that most o f the farmers in the village were indebted to the company; for many there 
had been a season in which the product o f their farm did not balance production costs. A 
majority o f growers had experienced some form o f crop failure, and was left with negative 
accounts with the company. In the case o f crop failure, growers with smaller advances might 
gain a little or break even, but growers who have taken large amounts o f agricultural input, such 
as fertiliser and chemicals, will have problems to settle their accounts with the company. 
The company was considerate towards growers with deficit accounts because losing both 
experienced growers and access to irrigated land would harm its operations. Hence, the 
company gave growers the opportunity to settle their debts in stages. I f a grower decided to 
continue planting seeds, 2 5 % o f the proceeds would be deducted from their standing account, 
which would be repeated in any following contract periods; if a grower decided not to plant the 
next season, debts would be cancelled. Overall, growers seemed to prefer planting maize seeds 
in succeeding seasons and pay their debts, because the financial assistance granted by the 
company was badly needed to sustain their farming enterprises.1 1 
However, increasingly growers began to consider their engagement in seed production, 
mainly due to the risky nature o f seed production and the chances o f failure. In 1996, the year 
previous to the research, many seed growers experienced extremely low yields in their farms; as 
a result, the proceeds o f their crop were insufficient to pay for the operational advances availed 
by them. The problems came as a surprise to the growers and many expressed fears o f a 
downward trend setting in. According to growers interviewed, crop failures were becoming 
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Size area % o f holdings % of land Average area per 
holding (hectare) 
< 1 30 9 0.6 
1-2 39 19 1.2 
2-3 17 30 2.4 
> 3 14 42 5.0 
Source: Irrigation Association (n=150, total area=284 ha) 
mote regular in recent years, inducing serious doubts about participation in the company's 
production scheme. At first, financial conditions in contract growing were favourable, in 
particular the terms for obtaining credit and the prices compensating for risk. O n second 
thoughts, growers raised doubts about the company's capacity to solve production problems, 
and its willingness to compensate risk via higher prices. 
After more than a decade o f seed growing, a different outiook emerged on agricultural and 
industrial development in the area. The political leadership, actively engaged in farming 
themselves, changed views due to a combination o f production problems in seed production 
and the arrival o f new ventures in the village. The barangay captain, elected in 1997, increasingly 
dissociated himself from Pioneer's operation, while during his earlier term, from 1993-95, he 
was an active supporter o f seed production. But disappointing yields in seed production 
changed his view on the potential o f seed production, especially in remote areas in the irrigation 
system with difficult access to water and less favourable soil conditions. During his first term, 
the barangay captain's opinion was that in order " to have an effective agriculture, we cannot 
invite everybody to the village". Such political support was essential for Pioneer's sustained 
access to irrigated land. In 1997, however, the barangay captain emphasised the importance o f 
creating employment in the village by attracting companies with assets to do so. In his opinion, 
which was shared with by a number o f other political leaders, Pioneer had been important for 
the village, but the company should not be allowed to have a monopoly in the village. 
Support o f the original settler-families was especially important for the sustainability o f the 
company's operations. This was because a large portion o f the irrigated land in the village was 
distributed among the sons and daughters o f those settler families originally invited to the area 
by D o n Carlos area after World War I I (table 6.3). Most o f these landowners are closely related 
to D o n Carlos. In many well-to-do families, one member managed the farms while others were 
involved in other businesses or employed as professionals in the city. Their approach to the 
contractual production o f hybrid maize seed differed from the approach taken by the small 
farmers, often former tenants and/or land reform beneficiaries. Families with enough land and 
financial means stood more independendy from the company. Mosdy, for the richer families, 
contract growing was one business asset among other ventures. What happened when the 
production scheme evolved was that farmers who were financially independent from the 
company's support began to discuss the profitability o f seed production, and explored other 
possibilities. Consequently, Pioneer lost its say over irrigated land, and, in addition, new ventures 
in the village competed for space and water with the company's operations. 
In the following sections I will explore how the changing social conditions interfered with 
co-ordination and planning in seed production. A central focus is that company and growers 
have a common interest in the same plot o f land, but the players conceive what happens in the 
field differentiy. The institutional dynamics related to these different perceptions have a strong 
impact on actual performance in seed production, as will be explained below. 
Table 6.3: Land distribution in the irrigation system by size (1996) 
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Box 6 .1: The production of hybrid maize seed (figure 6.4 and 6.5) 
Maize is a naturally cross-pollinating crop, which has certain implications for the reproduction 
process. When maize reproduces, much depends on whether pollen fertilise kernels from the same 
plant or from a different plant. In hybrid maize seed production, a company has to ensure that the 
selected pollinator fertilises the selected female plant in order to be able to guarantee the required 
make-up of the hybrid seed. In hybrid seed production, two varieties or lines are crossed to 
generate new variability and to produce desired recombinants. 
After controlled cross-fertilisation of selected inbred lines and/or hybrids, the phenomenon 
known as 'hybrid vigour" (or heterosis) is expressed. Hybrid vigour refers to the superiority of a 
hybrid variety over both parents in one or a combination of such character(s) as growth vigour, 
vitality, reproductive capacity, stress resistance, adaptability, grain yield, grain quality to increase 
yield potential and yield stability. Hybrid vigour is attributed to complementary action of favourable 
genes. Seed companies methodologically develop and produce hybrids, which exploit the 
phenomenon of hybrid vigour obtained by the crossing of two genetically dissimilar parents. 
A crucial initial step for seed companies is securing desired traits in the selection of suitable 
inbred lines; an inbred line is an individual resulting from the mating of closely related parents or 
through selfing. Lines are inbred through a process of self-pollination for seven to eight 
generations. Heterozygosity of an inbred line is lessened substantially after each generation of 
self-fertilisation (Jugenheimer 1958). Self-pollination is done many times to ensure genetic 
uniformity L6pez-Preiria and Rlipello 1994: 10-11). The inbred lines are used in further cross-
pollination. Plants resulting from inbreeding are generally characterised by low yields and greater 
susceptibility to adverse environmental conditions. However, the use of inbred lines is inevitable for 
manufacturing a hybrid variety based on the scientific principles of inheritance and selection. 
To solve the problem of low seed yields the invention of double crosses was groundbreaking. 
The reasoning of breeders early this century was that "vigour and heterozygosity could both be 
retained if two single crosses were combined in a double cross, which, while not as uniform as a 
single cross, would combine all the favourable characteristics of the single crosses, including high 
yield. Even though the process was initially more cumbersome, requiring the breeder to create and 
maintain four, rather than two inbreds and to produce two, rather than one cross, the huge 
increase in seed production was well worth the effort for commercial breeders" (Fitzgerald 1990: 
57). In a similar fashion, in the production of three-way crosses, a well-adapted single cross is 
used to minimise the negative impact from a-biotic stress. 
Following these steps several types of hybrid maize varieties can be produced: 
Single cross: a cross between two genotypes, usually two inbred lines. 
Double cross: a cross between first generation single crosses, of four separate inbred lines. 
Three-way cross: a cross between an inbred line (pollinator) and a vigorous hybrid single cross. 
In the research area the dominant method was the production of three-way crosses. However, 
recently the company tried to shift to the production of single crosses. 
(Glossary terms adapted from: IRRI (1991) Glossary, Genetic evaluation and utilization training course, 
International Rice Research Institute, Los Baftos, Philippines) 
Figure 6.4: Male and female parts Figure 6.5: The procedure to produce 
of the maize plant a three way hybrid maize variety 
SINGLE CROSSED INBRED C 
PLANT (AxB) 
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Table 6.4: Causes of failure in hybrid maize seed production mentioned by contract farmers 
Cause of failure Mentioned by growers 
(percentage of total) 
Water stress 38% 
Variety 29% 
Incompleted detasseling 29% 
Worm attack (stem borer) 15% 
Disease 13% 
Pollen cannot fly due to weather conditions 10% 
No isolation/Uncontrolled pollination- 6% 
Failed germination 6% 
Source: survey among 52 farmers 
ASYNCHRONY AND CO-ORDINATION IN MAIZE SEED PRODUCTION 
"May puso, pero walang damdam (there is heart, but no feelings)" 
A seed grower's description of crop failure 
In this section I will discuss the occurrence o f low yields in seed production related to 
barrenness o f the ear. Firstly, I will describe the range o f causes for this type of crop failure 
brought forward during interactions and encounters between growers and company personnel. 
These interactions strongly reflect the distribution o f tasks, institutionalised in contract growing 
o f hybrid maize seed. Secondly, I will relate this organisational perspective to an instance o f 
technical incoherence in seed production. This calls for an elaborate understanding o f the 
precise technical foundations o f failure. Therefore I examine the biological and technological 
features o f a common form o f crop failure in seed production, namely barrenness o f the ear, 
through a reading o f technical literature. Drawing on this instance enables us to examine the 
efficacy o f problem-solving activities in seed production. These paragraphs will illustrate how 
discordant interactions, and the actual distribution o f tasks, may well be at odds with a genuine 
endeavour to understand the (often interrelated) causes o f failure and, correspondingly, to find a 
co-ordinated and effective way to solve certain production problems. 
Where to put the blame? Looking for causes offailure 
In seed production, various factors contribute to the problem o f low seed yields (box 6.1 gives a 
brief description o f the technical features o f hybrid maize seed production). Most relevant for 
this study are genetic qualities o f the parent seeds, drought stress and crop management. Hence, 
performance in seed production is embedded in the complex interrelationship o f plants with the 
agro-ecological environment and the technical infrastructure o f the irrigation system. Likewise, 
growers mentioned various causes o f failure, o f which insufficient water supply and qualities o f 
the parent seed are the most prominent ones (table 6.4). 
The most commonly recognised form o f failure is called bagsang or barrenness, which means 
that the ear is not fully filled with kernels (see box 6.2 for types o f failure present in the area). 
This phenomenon is usually associated with the plant's capacity to respond to drought stress. 
The factors leading to barrenness are part o f a complex interaction between the genotype of the 
parent seeds and stress factors in the environment. Below, I will describe two incidences in the 
production scheme which exemplify the different and often contradictory searches for solutions 
to barrenness. 
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Box 6.2: Four types of crop failure present in the hybrid maize seed production scheme 
In a survey, growers mentioned four basic types of crop failure: 
1) Most of them had experienced the problem of unfilled or partly filled ears, locally known as 
bagsang. This form of failure originates from the moment of flowering. Drought stress and high 
temperatures might delay the timing of silk setting of the female seed plant, discourage pollen 
formation by the usually weak pollinator, or lead to failing pollination. As a result, fewer kilos of 
seed are produced; 
2) No or little germination of the planted parent seeds, locally called hilang, is related to weather 
conditions during the time of planting. The timing of planting is a difficult matter, which has to be 
co-ordinated with neighbouring farmers. Company technicians take into account both the 
probability of rainfall and the requirement of isolation from adjacent fields. 
3) Pests and diseases cause less damage, but in the case of a continuous planting of the same 
variety diseases are more difficult to control. The practice in seed production is to spray 
preventatively, especially during the period of detasseling when the plant is sensitive to diseases 
and infestation; 
4) A last major type of failure is error in detasseling. Detasseling is the physical removal of tassels 
from the female parent before the tassels shed pollen or before silk emerges on the ear shoots of 
the female plant. This is crucial to secure the desired cross-pollination of male and female parents, 
and to avoid any form of self-pollination. Detasseling leaves little margin for error and involves a 
high level of risk. It is a labour-intensive job, for a period of 1-2 weeks. 
Incidence 1: Variety or water supply? 
Variety L had been produced five seasons; the variety was one o f the company's most popular 
hybrids. It was released in 1993 after 7-8 years o f research with inbred lines from Brazil. In 
commercial maize production, the variety had a wide adaptation and it was also planted in 
Indonesia. In 1997, the variety was, in terms o f volume, one o f the best selling offerings o f the 
company world-wide. The production o f this variety had been a profitable enterprise for both 
growers and company. Interviewed growers said to be happy to produce this hybrid because 
yields were usually good. Some experienced yields well above the quota given by the company 
and, hence, they received a bonus payment from the company. Another grower also praised the 
yield qualities o f the seed parents, but later mentioned that sometimes pollination was slow, 
which led to few kernels on the female plant. When in 1996 the yields were disappointing, 
growers began to complain. This event launched a discussion on what really caused crop failure. 
In this particular cropping season, growers believed they had sufficient reason to question the 
qualities o f the parent seeds given to them by the company. They arrived at this point o f view 
because they identified the male plants as being different from the male plants they grew before. 
Most growers who experienced failure shared the observation that, this specific season, the 
colour o f the tassel was different. In discussions with company employees, growers stated that 
defective male parent seeds caused the failure. According to them, even i f the plant looked in 
good condition from the outside, this did not guarantee good productivity. It was their opinion 
that productivity largely depended on the capacity o f the male plants to produce pollen. But the 
head o f research o f the company said that he was convinced that the parent seeds provided by 
the company were able to perform well, and that the company was not at fault. 
Obviously, the company representative disagreed with the blame laid on the type o f male 
seeds provided by the company. The head o f research stated that it was unjust to criticise the 
company for the widely spread incidence o f failure. In contrast, he identified water shortages as 
the main cause o f failure: 
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If there had been enough water to supplement the needs o f the plants, growers might not have 
experienced crop failure. 
During this specific cropping season, the seed production area experienced extremely hot 
weather. Consequendy, the company argued, lack o f sufficient water supply definitely caused 
failure. T o support his argument, in talking to disappointed growers, he referred to the farm o f 
one grower where actually yields were high. This farm was located close to the collateral o f the 
irrigation system, and experienced no problems with water supply. With this argument the 
company shifted the responsibility for failure to the Irrigation Association, which is in charge o f 
distribution and availability o f irrigation water. All growers are a member o f the association and, 
therefore, are collectively responsible for management o f the irrigation system. 
Technicians also pointed out that, in their views, poor water management was the root cause 
o f crop failure. Passing a field used for the production o f variety L, I met one o f the technicians 
removing off-types in a field, while his colleague was busy irrigating the field; the grower was 
absent. According to the technician: 
The male plants are O K as long as you look after watering the plant so that the plants will not 
suffer from drought stress. 
At other occasions, company technicians complained about the irrigation practices o f growers. 
Regularly I observed technicians busy irrigating the fields o f growers. Farm monitoring was 
supposed to be done by the grower himself, but company technicians also kept a watchful eye 
on growth and performance o f the plants. One o f them said: 
I f the grower does not irrigate his plant, we have to take over; or else there will be failure. The 
maize plants suffer from his neglect. We have to do this because otherwise the grower's 
accounts with the company will increase. Yet, the grower does not pay for the work we do. 
Technicians also observed that growers neither took enough time to irrigate their crops, nor did 
they pay labourers enough to do the job properly. One grower confirmed the technicians' 
observation, saying he preferred to manage the irrigation himself, because labourers only took 
an interest in wages and in finishing the job as quickly as possible, and they did not water the 
fields efficiendy. Rapid water-flow inhibits an efficient uptake o f water by the soil. In one field, a 
technician noticed drowned young plants at the lower end o f the field. Farmers at the 
downstream end o f the irrigation system, who did not have easy access to water, were especially 
inclined to irrigate as quickly as possible because they were not sure o f water supply. Moreover, 
due to hasty irrigation water flows fast through furrows, which causes erosion o f the topsoil. 
So based on these observations by company technicians the suggestion is that the irrigation 
practices o f growers impede maximum usage o f the h'mited water available. Also the water 
tender, himself a grower, complained about neglect by growers: 
I noticed that most of the farmers wait for the plant to be dehydrated before requesting 
irrigation water. Farmers indicate their need for water too late, or they delay it to avoid paying 
for the water. They prefer to wait for the rain. I f farmers always postpone their request for 
water, I have a problem with organising water distribution. 
During many meetings, the water tender tried to convince farmers o f the need for timely 
requests. He also emphasised the importance o f maintenance o f canals and farm ditches in the 
system; garbage and weeds obstructed the flow o f water and, consequendy, hampered the 
efficient distribution o f water. 
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* See appendix 6 for a more thorough discussion on technological directions in maize seed development 
Clearly, efficiency o f irrigation, and o f water distribution, contributes to the occurrence o f 
failure. But, growers did not accept this as the single cause o f barrenness. Therefore in the 
dispute between company and growers the argument reached no conclusion. In the following 
example growers explicidy challenged the quality o f parent seed provided by the company. 
Incidence 2: genetic quality and prices 
The production o f variety P, which was a single cross (see box 6.1 and figure 6.5 for a 
description o f a single cross), turned into a highly disputed event. The company desired to 
launch single cross hybrids in the Philippine market because o f better performance and higher 
yields in commercial maize. However production problems and low seed yields are usually the 
case in the production o f a single cross.* In the case o f variety P, seed yields o f most seed 
growers fell to extremely low levels. In addition, growers observed the different appearance and 
quality o f male and female plants compared to the previous years. 
Growers in one part o f the irrigation scheme decided to write a letter to the company's 
production manager to file their complaint. They demanded a higher price because the low 
yields would never compensate for the intensive use o f agricultural inputs. In a letter to the 
company management, growers made the following observations: 
It was not made clear to us that variety P is a parent seed variety 
[This was a misunderstanding by the growers. Variety P was a single cross not parent seed, but 
the procedure for seed production, namely crossing two inbred lines, and the related production 
problems are the same, SV]; 
After detasseling we have not seen any fruit on the female plants; 
The expenditures per hectare increased due to defective seeds given to us. 
(Source: letter to company management, 1996, own translation) 
In the same letter the complaining growers made the following demands: 
We are asking for payment for our crop based on the profit we made during the previous season; 
If you will not grant our demands we will be forced to plant another variety of maize the coming 
season, and in particular not o f Pioneer; 
We have observed our standing crop and realise that we are probably deficit, and, therefore, we 
demand additional payment for our products. 
(Source: letter to company management, 1996, own translation) 
In interviews about this event many growers gave me the impression considering leaving the 
scheme if the company would not compensate their losses with higher prices. So production 
management was faced with the problem o f losing seed growers, but decisions about prices 
were taken at a higher executive level in the company. The original price for variety P offered by 
the company was two times higher as the price for other varieties. The reason for this decision 
is that, in the production o f a single cross, anticipated yield levels are considerably lower, 
compared to the usual three way crosses - 1 to 1.5 T / h a for a single cross hybrid and 3 to3.5 
T / h a for three way crosses. Still the higher price did not satisfy growers and they bargained a 
price increase. In these negotiations, the company agreed to an increase o f one peso per kilo. 
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A higher price, however, did not resolve the argument about what caused crop failure in seed 
production, and growers' doubts about performance in seed production persisted. The company 
insisted that its sole responsibility was to supply seed producers with good parent seeds, while 
growers were expected to bear the responsibility o f crop management and irrigation. The 
genetic composition o f parent seeds is entirely controlled by the company, and growers mosdy 
have to take the qualities o f the seeds for granted. Company personnel treated the qualities o f 
the parent seeds, especially those o f the inbred lines, as a trade secret and growers had little 
chance to discuss the specific characteristics. Most growers, on the other hand, insisted that the 
company should brief them about the specific qualities of parent seeds planted. They believed 
that knowledge o f the varieties would allow them to adjust, and provide specific remedies in 
case o f problems. Growers believed that the company's refusal to discuss the qualities o f parent 
seeds meant avoiding any share o f the burden o f failure. 
The two incidences described above illustrate that the division o f labour in the production 
scheme contributes to difficulties in decision-making about interventions and solutions, when 
complex production problems occur. The discussion was not solely about representations o f 
material reality, but equally about sharing risks and responsibilities (cf. Hacking 1990). Naturally, 
in the case o f conflict, company and growers argued from their respective positions in the 
technological system. Stricdy, the grower is fully responsible for seed production, but regardless 
o f the management ability o f the seed grower, seed yields have limits, related to the genetic 
characteristics o f parent seeds (cf. Heisey et al. 1998). Hence it is important to realise that three 
individual factors in combination, namely crop management, irrigation management and the 
quality o f parent seed, go to make up the technological reality in seed production. It is in 
growers' fields where the genetic properties o f the company's seed material, the outcome o f 
extensive breeding-programmes, and the growers' management o f the 'plant-environment-
interaction', meet. Although technically interconnected, institutionally these elements are 
separated. 
In the institutional setting o f contract farming both parties have an interest in simplifying 
material reality. The simplification o f the causes o f failure is a tool in the argument about who is 
right about the type o f intervention, and about who is to blame for failure. The question 'who to 
blame?' results in defensive styles o f interaction. In cases o f failure, juxtapositions and 
contradictions importandy shape the mode o f co-operation between company and growers 
though reality was comprehensive and interdependent. These juxtapositions defined the field o f 
operation for both growers and company. In that sense, the seed production scheme can be 
compared to "a network o f black boxes that depend on one another both for their proper 
functioning as individuals and for the proper functioning o f the whole" (Callon 1987: 95). 
However, the incidents examined here reveal the lack o f an organisational platform for decision-
making about, and co-ordinated intervention in, the combined use o f tools regulating the 
complex nature o f a plant's response to stressful environments. In the following I will further 
elaborate on this disparity in contract growing by examining the technical explanations for a 
specific form o f failure in seed production, namely barrenness o f the ear. 
Convergence and divergence in genotype-environment interaction 
The previous section shows that, on the whole, uncertainty about the causes o f failure shapes 
disputes between growers and company. Here, I will further examine the nature o f technological 
uncertainty in seed production. What follows is a technical expose indicating how the technical 
literature discusses the impact o f drought stress during the flowering period in normal maize 
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Figure 6.6: Average maximum and minimum temperatures in the seed production area per year 
Source: PAGASA and Pioneer Hibrcd Agricultural Technologies 
Figure 6.7: Average yearly rainfall in the seed production area 
Source: PAGASA and Pioneer Hibrcd Agricultural Technologies 
production. Most o f these insights are relevant for our comprehension o f the problem o f 
barrenness o f the ear, central to the present discussion on the socio-technical problematic o f 
maize seed production. 
Firsdy, the biological process o f producing hybrid maize seed is especially sensitive to 
environmental stress. Seed plants, for example, have difficulty to compete with weeds and to 
tolerate factors like moisture stress and high temperatures. As the maize plant is particularly 
susceptible to water shortage during flowering the consequences o f stress during this period can 
be severe in seed production. Therefore, in addition to management o f the environment, 
genotypic responses to stress have to be addressed (Edmeades et al. 1997). 
Secondly, the climate prevalent in the production area contributes to stressful environmental 
conditions, especially contingent drought resulting from irregular precipitation patterns and 
irregular water distribution causing moisture deficit. Agro-climatic circumstances in the 
production area can lead to barrenness o f the ear: temperatures may rise to very high levels (>35 
°C) and rainfall can be rather limited and irregular (average figures are presented in figure 6.6 
and 6.7). The incidence o f high temperatures and low rainfall is disastrous during the crucial 
periods for seed production: flowering and pollination. Logrofio and Lothrop (1997) mention a 
high number o f incidences o f production losses due to drought in Philippine maize agriculture. 
Unfortunately, I was not able to measure variance in maximum temperature and rainfall at 
specific time intervals in seed production, especially during pollination, which is most relevant 
for understanding the impact on yield or barrenness in seed production. In general, however, 
managing the genotype-environment interaction under adverse environmental conditions is a 
major hurdle in seed production. 
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The exact relationship between low yields, due to barrenness, and environmental variance, 
leading to penalties for drought stress and high temperatures, is a concern o f researchers in both 
the private and public sector. In a recent publication, Pioneer Hi-Bred indicates that among one 
o f its top research goals is to understand more about how plants perform in limited water 
conditions (Pioneer Hi-Bred 1999). The company says that even in less extreme situations, 
limitation o f water can result in dramatic reductions in yield. Its research indicates that: 
|T]he most dramatic relationship between water and yield reduction is seen in the period of 
two weeks either side o f flowering [. .] Drought stress during the vegetative state, immediately 
prior to or after tassel and silk emergence, can result in barren plants, smaller ears and limited 
kernel development 
[. .] Kernel abortion accelerates under continued lack of moisture f. .] Inadequate water slows 
down silk elongation resulting in delay or failure o f silks to emerge from the ear shoot. Silks 
may desiccate rapidly and be non-receptive to pollen. (Pioneer Hi-Bred 1999: c4) 
The problem o f barrenness is also widely discussed among maize breeders at international 
public research institutes, in particular C I M M Y T . 1 2 In this literature, variation in grain yield per 
plant is more strongly associated with changes in grain numbers per plant than with variation in 
weight per grain, especially when the plant is exposed to stress around silking (flowering) 
(Bolanos and Edmeades 1996, Edmeades et al 1997). The problem o f few kernels is related to 
asynchrony between male and female flowering; between pollen shedding and silking (Hall et al 
1981). Events affecting grain set during the flowering period are critical to determining yield, 
especially when the plant is growing in an adverse environment: 
When maize is exposed to stress at flowering there is an increase in the interval between pollen 
shedding and silk emergence. This has commonly been referred to as silk delay, loss o f 
synchrony, protandrous flowering, or more recentiy as the anthesis-silking interval. (Edmeades 
et al. 2000: 44) . 
The typical impact on yield o f an increased anthesis-silking interval, i.e. a widening gap between 
the moment o f pollen shedding and silk emergence, is presented in figure 6.8. Variation in 
timing is related to delayed silking, accelerated pollen shedding, or shortened duration o f pollen 
shedding.1 3 Moisture deficit at flowering most likely induces a variation in timing o f flowering 
and, because the exposure o f silks to pollen is curtailed, result in a reduction in yield. Breeders 
use the interval between pollen shedding and silking as a tool to predict crop performance. 
Furthermore, stress can lead to abortion o f fertilised spikelets one or two days after fertilisation 
because the plants lack energy during and after flowering (Edmeades et al 1993) . 1 4 
So failed pollination and aborted development o f fertilised kernels are generally recognised as 
an explanation for low grain yields in maize production. 1 5 One additional factor in maize seed 
production is that female and male plants are grown in separate but adjacent rows (box 6.1). 
The temporal and spatial separation o f tassels and flowers on the maize plant complicates 
pollination in maize seed production (figure 6.5). This separation leads to difficulty in realising 
the right nick; one has to synchronise pollen shed with silk emergence and pollen reception in 
order to insure a proper pollination (Graig 1977). Therefore, the possibility o f silk emergence 
after pollen shedding -the wrong nick- cannot be excluded in seed production. In short, lack o f 
synchronisation and unsuccessful pollination also form major constraints in seed production. 
Successful performance in hybrid maize seed production is grounded in a composite 
interaction between germplasm and environmental management. Asynchrony between male and 
female flowering in seed production is the result o f both the qualities o f parent seeds and o f the 
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Box 6.3: Technological uncertainty in hybrid maize seed production 
In the case of hybrid maize seed production, timing and efficacy of pollination, a key determinant of 
yield, derives from a combination of the following factors: 
• Delayed silk emergence or kernel abortion at the female plant due to drought stress and/or 
high temperatures; 
• Performance of the actual pollinator, usually an inbred line, which is dictated by its ability to 
defend itself against environmental and biological stresses (Pioneer 1997). A reduced root 
density is a common trait within inbred lines and requires an efficient and frequent water-
supply (Pioneer 1997); 
• Moisture and temperature conditions during the crucial flowering period. Weather conditions 
are beyond the influence of anyone, but a local irrigation association (IA) regulated water-
distribution. In the IA seed producers, commercial grain growers, and other farmers are 
gathered; 
• Scheduling of the planting date of male and female parents, by the company, so that tassels 
and silks emerge simultaneously. Generally, the male is planted in advance of the female, 
because an inbred line can be expected to grow slower, but a slight delay of pollen shedding 
or silk emergence can disrupt synchronisation. 
management and regulation o f environmental stress (box 6.3). In general one can say that during 
the stage o f flowering both male and female parent seeds are particulady susceptible to a-biotic 
stress, in particular to high temperatures or drought stress (table 6.5 provides an indication o f 
water requirements in maize seed production). Besides the regulation o f natural conditions in 
the seed fields, the choice o f parent lines to produce a hybrid importantly determines the final 
impact o f stressful environmental conditions on yields (Bradshaw 1956, F A O 1982). 
Despite the need for a consistent and co-ordinated answer to technically complex problems 
in seed production, evident in the case o f low yields due to lacking synchronisation in flowering, 
the organisational structure o f seed production separates the two basic elements o f crop 
performance: genetic qualities and control over environmental stress. Discordant interaction 
between growers and company shows how different representations o f a complex material 
reality surfaced in the conflict between both parties. Obviously, in the case o f a conflict over 
failure, the answers put forward by company representatives and growers link up neatiy to their 
respective positions in the system. Equally, a disputed understanding o f material reality in seed 
production obstructs finding composite answers attuned to the interaction o f genotype and 
environment. 
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Days After Development Stage2 Water requirement 
Planting1 From To in % of total amount2 
0-22 Planting 7-8"' leaf 11-12 
22-40 7-8'h leaf Tasseling 19-20 
40-50 Tasseling Silking 22-23 
Silking E n d o f 28-30 
pollination 
50-105 Pollination Harvesting 15-20 
1 Estimation based on planting schedule of the company 
2 Source: FAO 1982: 75 
Incorporating uncertainty 
The previous technical exposé on the problem o f barrenness in maize production iUuminates 
the mutual dependence o f parent seeds, crop management and water distribution, but problem-
solving activities in contractual seed production are importandy shaped by the institutional 
context rather than by the technological complexity o f seed production. Providing a technical 
answer to probable crop failure is a shared concern for company, growers and irrigation 
association, but the use o f contracts, however, constrains the capacity to deal with uncertain 
elements in seed production. Despite mutual dependency, there was no single person or entity 
with an overview o f all the performed tasks affecting the genotype-environment interaction. 
Virtually all seed companies contract farmers to multiply hybrid maize seeds (Dowswell et al. 
1996, Singh et al. 1995). Contract growers generally play such a key-role because seed 
production is "very management intensive, requiring meticulous planting, impeccable timing, a 
high level o f technical expertise, strict quality control, and considerable attention to detail" 
(Agrawal et al. 1998: 122). 1 6 The production process in hybrid maize seed requires constant 
supervision and more careful crop management than commercial maize: 
the biological process of reproduction in maize is very sensitive to environmental influences 
and can be controlled effectively only through intensive, hands-on management (..) This is the 
reason most seeds companies continue to work with contract growers; only these growers can 
be counted on to provide the attention needed to produce a successful seed crop. (Morris 
1998a: 360) 
Thus, the crop management capacity o f growers is a major reason to contract out seed 
production, however the mode o f reproduction in maize itself implies complex production 
agronomy, according to Dowswell and others: 
High levels of crop management skills are required to plant and grow separate rows o f male 
and female plants in a way that will synchronize pollen shed from the male plants with silking 
and pollen reception in the female plant rows. Unless the cross-pollination phase is carefully 
managed and timed, the desired hybrid combination will not be obtained powswell et al. 
1996 :150) . 
However, due to the contracting out o f seed production, certain external factors were not 
under control o f the system managers; especially, individual management o f the agro-ecological 
system in the farm and management o f the technological (irrigation) infrastructure. It is in these 
areas that the company reached the organisational and managerial limitation o f contract 
growing. 
Table 6.5: Water requirement at several stages in maize seed production 
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This cropping calendar is presented in appendix 7. 
The company tried to obviate a-biotic stress by prescribing a strict cropping calendar.* The 
tasks specified in this written procedure anticipated particular types o f failure, such as diseases, 
pest attack and water shortages. The company's assumption was that a certain sequence o f 
actions, set down in a prescribed cropping calendar, would lead to successful performance o f its 
parent material. The written procedure and the contractual arrangement were particular about 
who had to perform what task. However, the interaction o f parent plants with the environment 
was much too complex and unpredictable to fit into a standardised cropping calendar. 
Correspondingly, the manager o f the seed production scheme referred to the company's 
limited capacity to direct the genotype-environment interaction in seed fields: 
T o avoid failure we need knowledge about the environment and relate that to our knowledge 
about the characteristics o f the plant. In the past we did not pay much attention to the 
question whether plants were 'producible' or not. Now this matter receives more attention in 
our selection process. 
Some materials perform well in one season, but when timing is different in the next season, 
grain filling can be poor. Therefore we need information about the impact of the environment, 
especially after we have developed the parent lines and we move to commercialisation with 
larger plantings. Agriculture is about details, about adaptation to particular conditions. In our 
situation, the conditions are not predictable, especially because we spread planting over 12 
months, so we face changing conditions. 
The company's influence is largely restricted to the planting material it supplies to growers. A 
good deal o f the company's technological competence is enclosed in its artefacts, but the 
genotype-environment interaction in seed production in tropical conditions is excluded from its 
technological system. Finding solutions for particular production problems in seed production 
receives little attention from the expert system in the hybrid maize industry. The problem-
solving activities and the use o f various tools were habitually directed towards commercial 
introduction o f competitive hybrid varieties. 
The corporate hierarchy (figure 6.9), designed to market profitable hybrid varieties, does not 
allow much flexibility in the design o f its products. T o correct errors in the subsystem o f seed 
production, the company falls back on its internal hierarchy, which basically prescribes 
improved genotypes to solve problems. Nevertheless, the 'design puzzle' o f seed production, i.e. 
the fact that the precise economics o f seed production depends on the biology o f the seed, due 
to probable low seed yields, continually emerges and importandy shapes the company's 
interaction with its external environment (cf. Metcalfe and Boden 1992). 
Only recendy, company research in the Philippines started paying attention to the question 
whether hybrid varieties are producible or not. Local production management admitted that 
they should have had more interaction with the company's research department and parent seed 
department Eventually, however, the commercial value o f a new hybrid is o f overriding 
importance in the technological system o f hybrid maize. The performance o f the company's 
genetic material in a peripheral part o f the technological system, i.e. seed production, plays a 
marginal role in strategic choices made by the company's researchers and managers. Uncertainty 
and risk in seed production, resulting from the complex genotype-environment interaction, is 
not an organic part o f the whole system (cf. MacKenzie 1990). It is in this context that, at field 
level, growers and company technicians are engaged in managing various tools, in particular 
irrigation and parent seeds, to deal with uncertainty. 
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Figure 6.9: Divisions of labour in the technological system of hybrid maize seed 
(Note: the grey areas are most relevant for this study) 
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T H E POLITICS OF WATER DISTRIBUTION 
"Farming is all politics, that is the problem in this village" 
Board member of Irrigation Association 
The perspective developed in the previous section suggests that agricultural practices in the 
production o f hybrid maize seeds can be best understood as a composite sub-system, 
comprising an irrigation system, inbred lines and crosses as these mediate and regulate a-biotic 
and biotic stresses from the natural environment. The discussion on failure shows that the 
intrinsic qualities o f parent seed, in combination with weather conditions and the actual water 
supply, are o f critical importance for performance in seed production. Natural conditions in the 
seed production area, characterised by high temperatures and low and uneven rainfall, 
necessitate a reliable water supply. Hence, well-managed irrigation is a technical requirement for 
acceptable seed yields. But the required tools are embedded in an institutional setting wherein 
convergence and divergence constitute the power to handle crop failure. The way in which 
growers and company negotiate the nature o f risk in seed production negatively affects the 
efficacy o f solving concrete production problems. Eventually, the stalemate between company 
and growers may even interfere with a crucial requirement for seed production under tropical 
conditions, namely a well co-ordinated and effective irrigation management, an issue to be 
examined in the next section. The irrigation association was the responsible agency for resolving 
technical and organisational matters with regard to water supply to seed fields. 
Therefore, the association's capacity to control and regulate water distribution in the 
irrigation scheme is a key social requirement for seed production. Yet, divergent social relations 
in the area entangled this task o f the irrigation association and frequency undermined close co-
ordination and consistency in water management. The seed production area o f around 300 
hectares contained a large number o f farmers -around 150- a majority owning farms averaging 
almost 2 hectares. For the present analysis, location in the irrigation scheme is more important 
than size o f the farm. Remarkably, many o f the smaller farms were located in the area close to 
main canals (phase 1 and 2, table 6.6 and figure 6.10), experiencing less problems in water 
supply. Some o f the larger growers owned farms in areas at the tail end o f the irrigation scheme 
(phase 3 and 4) , where water scarcity was more apparent. 
Obviously, individual decisions with regards to land use and crop choice seriously interfered 
with the management capabilities o f the association and water distribution was contested. In 
spite o f this, seed production requires some form o f social cohesion and consensus around 
irrigation. Therefore, this section centres on how the politics o f water distribution are entangled 
with performance in seed production. I will particularly discuss the Irrigation Association's (LA) 
involvement in maintaining a cropping pattern which allowed for the expansion o f the seed 
production area, but which, simultaneously, made water distribution more susceptible to errors 
and co-ordination problems. 
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Figure 6.10: The irrigation scheme and land distribution by phase (source: Irrigation Association) 
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Table 6.6: Land distribution in the irrigation system by phase (1996) 
(n=150, total area=284 ha) 
Phase % of holdings % o f land Average area per 
holding (hectare) 
1 37 32 1.7 
2 39 33 1.6 
3 19 22 2.1 
4 5 13 5.3 
Source: Irrigation Association 
Ruling water distribution 
In the 1990s, one o f the association's main tasks was to effectively co-ordinate water 
distribution with the demands o f seed production. The complexity o f this task increased after 
the association decided to introduce a cropping pattern, in order to serve a larger number o f 
farmers. Since the majority o f farmers in the area were contracted to produce maize seeds, this 
change in management o f water allocation was closely co-ordinated with the planting and 
harvesting schedules o f the company. Originally, the scheme was designed for a relatively small 
area: 150 hectares. Due to the rotation o f water over three to four phases, it became possible to 
expand the service area up to 300 hectares and to make more effective use o f the available 
volume. However, introducing a cropping pattern requires well co-ordinated water distribution. 
The actual implementation o f the cropping pattern took quite some doing. The water tender 
played a key role in the discussions leading to the final approval. He was a seed grower himself 
and, after being appointed water tender in an early stage o f the irrigation system, he became 
responsible for water distribution in the scheme. The water tender claimed to have invented the 
cropping pattern in 1991. His main concern was " to avoid conflicts among the farmers, 
especially during the time in which farms need water to supplement the water uptake o f their 
plants". At first, the board o f the irrigation association ignored the water tender's suggestion. 
Also the board believed that the new management system would delay the normal planting 
pattern and, hence, disrupt the farm businesses o f the members. The water tender, however, 
continued to discuss his ideas with members o f the association and, eventually, a former 
technician o f one o f the seed companies supported him. This technician was familiar with the 
concept o f a cropping pattern and he saw the potential benefits. The technician promised to 
support the idea if the water tender would endorse his candidacy for president o f the irrigation 
association. The political deal worked out successfully and the technician was elected. But 
shortly after the elections the technician got himself involved in a serious conflict and had to 
leave the village. Fortunately for the water tender, the newly elected president also picked up the 
idea and gradually the members o f the association accepted the introduction o f a cropping 
pattern. In 1994 the cropping pattern was actually implemented. 
After the cropping pattern had become operational, members became progressively 
convinced o f its benefits. Initially, farmers in phase 1, close to the main canal (figure 6.10), were 
hesitant to approve the new management system and the expansion o f the scheme, because it 
threatened their access to water. Eventually, however, improved water management was also in 
their interest. Farmers recalled times before the introduction o f the cropping pattern when 
quarrels about access to water were numerous. The improved co-ordination in the scheme 
largely abolished these fights and water was distributed more equally. Moreover, the new system 
was also advantageous to the irrigation association because the extended area meant additional 
income and, consequendy, the association was better able to pay its amortisation to the National 
Irrigation Authority. 
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In the years immediately after the introduction o f the cropping pattern, the seed production 
scheme flourished. After the politics were settled and water management was changed, the 
company took the opportunity to expand its seed production area. During this time the market 
for hybrid maize seeds was expanding. The company supported the change in water 
management and closely co-ordinated planting and harvesting schedules activities with the 
irrigation association. 
However, the association's capability to control the system changed over time. For 
implementing the scheme, the board basically relied on farmers' willingness to continue growing 
seeds for Pioneer. For the cropping pattern to work, members had to agree with the fact that 
water distribution must, to a large extent, be arranged according to the time schedule o f seed 
production. Formally, members were obliged to adhere to the cropping pattern agreed upon by 
the board and the association's general assembly (see articles 8 and 9 in table 6.7). However, the 
board was not prepared to force people to grow seeds, as long as they co-ordinated farming 
activities with the water tender. 
Table 6.7: Synopsis of the membership agreement form of the Irrigators Association 
Article Specification 
2 To attend meeting, conferences and seminars prescribed by the Board of Directors and/or the 
government agency engaged in food production; 
3 To pay the required irrigation fees and other dues promptly; 
4 To willingly contribute personal services in the maintenance of all terminal irrigation facilities (...); 
5 To participate fully in any system of procurement and supply production inputs and marketing of 
products instituted by the association; 
7 To adopt and apply modem and proven farm management techniques and proper irrigation water 
management and maximization of rainfall; 
8 To comply with the agreed decisions of duly constituted authorities and the Board of Directors 
regarding the type, nature of crops to be planted in a closely knitted cropping pattern for the 
service areas of the association; 
9 To closely coordinate and/or assist in other related group activities on irrigation water 
management in order to promote increased crop production, for the promotion of the social well 
being of the Association members; 
10 To willingly assume responsibilities abide and comply with the terms and conditions imposed 
and/or promulgated by NIA, on the nature/mechanisms of irrigation water management for 
communal system within the jurisdiction of the Association. 
It was the difficult task o f the board to create a consensus around water management In the 
following section I will discuss two iUuminating circumstances in the history o f the association, 
which illustrate how changing social relations affected its operation. Firsdy, the entrance o f 
competitors in the seed industry put pressure on the relationship between association, farmers 
and company. Secondly, shifting decisions about land use and crop choice fragmented the 
required unity for the delicate management o f the cropping pattern. Both events were prompted 
by repeated occurrence o f crop failure in the company's seed production operations. 
Accordingly, the social conditions for water management in seed production became tied up 
with a variety o f evaluations o f performance and compensation in contract growing. 
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Co-ordinating water management and land use 
In 1995 and 1996, the entrance o f a competing seed company seriously disturbed the cropping 
pattern. The company, Cargill, tried to get access to irrigated land in the village. Expansion o f its 
production capacity was urgent because the Philippine government had contracted Cargill and 
its local partner to provide hybrid maize seeds for its Grain Production Enhancement 
Programme (GPEP) . Hence, Cargill tried to contract growers for its seed operations. 1 7 The 
consequence was that parallel seed production activities ran into conflict and endangered the 
symbiotic relationship between cropping pattern and seed production for Pioneer. 
Cargill's main grower was a member o f an influential family controlling a large area on the 
edge o f phase 2 and phase 3 (figure 6.10). He had been a grower for Cargill in the 1980s. The 
grower, who also managed land o f his brothers and sisters, was the treasurer o f the irrigation 
association and he was a leading figure in local politics. In addition to seed production, this 
family was engaged in the production o f commercial maize and silage. They also financed silage 
on other farms, and owned three trucks for the transportation and trading o f maize, silage and 
other products. Thus, seed production was only one aspect o f the family enterprise. 
Every cropping season, the grower and his relatives decided whether to proceed with 
contractual seed production for Pioneer or not. This time he embarked on seed production for 
the competing company because he was not satisfied with the income derived from the contract 
with Pioneer. In his opinion, seed production is a good venture provided there is enough water 
and the weather co-operates. But, he emphasised, "it also depends on the parent seeds given by 
the company. Sometimes these are not suited to our land and we can expect failure". Pioneer 
offered the family a medium-term contract o f three years, but they declined the offer: "We do 
not want to be tied to the company; we want to be able to opt for an alternative". 
So, this grower continuously assessed performance and the level o f compensation in seed 
production. 1 8 A bad harvest made him reconsider his commitment to Pioneer: 
The company does not share the risk o f failure, whereas the grower has to pay back all the 
operational expenses advanced by the company. It is better for a farmer to have the freedom 
to choose whether he wants to plant seeds or other crops. 
Apparendy, he did not feel obliged to sustain his relationship with one company and, in 1995, 
he decided to take his chances with Cargill. 
Although Cargill contracted only around 20 hectares, its operation undermined cohesion in 
the seed production area. Harvesting and planting schedules o f both companies ran parallel and 
hindered the implementation o f the cropping pattern. Furthermore, the simultaneous planting 
schedules resulted in isolation problems. Cargill planted on land adjacent to land planted by 
Pioneer, which risked unwanted cross-pollination. Furthermore, the entrance o f the competing 
company deprived the irrigation association o f its ability to control and co-ordinate land and 
water use in its service area. 
When Cargill entered, it did not consult the irrigation association; neither did the association 
give any formal approval o f the company's usage o f irrigation. The company ignored the 
consequences o f disturbing the cropping pattern. Members o f the board o f the irrigation 
association, however, observed that troublesome co-ordination o f water supply, due to the 
presence o f a second company, negatively affected fee collection in the scheme. This 
observation gave the irrigation association and the National Irrigation Authority (NLA) a legal 
base to intervene, according to NIA's community organiser. 
A main reason for the intervention was the decline in fee collection, which, in return, 
endangered amortisation payments to NIA. According to the association president, fee-
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collection was reduced by 5 0 % , contrasting high levels the year before. Seed production had 
hitherto guaranteed good fee collection because in its financial transactions with seed growers, 
Pioneer controlled fee collection. Both the irrigation association and NLA were eager to 
maintain this arrangement. Together they filed a case against Cargill and all parties reached a 
'gendemen's agreement', which defined this village as a Pioneer area and a nearby village as 
Cargill area. The association took the position that the scheme could facilitate only one 
company, in combination, i f so desired, with commercial maize or silage production. After the 
conflict with Cargill's seed growers, Pioneer realised that they had to win back growers. 
Convincing farmers to continue seed production proved to be difficult for company 
management. The production manager said, "we know many people in the village; nevertheless 
we constandy have to find our way in the area." Meetings o f the irrigation association were an 
important platform for evaluations and critique o f seed production. Personnel and officials o f 
the IA were continuously swayed between attuning the scheme to the needs o f seed production 
and to the demands o f dissatisfied growers looking for alternative land-uses. During a board 
meeting, the president o f the IA said that the biggest problem was the lack o f co-ordination 
between the irrigation association, the company, and farmers who had other plans than planting 
seed. Another board member observed that, recendy, many farmers were growing commercial 
maize or silage. The IA-board took up the position that the irrigation system was meant for all 
farmers, and that it should not be solely instrumental for seed production. 
In the context o f these developments and as a result o f the unreliable water supply, farmers 
located more remotely from the main canal became hesitant to grow maize seed. The cropping 
pattern had been especially designed to serve these farms in phase 3 and 4 (figure 6.10), where 
most farms cover substantial areas (table 6.6). Landowners in this part o f the irrigation scheme 
were willing to produce seed but their unfavourable locations made successful production 
doubtful. It was an important expansion area for the company, but a well functioning cropping 
pattern was indispensable for seed growing in these fields. So, conflicting water demands o f 
non-seed growers and seed growers, and o f growers at different locations in the scheme, made 
water management a difficult task. 
A second major hindrance to the cropping pattern was the practice o f mortgaging land, 
locally called prenda. In this practice the owner o f the land borrows money, but the financial 
arrangement still allows the owner to continue tilling his land. The contract between the two 
parties specifies some system for sharing the proceeds o f the farm. Logically, the provider o f the 
money wants to recover the investments as quickly as possible. Silage and commercial maize are 
convenient and cheap ways to realise this objective. Due to this practice o f mortgaging land, 
farmlands regularly passed through hands. Hence, many o f the small independent land holdings 
in the irrigation scheme showed little consistency in land use. The majority o f small farms were 
located in phase 1 and 2 where water supply was most reliable. The increasing inconsistency o f 
land use in these farms not only hampered an efficient implementation o f the cropping pattern, 
but also created isolation problems for seed production. 
Securing isolation, a basic requirement in hybrid maize seed production to avoid unwanted 
cross-pollination, surfaced as a problem after alternative crop choices began to play a role in 
farmers' considerations. Conflicting decisions about land use made it difficult for technicians to 
determine planting dates. In addition, both seed growers and commercial corn farmers preferred 
to plant just before or after the rain to ensure right germination. Moisture content o f the soil 
and isolation were the main consideration in the decision-making process o f technicians: 
improper timing might lead to failed germination or to problems during the period o f flowering. 
T o avoid any possible form o f crop failure, technicians had to become active participants in the 
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social arena in the village, but they had to play the game o f diplomacy. The company's policy 
was not to have a strong presence in the community. Nevertheless, technicians felt the 
corporate pressure to secure proper programming in the irrigation system (box 6.4). 
In this respect, much depended also on the irrigation association, which operated 
autonomously from the company. The association president and the water tender were key 
figures in the politics o f the irrigation association. In 1996, the year when Cargill tried to enter 
the area, Pioneer decided to hire the association president as a technician. He was assigned to 
other areas, but he was also allowed to join IA-meetings during working hours. The president, a 
trained agronomist, had applied before and he was occasionally hired as supervisor o f rogueing 
teams or for other temporary jobs. His employment stirred up bad blood because in a situation 
o f existing tension some people disapproved o f the two hats he was wearing. O n the other 
hand, the association president acted as a broker for the community. The community organiser 
o f the National Irrigation Authority emphasised his role in maintaining social cohesion in the 
scheme. 1 9 
Despite brokerage and much diplomatic effort, individual decisions by a significant number 
o f farmers threatened the social cohesion needed for the implementation o f the cropping 
pattern and for proper water and land management. Therefore, the company was confronted 
with its limited control over land use in the area. For the seed company, programming and co-
ordination were essential to its operations. In this production scheme, the cropping pattern was 
instrumental in achieving this, but changing social conditions increasingly impeded coherence 
and co-ordination. 2 0 Failure affected the commitment o f farmers to an irrigation system 
dominated by seed production, especially after alternative crops, such as silage, had been 
introduced. Silage became especially attractive after a livestock ranch entered the village, with 
owners providing contracts and finance to farmers to produce silage for cattle. Also because o f 
a short growing season silage became a competitive crop in the village. So aside from hindrances 
in water management, the intensified competition from alternate crops interfered with 
production management in the company's seed production operations. 
Changing commitments and risk assessments 
The task o f this chapter is not so much to determine individual choices, or the rationale behind 
risk assessments by growers, but to establish the effect o f the externalisation o f production risks 
in seed production on the stability o f the institution o f contract growing. The actions o f 
company technicians and successful performance by the company artefacts importandy shaped 
the working relationships with seed growers, and with the irrigation association. We have seen, 
however, that technological inconsistencies influence risk assessment by seed growers, and, 
consequendy, growers were often on the verge o f leaving the scheme. The growers' perceptions, 
and management o f production risks in seed production, is strongly embedded in the 
institutional and technical reality o f contract growing. Risks intrinsic to hybrid maize seed 
production politicised contract farming (cf. Tansey and O'Riordan 1999). 
The previous analysis o f the functioning o f irrigation management reveals variation in 
farmers' commitments to the seed production scheme. Evidently, individual decisions about 
continuation or discontinuation of the contract with Pioneer affect the capacity o f the irrigation 
association to properly manage water distribution and to co-ordinate with seed production 
planning. This sheds a new light on the company's remote control o f an essential condition for 
seed production, namely irrigation. By farming out the actual production o f seed, the company 
gave up direct control over farm management and over land. The externalisation o f seed 
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production implies a dynamic relationship between the institutional form o f production 
activities and the composite character o f tools and technologies used in farming. Seed growers 
decided about day-to-day activities in the farm and the contractual agreement left them freedom 
to decide whether to continue after one cropping season or not. However, success or failure in 
growers' fields not only depends on individual crop management but is also related to water 
management and selection o f parent seeds. Not capturing all production factors has problematic 
consequences for sustaining contractual relations and, equally, frustrates the required sequential 
implementation o f tasks. Therefore, building and maintaining good social relations is important 
for competent performance in seed production (Hutchins 1995). 
Thus, as a result o f the organisational set-up, the company was forced to involve itself in 
some form o f social engineering. The company's operations relied fully on sustainable access to 
irrigated land o f (experienced) farmers. And, consequendy, the company had carefully to 
manage its social relations with growers. The company had no community relations department; 
for solving social disagreements and reaching political settlements the company entirely relied 
on its technicians, acting as the company's front-line workers. 2 1 So, besides supervising the 
technicalities o f seed production, technicians had to mediate in the social relations around water 
management and land use (box 6.4). Although researchers and breeders tried to find answers to 
production problems, growers and technicians still had to cope with uncertain outcomes from a 
combination o f technical knowledge and available tools. Company technicians also acted as 
intermediaries between individual farmers. The company's technicians were assigned to 
persuade farmers to grow seeds, but this mainly was a matter o f corporate diplomacy; the 
company exercised little coercion. 
T o be able to convince farmers to join a seed production scheme, the company was forced to 
guarantee that the system was going to yield. This meant that one o f the major problems seed 
companies have to solve is to produce hybrid seeds economically, for which much depends on 
the mediating artefact. 2 2 Production managers o f different maize seed companies mentioned 
that they were only able to convince seed growers to continue growing seeds if the company's 
technology performed well and i f risks were compensated satisfactorily. Where there were 
recurrent production problems, growers were increasingly at odds with the company. 
Seed growers continuously decide which risk is acceptable and which is not (cf. Douglas 
1987), when does risk intrinsic to seed production jeopardise their entire farm business? Table 
6.8 summarises the returns and risks present in this production scheme. For seed growers, an 
attractive aspect o f contract growing is the reduction o f the risk o f price fluctuation; the 
company guarantees the price o f maize seed and offers favourable credit terms. Low yield is the 
most significant risk seed growers have to reckon with. Production risk in seed production 
comes from the unpredictable nature o f the weather, and uncertainty about the performance o f 
crops (Hardaker et al. 1997). Whether hybrid seeds are truly producible and profitable is a major 
concern for both growers and company. Contract growers reconsidered their participation in 
seed production, especially when alternative crops became available. It seems that highly 
variable yield, and arrangements for the sharing o f risk, are as important as those for sharing o f 
profit (cf. Bernal 1997). 
The compensation for production risk, in terms o f prices and favourable terms for credit 
cannot be seen apart from the technological hardcore in seed production. The biological and 
technical elements o f seed production strongly influence the social relation between company 
and grower. Despite the often stable and higher prices for the product, and despite the 
favourable credit arrangements in contract growing, the likelihood o f failure made seed 
producers hesitant to enter into a longstanding growing arrangement. Farmers' perspectives on 
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Table 6.8: Risks and returns in contractual production of hybrid maize seeds 
COMPANY 
Return Risk 
G R O W E R 
Return Risk 
Production Externalisation of 
production risk 
No stable supply or 
poor quality. Loss of 
parent seeds 
Free seed, new 
technologies and 
technical assistance 
Low yields under 
difficult weather 
conditions ; 
dependence on 
collective irrigation 
Finance Binding growers No repayment of 
advances 
Favourable terms for 
credit 
High production 
costs, little return 
Land Access to irrigated 
land 
No control over land 
use 
Profitable land use; 
reassessment every 
season 
Depletion of soil due 
to intensification of 
production 
Institutional Ability to direct 
production process 
Written procedures 
fail to solve 
production problems 
Technical assistance 
and advise based on 
company R&D 
Strict prescriptions 
which do not match 
conditions in field 
Business Flexibility in planted 
area; no investment 
in land ownership 
No access to suitable 
land; inability to 
supply market 
Reduced price risk in 
unpredictable 
commodity markets; 
assured prices 
Little bargaining 
power; fixed prices 
Low returns in risky 
production 
Note: Adapted from Hardaker et al. (1997) 
Moreover, individual risk assessments by farmers were affected by the division o f labour, 
which determined who had control over what type o f biological and technological aspects o f the 
production process. Pioneer tended to seek solutions for production problems in a hierarchical 
way. The company aimed for a segmented treatment o f production problems by improving 
plant material and by standardising crop management procedures. In this way, production 
management hoped to ensure technological consistency and to be able to delegate technical 
work to farmers (cf. Star 1985). The combination o f strategic and technological choices made by 
the maize seed company generated new worries for Seed growers, further challenging the social 
relations in this production scheme. 
The company's engineering perspective on production risks sought to claim a certain level o f 
certainty, but it was not able to erase sources o f conflict in the production scheme. Thus we see 
that the management o f production risk is also a social and organisational problem. This study 
shows that growers' interpretations o f the material effects o f new technologies are easily 
diffused into broader interpretative fields drawing on more contextual political and social 
experiences (Leach and Fairhead 2000). How risk is perceived, and how trust in a production 
scheme can be secured, is largely a matter o f social selection. Whether the company can 
risk and profitability changed constandy, especially because the province was experiencing a 
rapid modernisation o f agriculture that generated alternatives for existing land use and crops. 
None o f the surveyed seed growers was inclined to agree on a medium-term arrangement with 
the company. The company, however, preferred to sustain its relationship with growers because 
seed producers had developed technical skills over time, and because suitable irrigated areas 
were scarce in Mindanao. Yet failure interrupted the relationship between growers and 
company. This probability arose from weak inbred lines, and difficult environmental and 
biological conditions, altering the commitment o f seed producers. 
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accommodate these social variables remains to be seen. Contract growers may opt for 
alternative crops, depending on the direction and speed of agrarian modernisation, which leaves 
the seed company with the difficulty to find suitable land and experienced farmers to produce 
seeds. The company senses danger, but reinterprets social conflict related to production risk in a 
technical context, and, correspondingly, seeks solutions in improved technologies. However, 
there are in effect social as well as technical requirements for producing hybrid maize seed 
economically. This analysis o f contract farming highlights that while much depends on a 
capacity to use technical knowledge for practical purposes (cf. Campbell 1985), interpretation, 
negotiation, and compromise can be avoided by none o f the parties. 
Box 6.4: Technology brokers in seed production 
Technicians, as the company's frontline workers, change agents (Rogers 1962), or 'street level 
bureaucrats' (cf. Lipsky 1980), play a key role in mediating between day-to-day practice in growers' 
fields and the company strategic decisions about technology and agricultural practice. In the 
production of hybrid maize seed, aside from technical supervision, technicians mediate between 
growers and neighbouring farmers to avoid isolation problems. Isolation of seed fields is critical in 
seed production in order to avoid unwanted cross-pollination to guarantee pure and genetically 
uniform seed. One young, newly appointed technician, was faced with isolation problems in phase 
1. He passed by a number of farmers to invite them to a meeting of the Irrigation Association 
where planting would be co-ordinated, but his requests fell on deaf ears. Apparently, farmers did 
not see the need to co-ordinate their decisions with seed production. Usually, farmers in this area, 
tilling small farms with good access to irrigation, took a unanimous stand. Recently, however, land 
in phase 1 had frequently changed hands, for example after mortgaging or leasing by the owner, 
and this hindered programming in seed production. On another occasion, one of the old 
technicians, who was very sick and unfit to work, was brought to the area because no headway 
had been made in the negotiations about land use. This technician had played an important role in 
the community, especially during the starting phase of the irrigation scheme, and farmers 
respected him. But neither could resolve the deadlock around isolation of fields. 
Similar situations occurred in other phases of the irrigation system. Often, farmers in phase 3 
and 4 of the irrigation scheme were not united. Unreliable access to water made farmers decide to 
plant commercial corn, silage or sorghum. Longstanding conflicts between neighbours were one 
outcome of differentiated land use practices. One farmer, for example, was determined to plant 
maize seed, but for several seasons his neighbour was not willing to clarify his plans. This 
neighbour had an off-farm job, and his main concern was to make his land profitable with little 
effort. In this situation, the technician was hesitant to agree on planting seed because isolation was 
not assured, and due to the delay, planting was no longer opportune. 
Befriending growers was a time-consuming aspect of the work of technicians. One of the 
technicians described his job as follows: "My job is mainly interacting with people. I think it is 
important that technicians have good relations with growers. You must be able to discuss their 
problems and to get their trust and confidence. Therefore you have to befriend them. You must 
know how to laugh with them, how to join drinking sessions." 
Due to a reduction in personnel, one technician had to monitor 100 hectares. Earlier, the 
company downsized its personnel by 50 percent and the company (re)hired technicians through 
labour contracting agencies. Remarkably, cost efficiency was searched for at the lowest level of 
the enterprise. The flexible deployment of technicians and their limited presence in the area had 
repercussions on communication and co-ordination, as explained by one of the technicians: There 
are several styles for technicians. Recently, it has become more business-like. We used to be with 
more technicians, now we have no more time to drink with growers." 
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CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have examined whether the efforts o f various actors in a contract growing 
system were able to eliminate sources o f technological uncertainty and incoherence in the 
production o f hybrid maize seed. Interest centred on whether the production system could 
handle both the constraining effects o f the external environment and the intrinsic qualities o f 
maize lines. The reconstruction o f events in seed production has disclosed the co-existence o f 
both managerial and technological mechanisms contributing to production problems in hybrid 
maize seed (summarised in figure 6.11). The research has highlighted both the problematic 
characters o f the artefacts designed by the company as well as o f the social organisation o f seed 
production. The adopted sociologically and organisationally informed approach is 
complementary to agronomic and technical arguments about efficiency, yield and profitability in 
a specific production system. 
MATERIAL 
Mechanism 
Event 
Mechanism 
SOCIAL 
PLANT ENVIRONMENT 
1 
Low tolerance 
to stress 
Learning about 
uncertainty in seed 
production 
Î 
1 
Drought stress 
High temperatures 
FAILURE 
/ 
\ 
Distribution of tasks and 
compensation of risk 
Î 
TECHNOLOGICAL REGIME 
IN SEED INDUSTRY 
CONTRACT GROWING 
ARRANGEMENT 
Figure 6.11: Material and social mechanisms related to failure in seed production 
Firsdy, the material emphasises the relevance o f understanding how technical exploitation is 
organised. Accordingly, this chapter has investigated whether the particular social organisation 
and distribution o f tasks in contract farming constrains the endeavour o f both company 
employees and growers to combine their efforts in solving complex and integrated technological 
problems (cf. Hutchins 1995). Behaviour o f various actors, organised in separated task groups, 
contributed or undermined a co-ordinated effort, providing an answer to certain production 
problems in seed production. 
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Secondly, however, the technology used in the contractual production o f hybrid maize seed 
has a substantive and technical core, which is also part o f the problem (cf. Tranvik et al. 1999). 
The material examined in this chapter indicates that, at the level of production, technologies 
often are ambivalent; they do or they do not work. Consequendy, technologies contain potential 
conflict, especially because crop failure, expressed in the actual performance in terms o f kilos 
per hectare, remains a probable risk in seed production. 
Tuning in on a specific production problem in hybrid maize seed production provides a 
window onto organisational relations in contract growing because it is in these periods o f crisis 
that actors mobilise resources, articulate positions and experiment with new organisational and 
technical designs. This became especially clear by looking at two unintended implications o f 
yield variability on the sustainability o f contract growing arrangements. Firstly, the probability o f 
crop failure affected farmers' incomes and, accordingly, limited the incentive to enrol in 
contractual seed production. Secondly, divergent calculations and evaluations o f performance 
increasingly hindered a close co-ordination in water management, which increased the 
probability o f crop failure. 
Analysis in this chapter exemplifies vulnerabilities and inconsistencies in a peripheral part o f 
I the technological system o f hybrid maize, especially when transferred to a new social and natural 
: environment Likewise, it directs attention to the consequences o f these vulnerabilities for the 
'.; relationship between growers and company and for the related functioning and management o f 
^% corrimunity-based irrigation system. I observed several occasions when growers and company 
laid the blame for poor performance at each other's doors. Such events reveal how problems are 
defined and what agents think should be done to avoid failure. The viability o f contract growing 
importantly depends on the outcome o f such interactions; putting the blame on the other party 
likely impedes a co-ordinated effort to solve composite production problems. The description 
o f behaviour in relation to crop failure suggests that decision-making about the type o f required 
intervention, precludes understanding the underlying causes o f failure. The argument between 
company and growers primarily reflects diverse opinions about the required interventions and 
responsibilities. Juxtapositions predominated the exchanges, relating to respective positions and, 
hence, to responsibilities in the production scheme. This raises the question what type o f 
institutional devices might help manage or deal with uncertainties inherent to agriculture. 
The analysis o f production management shows that the multiplicity, and distribution, o f tasks 
and tools encumbers the capacity to solve production problems intrinsic to seed production. It 
shows that technical intelligence is linked to the functioning o f separate technological units. 
Despite the composite character o f technical uncertainty, the treatment o f crop failure in seed 
production is segmented. Hence, the composite nature o f production problems, central to this 
chapter, contrasts with the distribution o f tasks in bounded technological units. The lack o f a 
^cjtordinating agent hinders finding solutions to such composite problems, especially because 
j h € production system consists o f differendy behaving groups with distinct and specialised tasks 
and with different perceptions on how technology should function or be arranged (Hughes 
1987). Nevertheless, technological performance in this high-risk branch o f agriculture involves 
both effective co-operation and co-ordination between farmers and industry, to ensure high 
^qual i ty seed and regular deliveries, and among farmers, to manage land use and water 
distribution in accordance with production requirements. However, the analysis illustrates that 
organising, acquiring and using knowledge and technological skills always remains imperfect and 
uncertain (Metcalfe and Boden 1992). 
Management o f uncertainty in this setting is primarily "heuristic, often ad-hoc, and tailored to 
cope with the material and political exigencies o f the given local situation" (Star 1985: 413). 
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These types o f management practices are especially relevant to segmented organisations. The 
company delegates important technical tasks, i.e. crop management and irrigation management, 
and therefore the decision making process centred on uncertainties and production risks has to 
go through many channels. As a result, the actual behaviour o f the different parties is an, at 
times fatally muddled, compromise between potentially contending courses o f action. 
Consequently, the production scheme is better envisaged as a political coalition, rather than a 
unitary rational body (MacKenzie 1992). 
Inquiry further shows that the practice o f seed production in this particular setting was 
hampered by changing social relations around water use and land use, which were, in return, 
affected by the technological uncertainties inherent to maize seed production. Local social 
relations frame the capability o f the irrigation association to manage water distribution so that it 
meets the needs o f the seed production process. After several instances o f crop failure, 
discontented but influential growers threatened to undermine this capability o f the association. 
In particular financially independent growers began to think differendy about the acceptability 
o f risks in seed production. The variant responses o f farmers to the biological and physical 
qualities o f maize seed-production altered the technical and social conditions o f seed 
production. The particular social embeddedness o f the contractual production o f hybrid maize 
seed creates conditions for social disagreement about the solution to a specific type o f crop 
failure. Thus, as an unintended consequence o f the technical nature o f hybrid seed production, 
the politics o f seed production may impair the sustainability o f contractual arrangements in seed 
production. 
In the production scheme, technological performance depends on the intrinsic qualities of. 
artefacts, the natural conditions and the technical infrastructure. A review o f technical literature 
reveals that crop failure is rooted in an in-built susceptibility to drought stress in maize plants./ 
Therefore, proper management o f a-biotic conditions, in particular moisture content o f the soil! 
is especially crucial during flowering periods. This shows that, most likely, a combination o f 
different 'diseases' leads to the same problem, namely a reduced number o f kernels in the ear o f 
a maize plant. So, seed yields depend on the effective combination o f various technical tools. 
Such a composite technological regime often stirs up unexpected problems, and management o f 
these diverse technical conditions is a demanding task. Analysis also leads to the question 
whether the problem-solving components o f the technological system are o f any assistance to 
production management in a new and changeable environment. 
Hybrid maize seed production is part o f an established technological system, in which 
routines keep the machine going. Usually, the research departments, where new hybrids are 
developed, set research agendas in the seed industry. These agendas are closely related to the 
third sphere in a seed company, namely the marketing and financial departments co-ordinating 
and managing the flow o f information coming from the profitable and competitive seed market. 
In the hierarchy o f seed companies, seed product development is a distinct sphere from seed 
production. These institutionalised routines and practices both limit and direct the problem 
solving patterns in seed production. The argument in this chapter has been that, in a different 
context, it becomes especially clear that the system is bounded by the limits o f control exercised 
by artefactual and human operators (Hughes 1987). Notably, the company has no full control 
over all layers o f nature; its transformative powers mainly lie in plant genetics. But we have seen 
that the technological hardcore o f the seed industry, i.e. scientific and engineering knowledge 
about plant breeding, is not designed to solve problems in seed production; as a matter o f fact, 
it creates uncertainties at the level o f production (MacKenzie 1990). 
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The company stands on only one leg in this bounded technological regime. The other leg 
belongs in farmers' fields, and interacts with other spheres relevant for performance. Examining 
existing feedback loops in the production system exposes discontinuities between a whole range 
o f economic and technical units (cf. Constanza et al. 1993). Feedback and information exchange 
between the design unit and the production unit o f the company basically takes place by way o f 
the transfer o f artefacts, i.e. parent seed (figure 6.12). Hence, it is interesting to examine how the 
nature o f these artefacts is incorporated or resisted in seed production schemes at the local level. 
Therefore our discussion has focused on the rektignship bep^^n^technological constraints in, 
an^ ' tn^sl iQS 'of^nisat ion oi, the production system. Adaptationto changing environmental 
and Social con*dltions.ljas,.t0 takeplace^a£ die lowest level o f the functional system: the level o f 
seetrpfoHuction. Here we see that as a resmFBrconWacting out seed production, social and 
technical navigation is largely decentralised to local production units. The consequence o f this 
feature o f the organisational design o f the hybrid maize seed production system is that one 
group o f actors, e.g. growers, have cognitive alignments that differed from those o f the 
managers and researchers in the company (cf. Hutchins 1995). These differences arose from the 
interaction o f technological artefacts with natural conditions and from the social distribution o f 
tasks and responsibilities in the technological system. 2 3 Companies and farmers both think 
socially, but they also think differendy. Contracting schemes cannot escape the consequences o f 
institutional diversity. If, as Douglas (1987) insists, the institution thinks, then in the case o f 
contract farming, it is inherendy o f two minds. 
Figure 6.12: Boundaries in the technological system in the hybrid maize industry 
Adapted from Metcalfe and Boden (1992) and Kaplinsky (1985) 
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Managing Society and Technology in Contract 
Farming 
Contract farming is a widespread and important tool for organising agricultural production in 
line with corporate strategies and market demands. Global agribusiness companies have 
increasingly taken part in shaping agricultural production, as has been seen in Southern 
Mindanao over the past 50 years. In Mindanao, contract growing has become a showcase for 
progress and economic viability in agricultural policy and, simultaneously, it has developed into 
a new and important centre o f local power and modernisation. In addition, contract-growing 
schemes are responsive to existing patterns o f land distribution, inducing new ways to construct 
access to land and to develop production forms (chapter 2). Correspondingly, the focus o f this 
study has been on how local contract farming communities fit the institutional structures and 
the strategic oudook o f international firms. 
My investigation o f the functioning o f contract farming has been guided by two questions. 
Firsdy, I examined how firms use contract farming as a managerial tool to tune productive 
activities and farm work to requirements o f marketing and competition. In chapter 3, analysis o f 
the organisational consequences of contract farming has been related to reward and finance 
mechanisms. Chapter 4 examined different styles o f farm and labour management under 
contracting. In chapter 5, Neo-Durkheimian Cultural Theory was proposed as a useful tool for 
understanding unintended organisational tensions and frictions in contract farming, emerging 
from the interaction with society, and the hybrid nature o f its organisational culture.1 The hybrid 
nature o f contract farming allows for a diversity o f cultural actors to deal with technological 
uncertainties, changing market conditions, and alterations in organisation. Moreover, the 
investigation has brought society within the boundaries o f a contract farming scheme, co-
shaping management o f farm work and technology on dissimilar landholdings. 
Secondly, I wanted to understand how company and growers combine to select and exploit 
technological opportunities in a specific institutional context o f decentralised production units. 
The analysis o f asparagus farming in chapters 3 and 4 showed that the company is not 
omnipresent, and that, for solving production problems, modes o f interaction and collaboration 
in a hierarchical and managerial company importandy mould technological capabilities. This 
point was further explored in chapter 6, where I shifted my empirical focus to the contractual 
production o f hybrid maize seed, where the substance o f the technology is leading development 
o f the scheme. In this case, decentralised decision-making in a multidivisional firm impeded 
finding solutions to composite technological problems, and, consequendy, threatened 
organisational cohesion. 
This concluding chapter expands on the managerial perspective developed in the previous 
chapters. Central to the approach developed in this book is the importance o f seeing clearly the 
formal institutional relations linking different elements in a chain, and to explain hybrid 
organisational culture by looking at how local social relations and local cultures are included in 
the layered organisation o f contract farming. It is improbable that contract farming emerges 
smoothly from converging interests and a balanced and rationale mixture o f managerial co-
ordination and control, as is often suggested by company managers or policy-makers. On the 
contrary, how to fit a secure supply o f primary products and financial rationality into a socially 
7 
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durable organisational framework has been an ever present concern for agribusiness and food 
companies. The continuous drawing o f boundaries challenges straightforward managerial 
perspectives. Obviously, contract fanning does not work as a theory or an ideal type (potential 
or exploitative); rather people make the organisation and the technology work. 
The need for some form o f internal control in contract farming is self-evident. Often, control 
is still equated with hierarchical overseers, but in contract farming schemes companies opt for 
control at a distance. Therefore, my analysis focuses on the precise dynamics o f administrative 
and organisational control in contract farming (Hood 1996). Typical contracts are incomplete; 
not all events can be anticipated and rationalised in a formal contract and the contract must 
function in a changing organisational environment (Rousseau 1995). Company management has 
to tackle a variation o f problems for which the use o f only one management tool, namely 
stipulations in the contract, proves to be insufficient. The extent to which farmers faimfully 
follow the farming procedures stipulated in contracts or specified by company technicians is 
highly variable (Grossman 1998). This suggests that contract farming can best be understood as 
an evolving institutional arrangement, which engineers both the political and organisational 
features o f integration. Thus, contract farming can better be understood as a rolling set o f 
adjustments, and not as a search for a perfect accounting or technological system that excludes 
any uncertainty. However, growers and managers, as well as economists and critics, prefer to see 
contract farming as an ideal bounded project 
CONTRACT FARMING AND THE DEVELOPMENT QUESTION 
Over the years, policy makers primarily considered contractual arrangements between farmers 
and agribusiness as a favourable condition for improving productivity o f small-scale farms. In 
this view, contract farming is supposed to act as a vehicle for complementary growth between 
agricultural production and agro-industrial processing. Besides, contract growing has been 
strongly advocated as a way to address stagnation in small-scale agriculture and concentration o f 
land, which produce low employment rates and high poverty rates in Mindanao.2 Moreover, the 
views o f these agrarian reform advocates formed the basis o f several development plans for 
South Cotabato, which were later extended to Mindanao-wide development plans. 
Economies o f scale are the major point o f reference in development frameworks promoting 
contract farming. Taking into account the growing population and the scarcity o f unused land, it 
is thought that the social contribution o f the plantation sector might become negative in the 
near future. Contract farming is supposed to bring a solution to the irrational allocation o f land 
and labour resources, because it allows for labour intensive cultivation. Hayami et al. 1990, 
Adriano 1 9 8 8 ) 3 These ideas have been applied all-over the Philippines, but contract fanning, as 
an outcome o f such a development framework, features most prominendy in Mindanao. 
The concept o f contract farming seems to suggest a formalised relation between two 
independent parties or business entities, to which the basic assumptions o f economic calculation 
and a bargained equilibrium apply. These values o f economic modernisation underpinned the 
contract farming schemes implemented in Southern Mindanao. Economists and policy makers, 
emphasising the potential benefits o f contract farming, understand the formalised relationship 
merely in terms o f incomes, at times resulting in an over-optimistic account o f contract fanning. 
The analysis o f contract farming's advocates does not move beyond identifying the institutional 
arrangements and limitations o f the production systems that constrain the advance o f new 
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technology (cf. Oasa and Koppel 1987). 4 In contrast, this study does not see contract farming 
solely as a rationale outcome o f endogenous factors in agricultural development. 
Critical perspectives put great emphasis on potentially exploitative relationships in contract 
farming, and conclude that entering into a contractual relationship will not bring substantial 
long-term benefits to farmers. Critical analyses o f contract farming emphasise the potentially 
exploitative and unbalanced character o f incorporation. Critics mention that contract farming 
creates monopsony power ties between buyers and farmers (Buch-Hansen and Marcussen 1982, 
Clapp 1988). Debt bondage, as a form o f subsumption, is brought forward as key determinant 
o f the relationship between growers and company. In the Philippines, much critique o f contract 
growing arrangements centres on this financial dependence and the danger o f indebtedness (see 
for example I B O N 1998b). 5 This critique also reveals the dilemma between possible short-term 
incomes heavily outweighed by the long-term risks o f debt and labour bondage (Porter and 
Phillips-Howard 1994, Mackintosh 1989). 6 In this sense, contract farming is presented as a zero-
sum game, which is derived from analysing the various reasons companies have to switch to 
contract farming as an alternative to large-scale plantations.7 
In her application o f new institutional economics, Barbara Grosh (1994) does not readily 
accept such a critical perspective. 8 She explores situations where contract farming becomes an 
improved form o f governance dealing with various types o f market failures, such as imperfect 
information, limited investments, low prices, etc. By analysing contract farming as a hybrid form 
in an agro-industrial organisation, standing between spot markets and vertical integration, Grosh 
creates space for asking questions like: does contract farming generate efficiency gains in small-
scale farming, does contract farming provide rewards for the effort o f growers, and does 
contract farming facilitate technology transfer to farming enterprises.9 Unlike both the 
advocates and the critics o f contract farming, she presents a less essentialist picture o f contract 
farming, as either a potential income generator or a potential exploiter. 
My study also indicates that the integration o f contract growers is neither simply a 
modernisation process o f traditional, backward farmers nor a downward squeeze o f dependence 
and exploitation. O n the contrary, contract farming incorporates the complex social relations 
maintained by farmers with markets and government, and within their own communities. 
Furthermore, farmers continually weigh their options in a context o f high input prices, low 
commodity prices, declining productivity, and credit constraints. 1 0 Unilateral explanations either 
based on an optimistic, idealised assessment o f institutional/technological innovations and a 
trust in market mutuality, or derived from a critique fully explained by international economic 
and political structures, ignore the diversity o f farming practices and the local capacity to deal 
with transnational corporations and contractual arrangements (cf. Richards 1985, Scott 1985). 
In the two schemes investigated in this book, incomes out o f contract farming were initially 
favourable to small farmers, who had difficulties to earn a living from farming alone. Indeed, in 
many cases o f contract farming growers' incomes rise and they have less trouble to market their 
produce, but the initially favourable agreement may deteriorate after a while. This is illustrated 
by developments in the asparagus scheme, where production costs rose, prices and quality 
standards altered, and the company's financial policy became less accommodating. In 
contractual production o f hybrid maize seed, production risks affected growers' commitment to 
the scheme. Market instability, technological inconsistencies and conflicts over management and 
authority often make contracting schemes unstable in the long term (cf. Little 1994). 
Analysis shows how contract growers are responding to the consequences o f signing a 
contract rather than to its conception in corporate headquarters. Growers have a contradictory 
status in the relationship with agribusiness: they are both dependent and independent (Mooney 
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1983). Partly due to the credit element o f contract growing, producers find themselves in an 
insecure and subordinate position vis-a-vis the company; company and farmers do not operate 
on a level playing field. This indicates, according to Glover (1987), the need for intervention by 
government or by farmers' organisations. Pre-existing checks and balances, whereby farmers 
have recourse to legal procedures, laws regulating contractual issues (e.g. risk), or an 
institutionalised bargaining position inside the company structure, are often missing. Although 
government institutions are usually involved in contract farming schemes, these institutions 
mainly finance or subsidise modernisation programmes without an explicit policy to avoid 
lopsided relations between growers and company. 
However, evidence presented in this book shows that growers have substantial power in the 
actual performance o f contract farming, as part o f a corporate strategy. Moreover, there is clear 
evidence that small farmers who maintain alternative opportunities for production and income, 
in addition to their contracted obligations to the company, are in a much stronger position than 
farmers whose land area is devoted entirely to the contract crop (Porter and Phillips-Howard 
1997). Companies can decide to introduce new production schemes or expand production 
facilities, but access to arable land and farm labour remain basic requirements. Companies are 
forced to enter into complex social relations with landowners and farm workers. This imposes 
the task o f addressing new organisational challenges upon agribusiness corporations. 
Whether a contractual arrangement can yield material benefits for contractors largely depends 
on both the specific terms o f the arrangement, the forms o f governance and administration and 
on the working relations operational in the scheme rather than on the fact o f contracting per se. 
This study and a number o f other case studies (e.g. Collins 1993, Korovkin 1992, Glover 1984, 
Goldsmith 1985) confirm that a firm and strong opinion on contract fanning per se disregards 
the actual practice o f contract farming. Stating beforehand that the inevitable results o f contract 
farming and linkages to the agribusiness are impoverishment and exploitation does not tackle 
the complexity o f Mindanao's internationalising agriculture. Little (1994) emphasises the 
importance o f assessing contract schemes in the light o f realistic alternative options for 
increased production and income. He concludes that diversity o f contract farming in scale, 
conditions o f contracts and so on, is so great that it is belter to focus on the motives and power 
relationships o f contracting parties than on the generic institution (Little 1994, cf. Porter and 
Phillips-Howard 1995). The gradual acceptance and expansion o f contract farming points to 
farmers' capacity to respond to favourable development policies and market opportunities 
(Little and Watts 1994). Thus, it seems to be appropriate to examine what happens inside the 
organisation and to ask the question whether contract farming can be managed differendy. 
CONTRACT FARMING, TRUST AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
A key point o f decision-making in contract farming is the allocation o f rewards embedded in 
negotiations over a fair outcome o f contract growing. Concerns and conflicts over financial 
compensation in contract farming indicate the need for an institutional analysis o f trust and 
transparency, which includes examining credit flows, prices qualification o f the commodity, and 
computation o f production costs. Accountancy and budgetary processes are tools through 
which the parties battle their interests, revealing the terms under which farmers and companies 
have to function, and identifying various cultural dimensions present in one single organisation. 
A formal understanding o f the contractual arrangement assumes that the contract transforms 
socially unequal parties, the agribusiness firm and the farmer, into political and legal equals. It is 
precisely this legal neutrality which conceals the system o f social relations between farmers and 
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agribusiness companies, and which tends to obscure the emerging social relations it claims to 
define. The existence o f a written contract may suggest that the contractual arrangement is the 
essential mechanism for control, i.e. contract farming is essentially a way to formally integrate 
independent farmers in a marketing scheme. The institutional analysis o f finance and reward in 
contract farming (chapter 3) suggests it is a mistake to treat a formal contract between grower 
and processor as the defining feature o f contract farming. It shows the danger o f simplifying 
integration processes. A close examination o f the company's and growers' behaviour in 
asparagus production reveals that control cannot be reduced to one single mechanism, namely a 
formal say over production and marketing based on a legal contract. 
In periods o f crisis, the precise form o f financial and administrative systems, and the 
transparency o f accounting procedures, proves to be decisive in the functioning o f a contractual 
arrangement. In the process o f reorganising production and accounting, accounting information 
turns into an organisational liability. The information used in managerial decision-making is not 
always acceptable to all parties involved, and, consequendy, rearranging the contract growing 
relationship implies a major challenge for management. One o f the dangers o f accounting 
information is that it offers a fragmented image o f what happens in the real world (Roberts 
1996). Categories o f accounting information used by financial officers do not easily coincide 
with the grower's individual understanding o f running a farming enterprise. 
Although growers frequendy face serious problems in dealing with firms, the hybrid structure 
and multiple objectives o f contract farming schemes make it difficult to organise farmers or to 
design effective policy interventions, leading to individual entrepreneurial strategies or to 
personalised negotiations to strike better bargains. In my view, it is important to avoid a rigid 
unilateral definition of economic obligations (resulting from contract growing), which ignores 
the wider social context o f these relationships. What is negotiable, such as prices and profit 
sharing or cost structure and expenditures, is systematically related to the formation o f 
organisational activity. When realising that economic behaviour is always embedded in networks 
o f social relations, the study o f co-ordination and control in contractual relationships must no 
longer be limited to the formalised relationship, it must include social and organisational 
processes as well (Porter and Phillips-Howard 1997). 
CONTRACT FARMING AND LABOUR 
As a consequence o f contracting out primary production, people outside the boundaries o f the 
company have to establish quality and to maintain productivity, essential elements o f marketing 
strategies in the horticultural sector. Labour management appears to be crucial for dealing with 
biological challenges apparent in the production o f high-value crops, which have to meet strict 
quality standards. This emphasises the interdependence o f growers and company in regulating 
natural processes in agriculture, since growers are the ones translating technological advice and 
agronomic research into regulation o f nature and management o f work. So, a specific feature o f 
contract growing is the company's remote access to production resources such as land and farm 
work. These resources are located at the periphery o f the organisation, locally owned and exist 
as part o f local cultures. Hence, an exclusive technological dominance o f the company does not 
exist in asparagus production. Skillful labour by both growers and workers proves to be critical 
for the success or failure o f the entire scheme. A major concern for a contract company is this 
particularity o f labour relations in contract growing. 
The usual labour intensity o f high-value crops necessitates a closer look at labour relations in 
farmers' fields. In contrast to the view that contract farming basically entails the integration o f 
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family farms, this study confirms White's observation for contract growers in Java. White (1997: 
106) states that in many cases, small holdings in contract farming schemes are not actually 
family farms (i.e. family-labour based production units) but rather small or medium-scale 
enterprises based mainly on wage labour. This hints at a lacuna in the literature on contract 
farming, which is often restricted to the relationship between an agribusiness company and farm 
businesses or farm families, while, at least in Southeast Asia, wage labour plays a prominent role 
in the evolution of contract farming schemes. 1 1 However, little has been said about the role o f 
hired labour in such a multi-layered system o f contractual production. 
Analysis o f payment and management o f farm workers links wage work to the establishment 
o f quality and productivity in contracted farms, and, therefore, to the viability o f contract 
growing. The asparagus scheme, investigated in chapter 4 , was caught between two different 
principles o f economic organisation: the farming system and the new processes introduced by 
wage work (Mackintosh 1989). These two elements o f the contracting relationship, i.e. farming 
system and wage work, are different in terms o f supervision and in terms o f remuneration. 
Growers manage wage work and are rewarded for effort Workers are employed by growers and 
are paid daily wages or piece rates. Therefore widespread use o f wage labour in asparagus 
farming not only altered the financial logic o f the growing scheme, but it also added an 
additional layer to the organisational set-up. 
This study has noted the existence o f contrasting forms o f regulation and control over the 
labour process. Supervision o f farm work, regulation o f farm practices, and control over 
growers' activities can best be understood as a continuum o f practices (cf. Thompson 1983), 
which reflects the company's endeavour to secure a stable supply o f agricultural commodities. 
On the one hand, a new and demanding task for growers is to manage and supervise farm 
workers in order to establish satisfactory quality and productivity, and, as employers, growers 
are dependent on their social position in society for the recruitment o f workers. On the other 
hand, growers are integrated as a type o f foreman operating within a hierarchical corporate 
structure (Vellema 1999). As result, contractual production embodies varying forms o f control, 
and varying degrees o f coercion, over the production process and the farm management 
practices o f growers (cf. White 1997). All these forms o f control entail a different combination 
o f coercion, compensation and commitment (cf. Tilly and Tilly 1998). 
For corporate management, however, farm work remains functional to its overall strategy. 
The elasticity o f subcontracting as a form o f organising work implies its ability to serve as a 
technique for solving various problems concerning the recruitment and supervision o f labour in 
different historical and social contexts. By contracting out the production the company evades 
labour management problems and minimum wages, but, in return, relies on a combination o f 
direct and indirect measures to reach satisfactory productivity and quality levels and to control 
production costs. In cases o f failure, companies may decide to get a firm grip on farm work, 
which transforms the position o f a grower from an employer into a foreman. In the course o f a 
contract growing scheme, company management balances between achieving a closer 
supervision o f sensitive work tasks and leaving responsibility for labour management entirely 
with independent growers. This duality confronts company management with the question what 
makes different groups cohere so that productivity and quality levels can be sustained. 
CONTRACT FARMING AND TECHNOLOGY 
The viability o f contract growing also relies on the capability o f both growers and company to 
solve production problems. In social science, the nature o f technology and crops are often 
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incorrectly treated as secondary, while on the contrary these factors importandy shape the 
development o f a particular contract farming system. Obviously, technology and biology have a 
substantive core, but boundaries between the technical and the social are hard to discern 
(Tranvik et al. 1999). An institutional analysis o f contract farming emphasises the need to 
understand both the technological logic o f manufacturing the commodity and company control 
over technological choices and design o f the production process (cf. Kaplinsky 1985). The 
exploitation o f technology relates to technical substance and natural boundaries o f agricultural 
production, and depends on functioning o f different task groups in a specific institutional 
setting. T o this end various parties in a scheme have to co-operate closely and to co-ordinate 
their respective competencies. 
An important source o f influence for growers is the ability successfully to cope with 
technological uncertainty in production (Dent and Ezzamel 1995). Consequendy, companies 
still rely on the skills o f producers (cf. Pacey 1983), who work at the margin o f what is possible, 
with relative autonomy from organisational authority. However, growers also depend on the 
behaviour o f other agents for dealing with environmental influences or for solving composite 
technological problems. The boundaries between farm and firm are not clear-cut Company and 
growers constantly try to answer what is technologically possible and what is held to be the 
appropriate way o f dealing with a production problem. In doing so, they have to take into 
account inherent technical properties and argue about what are reasonable decisions. 
Agricultural performance always involves biological and technological uncertainties, but 
questions about acceptable levels o f risk can never be answered just by explaining how nature 
and technology interact. Where company and growers draw the line between success and failure 
cannot be explained by only referring to the intrinsic properties o f the artefacts alone (cf. Bijker 
1990). What also needs to be explained is how people agree to work together, interact so as to 
concentrate on improving yields, and, for the time being, ignore most o f the potential dangers 
and uncertainties that surround them (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982: 9). 
A reduced confidence in company's technological competence and expertise affects growers' 
attitude to the probability o f risk and uncertainty. These fears, worries and political suspicions 
felt by growers are real and they interfere with working relations in a scheme, and generate 
managerial problems. Trust in technological capability and expertise o f the company, and 
performance in the system, are two sides o f the same coin. But, in times o f crisis or conflict the 
interpretation o f the material effects o f technology is easily diffused into an interpretation o f 
more political tensions or social conflicts (cf. Leach and Fairhead 2000). Mapping out 
disagreements about biological and technological matters points at the problem o f 
organisational coherence. Therefore, the analysis o f technological uncertainty in chapter 6 leads 
to a further understanding o f how people see their relation with the institution they work in. 
Analysis o f technological uncertainty and organisation incoherence is not meant to create a 
dichotomy between farmer's knowledge and corporate expertise; it is about the interplay and the 
efficacy o f solutions to real problems. Emphasising juxtapositions obscures the way in which 
technology is exploited under certain social and institutional conditions. In contrast, my focus is 
on how different institutional modalities select among or silence technological options by 
determining what looks possible or dangerous. Contract farming demonstrates a specific 
organisational context, which combines business opportunities and technological capabilities 
(Metcalfe and Boden 1992). 1 2 The internal environment o f the firm, where knowledge is created 
through a trial and error procedure, is a decisive terrain for the generation o f capabilities, which 
always remains imperfect and firm specific. Addressing technological incoherence, however, is 
also dependent on the generation o f capabilities across firm boundaries (Coombs et al. 1992). 
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The distribution o f tasks inherent in contract growing easily hampers the capacity to solve 
urgent problems, for example if the research department is physically or institutionally remote 
from problems in farmers' fields. However, the company's operations depend on performance 
in growers' fields, and, therefore, there is common ground for improving farming practices. 
This suggests that the institutionalised action o f technicians and engineers in the company is not 
solely directed towards controlling the labour process o f farmers, rather this action is part o f a 
collective effort to improve crop performance, in which growers and company employees align 
around a common problematic. 1 3 Nevertheless, in contract farming, expert institutions are often 
disengaged from the people actually using the technology. Decision-making about the 
technological fix, repairing failing practices, is seldom driven from below. Vicarious learning 
seems to be a large part o f how these types o f organisations socialise members and there seems 
to be little institutional space for innovation and feedback (Rousseau 1995). 
This study reveals contract farming's limited capacity to include alternative technological 
views and to translate growers' insights to executive levels in the company. For growers, it is 
difficult to get access to design o f artefacts. Technological learning, however, moves around in 
the interface between organisational transformation and incremental technological 
improvements. Does analysis o f contract farming show that large sophisticated contract growing 
systems are only compatible with centralised and hierarchical managerial control over 
productive activities (cf. Winner 1985)? Is this pattern a requirement for proper functioning o f 
contract farming systems or can a company accept to share power and to democratise expertise? 
For answering these questions, I have explored how technological progress is restricted by 
technological, institutional and cultural boundaries (Basalla 1988). Perhaps the analysis 
contributes to creative thinking about how to organise a decision-making and learning process, 
taking into account the variety in technological possibilities and farming practices. 
SYNTHESIS : Is CONTRACT FARMING POSSIBLE? 
This study shows that contract farming is capable o f incorporating and co-ordinating a diverse 
range o f interests into one single organisational framework. The mixture o f actors included in 
contract growing makes it difficult to decide which parties are in effective control o f the scheme 
and how major decisions are made, but contract growing arrangements are meant to interfere 
with existing relations and introduced by social agents. For the actual engagement o f 
independent farmers, local brokers were indispensable for agribusiness corporations 1 4. Contract 
farming schemes assemble many different actors, like farm workers, landlords, medium farmers, 
production managers, financial controllers and technicians. I have centred on the operational 
nature o f the arrangement and raised the question how various agents, i.e. company managers, 
technicians, growers and farm workers, fit in one organisation and function in a reasonably 
coherent and effective manner. 
Analysis o f contract farming must be able to make a precise institutional and social analysis 
o f the distribution o f efficiency gains and rewards, the type o f working relations, the functioning 
o f different task groups, and performance o f technologies. Consequendy, the purpose o f this 
study is to fill the gap left by institutional economists, pointed out by Mary Douglas (1987): 
Institutional economics suggests why a particular institutional form makes more sense to 
rational individuals in one economic environment rather than another. It does not explain the 
process by which the institution keeps itself and the environment stable enough to be 
recognized by the individual making a rational choice [. .] The most profound decisions about 
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justice are not made by individuals as such, but by individuals thinking within and on behalf of 
institutions. (Douglas 1987: 111-112, 124) 
So, we have to find a way to analyse the evolution o f complex and layered organisations such 
as contract farming. In my analysis in chapter 5, building on Mary Douglas' work, behaviour o f 
growers and company employees and managers is nested in institutional modalities. These 
actors are involved in building the institution and in making contract farming work, which 
includes practices directed to immediate practical ends, such as solving production problems 
and creating patterns o f work My premises is that social values are systematically related to 
organisational activity (Richards forthcoming). Hence, the ideological and cultural power o f 
modern concepts like technical rationality or economic calculation have to be related to 
concrete organisational patterns and material practices. Furthermore, technical and institutional 
change in contract farming is steered by levels o f trust and insecurity.1 5 In this sense, the 
institution contract farming combines measures o f regulation with modes o f social involvement. 
Obviously, accounting, labour management and technology-use embody institutional values: 
institutional modalities that select or silence organisational and technological options by 
determining what possibility looks feasible (cf. Douglas et al. 1998). Institutional modalities 
include elements o f society, which cross the boundaries o f the project. When using contract 
farming as a managerial tool, a company bounces against society. This becomes especially clear 
by looking at what happens when the organisation is under pressure. I f financial pressure rises 
or i f productivity levels decline, the organisational variety intrinsic to contract farming turns the 
organisation into an unstable arrangement The exploitation o f technological opportunities in 
contract farming involves the organisation o f task groups dealing with the environmental 
condition o f production. Institutional analysis shows that the involvement o f different parties in 
devising technologies affects the way in which intervention and performance are evaluated. Also 
the material world cannot be extracted from the flow o f events in the wider society. Yet most 
contract farming schemes are not clear about how to engage actors in providing solutions to 
commodity-related production problems and in mastering the socio-technical complexity o f 
agricultural production. 
In the context o f out-sourcing agricultural activities, production managers may opt for 
congenial solutions rather than more stressful and 'nitty-gritty' operations in difficult social 
environments (Hood 2000). In times o f pressure, companies may fall back on hierarchical 
organisational frameworks, treating contract farming as a formal agreement between two 
business partners. Then, management o f contract growing becomes prescriptive, and the 
company tends to retreat into fixed technologies, imposing a mechanical and industrial view on 
social relations in contract farming, and panicking over profitability and productivity. 
Withdrawing from social issues inside and outside the boundaries o f the project looks 
convenient for company management. However, without fme-txtning with society contract 
farming will not work; a focus on separate elements, e.g. either financial matters or productivity 
problems, ignores interactions between project and society. 1 6 
The effort o f this book has been to reinsert organisation and technology into the wider social 
fabric. Economy and performance are inseparable from other areas o f social life, and 
consequently, a company has to deal with the details o f social and technological domains. An 
analysis connecting technology with social relations may help to give organisations their 
coherence and to enhance their capacity to respond to changing boundary conditions. 
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Notes 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
1 Therefore, contractual marketing arrangements and any form of tenurial arrangements with no 
mterventions in production are excluded from the study. 
Fine's (1994) analysis of systems of provision adopts a similar approach to the 'vertical analysis' of all 
aspects of food. He emphasises the materiality of food and problems of dealing with variety in 
consumption. 
In theoretical terms, Goodman and Watts's approach to globalising food "recognises local-global 
structures of convergence and divergence and yet does not reify difference by sliding down the slippery 
slope of particularism and local heterogeneity" (Goodman and Watts 1994: 40). 
Van der Ploeg (1986) uses the sectoral distinctiveness of agriculture to argue that due to the fact that 
complex biological processes are the objects of farm labour; farmers can retain a certain level of control 
over production. The complex and organic character of food production explains the persistence of 
heterogeneity and a range of production forms in agriculture, and, therefore, reveals the negotiated 
character of the labour process in agriculture (van der Ploeg 1990). 
Collins' argument leads to the conclusion that production relations, through which global agriculture is 
organised, as in the case of contract growing, can neither be deduced from theories of agrarian transition, 
nor simply read off from the characteristics of crops and technologies. 
The approach taken is largely engaged with 'what' and 'how' questions. 'What' questions are concerned 
with the exploration and description of some (bounded) phenomenon. 'How' questions are concerned 
with practical outcomes and with ways in which change might be brought about piaikie 1993). In the 
current ethnography, knowledge and the inside view are produced from a restricted class of events and 
from a limited number of observations of things (cf. Hollnsteiner 1963). 
The emphasis on qualitative methods does not mean that more quantitative data would be irrelevant for 
answering the questions raised in this study. For obvious reasons one project cannot comprehend all 
possible research efforts. I believe that this book opens doors to a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods, especially with regards to rewarding and pricing mechanisms and to yields, quality, 
and risks. 
This may well contrast with both the tradition of scientific management in the sense of Taylor, and with 
sociological literature which does not engage much with issues of reform. 
Chapter 2: Modernisation and agribusiness expansion in Mindanao 
lleto's (1971) historical account of Maguindanao was an indispensable source for this brief historical 
overview. 
This contrasts, according to lleto, with the practice in the Sulu and Maranao sultanates, the two other 
major Muslim tribes in Mindanao, where descent and religious affiliation played a more prominent role. 
The Spaniards had ignored Sarangani, although Chinese junks frequented the natural harbour and it 
was an important route to Celebes. In earlier days, sultans and datus in the Pulangi Valley preferred 
Cotabato for trading agricultural products because it could easier be reached by boat. The long duration 
of the journey and the difficulties of transportation made Saragani less attractive. 
One of the villages in the municipality of the research is said to be a location where datu Uto's cabinet 
met. 
5 The American take-over led to fierce resistance by the independence movements and a violent war in 
the northern islands of the Philippines arose. See Renato Constantino (1975) for an extensive overview 
of this period of Philippine history. 
6 This does not mean that resistance to foreign colonisation had faded away entirely. Several battles took 
place during the first three decades of the 20th century (Rodil 1994), but generally the American 
authorities succeeded to pacify Southern Mindanao. 
In general, Chinese traders in rice and maize controlled marketing channels and Christians controlled 
public office, while gaining an increasing production in primary agricultural production (Beckett 1994). 
Japanese enterprises succeeded to set up successful hemp plantations near Davao City. 
^Philippine Bill of 1902. 
A strong lobby of American beet and sugarcane producers who were alarmed by the potential 
competition coming from the newly acquired colony supported this policy. Nevertheless, the sugar 
industry developed in the Philippines, especially in the frontier regions in Negros. But the rubber industry 
was virtually kept out of the Philippines although Mindanao is perfectly suited for this crop fe lzer 1948). 
196 Making contract farming work? 
1 1 Public Land Act of 1903. 
1 2 Koronadal is a corruption of the local expression for 'dancing cogon grass', which indicated how the 
valley looked like in the early 1900s. 
1 3 The division of Cotabato province into North and South Cotabato had a major impact on the economic 
growth of the northern provinces, which were mostly excluded from the investments and funds generated 
for agribusiness expansion in South Cotabato. The provinces north of South Cotabato, where after the 
division the Muslim population was concentrated, served as one of the main rice granaries for the rest of 
the country. However, due the brutal political struggles between Christian politicians and militias and 
Muslim politicians and secessionist movements, these war-stricken regions lacked the right conditions for 
further economic development. At a later stage North Cotabato was again divided into three provinces, 
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat and North Cotabato, mainly to entertain political interests and to divide the 
Muslim population. In 1992, South Cotabato was separated from Sarangani, the area surrounding the 
bay, to facilitate the political careers of an influential political family with interests in logging and in 
ranching. 
1 4 Azurin (1996) correctly states that there is more than one explanation for the conflict in Mindanao. He 
confines the causes to land disputes, political representation, state discrimination and cultural differences 
(see also Gowing 1988). 
This study is not designed to examine the long-standing conflict between the Philippine government 
and Muslim secessionist movements in Mindanao. For an extensive list of relevant books and articles 
about this conflict I refer to the bibliography in Accord (1999) 'A first step to peace: Mindanao in transition' 
(available at http:/Avww.c-r.org/acc_min/biblio.htm). 
In 1979, President Marcos transformed NDC into a more powerful entity. Its main function was to 
acquire land for corporations interested in the plantation business. In the early 1980s, NDC was an active 
partner in realising large oil palm plantations in Mindanao (AFRIM 1989a), of which the Guthrie/NDC 
plantation became notorious because of its employment of private armies. The Commonwealth 
Development Corporation, a leading advocate of nucleus estates and of contract fanning, was one of the 
financiers and was put under a lot of pressure due to its involvement (AFRIM 1991a). 
1 7 In the 1980s and 1990s, NDC continued its initiating role in opening up land in Muslim areas for 
plantation crops, particularly oil palm. Malaysian and Philippine corporations modelled their production 
after the Nucleus Estate and Smallholder Outgrowers Scheme (NES) popular in Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Papua New Guinea. Earlier in the 1960s, oil palm plantation had been tried in Mindanao Py and Medina 
1995). However, Philippine land use policy still constrained large-scale development of plantation 
aariculture and centralised oil palm production was restricted to one or two locations. 
1 Notwithstanding the fact that Mindanao is also the biggest producer of coconut oil and copra. The table 
below shows that Mindanao is the country's biggest producer of a number of export products. Coconut 
production takes place both at plantations and at small (tenanted) farms. The market for copra is 
oligopolistic in nature and middlemen are key in keeping prices very low at farm level Boyce 1993: 
203/208). 
T a b l e : Mindanao's key agricultural export products in 1993 as share of Philippine total. 
Export product Share of total 
Philippines 
Coconut oil, crude 82% 
Coconut oil, 89% 
refined 
Copra 82% 
Banana, fresh 99% 
Pineapple, fresh 99% 
Pineapple, 99% 
preserved 
Tuna 67% 
Source: National Statistical Coordination Board, in: Dy and Medina 1995. 
1 9 In 1990, 85% of the pineapples produced in Polomolok are canned, of which 87% is exported to the 
US; Del Monte controls the Philippine market. DolePhil transacts with its affiliates, such as Castle and 
Cooke World, Dole Company, Dole Asia, Intercontinental Transport Services (IBON 1990). 
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In 1992, Dole phased out its pineapple operations in Hawaii (FRLD 1993). Hence, it relied completely 
on its Philippine plantations, operational since 1963 and its Thai operations, operational since 1973 as 
the company's suppliers of canned pineapple. In 1971 Castle and Cooke bought a 64% interest in Dole-
Thailand (IUF 1979). Unlike the situation in the Philippines, 95% of Dole pineapple produced in Thailand 
is sourced from independent growers (Dole annual report, 1997). 
For more than two decades Dole employed mostly regular labourers; an estimated number of 8-9000 
people. In the period 1988 to 1992, several redundancy programmes drastically changed the composition 
of the workforce. The company had stopped hiring regular workers since 1984 (Zaragoza 1988b). In 
1995, the use of manpower co-operatives and labour contractors has become a common feature of work 
in the plantation agriculture and processing. 
2 2 Dole's control over an area of 20-30,000 hectares has been one of the reasons for heavy criticism on 
the company; it was questioned whether the farmers in the area benefited in any way from the operation. 
Further criticisms in the community were raised about the observed negative side effects related to 
chemical pollution and soil erosion. 
In South Cotabato 40% of all cattle in the Philippines is raised and 60% of all cattle in Mindanao. There 
are large tracks of grazing lands and a number of big ranches, which depend on maize and mostly on 
pineapple pulp for their feed supply. Shortages, however, are common. 
Source: table 3.1 in Manalaysay et al., 1988. 
The food aid policy of the US strongly contributed to this pattern of agricultural policy f riedmann 
1990). The U.S. department of Agriculture worked hand in glove with US seed corporations and 
promoted the development of local livestock and poultry industries, which relied on imported grain. The 
Philippine government welcomed the food aid from the US. After the development of commercial markets 
for livestock and feeds the input industry, e.g. Pioneer Hi-Bred, carefully entered the Philippines. 
Boyce (1993) states that the Green Revolution in the Philippines was essentially a rice revolution. 
Maize yields increased largely due to increased input use while farming of traditional varieties was 
sustained. At the end of the Marcos era less than 10 percent of the country's maize acreage was sown to 
the improved varieties released in the last decade. 
Source: 1990 IFPRI Survey of Philippine maize and livestock production and marketing system, in 
Mendoza and Rosegrant (1995). 
2 8 These firms started contract growing of poultry in the 1960s, mainly in regions close to large cities, 
such as Central Luzon and Southern Tagalog in the vicinity of Manila. A concern of these firms was to 
guarantee a stable supply of feed to their growers. All of them had interests in feedmilling and other 
related activities. 
2 9 Until 1985, the National Food Authority regulated maize trade in the Philippines; the government 
organisation especially monitored the importation of maize. Due to an increasing burden of the national 
treasury, it surrendered its control. The pressure to remove quantitative restriction on maize importation 
intensified with IMF's prescribed deregulation and liberalisation with demands of feed millers after they 
were faced with shortages and high domestic prices (PDI 12/04/97). Until 1990, Thailand was the main 
source of cheap maize, but the country was still a net importer of minimal quantities. In 1995 this 
changed with the influx of large volumes to meet the growing demand; the USA (81%) and Argentina 
(19%) dominated the importation of maize (UA&P 1997) 
The issue of maize importation has been at the centre of heated policy debates in the Philippines. A 
few months after assuming power in 1986, President Aquino imposed a ban on maize importation. 
However, the World Bank immediately made known its opposition and soon deregulation got priority 
again. 
3 In 1979, first lady Imelda Marcos held sway over the Ministry of Human Settlement, which 
strengthened the trend towards agro-industry. Although most of the projects were propaganda activities 
the ministry altered the policy discourse towards agro-industrial development in Mindanao posterhout 
1985). 
3 2 Initially, the government favoured the labour-intensive manufacturing sector; low wages attracted many 
foreign investors. 
3 3 In the 1990s, Secretary of Agrarian Reform, Ernesto Garilao, strongly stressed the possible link 
between land distribution and improving productivity of agricultural lands (DAR 1993). "What we do not 
like to see is another wave of plantations", Garilao told Business World (01/09/95). "We always feel it 
[contract growing] can be done on small farms, where farmers bring their produce to the plant". Garilao 
was the one who positioned contract growing in a new paradigm, namely creating a competitive 
agriculture. "It is no longer feasible to give the land just to a tenant or to farm workers", he stated. 
"Farmers or co-operatives have to be related to markets, you need links to agribusiness. But, the 
conditions of the arrangement should be favourable for both sides. The government should assist in 
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realising such a symbiotic relation" (pers.comm.: 1995). In his opinion a lot has been done on the equity 
aspect, land distribution, and the real battle now is increasing the productivity of land reform beneficiaries: 
T h e poor must have some productive assets -land, credit, education, etc. So, if you are able to provide 
him land, the next is how would you help him become productive so he can have a higher income. 
Hopefully, if he's going to be a good farmer, he gets out of poverty.' (MC, 03/17/96). Horacio Morales, the 
succeeding Secretary of Agrarian Reform during the short lived presidency of Estrada, equally pressed 
for solutions aimed at securing productivity and profitability for farmers (Morales 1999). However, Morales 
spent much time in his effort to distribute land in the most precarious areas, namely the coconut 
plantations in Bicol and the sugar hacienda's in Negros. 
Republic Act 6657, referred to as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. 
3 5 The redistribution of maize and rice land was done most effectively during the Marcos administration, 
based on the Presidential Degree no. 27 (PD 27). This land reform programme was largely concentrated 
in the rice producing areas Luzon and was meant to eliminate tenancy. Several productivity programmes, 
such as Masagana and Maisagana 99 accompanied the land reform programme. President Marcos was 
hesitant to interfere in the sugar haciendas and in other commercial crops. On the contrary, during the 
Martial Law period declared by President Marcos the concentration of banana plantations increased and 
Dole's pineapple plantation on government-owned land got into full operation during Marcos' first term as 
president. 
A similar outcome was reached in the National Development Corporation-Guthrie Plantations, also 
located in Mindanao. 
3 7 The speedy but limited agrarian reform in the leased pineapple plantations did not reach out to the 
corporate banana and rubber farms in Mindanao. These farms usually covered areas up to one thousand 
hectares (the constitutional limit for corporate farms). Most of the corporate owners sought to exempt 
their lands from CARP coverage by applying for a ten-year deferment granted to those farms producing 
high-value or non-traditional export crops. In 1998, the corporate farms, plantations and haciendas were 
hardly touched by the agrarian reform programme. Their strong representation in congress led to an 
effective opposition against redistribution of land and landlords found several loopholes in the law to 
avoid or to obstruct land distribution. In 1998, the year that CARL would expire, the Ramos administration 
and congress approved an amendment to CARL, which increased its funding and extended its duration 
with another ten years. Ramos left to the next administration the challenge to actually implement agrarian 
reform in the troublesome sugar haciendas in Negros and coconut plantations in Bicol and to reorganise 
the large commercial farms. 
3 8 In the period 1950-1961/65 the Philippine government had adopted a protective import substitution 
policy based industrialisation around Manila. During this period growth in agriculture stagnated; there was 
little employment and productivity was low (Oosterhout 1985). 
3 9 In the 1970s the US was the largest foreign investor in the country (49%), followed by Japan (20%) 
(Oosterhout 1985). 
0 These projects were planned under the Philippine Assistance Program, specially funded by US 
congress. 
4 1 In his book A Captive Land (1992) James Putzel studies in detail how in the formulation of several land 
reform programmes the collision of a 'conservative' approach (non-distributive, productivity focused and 
exploiting new frontiers) with a more 'liberal' approach (land to the tiller, expropriation) continuously 
constructed the political arena. The arena, however, was mostly dominated by the non-distributive 
approach. 
4 The leading role attributed to agribusiness development is also reflected in the US $ 80 million US AID 
grant to the Agribusiness Systems Assistance Programme (ASAP) in 1991. This programme focuses on 
providing farmers with access to markets, technology and information, and it participates in the creation 
of joint-ventures between American and Philippine companies (Agribusiness Monitor 1991). 
4 3 The successive secretaries of Agriculture were: 
Paul Dominquez, married into the Alcantara family with vast interests in logging and ranching in South 
Cotabato and leaders in the cement and construction industry; 
Roberto Sebastian of Marsman Plantations and, as chair of the Philippine Banana Growers Association, 
a leading figure in the lobby against redistributive reform; 
Senen Bacani, the former general manager of Dole Philippines (1983-88), top-official in Dole Asia and 
more recently heading a holding company with investments in pineapple production and bananas. 
4 4 The appointed mayor after the EDSA revolution, a teacher representing 'civil society, alternated with 
husband and wife of a political family with vested interests in logging. 
4 S ln 1995 and 1997, new American funded programmes were supposed to replicate the successful 
development in Southern Mindanao. In 1995, the US government funded Growth with Equity in Mindanao 
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(GEM) with US $ 15 to 18 million (Mindanao Update July 1995) and in 1997 it extended this approach 
and made available US $ 2 million for projects involving former Muslim rebels (PDI 03/08/97). 
In 1995, Philippines congress approved the High-Value Crops Development Act, which was a response 
to low profits in agriculture. Participation in growing export markets by a conversion of land use was 
brought forward as a solution to this low profitability (Cabanilla 1996a). 
One of the earliest examples is the Tobacco Monopoly, extensively analysed by de Jesus (1980), 
perhaps the most durable and effective measure taken by the Spanish colonisers to control agricultural 
production and trade. The Tobacco Monopoly was most successful in Luzon. 
In 1962, resettlement became part of various land reform programmes, which were designed to 
alleviate agrarian problems in the more densely populated areas of Central Luzon and the Visayas. The 
government shifted away from directing agricultural development and limited its role to the physical 
transfer of land to tenants (Mastura 1988a, Paderanga 1995). 
4 9 Business World (22/01/93: p. 9). 
" Business World (03/01/93). 
In contrast to the supply of feed grains, the poultry and livestock industry has been in the forefront of 
contract growing. In the 1960, integrated firms introduced contract growing of chickens in the 
surroundings of big cities, especially Manila. The supply of feed to poultry growers was generally 
arranged via marketing channels incorporated in the integrated enterprises, but contractual agreements 
with maize farmers did not sustain. 
Two large cattle raisers operated in the municipality of Polomolok; Dealco imported cattle from 
Australia and fattened the animals in Polomok (more than 8000 heads). Montery, a subsidiary of the food 
conglomerate San Miguel Corporation, raised between 4000 and 6000 heads in its farm in Polomolok 
(SMFACI pers.comm.). Furthermore, backyard raising of mainly swine was an important income 
generator in the villages. In 1996, South Cotabato has become the second largest livestock industry, with 
frequent shipping of swine and cattle and with the presence of all integrated poultry industries (PDI 
21/05/96). 
The total value of hybrid seed used in the Philippines in 1992 amounted to 11.3 million US dollars 
(£IMMT 1994). 
The best-known example of the conversion of maize land into pineapple land is the operation of T'boli 
Agro-Industrial Development, Inc. (TADI) headed by a former secretary of Agriculture and former general 
manager of Dole Philippines. An estimated 1500 hectares of tenants and agrarian reform beneficiaries 
have been planted with pineapples, contracted by TADI (Menguita 1995). 
In 1990, Stanfilco managed 800 hectares of banana land near General Santos City of which 
independent growers managed half and company officials managed the other half as a plantation. 
Stanfilco's biggest banana operations, 4000 hectares, are located near Davao City; 15 hectares were 
managed by corporate growers and 1500 hectares by independent growers, in addition the company 
managed a farm of 900 hectares (IBON 1990). The company's banana operation in General Santos City 
has been reduced in size; the former banana growers now planted their irrigated fields with yellow maize. 
In the Davao provinces, former plantation workers were recently turned into contract growers, although 
most of the work was still organised by the company. Co-operatives played a crucial role in this 
redistribution of land ownership. The company is still engaged in marketing arrangements with locally 
owned banana plantations. 
In 1995, TropiFresh was the second largest supplier of fresh asparagus to Japan. The company also 
eyed the commercialisation of anthuriums and other cut flowers, and of gobo, a vegetable favoured by 
the Japanese. 
The history of village 1 is extensively discussed in chapter 6. 
The financial aspects in contract growing make it a dependent form of agricultural modernisation 
£Korovkin 1992), which will be discussed in chapter 3. 
During the Marcos era, a long-running conflict between the Philippine government and Muslim 
secessionist movements erupted, which was related both to the introduction of electoral politics and to 
the on-going encroachment of settlers and agribusiness into the homeland of the Muslim inhabitants. 
Also during the Marcos era, wealthy business cliques and agribusiness firms had been able to channel 
their aspirations and interests through the political system. The operations of landowners and merchants 
were embedded in a 'electoral-cum-bureaucratic' structure running from the municipality to Manila 
£McCoy 1982). 
McCoy critically described this view, presenting farmers and peasant a s : " [ . . ] the sum of the social 
and bureaucratic units in which he lived -extended kinship networks, the traditional village, the 
municipality and the nation. Restrained by traditional values of reciprocity, the Filipino lived in a state of 
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cultural, political and economic 'underdevelopment' that served as a positive barrier to rnodernization'." 
(McCoy 1982: 3). 
1 The analysis of modernisation and integration presented here emerged from reading the collection of 
essays edited by McCoy and de Jesus (1982). McCoy formulated the point of departure for such an 
analysis as follows: 
"The Philippines is not simply the sum of its political systems nor is it the prisoner of its anti-modern 
'Philippine values'. Instead of a village society bound by cultural patterns and political rules, there 
emerges the image of an intensely dynamic society, or series of societies, that has changed 
constantly throughout its four centuries of recorded history in response to economic, demographic and 
technological stimuli. Instead of the 'political' image of Philippine society and the cultural image of a 
Filipino 'folk' resistant to change, we can substitute data indicating a society whose merchants and 
peasants were skilled innovators. The only tradition is that of change, and the only enduring 'values' 
are those of an essential rationality. Nor is the country's historical 'underdevelopment' a simple 
function of imperial exploitation, but very much a collaborative enterprise between the indigenous elite 
and foreign interests." (McCoy 1982: 3-4). 
6 2 The narrow focus of the settlement programmes can also be found in an additional consideration of the 
Commonwealth government and of the Philippine government in the 1950s. Its idea was that migration of 
land-hungry families, most of whom were tenants to big absentee landlords, would resolve the agrarian 
unrest in the plains in Central Luzon without getting involved in the difficult process of land distribution. 
See Kerkvliet (1977) for an historical account of the Huk rebellion in Central Luzon. 
6 3 In addition, contract growing schemes are embedded in the politics of rural regions. Until the end of the 
1960s and the early 1970s, Muslim leaders remained distinguished political figures in the municipality. 
However, due to the settlement programmes and due to the high influx of plantation workers this political 
landscape changed. Christian politicians had become increasingly powerful;"[. . ] while migration tended 
to fragment family grouping, ethno-linguistic affiliation and town of origin in the long term provided an 
alternative framework for mobilization." Beckett 1994: 304) This was especially the case during the 
turbulent 70s, when the violent conflict between Muslim secessionist movements and the Philippine 
government entered the boundaries of Polomolok. During the war in Mindanao, the leading Muslim 
families commanded armed groups in defence of their villages. Through the existing kinship networks, 
Muslim fighters from northern provinces, member of the Mora National Liberation Front, the separatist 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front or the militant Black Shirts, came to these villages as well. In the settlement 
village, one family took part in organising the llaga, a Christian militia made up of mainly llongo migrants, 
who, like the majority of the settlers in village 2 came from the province lloilo on the island of Panay. 
However, in South Cotabato the conflict turned out to be less violent and protracted than in other 
provinces. Still, it remains to be seen whether the project of modernisation is able to redirect these 
conflicts and to establish new forms of co-operation. 
Chapter 3: Performance and compensation in contractual relations 
1 1n the research area, maize land declined by 24% since 1990 (IBON 1998a). 
2 Murdock owns 23% of the company's shares, which represented a value of US $ 400 million in 1994 
(Barret 1994). 
Over the years, Castle and Cooke had acquired large tracts of land. Mainly concentrated in California 
and Hawaii (around 60,000 hectares) these were potential assets for profitable development projects 
(Barret 1994). 
Soft banana prices were related to the EU's imposition of quotas on selected fruit imports. 
5 Preserving and enhancing the strength of its brand name was a particulariy important pursuit during the 
time Castle & Cooke wanted to sell the food operations (Predicasts 1990). 
6 Dole also incorporated Bud California, a company with long experience in shipping fresh vegetables. 
7 In 1991, an asparagus-branding programme was budgeted; the company was looking for ways to pack 
and bundle its produce in order to equip its products with a clear identification. It had to figure out how to 
do it in a merchandising arena dominated by bulk displays not built for carrying a label (Predicasts 1990). 
8 Understandably, supermarket chains prefer to link their own name with quality, rather than a corporate 
name that appears in every chain's produce department. 
9 Bill Heintz, president of Dole Fresh Vegetables Co. (Predicasts 1990). 
1 0 The company's 1997 annual report showed sales of 1.04 billion US dollar in Asia and a 16% increase 
of sales in Japan due to 'increased marketing efforts and the strength of the Dole brand, which is 
recognised by 92% of the consumers' (Dole 1997). 
1 1 The largest sales of Dole TropiFresh are in asparagus. In cut flowers the company ships anthuriums, 
leatherleaf fern, and dendrobium orchids. The company also developed a line of solo papaya, and was 
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involved in developing product lines suitable for export markets, which included carrots, long onions, and 
gobo. All production sites were located on the island of Mindanao (source: company brochure, Dole 
TropiFresh). In 1994, industrial analysts estimated flower sales US $ 20 million, and sales in asparagus 
US $ 40 million (Pastor 1994). 
1 2 Source: http://www.flntrac.com/rap/bulletins/market/aspar.html. This material is provided through the 
courtesy of the Asia Regional Agribusiness Project/Fintrac Inc. through the Market Asia website at 
www.marketasia.org. 
1 3 In 1995, South Cotabato exported US $ 1.9 million worth of asparagus to Japan; this covered more 
than 90% of the total Philippines export of asparagus to Japan. The value of total export of pineapple is 
estimated at US $ 44 million (BW 12/1/95, BW 18/9/95). 
China is the largest producer in Asia, but its asparagus are mainly marketed domestically. In Thailand 
and Taiwan production declined during the 1990s. Taiwan is a big importer of asparagus from Australia 
(83%) and New Zealand (17%); imports from the Philippines are nil. 
1 5 Quoted in Pastor (1994). 
1 6 Dole Food Company Form 10-K, 1996. 
1 7 Initially, the company tried to bring Landbank into the programme, but Landbank is not supposed to 
finance farms larger than 1 hectare. 
1 8 Advertisement DBP, PDI 10/02/96. 
1 9 DBP had an interest in showing its developmental efforts at the highest levels in the Philippine 
government. In DBP's feasibility report it is mentioned (1990/91) that the bank was asked to make a 
presentation to the president and his cabinet. 
0 In 1995, this policy culminated in the High Value Crops Development Act RA 7900, which promoted 
land conversion as a response to low profits in agriculture (Cabanilla 1996). 
Source: Company Guarantee Agreement between company and bank (1990). 
Presidential message in a Livecor Advertisement celebrating its 14 t h anniversary (PDI 11/01/97). 
2 3 Source: Guarantee Agreement (CALF-GFSME Guarantee Facility) by and between the Guarantee 
Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises and Development Bank of the Philippines (1990). 
Source: Various documents under the auspices of the local branch office of the Development Bank of 
the Philippines: Credit application forms (1991) Loan Transaction Executive Summary (1990), Loan 
Transaction Executive Summary (1991), Asparagus Growers Associations Credit Application (n.d.), 
including Asparagus project; operating guidelines (n.d.), Financial Memorandum, Notes and Assumptions 
pn Financial Projection (n.d.) 
5 The results of these experiments showed an average yield of 2.6 ton per hectare per harvest season. 
Later we will see that the company introduced much higher quotas in order to balance production costs. 
During the government sponsored Maisagana credit programme in maize farming (see chapter 2), it 
was common practice to submit land titles as collateral. The results of this modernisation programme 
were disappointing and, logically, farmers were hesitant to use their land titles again. 
Alfred McCoy (1994) extensively discusses the apparent influence of family upon the wider society and 
its politics in the Philippines. The analysis in McCoy's 1994 volume centres on the role and history of 
strong families, leading banks, corporations and political parties in the context of a weak state. Local 
bossism equally shapes the economic and political context for contract growing. Families, organised on 
patterns of bilateral kinship, bring a mix of unified kinship networks into the arena and they employ many 
tactics to serve the family's interests. Brokers, whose origins are in local political families, control 
localities and they try to turn political capital into commercial opportunity. The interactions with companies 
are one way to secure political survival and serve economic interests. Unfortunately, this study can only 
marginally discuss the related concepts of rent-seeking, licensing power, and redistribution of economic 
gains. My assumption, however, is that the intertwined processes of integration and modernisation 
ttjrough contract growing create new bases of local power. 
An interesting illustration is a quotation from an interview with one of the Muslim leaders: "A 
multinational is a multinational, but that does not mean you cannot do well by signing a contract [ . . ] 
1 can communicate directly with the general manager. He insists to be called John and not sir, but that 
does not change the true relation." 
2 9 The bail out offer to the first batch of growers was P 15 to 20,000 per hectare, which increased when 
the company had to compete for land with another company. 
In discussions with farmers, the period 1981-1989 was talked about as ilaga-time, referring to Christian 
groups engaged in warfare with their Muslim neighbours (see chapter 2). The owner of a maize dryer and 
trading business acted as barangay captain for two successive terms during this period. His involvement 
in the religious movement during the war in Mindanao might have undermined his position in a new 
phase, wherein Muslim farmers had become colleague growers. 
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Source: Various documents under the auspices of the local branch office of the Development Bank of 
the Philippines: Credit application forms (1991) Loan Transaction Executive Summary (1990), Loan 
Transaction Executive Summary (1991), Asparagus Growers Associations Credit Application (n.d.), 
including Asparagus project; operating guidelines (n.d.), Financial Memorandum, Notes and Assumptions 
on Financial Projection (n.d.) 
3 2 DBP shall pay GFSME a guarantee fee in an amount equivalent to 2% per annum of the guaranteed 
amount based on the diminishing balance thereof, which is again diverted to the growers. 
3 3 Source: Financing agreement between Asparagus Growers Associations, company, Development of 
the Philippines and Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises (1992). 
3 4 Source: Financing agreement between Asparagus Growers Associations, company, Development of 
the Philippines and Guarantee Fund for Small and Medium Enterprises (1992). 
3 5 Source: Loan Agreement between Asparagus Growers Association and Development Bank of the 
Philippines (1992). 
3 6 Associations have a saving and a current account with DBP. Source: Loan Agreement between 
Asparagus Growers Association and Development Bank of the Philippines (1992). 
3 7 The arrangement for the last expansion of 550 hectares was different: the grace period was limited to 3 
years. 
The bank reserves the right to refuse to advance any amount under the lines established even though 
the maximum amount of the lines have not been fully availed. Source: Credit line agreement between 
Asparagus Growers Association and Development Bank of the Philippines (1992). 
3 9 Source: Credit line agreement between Asparagus Growers Association and Development Bank of the 
Philippines (1992). 
4 0 See Hendriks' (1997) detailed account of trading in the Philippines. 
4 1 This was a remarkable decision because the financial agreement stipulated: T h e borrower may, at its 
option, repay the loan in part or in full together with accrued interest thereon to the date of prepayment." 
The bank would charge a prepayment fee of 0.5%. 
4 2 Source: Company position concerning purchase prices, dated 19/08/1995. 
4 3 When, in 1997, the Asian financial crisis disrupted economic growth in the region and the exchange 
rates changed dramatically, growers used an article in the financing agreement to open up new 
negotiations about prices. This article stipulated: T h e company has assured the associations that it will 
buy all the produce from project at reasonable prices. The company assures the planters and the 
associations, as a sole buyer of asparagus a floor price. The company's buying price shall be subject to 
upward adjustment in accordance with corresponding increases in the export market and the Peso-US 
Dollar exchange rate as may be applicable and beneficial to both the company and the planter." 
However, the company did not accept this argument. 
Figure: Peso-Dollar Rate (P/US$) (Period average) 
Source: Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (http://www.bsp.gov.ph/Statistics/sefi/P$MonAnn.htm) 
4 4 I was not able to observe these practices directly. Growers who revealed them in interviews allegedly 
based their conclusions on conversations with former workers of the company to whom they were 
related. The company hired contractual workers for the packing plants, which implied a high turnover of 
workers. Hence, quite some people left the packing plant after five months, which was the legal limit for 
contractual workers. 
4 5 Source: Various documents under the auspices of the local branch office of the Development Bank of 
the Philippines: Credit application forms (1991) Loan Transaction Executive Summary (1990), Loan 
Transaction Executive Summary (1991). 
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Internally, management decided that overspending could be countered by the retrenchment of 
technicians and other staff. 
7 In the feasibility study growers were expected to shoulder labour expenses, particularly in the form of 
family labour. The general budget for asparagus farming was as shown in the table below. The 
organisation of farm labour, however, proved to be different, which will be extensively discussed in 
chapter 4. 
Bank Company Growers \ 
Plant and field 
maintenance 
Subsistence allowance and 
transport 
Labour 
66-69% of total budget 1 1 % of total budget 20-23% of total 
budget 
A generally accepted view on agricultural problems in the company was the following: "Main problem is 
that inputs are not put in". 
Porter and Phillips-Howard (1994) present the case of contract growing of barley for Jos International 
Breweries in Nigeria. In this scheme, crop yields were low due to, amongst others, diversion of 
subsidised inputs, i.e. misallocation of fertiliser to non-contract crops, and due to inappropriate crop 
management. 
5 0 Mars (1982: 10) defines fiddling as: "the movement of resources to individual private use that do not 
appear in official accounts -or that appear in official accounts under different headings and which are 
acquired by individuals through their relationship to a job. These resources may derive directly from the 
job itself or be allocated from an outside source that related to the job." Fiddling generates rewards that 
are differentially allocated to individuals by what Mars (1982) terms 'individual contracts' that are the 
'covert institutions' of occupational life. 
8 1 Roberts (1996: 44) gives a useful description of relations resulting from such a form of accountability; 
he sees the connection between parties as hierarchical and instrumental. 
Glover and Kusterer (1990: 127) also note the common complaint of companies that growers do not 
follow their technical advice and suggested planting dates. The "industrial option' (see Mackintosh 1989), 
implying a sharp increase in intervention, to manage and transform productive activities in agriculture, 
became an attractive option for company management. 
5 3 In her analysis of contract growing of cavendish bananas in Mindanao, Magno also points to a vicious 
circle of debts, but her analysis lacks a precise understanding of the mechanisms leading to a situation of 
falling profitability: "A great number of those involved in this financing scheme of the corporations are 
small farmers, majority of whom own only five hectares or less [. . ] Faced with problems such as the 
marketing of their surplus at a profitable price, the TNC's offer proved to be a tempting alternative. The 
corporate financing scheme offered the farmer their much needed capital, in form of loans and farm 
inputs, technical assistance and a ready market for their products. With promises of a better income, the 
small farm-owners were easily persuaded to shift to planting export fruit crops such as pineapples and 
bananas [. . ] The offer of the corporation was too good to resist and undeniably after sometime, the 
farmers' incomes increased and they were able to pay off their loans to the corporation [ . .] The grower-
corporation relationship blossomed in the first few years of their partnership. Despite the high costs of 
farm inputs, the grower managed to earn more in planting cavendish bananas compared to their former 
crops produced [ . .] But the partnership later soured towards the end of their 10-year contract when the 
grower started to feel the long range effects of planting cavendish bananas. Soil acidity due to excessive 
chemical applications, blowdowns and uncertainty of market demands placed the farmer in an endless 
cycle of indebtedness to the corporation." (Magno 1984: 190-191). 
Glover and Kusterer (1990) suggest that companies may shelter producers from risk in the first few 
years of production, so that by the time the company starts to squeeze the growers they have committed 
a large portion of their resources to the crop. However, they also present evidence from outside Africa 
(Guatemalan vegetable production) that farmers may invest profits from the early phase when profits are 
high to diversify production so that they become less dependent on a single crop buyer. 
5 5 One of the agreements signed by the associations entitles the bank to change the original agreements: 
"The bank reserves the right to require the association to make, execute and deliver such other 
documents and to furnish such additional collaterals and/or securities as may be acceptable to the bank 
if, in the judgement of the bank, sufficient facts exist or conditions warrant any such step or steps to be 
taken for the protection of its interests." Source: Credit line agreement between Asparagus Growers 
Association and Development Bank of the Philippines (1992). 
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Chapter 5: Fixing control and cultivating accountability 
1 See also Maat (2001) for an example of analysing institutional thinking in agricultural research institutes. 
2 Magno also describes a wide range of growers' responses to indebtedness in the case of the production 
of cavendish bananas in Mindanao: "The eventual effects of contractual growership elicited diverse 
reactions from the growers. Some grower's groups recognised the lopsidedness of their contracts with 
the corporation, others continued to bargain with the corporation for better and more profitable terms 
while some still see the corporation as something of a godsend savior who would uplift them from 
poverty" (Magno 1984: 191). 
McGaw (1985) gives a fascinating historical account of methods of accounting in evolving business 
organisations. Her study raises interesting questions about the relation between financial accounting and 
the firm's economic condition. Little or no research has been done which relates a specific innovative 
organisational configuration such as contract farming to the accounting methods practised. 
4 Other growers, however, complained about the inaccessibility of the company compound: "We have to 
wear shoes to enter the office, otherwise you will be sent back by the company guards to the gate. 
Therefore, we have to borrow shoes from our neighbours. Furthermore, many of the negotiations are 
directly with the General Manager, so you have to voice out in English". 
According to Pertierra (1988: 186/7): "A dominant idiom such as English limits the ability of peasants to 
assert and justify their discursive claims. Internal political relations are less marked by power differential 
and are more characterized by normative interests. In this latter context, utterances depend more on their 
content for their value and there is a corresponding tendency to employ discursive models using the rich 
vernaculars". 
5 Remarkably, the company hired only one Muslim technician, despite the fact that more than half of the 
growers came from Muslim communities. This hindered personalised interactions in these communities. 
One grower told me: "During seminars the company emphasises the idea of partnership. Accordingly, 
growers and company will share both risks and profits. But the idea of partnership was only in theory, not 
in practice." 
7 Scott observes a similar outcome of changing relations in Malaysia: "Although older patron-client bonds 
may lose legitimacy, new vertical links may loin peasants to politicians, office-holders, or rural bosses and 
provide many of the essential services of the older relationship" (Scott, 1972: 6, emphasis added) 
It remains to be seen whether, due to the personalised character of interactions with company officials, 
growers seem to be prepared to accept uncertain procedures and unpredictable rewards. 
A similar dichotomy is presented by Bernal's analysis (1997) of the colonial Gezira scheme in Sudan. In 
this scheme, colonisers created a subordinate and dependent population of farmers, while, 
simultaneously, they represented and treated farmers as if they were free agents, or 'partners', to whom 
the benefits of scientific methods and corporate opportunities were extended. 
1 0 In Korovkin's study (1992) individual producers signed the contract, but the terms were negotiated 
collectively. Due to absence of landlords, fruit companies and government credit agencies developed into 
a new and important centre of local power. However, they had to confront organised contract growers, 
mostly of peasant origin, who were able to defend their collective interest. 
1 1 Boyce (1993: 213) gives an illuminating description of different corporate approaches to price 
negotiations and debt bondage: "In the case of agreements with corporate banana growers, exchange 
relations govern the distribution of profit between the domestic producer and the TNC [Transnational 
Corporation]. The attendant conflict over the purchase price became particularly acute when the 
Japanese market for bananas began to shrink in the late 1970s. The bargaining strategies of the TNCs 
varied. The head of the bargaining team for Del Monte growers stated that Del Monte 'drives a hard 
bargain and transfers any losses to its growers', precipitating several bankruptcies by 1980, whereas 
Dole 'gives out loans to its growers, keeps the plantations going and perpetually in debt'." 
Boyce cites former secretary of Agriculture and vice-president of Marsman, Roberto Sebastian (quoted in 
Hawes 1987:117). 
1 2 The outcome of budget cuts and the reduced subsistence allowance was less dramatic for well-off 
farmers compared to financially weak farmers. However, the company's review process was not 
discriminatory along these lines: big landlords, as well as small farmers were dumped. Farmers capable 
of containing costs and improving quality were likely to prosper despite the enforcement of budgetary 
control. Farmers who had spent the profits from asparagus growing for purchasing consumption goods, 
such as motorcycles, were highly dependent on the offers made by the company. Others, who had 
invested profits in new farms or other businesses, had a sounder base to negotiate new terms introduced 
in the scheme. 
1 3 This notion of a contractual relationship is closely in line with the systems analysis in agribusiness as 
developed in literature in the 1970s (see for example Morrissy 1974). 
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In such cases, arguing in favour of a comprehensive revision of the budgetary process and the 
accounting system may be the best choice, but one that 'overestimates men's ability to calculate' and 
'underestimates the importance of political and technological constraints' (Wildavsky and Hammond 
1965: 321). 
15 
One of the Muslim brokers said: "Labourers will be hurt by abandonment. A farmers will retain the land; 
they will lose their jobs". After a series of conflicts and cases of abandonment, it was rumoured that in 
some villages militant and armed Muslim groups were recruiting jobless farm workers. 
Towards the end of my fieldwork a remarkable alliance between Christian growers and a leading 
Muslim family arose. The Muslim family recognised the capacity of Christian growers to disclose 
malversation and flaws in the financial transactions with the company. What is even more remarkable 
about this alliance is the fact that the political figure from the Christian village was a member of a family 
which had become notorious during the violent conflict between Muslims and Christians in the 1970s (see 
chapter 2). The question is whether modernisation and integration creates common ground for new 
political alliances. Moreover, it remains to be seen whether such alliances will be able to reshape the 
organisational configuration in contract farming. 
Company management was composed of American and Philippine officials, most of whom had 
experience in plantation agriculture. Many of the Philippine managers and superintendents received 
training at universities and colleges in Mindanao. 
This occurred in four episodes, not in a smooth learning curve (Jonssen 1996): 
« Cost reports and drop in quality trigger interventions; 
• Management initiates a change in routine to remedy problem and to create new work relations. 
Management declares the problem solved and adopts new routines after closure; 
• The intervention results in new rules of the game and new norms of good practice. 
Pertierra's work (1988, 1995, 1997) tackles the balance between purposive-rationality and value-
rationality that characterises peasant social life. He wishes to explore how these rationalities are 
responsible for the differential responses to social and technological forces currently acting on rural 
communities. For this purpose, he sees peasants pursuing diverse and often irreconcilable interests 
within village society as well as defending their deeply felt moral values. Pertierra (1995, 1997) 
extensively discusses the notion of culture in Philippine society, which he presents as systems of 
meaning and structures of action. In modernising societies, representations, obviously of importance in a 
contractual arrangement, become a basis for establishing relationships. One of Pertierra's (1997) interest 
is in situations where social structures, such as the market or a contract growing scheme, connect people 
of diverse and incommensurable backgrounds. Here culture becomes post-reflective and individualised. 
Further exploration of this middle ground between political economy and moral economy is beyond the 
scope of this study. Nevertheless, it attempts to a certain degree to examine external notions of economic 
development and technological innovation in terms of existing local structures (Pertierra 1988). 
Chapter 6: Technological uncertainty and organisational coherence 
In 1999, Pioneer Hi-Bred International became a Du Pont company. 
Maize seed has not always been a profitable commodity for private companies; only since hybridisation 
gained ground, seed became an immensely profitable commodity (Berlan and Lewontin 1986). Scientific 
achievements in the late 1920s resulted in theoretical and practical progress necessary for the final shift 
to hybridisation. In the following decades, hybridisation proved to be a perfect solution to break through 
the biological barrier that had prevented the private sector to invest in crop improvement iKIoppenburg 
1988). The fact that hybrid vigour hardly survives in succeeding generations, turns commercial 
exploitation into a profitable enterprise. Preferably, farmers have to buy new hybrid seeds every cropping 
season, if they want to have plants which show hybrid vigour. Maize was technically and commercially 
well suited to hybridization (Rouanet 1987). The breeding and selection method promised hybrid vigour, 
i.e. high yields, and hybridisation offered seed companies the opportunity to control reproduction of 
commercialised proprietary varieties. 
Recently, the company also experimented with seed production under rain-fed conditions, in order to 
lessen its dependence on irrigated land. This experiment was, however, accompanied by major 
production problems and risks, which hampered a straightforward shift in seed production. 
The seed production operation in the Philippines adopted Pioneer's international philosophy: "Let's 
farmers do the farming". The production manager said, "we may have the technology, but farmers are 
more effective in applying it." 
I observed several cases in which a farmer was producing hybrid maize seed without a formal written 
contract. The technician forgot this or the technician assigned to the area was transferred to another 
village. 
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This overview of the hybrid maize seed industry in the Philippines borrows strongly from Baldos (1993). 
The total value of hybrid seed used in the Philippines in 1992 amounted to 11.3 million US dollars 
fCIMMYT 1994). 
In 1975 Pioneer tested the first varieties under Philippine conditions. The company's research resulted 
in some promising and adapted hybrids but the varieties' susceptibility to the downy mildew disease 
remained an unresolved problem. A few years later, this problem was resolved by treating the seeds with 
a fungicide. 
9 Simultaneously, the import of seeds continued which enabled the company to adapt to the market 
situation more easily (cf. Pray and Echeverria 1988). 
Since the 1950s, the brewery had shown an emerging interest in agribusiness. In 1977 SMC entered 
the corn industry, which entailed seed production as well as feed mills and growing of poultry. Initially, the 
company used its beer-distribution network to market public-bred hybrids. Its strategy was to develop 
high yielding seed well adapted to Philippine conditions (Karen 1985). This, however, was not a very 
profitable enterprise. Only after the Maisagana programme in 1980, the company invested again in seed 
production and marketing. With the arrival of a new management in SMC, the company decided to hive 
off its seed division. Together with Pioneer, a joint venture was established in 1989. Most of SMC's 
personnel transferred to the new company: Pioneer HiBred Agricultural Technologies (PHAT). 
Furthermore, Pioneer already hired people who gained experience with contract growing under the old 
alliance with AADC. Nevertheless, the number of regular employees was far less compared to the 
operation of SMC. 
1 Grosh (1994) refers to a similar situation, where the scheme may forgive or roll over farmers' debts on 
terms more generous than those provided by the contract. In such cases processing firms believe 1) that 
the events of that growing cycle were unusually negative, and 2) that the reason for the negative outcome 
was not caused by farmers' behaviour. The alternative would probably be withdrawal by farmers from the 
scheme, and the scheme may be willing to gamble its expected future earning to avoid this. Accordingly, 
Grosh concludes that the true ability of the processing firm to shift risk to farmers may be exaggerated by 
examining the legal provisions of contracts. (Grosh 1994: 241). 
1 2 Most of the technical insights presented in this chapter are derived from my reading of the discussion 
reflected in Edmeades et al 1997, FAO 1982, Edmeades et al. 1993, Bolafios and Edmeades 1996 and 
Edmeades et al 2000.1 thank Anne Eiings for helping me to get a grip on this complex body of literature. 
A careful reading of the technical literature suggests that failing pollination under conditions of drought 
stress is primarily related to delayed silking. Although accelerated pollen shedding, due to high 
temperatures and lower humidity, may also cause poor seed setting and reduced yields (FAO 1982). The 
pollen shedding of male inbred line might be delayed because the plant suffered from high temperatures, 
especially temperatures higher than 35°C cause problems. High temperatures regularly occurred in the 
production area, which explains variation in the duration of pollen shed, which generally lasts for only 1-2 
days in the case of an inbred line. But, as one breeder mentioned, in the case of extreme temperatures 
pollen may die within 8 hours in stead of the usual 24 hours (cf. Struik et al. 1986). 
1 4 Obviously, an array of stress factors is excluded from this discussion, such as nitrogen deficiency, the 
area of thermal adaptation, and crop density. 
5 Interviewed breeders and production managers in the Philippines often mentioned the problematic 
performance of the male inbred line in seed production. The reason for this is that the pollinator results 
from a process of inbreeding. In seed production male plants are often characterised by undesirable 
traits, such as low yields and greater susceptibility to adverse environmental conditions. Usually, inbred 
lines are weak and short plants, with low seed yields. Yet, Ribaut et al. (1996) question the impact of 
stress condition on the timing of male flowering. Like others, they emphasise the delay in silk emergence 
as a major bottleneck in maize farming. 
1 6 Another reason to contract out seed production is the ability to adapt more easily to changing market 
conditions. Flexible contracts offer the opportunity to reduce or to expand the production area. Planning 
of the volume of seed required is an acute task in seed companies. Dowswell and others mention that a 
major cost for seed companies is inventory finance: "Because seed is a seasonal product, there is a 
considerable lag from the time when seed is produced and processed and when the farmer buys it [ . . ] 
Over-production of a particular seed type can be very costly because it means that the seed distributor 
must either sell of his stocks at a considerable amount or carry the surplus seed inventory for another 12 
months before being able to dispose of it." (Dowswell et al. 1996:151). 
1 7 One of the interviewed breeders, of a competing company but with a working history in Pioneer, 
mentioned that seed companies in the area had reached a gentlemen's agreement about the use and 
access to irrigated land. The area in Southern Mindanao was often referred to as the battleground of the 
seed companies, mainly indicating the on-going struggle about land for seed production. Breeders and 
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production managers constituted a close network of people who had worked together and had gone to 
school or university together. Many of them had worked for Pioneer in earlier years. For some reason, 
Cargill, in 1999 purchased by Monsanto, was not part of the gentlemen's agreement about territories for 
seed production. 
1 8 This grower had a history of conflict with Pioneer. He continually tried to negotiate the results of 
contract farming: "Pioneer can hold the neck of the grower if you do not complain". In 1997, Pioneer put 
his seeds to a Grow Out Test (GOT) because its technicians believed the field had some isolation 
problems. A GOT is meant to determine whether the seeds are pure or not. The company did not inform 
him about the GOT, but in accordance with the procedure for a GOT the prices for his seeds were 
lowered already. Only after positive results would he receive the agreed price. He had to use personal 
contacts to keep himself informed about the results. He challenged the assessment of the company, and 
threatened not to sell his current seeds. Remarkably, he had not signed a formal contract yet, because 
the company had replaced the technician in his area. After many complaints and conversations, the 
grower received the agreed price, probably for the sake of peace. 
Interviews with company personnel and with association members did not confirm the idea that the 
employment of the president was a strategic step of the company. Besides, he was serving his second, 
and formally last, term as elected president, since a new term was not allowed by the constitution of the 
association. 
20 
The company explored the possibility of entering new production areas. Part of the seed production 
activities were scheduled to take place in an established rice production area in the island of Luzon. Seed 
production was supposed to take place in the dry season, which would help to reduce disease pressure 
because fewer hosts are available to pests and diseases. It was also expected that irrigation water would 
be less problematic. Nevertheless, the presence of a modern seed conditioning plant and the 
accessibility of the market for hybrid seed in Mindanao would make a complete transfer of seed 
production less likely. The company could not afford to move the plant, hence, it had to make the best out 
of the current situation. 
Technicians also supervised detasseling in the fields of growers and they managed the rogueing 
crews, which were hired by the company. Furthermore, they arranged the contracts for the next planting 
season; they managed the budgets of growers and were responsible for the signing of Purchase Orders 
for agricultural inputs. 
2 2 The production manager explained that the company could never become very big and rigid because 
of the influence of nature in agriculture. 
These observations are highly inspired by Edwin Hutchin's book (about the practice of navigation on 
board a US marine vessel) Cognition in the wild. 
Chapter 7: Managing society and technology in contract farming 
1 The hybrid nature of contract farming is derived from, for example, the combination of hierarchical forms 
of administration and entrepreneurial attitudes towards small-scale production, the mixture of outsourcing 
productive activities and hands-on supervision by company technicians, or the prescription of technology 
packages and the need for skilful management of farming by independent growers. 
Influential in the construction of this policy of agro-industrial development in the Philippines has been 
the work of Hayami, Quisumbing and Adriano, who suggest, in their book Toward an alternative land 
reform paradigm (1990), that it is timely to introduce contract farming as an alternative to plantations. 
Proposing contract farming as a required induced institutional innovation is based in an analysis of 
scale and intensity and of the ratio between land and population in agricultural development, as outlined 
in the theory of induced innovation of Hayami and Ruttan (1985). Likewise, Bray's analysis of rice 
agriculture (1983, 1986) assures that small-scale intensive cultivation is the appropriate from of 
organisation under Asian conditions, and she challenges the supposed superior efficiency of large units 
of production. Effective transfer of technology is believed to increase both land productivity as well as the 
demand for labour by an increased number of operations; labour intensive cultivation requires skill-
oriented and biological technologies, as opposed to skill-excluding and mechanical technologies. In this 
sense, contract farming represents a correct institutional measure in a context where land is scarce and 
labour is plentiful and where institutional constraints, such as lack of credit facilities and market linkages, 
hinder an optimal combination of land and labour (Adriano 1988). 
4 Long and van der Ploeg (1989) also criticise this kind of interventionist thinking because it lacks an 
assessment of the complex pattern of development tendencies and countertendencies. 
Remarkably, this critique also builds on the paradigm of 'land to the tiller', which has consistently 
dominated the discussion on agrarian reform in Southeast Asia, but in contrast to the above advocates it 
fears a lopsided situation in case farmers are contracted by large companies. Supposedly, land 
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ownership breaks down dependency relations and, consequently, enables farmers and tenants to lay the 
foundation for a prosperous life. Basic to this idea is to distribute land so that independent farm families 
are able to produce food and, if possible, sell some of their surplus. Non-governmental organisations and 
farmer movements are anxious that a contractual relationship results in spiralling indebtedness rather 
than in a win-win situation. 
6 Mackintosh's study of economic change induced by the incorporation of small farmers into growing 
schemes in Senegal shows that, typically, these schemes "set out to elide the relations of those 
producers to the market for their goods. They become cogs in a larger production scheme, where prices 
are set to locate returns further up the chain of production and sale" (Mackintosh 1989:40). 
7 Several reasons for shifting to contract farming are mentioned in the literature. Firstly, contracting 
secures a guaranteed supply of raw material without high costs for land and machinery, and without an 
increase in permanent labour. Secondly, through contract farming companies are able to shift risks of 
weather conditions and the intensification of labour use onto the shoulders of the small farmers. Thirdly, 
contract farming offers the opportunity to avoid expropriations as a result of land reform programs (Glover 
1984, Llorito 1989, Watts 1990). Finally, the use of alternatives to wage labour such as contract farming 
can play an important role as a strategy to counter the development of organised labour movements 
ICollins 1993). 
Grosh states that the true ability of a firm to shift risk to farmers may be exaggerated by examining only 
the legal provisions of contracts and disregard the provision of loans to farmers (1994: 241). 
9 Literally Grosh (1994: 238) asks whether "contract farming could provide a Pareto-improving form of 
governance compared with the alternatives", which brings up the idea that improvements for growers do 
not necessarily mean losses in profit for the company. 
1 0 Access to credit, markets and new technologies does not mean to say that contract farming is indeed 
the best way of allocation, as argued by Porter and Phillips-Howard (1994): "[Contract farming] offers 
access to new technology and expertise, which may be beneficially integrated into, or harmfully imposed 
on, local indigenous technical knowledge, it provides a potential market, but not necessarily an assured 
one." 
1 1 In general, use of wage labour in small and medium farms is an ignored aspect of Philippine 
agriculture. Except for some studies on labour relations in rice agriculture (Ledesma 1982, Aguilar 1989). 
The common assumption is that agricultural is family based, only plantations hire wage labourers. 
Usually, these modes of farm work are a blank spot of labour organisations and unions, which tend to 
concentrate on formal labour in the industry or in plantations. 
1 2 This calls for a combination of impact studies (interplay of things and social relations, productivity and 
incomes) and design studies (spin-offs of technological path-dependencies and learning processes) 
(Tranvik et al. 1999). 
3 This analysis does not fit well with a deskilling thesis, and it shifts attention to institutional constraints in 
solving production problems. 
1 4 The history of Southern Mindanao reveals that colonial governments had tenuous and uncertain control 
over this part of the archipelago (de Jesus 1982). Historically, local leaders acted as authorised 
gatekeepers in dealing with alien authorities and interests. In the first half of the 20th century, the arena 
for accommodation of foreign and domestic business interests was predominantly controlled by local 
political leaders who were also entitled to dispose of land use and who, naturally, got their share of the 
resulting profits. However, since the 1970s, years of government neglect, land disputes and rising 
expectations induced by modernisation complicated this mediating task of Muslim leaders because the 
majority of peasants and labourers hardly benefited from the development processes (Tan and Wadi 
1995). 
1 5 With Ed de Jesus (1982) I would argue that it is risky to assume that people see only two sides of a 
question, e.g. modem vs. traditional or nationalist vs. colonialist, or that they necessarily consider two 
options mutually incompatible. Obviously, the enrolment of farmers in a corporate contract farming 
scheme was not only a matter of economic necessity, although provision of agricultural inputs was a 
great incentive to enrol in the production scheme, given the shortage of credit facilities and the costs of 
supplies on the open market. Equally important for farmers' commitment to a 'modern' project were 
relations of trust with the company. 
1 8 At the beginning of the research, I spoke to one of the company managers. Discussing the problems in 
the production scheme, he made clear to me that he was confused about the cultural and personal 
attitude of the farmers contracted by the company. He clearly assumed that the company entered into a 
business-type deal with independent business-oriented farmers, an arrangement that could easily turn 
into a win-win situation. Reality, however, revealed a much more complex situation, which was difficult to 
tackle by the company. Maintaining good social relations entailed more than closing a business deal. The 
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diversity in perceptions and social histories included in the scheme confronted the company with a messy 
situation. Therefore, he asked me the question whether I would be able to explain the culture of the 
people incorporated in the company's operations. I hope my work sheds some light on what seems to be 
a common problem faced by companies venturing into social engagements in new terrain. 
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A P P E N D I X 1 : T H E FIRST YEARS OF THE SETTLEMENT PROGRAMME IN SOUTHERN MINDANAO ( 1 9 3 8 - 1 9 4 0 ) 
One o f general Santos' first steps was to meet D o n Paco Natividad, an old settler who arrived in 
Sarangani Bay before the government supported programs. Natividad had bought a substantial 
area o f land from one o f the datus in the valley that extended into Polomolok. He planted 
coconut and raised cattle and was engaged in trading. In the history o f Buayan municipality, later 
renamed as General Santos City, his family continued to play a role o f consequence. The same 
goes for the family o f a settler from the Visayas who ventured to go to the south in an early 
stage and who worked for a Japanese trader and ranch owner. In the first half o f the 20th 
century, Japanese planters fully controlled hemp or abaca production. Some plantations were 
located in the Sarangani Bay area but most o f the hemp production was concentrated in the 
surroundings o f Davao. After the Second World War this D o n Pedro Acharon became the 
owner o f a large ranch which is now the area for maize seed production; the case study which is 
presented in chapter five. He served several terms as mayor o f Buayan and o f General Santos 
City and his family maintained its presence in the political arena o f the city. 
These established settlers maintained good relations with datus and sharifs in the valley, they 
had bought land from these Muslim leaders and the local datus had no objections to people who 
contributed to commerce and other enterprises in their constituency. Hence, general Santos was 
soon introduced to sharif Zainal Abedin. Like most datus in the valley he was related to Sultan 
Sambuto, who arrived in the area in 1926 after he had lost parts o f his territory near lake 
Buluan. As explained before, most sultans in Pulangi Valley lived in mutual rivalry. In the early 
1900s, he and his followers inhabited the place, and they used the land given to them by the 
original inhabitants o f the area, the B'laans. Sultan Sambuto was able to maintain his power and 
wealth, which essentially depended on control over manpower, i.e. bonded labourers or free 
people who owe allegiance, and on authority over land. 
Sharif Abedin owned a large coconut plantation and other farms, and he controlled many 
workers in the area. Consequentiy, Abedin was an influential political figure in the valley and, 
fortunately for the national government, he co-operated on the settlement programmes. In their 
initial conversation general Santos assured sharif Abedin that "their rights o f whatever rights 
they have acquired will be duly respected by the Administration, and to emphasize this fact, I 
made it clear to them that as far as I am concerned, the best tide that one can have for 
possession over a piece o f land is the existence o f improvements thereon, such as houses, 
plants, fences, etc., more than the certificates o f tide." (Ramirez 1993: 49). 
In 1940, Sharif Abedin was the first appointed mayor o f Buayan when it became an 
independent municipal district almost o f the size o f a province; its jurisdiction extended to 
Polomolok and Tupi, the areas opened for settlement in the centre o f the valley. The settlement 
programme was interrupted by the Japanese occupation, but N.L.S.A. resumed the operation 
immediately after the war (BRC 1994). Soon after the war, a relative o f Natividad was appointed 
military mayor in the settlement district Polomolok and one o f the leading datus became vice-
mayor. The latter became the first appointed mayor o f the municipality Polomolok, which was 
inaugurated in 1957. 
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A P P E N D I X 2; D O L E ' S VENTURE IN THEPHTLIPPINES 
It was James Dole who ventured Into pineapple production and canning in Hawaii in 1901. He 
succeeded in finding financiers for his Hawaiian Pineapple Company (Hapco) and as president 
o f the Association o f Hawaiian Pineapple Growers, he guided the promotion o f this tropical 
fruit. In the 1930s, his company's bright financial future fell apart and the banks took over. 
Casde and Cooke, one o f the leading sugar firms in Hawaii and in control o f banks, arranged for 
a re-capitalisation o f the pineapple company. In 1932, the company continued using the name 
o f Dole as its trademark, but under the corporate management o f Casde and Cooke. Hapco 
became one o f the largest subsidiaries o f Casde and Cooke and in 1961 it merged into Casde 
and Cooke and became Dole Pineapple Company, a wholly owned subsidiary (Dole and Dole 
1990, Hoover 1995). Pests and increasing labour costs in its island o f origin, Hawaii, prompted 
the transfer o f a significant part o f the pineapple operation to the Philippines. 
Before Dole entered the area, families o f the original homesteaders tilled the land. They 
usually cultivated 12-hectare lots and planted corn or sorghum. From the early stages o f Dole's 
development, critical questions have been raised about the constitutionality and legality o f the 
25-years sublease agreement with N D C (Furuhashi et al. 1982). The critique focused on the 
allegedly low rentals paid by the company, the duration o f the contract, and on the way in which 
N D C and Dole acquired farm lots which were to be used eventually for the pineapple operation 
( IBON 1995). O n the other side, however, the history o f land-use in Polomolok seems to 
support the proclaimed marginality o f the area. Many migrants bypassed Polomolok to areas 
further inland and they disregarded the sandy and water-deficient soils (furuhashi 1982, cf. 
Pebzer 1948). Informants pointed out that their parents, who had attempted to farm the area, 
abandoned these attempts before Dole arrived. Some mentioned the relief o f being able to sell 
plots after being faced with indebtedness and slack production. 
Dole's expansion into banana production in Mindanao 
In 1964, Casde and Cooke, acquired Standard Fruit Company, which allowed for a shift to 
banana production. Mindanao became a prime location for the new agricultural operations o f 
the company. For the banana export industry access to land was complicated by the fact that 
much o f the suitable lands were already in use by farmers or corporations. In 1968, Stanfilco, 
Dole's banana division in the Philippines, became the first exporter in the Philippines (AFRTM 
1991b). Through the holding company House o f Investments, an influential political family in 
Mindanao, the Yuchengco family, was a major investor in Stanfilco. The family managed three 
o f the bigger plantation producing for Stanfilco. Besides, the family owns a bank ( R C B Q and it 
has several interests in telecommunication and insurance (AFRTM 1989b). The family recendy 
sold its shares in Stanfilco to Dole Philippines. Also the minister o f Defence Enrile, close to 
President Marcos, had a high position in Stanfilco's banana business and he was a major 
stockholder (Oosterhout 1985). 
The entrance o f other banana companies sharpened the competition for land in the 1970s. 
Most banana companies entered into long-term production agreements with local producers 
and agro-corporations while retaining control over shipping and marketing (Boyce 1993). The 
plantations o f the contracted growers varied between 100 and 1000 hectares; only Stanfilco 
managed to work with owner-cultivators tilling less than 6 hectares. In the 1970s, competing 
brands o f Stanfilco, like Del Monte and Chiquita ate up 7 5 % o f Stanfilco's market in Japan. 
Until the 1980s, the company had the policy to leave aside first class bananas because to many 
conditions were attached to the production. But in 1989, the company lost market and it began 
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to rethink its strategy (AFRTM 1991b). In the 1990s, several programmes were launched to 
improve the quality o f bananas produced in the fields o f growers (BW 0 3 / 1 1 / 9 5 ) . 
Dole's banana division Stanfilco gained substantial experience in growing arrangements with 
small and medium landowners. While Dole's competitors only had growing arrangements with 
domestically owned agro-corporations, Stanfilco not only contracted local agro-corporations but 
also small and medium landowners (EBON 1990). Originally, contract growing in bananas left 
farm operations largely to the landowner, but this proved to be unsatisfactory in assuring 
quantity and quality in the competitive banana export market In the present scheme hired 
labourers under the management o f Stanfilco, performed several tasks, including fertilisation, 
spraying and harvesting. 
In the 1970s, the banana industry developed into a mature industry. During martial law, 
president Marcos imposed a statutory limit on the total area planted with bananas in an effort to 
regulate competition in the banana industry. The maximum allowed acreage was divided among 
four parties: Stanfilco, Tadeco (growing for the Chiquita label o f United Brands), Del Monte, 
and Dahitri (Magno 1984). This measure assured control over the industry by four firms and 
their allied growers. It also engendered a situation in which landowners close to the president 
had entrenched interests in the agro-export industry (Boyce 1993); a narrow class o f wealthy and 
powerful landowners benefited from the flow o f income from exporting bananas. 
The most notorious banana plantation owner was Antonio Floirendo, a close associate o f the 
presidents Macapagal and Marcos. His T A D E C O plantation is near Davao, where most o f the 
banana plantations are located and majority o f his workers is recruited in the nearby prison. 
Floirendo was president o f the Banana Growers and Exporters Association and had diversified 
business interests, such as banana and abaca plantations, swine farm and cattle ranches, trees 
and timber, trading and construction and several industrial enterprises (Oosterhout 1985). 
Mainly in the provinces around Davao City, leading business families combined interests in 
banana plantations with concessions in timberland and participation in the wood and paper 
industry (AFRIM 1989b). The established migrant families developed former Japanese and 
American plantations; many o f the new families accumulated capital in logging operations, 
which they invested in various enterprises. Moreover, wealthy families from other islands 
acquired plantation and large tracks o f land in Mindanao; during the martial law era (1972-1986) 
close ties with the presidential couple paved the way for land acquisitions in Mindanao 
(Oosterhout 1985). These families have been major landowners in southern Mindanao and 
vacant land had become scarce, especially in productive agricultural areas (Llorito 1989). In the 
1980s, the pact between government, landowners and agribusiness created a discordant situation 
in the banana plantations around Davao City and partly explains the rise o f the communist New 
Peoples Army in these regions. 
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A P P E N D I X 3: CONTRACTUAL AGREEMENTS BETWEEN COMPANY AND INDIVIDUAL GROWER IN ASPARAGUS 
FARMING 
Sources: Extracts from the Memorandum of agreement in asparagus production (new), Articles from the farmer's 
contract-growing agreement (old-1990). Additional articles from financing and guarantee agreements (1992) 
1 Company 
Venture 
Whereas, the company, having investigated intensively the 
possibility of developing an asparagus export industry in 
the Philippines and having arrived at the conclusion that 
the same is feasible from both the economic and social 
point of view, has decided to embark on a venture whereby 
a major share of the acreage needed to produce the fruit 
will be contracted to individual Filipino farmers. 
For and in consideration of the planter's undertakings 
under this agreement the company shall among other 
things undertake and perform the following: 
(a) Prepare at its own expense a soil analysis of the land to 
be planted and submit detailed recommendations for 
cleaning, drainage, planting, pre-production to the planter; 
(b) Furnish without costs to the planter the necessary 
seeds up to a maximum of 600 grams per net hectare to be 
planted; 
(c) Furnish continued technical assistance to the planter 
and to recommend such cultural practices necessary to 
obtain maximum yields and high quality asparagus; 
(d) Pay for the asparagus delivered by the planter and 
accepted by the company at the rate specified in this 
agreement. Payment will be made within 15 days after 
acceptance or delivery by the company. A proportionate 
share to pay for bank loans and fees and/or company's 
advances to planter shall be deducted from the gross price 
thereof before payment. 
The company agrees to exert its efforts to assist the 
planter in securing the necessary financing at the best 
possible terms. 
Technology/Expertise 
The company has the planting seed material and the 
trained and technical personnel and know-how for the 
project, world-wide marketing facilities, the necessary 
scientific knowledge and practical experiences. 
(Financing agreement) The company shall advance 
production inputs to the planters, which shall later on be 
reimbursed by the association at cost out of the loan 
proceeds from DBP in accordance with the schedule 
loan releases. 
Grower 
Venture 
Whereas, the planter, being fully aware of the substantial 
investment and the extensive technical know-how required 
in a venture of this nature, has decided to participate In this 
venture under the terms and condition hereinafter set forth. 
The planter shall undertake and perform the following: 
(a) plant asparagus only in the area covered by this 
agreement which the company designates; plant only the 
asparagus seeds furnished by the company; 
(b) follow the asparagus cultural practices prescribed by 
the company; 
(c) not no intercrop between asparagus within the area 
covered by this agreement without previous written 
authorisation from the company; [..] 
(j) sell and deliver to the company at whichever of its 
packing plant designates by the company, asparagus in 
good quality, per company's specifications as described in 
paragraph 11. In the events that the asparagus does not 
meet such specifications, the company may reject the 
same without any liability therefor [..] 
(n) sell exclusively to the company all asparagus produced 
on the land, except those rejected by the company for 
failure to meet the specifications contained in paragraph 
11. 
If necessary by the terms and conditions of the loan, the 
planter agrees to mortgage his unencumbered properties 
to guarantee the loan that may be obtained under this 
agreement. 
Technology/Expertise 
The planter shall permit company personnel or persons 
or entities designates by the company to inspect the 
planter's land at any time to determine the condition of 
diseases and pests control, to verify product estimates 
and, for such other purposes as the company may 
consider convenient for adequate plantings of 
asparagus. 
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Accounting: financial management 
(old) The company shall deduct corresponding 
repayment of advances including interest thereon if any, 
made by the company in favour of the planter from the 
asparagus sales proceeds. A periodic statement of 
advances and repayment schedule shall be furnished to 
the planter by the company. 
(old and financing agreement) The company shall design 
a computer accounting programme which will properly 
account for the sales proceeds of the planter, his 
corresponding deductions for payment of advances 
made by the company in favour of the planter, and for 
the payment of loan amortisation due to the bank and the 
respective outstanding balances thereof. 
Quality and prices 
The company may reject without any liability whatsoever 
asparagus which do not meet the above specifications. 
The company may change the above specifications as it 
may deem necessary, which change shall be operative and 
take effect immediately upon written notice to such effect 
furnished by the company to the planter, except those that 
shall have specified effectivlty dates. 
The company agrees to pay for the asparagus accepted by 
the company in accordance with the conditions set forth 
herein governing purchase from and payment to the planter 
under the specified rates, and the company may change 
these rates, from time to time, when the circumstances so 
warrant 
(Financing agreement) The company has assured the 
associations that it will buy all the produce from project at 
reasonable prices and under terms. The company assures 
the planters and the associations, as a sole buyer of 
asparagus a floor price. The company's buying price shall 
be subject to upward adjustment in accordance with 
corresponding increases in the export market and the 
Peso-US Dollar exchange rate as may be applicable and 
beneficial to both the company and the planter. 
(Guarantee agreement) Company shall buy at competitive 
prices that will assure viable operation of the project 
Accounting: debt payments 
(old) The planter shall authorise the company to deduct 
from the asparagus sales proceeds the corresponding 
sum representing: 
(1) Repayment of advances made by the company, 
including interest thereon, if any 
(2) Bank loan amortisation, including bank fees and 
charges, if any, which same amount deducted shall be 
remitted by the company to bank in favour of the planter 
on or before amortisation due dates free of service fee 
on the part of the company. 
Land 
The planter is the owner of a certain parcel of land, 
recorded in appropriate land titles, suited to the growing 
and cultivation of asparagus and other agricultural crops, 
(loan agreement DBP-association) The planters have good 
titles to all the properties to be used as project sites, free 
and clear of all liens, encumbrances, restrictions, pledges, 
mortgages, security interests or changes, except as have 
been disclosed by the lender in writing or as may have 
been registered prior to this agreement The individual land 
titles covering the project sites shall be submitted to the 
bank for safekeeping throughout the term of the loan. 
The planter shall not sell, displace, transfer, assign or lease 
the land to any third party without prior written consent of 
the company. It is understood that this agreement shall 
constitute a lien attaching to the land and/or asparagus and 
other agricultural crops planted thereon in the event of sale, 
' disposition, transfer, assignment, or lease of such land in 
favour of third party. 
Mortgage or encumbrance shall not, without written 
consent of the company, in any way cover, include or affect 
the rights of the company under this agreement 
(old) The planter shall deposit with the bank his title/s 
covering the asparagus farm site during the term of the 
loan and for as long as this contract is in force and effect 
Appendices 217 
Termination 
Should the planter fail to follow the company's prescribed 
cultural practices to such an extent as in the opinion of the 
company the success of the crop is endangered, the 
company shall have the right upon one week's notice in 
writing, to turn over the operation of the planter's land 
covered by this agreement to an administrator to be 
selected by the company who will do all the necessary 
work for the account of the planter to save the crop and 
shall pay to the planter 2Vi % of the gross revenue. 
The administrator shall continue to operate the farm until 
such time as all loans or other financing agreements 
guaranteed by the company as well as all advances and 
monies due to the company shall have been fully 
liquidated. 
(Financing agreement) The company shall advance any 
shortfalls of a planter's loan obligation with the association, 
in cases of planters whose farm management has been 
taken over by the company through an administrator per 
condition of the Memorandum of Agreement 
In the event the company decides to terminate the 
agreement prior to the ten-year period, the company 
shall pay the planter the amount of one hundred 
thousand pesos per net planted hectare. Said payment 
will first be used to pay for any and all loans and 
advances that have remained outstanding as of the date 
of termination of this agreement. 
Termination 
• Upon termination of this agreement, the company shall 
have the right to dismantle and remove all installations or 
may leave them without costs on the land, and the 
company shall restore the land to its prior condition. 
• Furthermore, the company reserves the right to remove the 
asparagus crowns and/or seedlings in the lot of the planter 
at its own expense and for which the company shall pay 
the planter the amount of fifty centavos per piece. Said 
payment will be used to pay for any loans and/or advances 
outstanding as of the date of termination of this agreement 
• In the event the planter decides to terminate the 
agreement prior to the ten-year period, any and all loans 
and advances made to him under this agreement that 
have remained outstanding shall become due and 
payable immediately on the date of termination. 
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A P P E N D I X 4: PRODUCING ASPARAGUS IN THE TROPICS; PROBLEMS AND CONSTRAINTS 
The way the company dealt with uncertainties and unknowns o f asparagus production in the 
tropics importantly shaped the working relationships in contract growing. The scan o f technical 
literature presented here gives an indication o f the nature o f various interrelated production 
problems asparagus growers and company had to deal with over the years. Generally, there is 
little information on growth and development o f asparagus in the tropics (Nichols 1992), but 
this brief technical excursion underlines the relevance o f biological and technological factors for 
understanding a particular production system. These factors co-shape the production system 
along with the organisational and social relations central to this chapter. The combination 
explains differences in cultivation practices, and agronomic and economic results, as is 
suggested by Castella et al. (1994 and 1995). 
The Philippine production scheme based its farming system on previous experiences in 
Taiwan, but nowadays the scheme is a leading source o f experimentation and research on 
asparagus production in the tropics. Initially, the company did not exacdy know how to produce 
asparagus and entered into a learning process. During the time the company laid out the basic 
features o f the farming system, there were still many unknowns about performance o f asparagus 
varieties under tropical conditions, especially because most breeding programs focused on 
temperate environments. The company was well aware o f its reliance on a technically suitable 
asparagus production system (in contrast to Grubben's (1992) analysis o f failing asparagus 
production in Indonesia). The company's long-term research programme focuses on planting 
varieties able to cope with tropical conditions. Growers in the current scheme, however, had to 
work with the asparagus variety selected in 1990. The technicalities o f three production 
problems affecting performance in the growing scheme are examined below; (1) the impact o f 
sustained production, (2) disease control, and (3) post-harvest handling. 
1. Sustained asparagus production in the tropics 
Asparagus officinalis is a dioecious herbaceous perennial traditionally produced in temperate 
environments, where the succulent spears are harvested in late spring. Ferns are allowed to grow 
during summer and die down in autumn. Plants over-winter as a storage organ comprising a 
crown and swollen storage roots. Yields in the following season largely depend on adequate 
carbohydrate reserves. The absence o f a 'natural' rest period is a major difference o f asparagus 
production in temperate and tropical environments. Taiwanese experiments in the late 1950's 
showed it is possible to produce asparagus in tropical environments using the 'mother fern' 
technique that permits harvesting throughout the year (Nichols 1986). This technique involves: 
"establishing plants in the field and then allowing two or three spears per plant to develop into 
fern. Thereafter, future shoots are harvested as they develop over a full 12-month period, except 
that a short rest period is taken twice during the year, when the old fern is replaced by new fern. 
Using this technique, annual yields are heavier than for temperate climate production systems, 
but are less concentrated" (Nichols 1986: 7). Thus, two or three fern shoots per plant can 
support the production o f spears over a long period. O n the other hand, experiments show that 
as temperature increases to above 30 °C the root shoot ratio declines; high temperatures may 
constrain photosynthesis, which may result in limited storage reserves for future growth 
(Nichols 1992). The problem o f carbohydrate loss in production o f tropical asparagus is one 
that, according to Nichols (1999), has yet not been resolved: 
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"In temperate climates, plants cease to produce new fern in the late summer, but they continue 
to store carbohydrates for the next year's crop in their roots until autumn. In the humid 
tropics, where new spears and new fern grow continually, no dormancy period occurs, and 
plants do not store carbohydrates. I f all the fern is removed at once, the plant suffers a large 
net loss o f carbohydrates, which the young fern and spears require to reach a stage at which 
they can photosynthesize efftcienriy. This loss can be crippling." (Nichols 1999). 
The balance o f carbohydrates in the plant is considered one o f the reasons for lower quality. 
Both production and quality o f spears are dependent upon the carbohydrate reserves held in the 
crown and the roots o f the plant Jayamangkala 1992). The more spears are cut, which is 
possible with using the 'mother fern' technique and the extended harvesting period, the more 
the reserves are depleted. According to Jayamangkala (1992: 12): "the rapid replenishment of 
food reserves may be severely curtailed so that buds produced by the plant may be smaller in 
size and more reduced in number". Hence, the question occurs how long one can harvest using 
the 'mother fern' technique is difficult to answer. Furthermore, the efficacy o f the required 
dormancy or rest period during the growing cycle to allow the crown to generate carbohydrate 
reserves is not easy to establish. This was the key issue in the modified farming system 
introduced by the company in the midst o f conflicts and disagreements with growers. 
A related complicating particularity o f the asparagus plant is the presence o f autotoxic 
substances from asparagus root exudates, apparently leading to extensive death o f storage root 
in the older plant. This phenomenon is associated with reduction in yield and quality in 
continuous cultivation in Taiwan (Young and Chen 1989, Young et al. n.d.). Thus, accumulated 
toxins and crops residues in the soil may have harmful effects on succeeding crops or negatively 
affect continuous cropping. Furthermore, it may inhibit rehabilitation and replanting o f 
asparagus plantations. 
2. Pests and diseases 
Literature suggests that disease control in asparagus is relatively simple because the most 
vulnerable part o f the plant, the fern, is removed at intervals (Nichols 1992). The plant is 
comparatively free from insect pests and most diseases and does not need highly specialised pest 
control (Coop. Extension UC 1977). Yet, all commercially grown cultivars o f Asparagus officinalis 
are susceptible to infection by Fusarium species, which are prevalent throughout the growing 
cycle (Wacker et al. 1990). The fungi are common to most soils and infect and colonise roots, 
crowns and stems and cause the ferns to turn yellow, wilt and die. The soil born fungi invade 
the roots and crowns early in the life o f the plant until some stress factor, particularly related to 
the moisture-nutrition ratio and to a lesser extent to weed growth, alters the host physiology 
which allows the fungi to become pathogenic and to cause wilting and rotting o f roots and 
crowns (Nigh 1990). Fusarium is more critical in younger plants than in older crowns; it is 
believed that older crowns become somewhat more tolerant to the disease. In the case o f 
Fusarium-iaiecteA plants, blight (for example Phytophthora infestans) is one o f the most common 
diseases that results in withering, cessation o f growth, or death o f parts (FRLD 1993). Regular 
and preventive application o f fungicides is common practice in the Philippines. 
Cultural practices reducing stress, e.g. irrigation and fertiliser regimes, and genetic sources o f 
resistance are recognised as suitable methods to reduce yield and stand decline, in contrast to 
chemical control (Di Lenna and Foletto 1990, Elmer 1990a, 1990b). Excessive soil moisture due 
to flooding is seen as adversely affecting asparagus growth; a high water table is especially 
detrimental to vigorous growth (Coop. Extension UC 1977). Whether this is because o f the 
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direct effect o f water or relates to increased diseases is subject o f further investigation (Falloon 
et al. 1991). Thorough soil preparation before planting is essential because there is no 
opportunity for further preparation afterwards. 
3. Post-harvest handling 
Asparagus has extremely high respiration rates and undergoes rapid ageing after harvest. 
Therefore, supplying the critical Japanese market requires both careful harvesting procedures 
and post-harvest handling (Fintrac 1999a, 1999b). Rapid cooling o f asparagus spears and storage 
at near freezing temperatures are used to commercially maintain asparagus quality (Baxter and 
Waters 1991). Cooling facilities and storage and packaging systems were a major concern for the 
operations in the Philippines, especially because sensory changes could alter the company's 
position in the critical Japanese market. Transportation from the a grower's field to the 
processing plant was a critical phase in the production system, mainly because hauling was done 
in open vehicles in usually high temperatures. Maintaining quality during and after packing was a 
technically complex procedure which required substantial investment in machinery, 
classification and packaging facilities, and (hydro)cooling facilities from the side o f the company. 
At arrival in the market, the produce had to be fresh and satisfy high quality standards. Even 
within a short shelf life, quality may deteriorate because o f changes in texture and flavour, or in 
some cases because o f microbial spoilage (Browne et al. 1989). 
Experiments by Lill, King and O'Donoghue reveal the precarious nature o f the asparagus tip, 
which is unusual from a post-harvest viewpoint, and the most critical criteria in quality 
assessment, because it is a shoot, characterised by intense metabolic activity, and is o f a highly 
perishable nature (Lill et al. 1990). Asparagus spears are very active metabolically and highly 
perishable during handling and storage. Perishability related to the heterogeneity o f the tissues is 
reflected in physiological gradient in the spear; tip sections o f detached spears produce CO2 at 
four times the rate o f butt sections after harvest. Another factor mentioned by Waldron and 
Selvendran (1990) is changes in the cell wall composition o f stems o f asparagus during 
maturation and during storage, resulting in a hard and woody stem o f low quality. 
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A P P E N D I X S : SYNOPSIS OF GROWERSHIP AGREEMENT IN HYBRID MAIZE SEED PRODUCTION 
Article Specification 
Grower's undertaking 
2.1 To plant, care for and produce for PHAT, Inc hectares (net area) of seed field. Trie specific area 
preferably with irrigation facilities is part of the farm occupied by the GROWER. 
2.2 The GROWER acknowledges the fact that the parent seeds and each hybrid produced from them has a 
unique genetic make-up such that each hybrid identified/coded with a number is a proprietary material 
developed, registered and owned by PHAT, Inc. 
2.8 To follow all cultural pracriccs contained in the guidelines as well as recommended by PHAT, Inc. 
technical staff 
2.9 To do acceptable detasseling of the female maize as per PHAT, Inc. quality standards. 
2.10 To cut the male after pollination is over, the date of which will be decided by PHAT, Inc. technical staff 
who will also do the supervision of such activity. 
2.11 To deliver the seed maize at his own expense to a place where commercial trucks van reach at the time 
of harvest. 
2.12 To allow PHAT, Inc, duly authorized reprcsentauve to enter and inspect the farm and facilities of the 
GROWER. 
2.13 To pay back all inputs (labor and material inputs excluding the value of the parent seed involved except 
when so stated) advanced to them by PHAT, Inc.. Should any balance exist, the balance may be 
terminated at PHAT, Inc., option thru: 
2.13.1 Another planting, after which all GROWER advances, old and new will be liquidated. 
2.13.2 Immediate cash setdement not later than 30 days after receipt of notice. 
2.20 To perform, at PHAT's expense, the roguing of male and female plants following set quality standards. 
Company's undertaking 
3.1 To supply at its own expense the parent seeds. 
3.2 To advance the cost of land preparation, fertilizers, pesticides as well as labor inputs necessary and as 
budgeted for GROWER'S account as trustee and will be deducted from his proceeds upon harvest. 
3.3 To shoulder actual cost of roguing the male and female plants. 
Other conditions 
5.1 PHAT, Inc., may terminate this agreement upon notice to the GROWER for the latter's failure to follow 
the recommendations of PHAT, Inc., technical personnel or for any violation of the terms and 
conditions herein stipulated. 
6.1 Where the GROWER'S quality of work is unsatisfactory or when the operation is sufficient to endanger 
the yield and/or purity of the seeds PHAT, Inc., may come in and have the specified job done or redone, 
provided, that all expenses incurred for such works shall be for the account of the GROWER. 
Note: This table shows the articles of the Growership Agreement related to farming practices. The contract between Pioneer Hi-
Bred Agricultural Technologies Inc. (PHAT Inc.) and an individual seed grower is not very explicit about how production risk is 
handled. What is specified is that the grower is paid an agreed price per kilo, and consequendy, the grower shoulders the financial loss 
after a reduced yield. 
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* For understanding the technological regime in the hybrid maize industry I interviewed breeders of 
competing seed companies in the Philippines and breeders at public institutes, in particular the Institute of 
Plant Breeding in Los Banos, the Philippines. In addition, I interviewed breeders and agronomists of the 
department of Agronomy and of the Seed Science Center at Iowa State University because this is the 
breeding ground for technological development in the hybrid maize industry in general and for Pioneer 
HiBred in particular. Pioneer's head office is in Johnston, Iowa The focus of these interviews was on the 
question whether my understanding of the problems in seed production was correct and how technological 
decision making in hybrid maize breeding tackled these concerns. I thank Artemio Salazar, Institute of Plant 
Breeding, Los Banos, Philippines (interview 1998), Joseph Burns, Seed Science Center, Iowa State University, 
Ames, USA (interview 1998), and Ron Cantrell, department of Agronomy, Iowa State University, Ames, USA 
(interview 1998) for their insightful comments. O f course, I am entirely responsible for the presentation of 
technical insights in this thesis. Also very instructive was attending the 7 h Asian Regional Maize Workshop 
organised by CIMMYT, PCARRD, UPLB and DA-BAR in Los Banos, Philippines in 1998. During this 5-
days workshop, entitled 'Strengthening hybrid maize technology and public private partnership to accelerate 
maize production in the Asian region', employees of both private seed companies and national and 
international public institutes m e t The presentations and discussion during the workshop shed light on 
problems in seed development and seed production in Asia. 
A P P E N D I X 6: TECHNOLOGICAL DIRECTIONS IN HYBRID MAIZE VARIETY DEVELOPMENT IN THE TROPICS* 
After the expansion o f new lucrative markets in the Philippines, large seed companies 
increasingly undertook research focused on proprietary hybrids. With an increasing demand for 
poultry and pork, the production o f yellow corn, which is exclusively used for livestock-feed, 
expanded. Pioneer envisions that production o f yellow maize will be concentrated in a number 
o f key-production areas, which is also in line with government policy. The assumption is that 
new varieties will be planted under controlled environmental conditions in areas favourable to 
intensive agriculture. 
Mainly multinational seed companies had the capacity to exploit exotic germplasm for 
improving their varieties. In the 1950s, hybrids, mainly from the US, failed to perform well in 
tropical countries (Dowswell et al. 1996). These hybrids, used in more temperate climates, were 
not well adapted to hot environments and resistance to diseases was lacking. The tropical 
market is still a difficult niche and companies are not inclined to use elite material in these 
markets. People in the seed industry see Southeast Asia as a difficult area for seed production. 
Technological and commercial conditions differ substantially from the mature U.S. market. 
Since the 1980s, Pioneer is engaged in research for the tropical environment in the Philippines, 
and the company intensifies its endeavour to introduce hybrid varieties suitable for production 
under local conditions (Agribusiness Monitor 1993). As o f now, the number o f inbred lines 
available for seed production under tropical conditions is limited. Germplasm distributed by 
C I M M Y T (International Maize and Wheat Improvement Center, located in Mexico), is still an 
important base for the development o f new proprietary hybrids. Hence, the Philippine seed 
industry has to rely on a small spectrum o f inbred lines. Therefore, the probability o f low seed 
yields continues to exist. The difficult task o f maize breeders is to provide convincing answers 
to such a long-standing problem. 
Already in the beginning o f the hybrid maize seed industry, seed production came to the fore 
as an economical and technological puzzle for breeders (Fitzgerald 1990: 57-64). Generally, seed 
yields are considered low. In the 1920s, questions resolved around the process o f producing 
hybrids; breeders debated how high-yielding lines could be identified in an early stage; on what 
basis selection o f parent material could occur; or, why inbred crosses or double crosses o f two 
hybrids performed well in one geographical area but not in another. So, from the beginning o f 
the hybrid seed industry, a major concern was how to realise high enough seed yields to make it 
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a cost-efficient investment for the industry. Such issues are still widely debated in the seed 
industry, and, as Fitzgerald argues, 'their resolution ultimately had less to do with unassailable 
proof than with consensus'. 
Similar matters were brought to the fore during the 7* Asian Regional Maize Workshop in 
Los Banos, Philippines in 1998. S.K. SavaL a C I M M Y T maize breeder based in Bangkok, placed 
the economic performance o f selected lines on the agenda. He explicidy related the need o f seed 
companies to reduce unit costs to the performance o f inbred lines in seed production. His 
concern was the low frequency o f usable lines in the tropics and the small germplasm-base with 
which seed companies and breeders have to work. He referred to the need for more diversity in 
the genetic material used in seed industries in the tropics, especially to enhance a-biotic and 
biotic stress tolerance. This observation supports the conclusion o f Cromwell and Tripp (1994) 
who state that the precise economics o f seed-production depends on the biology o f seeds. 
Under these conditions, breeders and production managers have to find a balance between 
finding vigorous seed and retaining the genetic qualities o f the selected lines. The inevitable use 
o f inbred lines generates specific production problems in seed production. Crossing two inbred 
lines usually gives such low yields that seed production is hardly economical. This can be 
avoided by producing three way crosses, which were produced in the research area. In the case 
o f three-way crosses, a single-cross hybrid serves as the seed-producing female, and a pure 
inbred line as the pollinator. Usually, the hybrid female is a well-adapted, good-yielding plant 
demonstrating hybrid vigour. Therefore, seed yields are potentially higher in the case o f three-
way crosses (CIMMYT 1987). 
In the earlier years o f the seed industry in Southeast Asia, the primary emphasis was on 
developing double cross and three-way cross hybrids, seeds o f which could be produced more 
easily and cheaply (Morris 1998c: 2 7 4 / 5 , Wright 1980). Also in the Philippines seed companies 
produced three-way cross hybrids to reduce the possibility o f crop failure, and therefore, the 
costs o f seed production. The production o f three-way cross hybrids only partly resolves the 
problem o f low seed yields. In the Philippines as well as in other Southeast Asian countries 
(Morris 1998a) seed production managers have often difficulty controlling quantity and quality 
o f commercial seed. Seed yields can be reduced by unfavourable weather conditions, especially 
i f this results in drought stress during the critical flowering period. Tropical conditions in seed 
production make a good performance even more difficult: high temperatures and uncertain 
rainfall, as well as high disease pressure have a strong impact on seed yields. 
However, performance in seed production is only a minor consideration in defining 
technological directions in the hybrid maize industry. In the 1990s, competition in the 
Philippine seed industry increased significandy. In a situation o f fierce competition, companies 
realise that they have to develop exclusive products with distinctive qualities for farmers 
purchasing seeds in the market place (Morris 1998c). Single-cross hybrids have the greatest 
opportunity for expression o f hybrid vigour and therefore higher yields (Wright 1980), which 
may be a decisive factor in a competitive environment. From the perspective o f a seed 
company, three-way crosses have two major disadvantages (Pioneer Hi-Bred 1997): 
(a) Using a hybrid female requires one additional step. The company has to produce the 
hybrid parent, which means that additional land, time and money are devoted to the production 
o f those parents. The additional step makes parent seeds become expensive and slows the time 
o f introducing new products to the market place; 
(b) Furthermore, use o f hybrid parents leads to an increasing genotypic and phenotypic 
variability within the commercial seed product. Hybrid vigour, or heterosis, is maximised when 
both parents are very uniform but not closely related, as in the case o f single-cross hybrids. 
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Hence, three-way cross hybrid have less yield potential. Due to higher demands made by the 
company's customers, the company has to produce the highest quality seed products possible in 
amounts adequate to achieve sales goals. 
Under tropical conditions, most three way crosses still outweigh single cross hybrids in terms 
o f yields in seed production. But, hybrid seed development becomes increasingly directed 
towards single-cross hybrids, grounded in cross-pollination o f two inbred lines. The shift to 
single cross hybrids can be found in the Philippines, as in most o f Pioneer's locations around 
the world (Pioneer Hi-Bred 1997). Philippine breeders and seed companies were very anxious 
for launching a successful single cross hybrid by competing companies; one breeder compared 
his company's effort to find suitable lines as a 'hit game'. A leading Philippine breeder 
confirmed the growing importance o f single cross hybrids: "The direction to single cross 
hybrids is there, the question is only when. Competition in the seed industry is about yields and 
resistance to diseases in commercial production. Yields and performance in seed production is 
probably an afterthought in breeding". 
Pioneer's former supply manager for Southeast Asia explained the challenges for seed 
companies in Southeast Asia: "For seed companies Southeast Asia is a competitive but potential 
market for Pioneer this market is maybe 2 percent o f company sales. Competition is strong in 
this new market In Thailand one company came up with a successful single cross and it took 60 
percent o f the market. At the breeding side, single cross hybrids show rapid and bigger jumps in 
yield. But single crosses are difficult to produce so this creates challenges at the production side. 
It is also a challenge to breeders to consider what will happen if parent seed cannot survive. In 
the U.S. producibility has become one o f the main criteria, they look at a minimum o f pollen 
scores and at a minimum yield o f female plants." Interviews with breeders and agronomists in 
Iowa, Pioneer's home-base, reveal that Pioneer used to be one o f the few seed companies 
selecting for inbred performance. The introduction o f single cross hybrids in the U.S. in the 
1970s forced breeders to look at seed production factors. Accordingly, the selection o f high-
yielding inbred lines explains part o f Pioneer's success, according to one o f them. Yet, in setting 
the research agenda, traits o f newly launched hybrids are the number one consideration for seed 
companies; the efficiency in seed production comes off second best 
The major disadvantage o f producing single-cross hybrids is the probability o f low yields o f 
parental inbred lines. The ability o f inbred lines to defend itself against stress is a significant and 
problematic factor in seed production, which complicates the production o f single-cross 
varieties. In the production o f single-cross varieties, a-biotic and biotic stress factors will play a 
more influential role. Inbred lines are sensitive to extreme temperatures. Pests and diseases can 
be controlled relatively well in production o f three-way hybrids through preventive spraying and 
through resistance o f the seed-producing plant, an F l hybrid. This will change with the use o f 
an inbred-line as seed producing plant, as is the case with single-cross hybrids. The agricultural 
environment in Mindanao is one with high disease pressure. Due to the continuous planting o f 
corn, hosts are readily available to pests and diseases. Pioneer's production manager often 
mentioned the urgent need o f a land-use plan, enforced by the department o f Agriculture, to 
break the disease cycle in Mindanao. Pioneer's plant pathologist in Southeast Asia emphasises 
that "the increasing trend towards single cross hybrids would extend disease problems to the 
seed production areas where susceptible parental inbreds o f commercially acceptable hybrids 
have to be grown" (Dalmacio 1998). 
By introducing single cross hybrids, company breeders will be challenged to discover more 
vigorous germplasm complexes capable o f producing vigorous inbred lines with higher yield 
potential. For new traits much effort is put into back crossing, less effort is put into 
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performance o f parent seed in seed production. However, good performance in seed 
production seems to be a basic requirement before single-cross hybrids can become an 
economic reality (Dowswell et al. 1996). Hence, with the introduction o f single cross hybrids 
mistakes or errors lurk in the seed industry. Obviously, this will generate insecurity in the 
company, especially because the company had to get new products to the market quickly. A 
possible shift to single cross varieties would require an improvement o f the company's capacity 
to manage commercial seed production operations (cf. Morris 1998c). The likelihood o f failure 
will make farmers more hesitant to enter into a growing arrangement. Probably, the shift 
towards single cross hybrids entails higher risks for seed growers ^ y c h 1988, Wright 1980). 
This seemed to be a major concern o f several production managers o f different seed companies 
producing in Mindanao. 
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Stage Days 
after 
planting 
Activity Inputs 
Land-preparation Plough and harrow; furrow at 70-75 cm 
2 before Check isolation in space or time 
0 Planting and basal 14/14/14, other nutrients depending on soil 
analysis, Larvin (protection of seed) 
1 Herbicide application Atrazin 
10 Population count male 
10 Population count female 
12 Off-baring Single blade plough 
12 Roguing I 
12 Side dressing 1 Urea 46-0-0, Potas 0-0-60 
15 Worm control I Insecticide (Matador), foliar fertiliser, Fungjcide 
(Dakonil) 
20 Manual weeding 
22 Irrigation I 
10* leaf 23 Side dressing II Urea 46-0-0, Potas 0-0-60 
23 Hilling up 
30 Disease control Insecticide (Karate), fungicide (DakoniT), foliar 
fertiliser 
35 Rogueing II 
35 Worm control II Furadan granules (insecticide), placed inside 
kernel (many children) 
43 Irrigation II 
44 Population count male 
44 Population count female 
44 Detasseling, plus irrigation if dry/warm 
14* leaf 45 Rogueing III 
Silking stage 52 Worm control III Karate, control maize borer , protect tassels in 
male rows, (aphids; grow after de-tasseling) 
Blister stage 65 Worm control IV Decis, scout for worms 
Male shredding (cut, and harvest for 
silage) 
Dough stage 75 Rogueing IV 
80 Population count male 
80 Population count female 
Physiologic 105/110 Harvesting (when 50% is matured) 
maturity 
Source: Brochures distributed by PHAT, Inc., AADC, and Institute for Plant Breeding. 
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Samenvatting 
(Summary in Dutch) 
Werken aan contractteelt 
Maatschappij en technologie in Filipijnse transnationale agribusiness 
Sietze Vellema 
Contractteelt is een veelgebruikte manier om landbouwproductie in overeenstemming te 
brengen met bedrijfsstrategieën en markteisen in de internationaliserende agribusiness. Het boek 
analyseert hoe gecontracteerde boeren in lokale gemeenschappen op het eiland Mindanao, de 
Filipijnen, onderdeel worden van de instjtuüonele structural, de bedrijfsvoering en het 
strategisch perspectief van internationale bedrijven. Deze etaografische Studie bestudeert 
management problemen en technologieoverdracht in het geval van contractteelt van groene 
asperges voor de Japanse exportmarkt en van hybride maïszaden voor de Filipijnse markt 
Twee vragen vormen de leidraad voor het begrijpen van de organisatorische en 
technologische veranderingen die contractteelt met zieh mee brengt Ten eerste behandelt het 
boek de vraag hoe bedrijven contractteelt hanteren als een managementinsttument om 
produetieve activiteiten in de velden van contracttelers af te stemmen op de eisen die gesteld 
worden vanuit de markt Ten tweede wordt onderzocht op welke wijze bedrijven en 
contracttelers binnen de institutionele context van gedecentraliseerde produetie in Staat zijn 
samen te werken bij het construeren en selecteren van technologieën. 
Uitgangspunt in de analyse is dat de institutionele vorm van contractteelt verre van eenduidig 
is. E r zijn veel mattieren waarop bedrijven contractteelt inrichten. In de regel is er sprake van 
een zekere arbeidsdeling, waarin bedrijven zieh richten op verwerking, handel en distributie, en 
telers een zekere autonomie behouden wat betreft het produceren van het gewas. Ideaaltypisch 
oefent het bedrijf alleen op een indirecte en formele wijze contrôle uit op de produetie. Dit 
blijkt vaak onvoldoende, zeker in tijden van crisis, en organisatorische en technologische 
intervenues door de contracterende bedrijven bepalen in belangrijke mate de dynamiek van de 
overeenkomst D e Studie maakt duidelijk dat de aard van deze intervenues, bijvoorbeeld een 
hierarchische ingreep bedoeld om produetiekosten te Verlagen o f kwaliteit te verbogen, botst 
met het gezichtspunt en de betrokkenheid van producenten. Een moeilijke taak van het 
management is om de sociale interactie in contractteelt te begrijpen en een acceptabele manier te 
vinden om problemen in de teelt o f de organisatie het hoofd te bieden. Daarmee is de Studie 
verbunden aan de vraag o f contractteelt een sociaal en politiek duurzame vorm van 
ontwikkeling is. 
D e institutionele benadering benadrukt dat voor het begrijpen van hoe contactteelt werkt er 
verder gekeken moet worden dan de formele institutionele verbanden tussen verschilfende delen 
van de keten. Een etnografie van contractteelt laat zowel de formele kant, de vastgestelde 
verdeling van taken en verantwoordelijkheden, als de informele kant, onderhandelingen over de 
interpretatie en uitvoering van taken, in een gelaagd agribusiness-systeem zien. Dit implieeert 
bestudering van een reeks van factoren die de werkverhoudingen beïnvloeden, zoals coördinatie 
tussen produetieactiviteiten, de geloofwaardigheid van winstdeling en kostenberekening, naast 
elkaar bestaande management stijlen, omgang met risico's en onzekerheden inherent aan 
landbouwproductie, en de effectiviteit van de voorgeschreven technologie. D e wijze waarop 
partijen grenzen trekken en verantwoordelijkheden verdelen tussen boerenbedrijf en 
/ 
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agribusiness is hierbij een centraal punt van aandacht. D e vaak hybride organisatorische cultuur 
van contractteelt moet begrepen worden vanuit de wisselwerking met lokale sociale 
verhoudingen en vanuit het institutionele perspectief dat verschillende taakgroepen in de 
organisatie hanteren. 
Het onderzoek heeft plaats gevonden in een regio in het zuiden van het eiland Mindanao, de 
Filipijnen. Hoofdstuk 2 schetst de récente sociale historié van boeren en agribusiness in een 
regio die zieh kenmerkt door toenemende migratie na de Tweede Wereldoorlog en een 
uitbreiding van plantages sinds de jaren zestig. In de regio bestaat kleinschalige landbouw naast 
grootschalige plantages. Contractteelt integreert de kleinschalige landbouw met de agribusiness 
sector. D e uitkomst van dit procès wordt in de volgende hoofdstukken besproken. 
Hoofdstuk 3 onderzoekt de financiële aspecten van institutionele en technologische 
verandering. D e introductie van contracten voor de produetie van asperges was in eerste 
instantie nauw verbunden aan het verstrekken van krediet in de lokale gemeenschappen. Na het 
tekenen van een contract werden boeren onderdeel van een complex administratief systeem en 
werden zij, in een later stadium, onderworpen aan financiële evaluatie door het management D e 
organisatorische analyse van beloning en accounting laat zien hoe in contractteelt macht wordt 
uitgeoefend en hoe formele en informele onderhandelingen communicatee tussen partijen 
bemoeilijken. 
De wijze waarop contrôle vorm krijgt in contractteelt wordt verder onderzocht in hoofdstuk 
4. Dit hoofdstuk laat zien dat contractteelt meer behelst dan een formele overeenkomst tussen 
partijen en dat contrôle over werk in het veld en het aansturen van een diverse groep telers een 
complex managementvraagstuk is. Dit wordt besproken aan de hand van supervisie en 
rekrutering van arbeid, het oplossen van productieproblemen, en de overdracht van kennis en 
künde in de velden van aspergetelers. 
Hoofdstuk 5 breng de inzichten uit hoofdstuk 3 en 4 samen in een analyse van verschillende 
organisatorische culturen en institutionele perspectieven aanwezig in contractteelt Contractteelt 
is opgebouwd vanuit een mengeling van contrôle, overtuiging en samenvallende belangen. Het 
is echter de vraag o f de uitkomst hiervan een voorspelbare aanvoer van hoogwaardige 
producten garandeert Het hoofdstuk toont aan dat bestaande sociale verhoudingen en 
verschillende motivaties contractteelt bepalen en dat dit in de organisatie tot spanningen kan 
leiden die noodzaken tot meer aandacht voor de interactie tussen project en maatschappij. 
Hoofdstuk 6 verlegt de aandacht naar de produetie van hybride maïszaden. Centraal Staat hoe 
de taakverdeling in het project, tussen bedrijf, producenten en irrigatieassociatie, het omgaan 
met productierisico en technologische problemen bemoeilijkt. Het hoofdstuk laat zien hoe het 
aanpakken van technologische problemen door het bedrijf in een gespannen verhouding Staat 
met het opbouwen van een duurzame vertrouwensrelatie met de producenten en de lokale 
gemeenschap. 
Het concluderende hoofdstuk 7 werkt het management perspectief nog verder uit Het laat 
zien dat contractteelt niet een rationele oplossing is voor coördinatie- en controleproblemen. In 
tegendeel, contractuele voorschriften zijn een te beperkt instrument voor het beheersen van 
sociale en technologische problemen. Het uitbesteden van produetie vergt een sociologisch 
geïnformeerde managementstijl waar de interactie tussen project en maatschappij en de 
technologische onzekerheid van landbouwproductie wezenlijke onderdelen van zijn. 
Management van contractteelt kan beter begrepen worden als een anticiperende verzameling 
van aanpassingen, en niet als een zoektocht naar een perfect en afgebakend systeem dat elke 
onvolkomenheid o f onzekerheid uitsluit. Dit verklaart de aandacht in dit boek voor de in 
contractteelt aanwezige inventiviteit en variatie die de basis kunnen vormen voor een effectieve 
en sociaal productieve wijze van integratie en technologieoverdracht. 
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